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ABSTRACT: Mutiny in the Public Eye
Between 15 April and 15 May 1797, during the darkest days of England's war with
Revolutionary France, the 30,000 men of the Channel Fleet mutinied. They sought a pay
increase. Their action appeared to leave the country open to invasion - provoking
intense political debate and public discussion.
Newspapers provided the public (and opposition politicians) with their only information
about what was happening in Portsmouth. They also provided the seamen with their only
information about what was (or not happening) in London to redress their grievances.
Newspapers provide historians with a useful chronology, a wealth of contextual detail,
profound insights and highly prejudicial impressions of the mutiny. Beyond conveying
information, newspapers played a decisive role in the mutiny. They were used to
influence public opinion and sow dissension within the fleet. Ironically, they also enabled
the fleet to maintain solidarity; as well as to communicate with, influence and secure
public support.
The mutiny was a story that could not be contained. It signalled a breakdown in
government's ability to manage the press. The news - some of it no more than rumours
or speculation - came from a variety of sources: the Admiralty, government, opposition,
observers in Portsmouth, naval officers who had been put ashore and those who
remained on board their 'mutinous' ships, and the seamen themselves. Given this
plethora of information, much of it confused and virtually all of it in the public eye,
government was forced into the unfamiliar and uncomfortable position of having to
negotiate a resolution to the crisis in public. The press, on discovering the public's
appetite for the news, gained valuable insights into its influence over and responsibility to
the public - insights that were the subject of much discussion, but only gradual change.
The thesis examines press coverage of the mutiny, the role the press played in the mutiny
and how it has contributed to interpretations and misinterpretations of the mutiny.
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INTRODUCTION: Mutiny in the Public Eye
This is a study of war. It examines the relations between government, the media and the
public in time of war; and seeks to discover how these relations intensify, expand and
change in time of total war. It crosses the disciplines of journalism and maritime history
to focus on an event where newspapers played a particularly active role in the news, the
Spithead Mutiny of 1797.
If at the time the Mutiny prevailed in our fleets, any man had asked him what had
been the cause, he would have answered, 'in a great measure the Newspapers'. And
this was a Mutiny which, had it not been providentially suppressed, would have ru-
ined the Navy and laid our Country at the feet of France.1
William Windham overstated his case. Pitt's Secretary at War and resident royalist re-
treated slightly from suggesting newspapers actually caused the mutiny, but stoutly
maintained his conviction: 'No man would be hard enough to doubt that what passed
from that House to the fleets through the Newspapers, had certain, and great and perni-
cious effect on the minds of the seamen.'2 Another overstatement, perhaps, but what
passed from the speeches made in the House of Lords on 4 May 1797, through the me-
dium of newspapers on 5 May, to the seamen at Spithead did affect the mutiny's out-
come. In describing its effect as great and pernicious, Windham assumed his colleagues
in Commons shared his opinion that the medium had breached parliamentary privilege,
exacerbated a volatile situation and became intimately involved in the messages they de-
livered.
His assumption was safe. A vital source of information and entertainment, newspapers in
the late eighteenth century were immensely popular and exerted an influence far beyond
their modest circulations. 3 It was an influence those in and those aspiring to power nec-
essarily employed, but found inherently intrusive and threatening. Windham assured the
honourable gentlemen 'he never saw a man with a newspaper in his hand, without re-
garcling him with the sensation that he was taking poison.' Relishing the metaphor, he
'The Times, 1 January 1799
2 Ibid Windharn's comments were made in response to George Tierney's complaints of a breach of Parlia-
mentary privilege and libelous misrepresentations by The Time,.
combined circulation of London dailies in the late I 790s did not exceed forty thousand. However, as
copies were read by twenty to thirty people in coffee-houses, pubhc-houses, pot houses and circulating
libraries, readership estimates ran as high as 1.2 million. I Christie, Myth & Reality in Late-E:,ghteentb-Centurj
British Politics and Other Paper (London; Macmillan, 1970), 325
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added 'newspapers circulated poison every twenty-four hours and spread its venom
down to the extremity of the kingdom.' 4
 Again, he offered the mutiny as proof of his
point.
Windham's low opinion of the press had been cultivated by Samuel Johnson and Ed-
mund Burke. Dr Johnson offered his contempt for newspapermen, appropriately, in the
prospectus for his newspaper, the London Chronick
Of those Writers who have taken upon themselves the Task of Intelligence, some
have given others have sold their Abilities, whether small or great, to one or other of
the Parties that divide us; and without a Wish for Truth, or Thought of Decency,
without Care of any other Reputation than that of a stubborn Adherence to their
Abettors, carry on the same Tenor of Representation through all the Vicissitudes of
Right and Wrong, neither depressed by Detection, nor abashed by Confutation;
proud of the hourly Encrease of Infamy, and ready to boast of all the Contumelies
that Falsehood and Slander may bring upon them, as new Proofs of their Zeal and
Fidelity.5
While Johnson criticised newspapermen, Burke categorically condemned newspapers 'as
the grand instrument of subversion of order, morals, religion and human society itself.'6
While the former saw a potential for abuse, the latter apparently saw no potential for
good. Again, with the mutiny in mind, their protégé held the danger lay in that newspa-
pers gave:
the People an opportunity of sitting in judgement everyday on the measures under
discussion in that House tumultuously to express this disapprobation or approbation
- and favoured the propensity of all vulgar minds, perhaps also of minds of no mean
endowment, to form premature and intemperate decisions upon the whole matter,
long before the detail of its parts and the character of its principle could be discussed
and unfolded by the legislature.7
Windham's concerns were far from new. One hundred and thirty-four years before Sir
Roger L'Estrange declared:
A public Mercury should never have my vote because I think it makes the Multitude
too familiar with the actions and Counsels of their superiors, too pragmatically and
4 Par/jamentarjHisforj, xxxiv, 162-4; A Aspmall, Po/thcsa,,dthe Press, 1780-1850 (London: Home & Van Thai,
1949), 9
5 London Chromcle, 1 January 1757; History of The Times: The Tbanderer'in the Making 1 785-184 1 (London: The
Office of The Times, 1935), 16-17
6 Aspina]1, 1
St James Chronick, 1 January 1799
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Censorious and gives them ... a kind of Colourable Right, and Licence to be meddling
with the Government.8
A Breach of Parliamentary Pririlge
Wmdham's concerns were shared by most of his colleagues, but his point was moot. The
issue came to the public's attention in 1760 when the London Chronicle published verbatim
Parliament's thanks to Sir Edward Hawke for his victory at Quiberon Bay. 9 The offend-
ing paragraph contained nothing that could be considered offensive. It was the fact of its
publication, rather than its content, that resulted in heavy fines and narrowly averted
prison sentences for its publishers.'°
Parliamentary privilege was irrevocably breached in 1763 when John Wilkes lampooned
the king's Parliamentary address in number forty-five of the North Briton. Government
immediately prosecuted for seditious libel and blasphemy. After a brief flight to France,
'that devil Wilkes' won his celebrated trial and Parliament lost the ability to control the
news of its proceedings. 'The press made the legislature dependent on the will of the
people - a possibility (or a fact) many politicians found abhorrent.'" A few exploited the
opportunity, but most saw little point in discussing it.
Similar battles, with similar results, raged over the Letters of Junius. In December 1769
the anonymous but highly-placed observer advised the king: 'Sir, It is the misfortune of
your life ... that you should never have been acquainted with the language of truth, until
you heard it in the complaints of your people.'12 While Junius remained in the shadows,
his publishers were prosecuted for seditious libeL After another lengthy trial, they too
were acquitted in 1770 and a triumphant Junius proclaimed:
Intel4genar, 31 August 1663; G Cranfield, The Press and Sodey: From Ca,cton to Northckffe (London: Longrnan
Group, 1978), 152
9 London Chronicle, 31 January 1760
10 Cfidd, 62
1 Aspmall, 35; J Black, The English Press in the Eighteenth Century (Aldershot Greg Revivals, 1987), 174;!
Christie, Wars & Rzvolution.c Britain 1760-1815 (London: Edward Arnold, 1982), 63-5; L Colley, Bnto,u
Forging the Nation: 1707-1837 (London: Pimiico, 1994), 106. Government's ultenor motive may have been
to prevent Wilkes from sitting in Parliament, 'believing he would move for an increase in amly pay on the
pretext of the rising cost of living, a proposal which they could neither reject without danger, nor accept
without ridicule.' H Walpole, quoted by C Trench, Portrait of a Patriot (London: William Blackwood, 1962),
220
'2 Pub&Jj 19 December 1769
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Let it be impressed upon your minds, let it be instilled into your children, that the
liberty of the press is the palladium of all civil, political, and religious rights of an
Englishman. The power of King, Lords and Commons is not an arbitrary power.
They are the trustees not the owners of the Estate.'3
His publisher, John Almon, having borne the brunt of government's displeasure, was less
sanguine. He observed:
A man had better make his son a tinker than a printer. The laws of tin he can under-
stand but the law of libel is unwritten, uncertain and not definable. It is one thing to-
day and another tomorrow. No man can tell what it is. it is sometimes what the King
or Queen pleases, sometimes, what the Minister pleases, sometimes what the Attor-
ney General pleases.'4
Conceding it could not be broken or its intrusion into public affairs prevented, politicians
assumed the press could be managed. As 'such information as the public had to form its
opinions on, did derive from the papers', the ministers and their under-secretaries sought
to limit the information available. 15
 News of the war, particularly news of the naval war,
came from a variety of official and semi-official sources. To ensure the public got the
right message, government hired writers to generate a steady supply of patriotic appeals,
letters, paragraphs and poems, then paid newspapers to publish them. In a rare moment,
even Windham admitted their usefulness: 'I allow that amongst a great deal of execrable
stuff, one does, now and then, find a good remark in the public prints, and these prints
do at this moment, show a becoming activity in the public cause." 6
 Perhaps without in-
tending such candour, he described the principal activity of government papers. Gov-
ernment also awarded advertising and printing contracts with the understanding they
guaranteed support. Usually from secret service funds, Secretary at the Treasury George
Rose discreetly subsidised most government and a few opposition papers.17
Given their precarious finances, newspapers proved easily corrupted, generally serving
political before public interests. Consequently, 'they did not lead opinion, they fed it."8
"Junius, quoted by F Williams, Dangerouc Estate: TheAnato,,rj ofNewipapers (London: Readers Union, 1958),
41
'4John Almon, London Maane, quoted by F Williams, IbieL, 50
' 5 IbitL, 50
l67 Cobbett, The Political Protew: A View of the Public Character and Conduct of R B Shendan, Esq. (London:
Cox, Son & Bayhs, 1804), 3
'7 Aspinall, 66
'8 A Harvey, Britain in the Ear5 19b Century (London: Batsford, 1978), 47
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Of course, the public whose opinion they fed included only a small portion of the popu-
lation:
When I talk of the Sense of the People,' said an coadjutor of the Elder Pitt, 'I mean
the Middling People of England - the Manufacturer, the Yeoman, the Merchant, the
Country Gentleman, they who bear all the heat of the day, and pay all the Taxes to
supply the Expenses of Court and Government.'9
Following in his father's footsteps, Pitt found political power in popular support. 'He
remained constantly alive to the need to "have the Impression and Effect of Numbers
on our Side".'2° He sought popular support without 'the Inconvenience of much public
Discussion'.21
 He mobilised the 'middling people' when he encouraged the growth of
John Reeves' loyalist associations in 1 792. His Foreign Secretary, William Grenville,
made both the desired impression and the reality clear when he advised:
A few persons of rank cannot be kept out of it, but we mean it to consist of mer-
chants and lawyers. As a London society, and that the example should be followed in
each county or district - including as many farmers and yeomen as possible.
Pitt appealed to those who were 'still sensible of their Happiness and eager to preserve
it'.2 ' Five years later, as his hold on power increased and the threat of revolution was re-
placed by the threat of invasion, Pitt remained indifferent to the voice of the people. 'He
offered independent rather than popular leadership - he would no more be run by the
people than by the King or by Party.' However, to maintain his independence from
king and party, Pitt still needed the impression and effect of numbers on his side, and
used the press to maintain the illusion.
A century and a half before, John Locke explained:
The advantages the Crown might expect from a carefully supervised newsbook:
(1) To settle away when there shall be any revolt or backsliding in matters of religion
or obedience (which commonly grows among the vulgar) to draw them in by the
' lEnd, 43
20 M Duffy, The Younger Pitt (London: Longman, 2000), 131. Crown & Anchor societies were encouraged
to advertise in newspapers rather than hold public meetings.
M Duffy, 'William Pitt and the Origins of the Loyalist Association Movement of 1792', HistoricalJournal,
xxxix (1996 , 957
While his over zealousness later caused Pitt embarrassment, Reeves remained useful.
Buckmghain & Chandos, eds., Memoirs of the Court, and Cabinets of Geoi'e the Tbir4 ii, 229; Duffy, The
Younger Pill, 152
Pitt to Dundas, 15 November 1792, William L Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Pitt Papers; Duffy, Wil-
liam Pitt & the Ongins', 957
Duffy, The Younger Pitt, 133
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same lines that draw them out, by spreading amongst them such reports as may best
make for that matter to which we would have them drawn.
(2) To establish a speedy and ready way whereby to disperse into the veins of the
whole body of State such matter as may best temper it, and be most agreeable to the
disposition of the Head and the principal members upon all occasions that shall be
offered.
(3) To devise means to raise the spirits of the people and to quicken their conceits
and understanding by giving them tastes of matters clear from the common mire of
worldliness. It makes such apt to be drawn from the cold sotich humour of sloth
[and] extends the sense by degrees to the conceit of the right rule of reason, whereby
they are wrought easily to obey those by which these rules shall command them.
At the restoration, it was generally understood the king and his ministers were dependent
on public support. With this in mind, government used newspapers to influence public
opinion. 'From their point of view independence, not circulation, was the danger. Kept
in control newspapers could have their uses, merit employment in much the same way as
a paid bully or a hired informer and held in the same contempt.' As might be expected,
the bullies and informers proved difficult to control. Initially, government sought to limit
newspapers' influence and independence through the Licensing Acts. When this form of
censorship proved inadequate, the acts were allowed to lapse. A combination of taxes,
legal intimidation, advertising, printing contracts, paid insertions, subsidies and 'priorities
of the news' soon served the same purpose. Stamp taxes limited newspaper circulation
and, it was assumed, their influence. Subsidies, bribes, advertising and lucrative printing
contracts rewarded sympathetic newspapers. The distribution of newspapers outside
London was free, but not fair. Postmaster General Francis Freeling apparently consid-
ered it part of his remit to substitute government newspapers for those of opposition.3°
The post office also controlled the supply and translation of foreign newspapers. For
most English newspapers, this was their only source of continental news, a source often
providing more interpretation than translation. For postal employees, it was 'a guinea a
paper'. However, government's most effective measure involved the 'priorities of the
news'. Government controlled the supply of intelligence from official sources, especially
the Admiralty. Despite all this, it still failed in its purpose. While the weak foundered,
Calendar Stale Papers Domestic,Jarnes I 1619-1623; G Cranfield, 9
2 P Taylor, Mumtion.r of the Mind (Wellmgborough: Stephens, 1990), 101. James II did not understand and
lost his crown as a result.
Williams, 48
Priorities of the news' mvolved restrictions on what news was released and to whom.
3°Cobbett to Aukland, 15 June 1801, quoted m Historj of The Times, 101fn
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strong newspapers flourished and became even less manageable. Experiments in con-
centrating favours on a few government-controlled or government owned newspapers
proved disastrous, generally serving more to amuse than influence the public.
Whole Piles of Pamphlets and Papers, sent Gratis by the Post Office, lye neglected
and unread, and in some Places the Packets are not yet open'd ... the Waiters in sev-
eral Places have been very near having their Heads broke for carrying LundoiJour,rals,
Free Britons, Courants, etc. to light the company's Pipes, Gentlemen thinking it gives an
ill-Taste to their Tobacco, and order'd them to the Necessary-House, as the most
proper Place.31
J W Fortescue explained why:
We in England love nothing so well as to criticise, in our newspapers and our talking
assemblies, the current actions of the Government's of the world and of their offi-
cers, civil and military, in all quarters of the globe. Nor do we stop at criticism, for we
do not hesitate to pass judgement in uncompromising terms. If we know the whole
truth, we have a right to do so; but how often do we know the whole truth? And be-
lieve me there is nothing so difficult to ascertain, or to apprehend when ascertained,
as the truth about current military operations. Yet there is no subject upon which
hasty judgement is so ready, and shallow criticism is so voluble.32
Newspapers were an important, almost vital, source of information and entertainment,
but their shortcomings were understood. To succeed, newspapers have always had 'to
inform and to entertain, to appeal forever to the enlightened forces of public opinion
whilst drumming up the largest possible number of paying customers'. 33 Ultimately, they
were made as much by those who read as by those who wrote them. While successive
sharp increases in stamp taxes limited their circulation, government found it impossible
to liniit their influence. The sudden popularity of coffee houses in London owed much
to the fact that they gave patrons the opportunity to read and discuss the news. Claims of
over twenty readers per copy were typicaL The public was showing interest in public
affairs. A French émigré, Jacque Mallet du Pan, recognised the consequence and true
potential of an enlightened public:
Here we are in the full tide of war, crushed by taxation, and exposed to the fury of
the most desperate of enemies, but nevertheless security, abundance and energy reign
supreme, alike in cottage and palace. .. .The spectacle presented by public opinion
has far surpassed my expectation. The nation had not yet learn to know its own
31 London Ewnin Post, 3 November 1733. Canning's Anti-Jacobi,,, November 1797 to May 1798, proved an
exception.
32 J Fortescue, Bñti.rb Statesmen of The Great (Var 1 793-1814 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), 262
"P Williams, 11
' I Christie, Myth & RzaIiy, 325
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strength or its resources. The government has taught it the secret and inspired it with
unbounded confidence almost amounting to presumption.35
Ainore practical approach
While Pitt's Secretary of State at War railed against any representation of what passed in
Parliament, Pitt's Secretary of State for War and closest advisor, Henry Dundas, could
not indulge in such sweeping generalisations. A master at manipulating the media to
achieve political ends, he restricted his criticism to misrepresentations, arguing the sea-
men at Spithead had been misled. Referring to a time when the mutiny threatened to
become violent, Dundas argued:
No jealousy ever appeared however, till some for whose extreme wickedness I can
find no name sufficiently descriptive, insinuated to the seamen that the pardon which
had been issued in their favour was a forgery. When the conversation which took
place on the subject got into the public papers, a new mode of misrepresentation
presented itself and the diabolical malice which laboured to renew disturbance,
changed its mode of attack. It was represented to them, with the most abominable
36
wickedness, that their Bill had been thrown out by Parliament.
While they informed the public of what was happening in Portsmouth, newspapers in-
formed the fleet of what was (or was not) happening in London. They enabled the sea-
men to follow the public discussion and gave them a measure of public sympathies.
Admiral Sir Alan Gardner, who played a prominent, though not particularly distin-
guished, role in the proceedings, complained: Public Newspapers are read by almost
everybody in the fleet'37 If he was only half right and only half the fleet could read, the
other half could and apparently did listen when the news was read aloud.38
Newspapers did more than present the news. How they presented and interpreted it in-
fluenced public opinion, a potential appreciated and exploited by opposition and gov-
ernment. With poor prospects in Parliament, opposition leaders found they could
advance their ambitions through the press. The politician and playwright Richard
Sheffield Iris, 20 April 1798; quoted by C Emsley, British Soae!y & the French IVan 1793-1815 (London:
Macmillan, 1979), 67
Star, 11 May 1797
PRO ADMI/107, Gardner to Nepean, 8 May 1797
Little is known about literacy amongst seamen. Estimates of functional literacy (ability to read, but not
wnte) for the general population in the late 18th century range from half to two-thirds. J Feather, A History
of British Pnbkshing (London: Routledge, 1991), 85; F O'Gorman, The Lon,g E:hteenth Centu!y British Political
&SoaalHistorj
 1688-1 832(Lond on: Arnold, 1997), 129; Webb, 22
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Sheridan proved particularly adept and exploited his close 'connexions' with the press.39
However, in the struggle for public sympathies, government's needs were far more
pressing. Given the demands of the war against revolutionary France, the ministers had
no choice but to enlist public support. In January of 1793, the Morrnng Chronicle recog-
nised:
the war which loomed ahead threatened to be fought over 'principles' and there
was a danger that we must go on killing as long as there are any Frenchmen left to
kill, or leave their opinion, as all who ever made war upon opinions have hitherto left
them, invigorated and exasperated by the conffict.'°
The conflict was real, but the war was ideological. Twenty-two years later little had
changed when The Times admitted: We are engaged in a war - a war of no common de-
scription - a war of system against system, in which no choice is left to us but victory or
expiration.'41
Appearances, however, were deceptive. In 1793 it may have been difficult to separate the
sympathies of British radicals from the events in France. A year later, after Louis was
beheaded and war was declared, the corresponding societies themselves made the dis-
tinctions clear. While government questioned their sincerity and launched investigations
to prove seditious motives, no convincing proof was found. With few exceptions, the
societies sought reform, not revolution. They looked more to the Glorious Revolution
than the French Revolution for inspiration. However, it was not a good time for reform;
and, given the circumstances, 'it is perhaps unsurprising that Pitt was unwilling to go to
any great lengths in seeking fine distinctions between the principles of British radicals
and French revolutionaries.'42
 Windham quipped: 'No one would select the hurricane
season in which to begin repairing his house?
Although the king and his ministers announced their determination to 'keep our exer-
tions within such bounds that we may continue the war for many years and thus by time
overcome the enemy',43 the expense involved, particularly those associated with creating
39 Shendan also owned the Drury Lane Theatre. Of the advantage, William Cobbett commented: 'I shall
make a full exposure of your connexion with the newspaper press, shall show the reciprocal dependence
which subsists between you and the persons concerned in the conducting of that press, and shall point out
the mischiefs which have arisen, and which will yet anse, from this reciprocity.' Cobbeti, PokticalProteu.r, 11
40 MorningChtvnick, 3OJanuary 1793
TheTimes,l5Februaryl8l2
42 Duffr, The Younger Pitt, 148
43 P Mackesy, War Without Victory, The Downfall of Pi# 1799-1802 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 32
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and maintaining a navy of a thousand ships and 120,000 men, exceeded all expectations.
In addition to requiring 'large numbers of men from a wide range of social backgrounds
to take up arms in support of the British state', those remaining paid the bill, both for
the king's army and navy and those of his reluctant allies. On 27 April 1797, Pitt submit-
ted a budget of £42 million, three-quarters of which could be attributed, directly or indi-
rectly, to the war effort. Sigmficantly, it was submitted during the second week of the
mutiny.
In the past government depended on private capital to fund its wars. Having borrowed
£18 million in a ioyalty loan in December of 1796 and more than £156 million since the
war began, the supply was nearly exhausted. With bad news from the battlefields, credi-
tors lost their enthusiasm for the war. When the solvency of the Bank of England came
into question, Pitt suspended cash payments. Unwilling to countenance further debt or
higher interest rates, he reluctantly turned to England's taxpayers to make up the differ-
ence.45 Again, he sought public support without public interference and used the press to
get it. Pitt may have sympathised with Windham, but he took his lead from Dundas.
Both government and opposition assumed the press could be used to advantage. Both
used it to manipulate public opinion and secure (or undermine) public support. Neither
considered the possibility that those advantages could be usurped by an aggrieved com-
munity within the public. They failed to appreciate that in their efforts to satisfy the pub-
lic appetite for news or to sell more papers, newspapers will print news from any source.
Newspapers gave the seamen of the Channel fleet the opportunity and the means to
capture public sympathies. Developing at a pace and intensity far beyond government's
ability to manage, or opposition's ability to capitalise upon the news, the mutiny proved:
Perhaps the most important aspect of the history of the press in this period is the de-
cline in the ability of governments to control it'
' Colley, 287. While this may have been true of the army, militia and fencibks, the majority of those
pressed or recruited into the naval service were already seamen.
Income taxes were introduced in 1798.
' A Wadsworth, Newspaper Qrculatiorn 1800-1954 (Manchester Manchester Statistical Society Transactions,
1955), 11
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Contemporari ô historical controvery
Few subjects evoked more controversy amongst contemporary observers than the mu-
tiny. Opinions were sharply divided along political and professional lines. While opposi-
tion newspapers used the mutiny to undermine confidence in government, they showed
little interest in the seamen's grievances or sympathy for their circumstances. Instead,
they argued the mutiny resulted from a breakdown in naval discipline and was proof of
Pitt's incompetence. Rather than criticising government for neglecting the seamen, they
criticised it for making concessions to them. Govermnent papers responded first by
minimising the severity of the situation, then by focusing the public's attention on possi-
ble conspiracies, rather than government's poor performance in the crisis.
Both government and opposition newspapers saw the mutiny in political terms. Only
professional observers, naval officers and government investigators, looked beyond the
rhetoric to examine underlying causes. While newspapers left a massive and accessible
record, the opinions of most professional observers were not published. Consequently,
most histories of the mutiny have embraced the politics, prejudices and limited perspec-
tives of the former; and neglected the thoughtful analysis and insights of the latter.
Isaac Schomberg, a retired naval captain who commanded Ctiioden at the Glorious 1' of
June, admitted his account of the mutiny was circumstantial and made no attempt at in-
terpretation, other than to observe it 'threatened to subvert that discipline in the naval
service by which our fleets are so well regulated, and consequently so often led to vic-
tory.'47 He paused from his chronology just long enough to defend the honour of his
former colleagues: 'The captains and officers, astonished at this sudden and violent act of
disobedience, used every means in their power to persuade the men to return to duty.'
Curiously, Lady Spencer, wife of the First Lord, used the same observation to reach the
opposite conclusion: 'That a mutiny of this extent should have been brewing for 3
months and not one word of it to have transpired is most wonderfuL Surely, it implies a
strange want of knowledge amongst the officers.' She made an important distinction
between cause and effect. Lord Howe, the Lords of the Admiralty and the officers in the
47j Schomberg, Naval Chronology: Summary ofNaval & Mantime Events (London: Egerton, 1802), in, 8
Lady Spencer to Wmdharn, 20 April 1797, Earl of Rosebery, The Win€tham Papers (London: Jenkins,
1913), 46-47. Her mention of '3 months' implied an awareness of the seamen's discontent before the 28
February petitions were received.
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fleet were well aware of the seamen's discontent. Their complaints were long standing
and came as no surprise. Their methods, however, came as a shock to all but a few.
Schomberg examined no precedents or warnings. He refrained from commenting on the
causes or government's handling of the mutiny. He offered no offence to his readers or
government by mentioning the seamen's grievances. Schomberg revealed the source and
shallowness of his interpretation in observing:
In the month of February last, petitions were sent from all the line of battle ships at
Portsmouth to Lord Howe, but being all written by one person, and couched in the
same language, it was presumed they were only the productions of some factious or
mad-brained individuals, who were too contemptible for notice; the petitions were
therefore thrown aside, and obtained no answers.49
Actually, what he wrote was not nearly as important as how he wrote it. Schomberg of-
fered a version of Lord Howe's remarks before the House of Lords on 3 May that ap-
peared verbatim in the Star on 4 May. Failing to cite a source may be forgiven, but
accepting an opposition newspaper's transcription as accurate should not. Implications
of contempt for the seamen and indifference for their grievances were politically moti-
vated, calculated to cause embarrassment and conspicuously absent from other versions
of the same remarks. 5° From the beginning, newspapers have influenced the historiogra-
phy of the mutiny.
Edward Peiham Brenton, another naval officer turned historian, seldom let the facts in-
trude on his politics. He dismissed suggestions of conspiracy and held the mutiny to be
the product of lax discipline and ministerial incompetence. He offered a Whig interpre-
tation:
If it were inquired what event, during the reign of his Majesty King George the
Third, had most endangered the safety of the British empire, few would hesitate to
say that the mutiny of the fleet was, of all those that happened in that long and inter-
esting period, the one most likely to have accelerated its downfall - it occasioned a
political paralysis, which affected not only the kingdom at home but every foreign
settlement or station where a ship of war was to be found.5'
He spared the reputations of the fleet's junior, but not its senior officers:
49 Schomberg, 8; Star, 4May 1797
5° Schomberg commanded Cu/loden at the Glorious 1 of June. Like Collingwood, he received no medal
but he had less reason to complain.
51 E Brenton, The Naval His-tory of Great Britain front the year 1783 to 1836 (London: Henry Colburn, 1837), i,
275-276
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The origin of the mutiny has been ascribed to various causes - to the machinations of
domestic traitors, and corresponding societies, to the severity or tyranny of the cap-
tains, and the secret influence of foreign enemies. These may each have had their
weight in producing the fatal effects, but certainly severity in the captains was not
generally, nor could it have been reasonably, complained of by the seamen. Most of
the captains erred on the other extreme, particularly that highly accomplished officer,
the late Sir Andrew Snape Douglas, at the time captain of the ,Queen Charlotte, on
board of which I had been serving not long before, and where the want of punish-
ment of the men was felt by the officers as a great evil.52
Brenton claimed intimate knowledge of the proceedings: 'Having been a witness to the
greater part, and intimately acquainted with the whole transaction, I shall proceed to state
what were the causes set forth at the time, and which never were, and, I think, never
could be, fairly contradicted.' 53
 However, his confidence was misplaced, as he has been
contradicted by virtually everyone commenting on the subject. John Knox Laughton
identified his limitations as a historian: 'his opportunities of gaining information were
almost unequalled; but he seems to have been constitutionally incapable of sifting such
evidence as came before him, and to have been guided more frequently by prejudice than
by judgement.' TM
 Those prejudices emerged as Brenton simultaneously criticised the sea-
men for not signing and Howe for ignoring the February petitions. He questioned the
former's resolve and saw the latter's neglect as consistent with earlier efforts to silence
seamen's complaints. In this instance, Brenton argued Howe had miscalculated as 'the
seamen; with that rough and unpolished audacity which has been the terror of their ene-
mies, ... persisted, and obtained the redress which they sought.'55
More deftly than Schomberg and in sharp contrast to Brenton, William James avoided
the controversy surrounding the mutiny. He tactfully submitted:
The captains and officers of the different ships were astonished, nay, almost as-
tounded, at this sudden act of disobedience, and, as may be supposed, did their ut-
most to persuade the men to return to their duty; but all their efforts were in vain.
52 Brenton, 276. His comment about Douglas was insensitive as he had received a severe head wound at
the Glorious 1" ofJune and died a month after the mutiny.
53 Brenton left Portsmouth before the mutiny broke out, but was on Agamemnon at the Note.
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His account of the mutiny is accurate, but extremely brief. James made no secret of his
distaste for the subject and assumed it would be of little interest to his readers or rele-
vance to postenty:
The subject is a melancholy one, and one which we would fain pass over, but histori-
cal impartiality forbids any such fastidiousness. At the same time, the subject not be-
ing an international one, nor one of which the details have acquired any permanent
interest, we may, consistently with our plan, abridge the account.
In a brief exception to his abridgement, James exonerated Howe and detailed his efforts
on behalf of the seamen. He avoided the question of causation by mentioning neither
subversive influences nor government culpability. Frustratingly, James identified, but did
not explore, the key issue: 'The spirit of the mutiny had taken deep root in the breast of
the seamen, and, from the apparent organization of the plan, seemed to be the result of
far more reflection than for which the wayward mind of a jack-tar is usually given
credit.'57
In 1829 Charles Cunningham, captain of C!yde and witness to the mutiny at the Nore,
explained what prompted him to write his narrative. While his narrative falls outside the
scope of this study, his reasons for writing it are relevant.
He [Cunningham] has been frequently applied to by his Naval Friends, and others in
this enquiring age who feel an interest in those proceedings, for a detail of the cir-
cumstances connected with the Mutiny at the Nore in the year 1797. Its true charac-
ter has been in many points misunderstood: and indeed very little is known
respecting it beyond what was partially published in Newspapers and other periodi-
cals, which, from their very nature, could not supply the various Naval Histories
(since compiled from them) with any substantial or connected account.
Sir John Barrow, Admiralty secretary from 1804 to 1 845, described 1797 as 'pregnant
with mutiny':
The year 1797 may be distinguished in naval annals as a year pregnant with mutiny in
the fleets, both at home and abroad. In looking over the list of courts-martial for that
year, it appears that no less than seventy-nine were held in the different squadrons
and ships for mutiny and mutinous behaviour alone, some on individuals singly, oth-
ers on combinations.6°
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Given his access to official records and Howe's letters, Barrow's account of the mutiny is
surprisingly inaccurate. Clearly, the subject remained contentious forty years after the
fact. To protect the reputations of the admiral and the Admiralty, Barrow presented an
impression rather than the truth. He began with Howe's version of the events preceding
the mutiny:
On the 4th of March 1797, being then at Bath for the benefit of the waters, he says, 'I
have received, within the last three days, four petitions, as they are termed, as coming
from the Royal George, Formidable, Ramillies, and Queen Charlotte, the purport of them to
solicit my interposition with the Admiralty that seamen may, in their turn, experience
an equal act of munificence as that shown to the army and militia, in the provision
made for an increase to their pay, and for their wives and families; alleging that the
last could only obtain such relief as the seamen themselves sent them out of their
pay. The petitions from the three last-mentioned ships, dated the 28th of last month,
are I think evidently copied by the same person, though the writing appears different
on a cursory inspection. Neither the motive nor the matter of these papers require
any comment; but I shall take them with me to town, when I return thither, for Lord
Spencer's private information. I suspect the whole of them to be the fabrication of
the same individual Should it prove otherwise, or that the idea of such pursuit
should have been adopted by communication of the purpose to the different ships'
companies, it may require some such explanation as the difference of the circum-
stances between the soldier and the seamen admits of, to prove to the latter that his
advantages are still more considerable than the precarious situation admits of being
extended to the former. But the wisdom of the Admiralty will best decide hereon. To
which, however, it seems material to know, whether such expectations or claims ap-
pear to have been very generally circulated in the ships of war.'61
The account absolved the admiral of accusations of neglect, but was at odds with public
descriptions of the same events, including transcriptions of Howe's remarks before the
House of Lords. Barrow compounded the confusion by commenting:
The Earl, in the mean time, thought it right to ascertain, if possible, the real state of
the case, and for this purpose wrote to Sir Peter Parker, the port-admiral, and to
Lord Bridport, then in command of the fleet, and received in reply the opinion that
both the petitions were the work of some ill-disposed person: in consequence of this,
no danger was apprehended either by Lord Howe or Lord Spencer.
The impression that Howe and Spencer did all they could to deal with a delicate situation
suffers in that both Lord Bridport, acting commander-in-chief of the Channel Fleet, and
Port Admiral Sir Peter Parker denied any knowledge of these earlier petitions. Barrow
also asked his readers to believe:
Lord Spencer, it seems, was very urgent that the Board should consent to his going
on board the Queen Charlotte, and trying what effect his personal remonstrance and
61 IbuL, 323-324
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exhortation might have on the men; but this was unanimously objected to by the
Board, as placing too important a stake in the hands of the mutineers, who might
then dictate their own terms; and that, at any rate, it would be derogatory for the
First Lord of the Admiralty to enter into any personal discussion with them.
Nothing in Admiralty minutes or Spencer's letters confirms Barrow's interpretation. On
the contrary, despite public expectations and Howe's example fourteen years earlier,
Spencer apparently refused to consider it. 63
 Despite of his concern for appearances, Bar-
row detailed Howe's dealings with the delegates, including the celebrations that followed
their successful conclusion. He also offered an iisight most historians of the mutiny
chose to ignore: 'throughout the proceedings, not one syllable was ever uttered by them
either against flogging or impressment.'TM
In a subject steeped in controversy, William Johnson Neale may be the mutiny's most
controversial historian. Neale is considered a tainted source. History of the Mutiny at Spi-
thead and the Nore is the first popular history of the mutiny. Conrad Gill, who wrote the
first scholarly history of the mutiny, dismissed Neale's work as having 'very little histori-
cal value: it resolves itself into an attack on Pitt and his colleagues and is very inaccurate
in detail.'65 Knowing he was the first to examine the relevant records, Gill condescended
to add: 'Neale seems to have drawn his information from Schomberg or Brenton and
from newspapers of 1797, but he introduces mistakes which are not found elsewhere.'6
G E Manwaring and Bonamy Dobrée, who wrote the best-selling history of the mutiny,
were more charitable, describing Neale as 'a distinguished lawyer who had once been a
sailor' and his work as 'good, though too emotional, and full of small inaccuracies'.67
David Bonner-Smith, whose comments in Mariner's Mitror are well worth reading, held
both the author and his work in contempt: 'his anonymously published account should
be read in conjunction with his anonymously published novels in which scurrility neces-
sitated the use of anonymity.'6S Lest the point be missed, he added: 'An author who sup-
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George Second Earl Spencer, Firs Lord of tbeAdmiraltj 1794-1801(London: NRS, 1914), a, 115
Barrow, 336
C Gill, Naval Mutinies of 1797 (Manchester. University Press, 1913), 395
Actually, all of Neale's errors can be traced to inaccurate newspaper accounts.
67 G Manwanng & B Dobree, Floating Rpublw (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1935), vii
D Bonner-Smith, 'Naval Mutinies of 1797', Mariner's Minur, xxi (1935), 428-429
24
presses his own name from his title-page usually has a good reason for desiring anonym-
ity.' While most naval historians grant him his anonymity by ignoring him, Coats ac-
knowledged Neale's work, 'despite Gill's criticism of inaccuracy, his bias against Pitt and
his restricted access to sources, his is an informative, ironic and fluent account of the
mutiny.'69
Neale's DNB entry hinted at another reason why he might have desired anonymity, de-
scribing his work as 'an adaptation of a History of the Mutinj by George Roberts'. In an
autograph note appearing on the half title of a copy offered in 'A Catalogue of Second-
Hand Books', Roberts made the accusation explicit:
I compiled this book from various documents for Mr. Neale, Barrister-at-Law, Ox-
ford Circuit. Mr. Serjeant Allen had essayed to do it for £20, but handed the business
over to me. Mr. Neale put in all his Radicalism, and expunged as much as he could of
my Toryism; he wrote a great deal of Trash and more bad English.70
Compiled is the key, as little of the work, regardless of its author, is original. Most of it
was copied, not from Schomberg or Brenton, but from contemporary newspapers. All of
the various documents mentioned by Roberts appear there; as do the inaccuracies men-
tioned by Manwaring and Dobrée and the mistakes Gill could not find elsewhere. The
attacks on Pitt are relentless; but they are also confused, confirming the work's mixed
origins and alerting historians to the danger of believing all they read in newspapers.
Historians are warned to be on guard against the polemic misuse of evidence, 71
 but are
not told what to do when it is encountered. Beyond question, Neale/Roberts is a tainted
source, an easy target for disdain. Their work certainly should be put into context and
taken with a measure of scepticism, but it should not be ignored. Impassioned, inaccurate
and inconsistent, it offers insights unavailable elsewhere:
In a page which has been most questionably termed the brightest of British history,
appears a dark and melancholy blot, shunned by all writers, and wronged by the few
compelled to traverse over it, the claims of Truth and Justice at length subject to the
examination of the historian, the Mutiny at Spithead and the Nore. The discipline of
the British navy had been the growth of centuries: cemented alike by the influence of
A Coats, 'Spithead Introduction', The Mutinies of 1797: bicentennial conference papers (Exeter University Press,
forthcoming), 5
70 Notes and Queries, 5th series, xii (18 October 1879), 307 & 355. The publisher offered a cunous defence
and another alias for Neale: 'I know for a fact that the late Mr. Thomas Tegg in 1842 paid Mr. Johnstone
Neale the sum of J70 for writing this, and I feel convinced, knowing Mr. Neale to be a man of honour and
a gentleman, that he would never have place his name on the title of a book unless he had been the author.
William Tegg, FRHS.' As Bonner-Smith noted, Neale did put his name on the title.
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innumerable victories abroad, and by a continued series of triumphs over the severest
trials of misgovernment at home, it yet received, in the year 1797, a succession of
blows so severe as for a time to excite just fear lest the ruin of the service and the
consequent destruction of the empire should ensue.72
Their insights are invaluable, but relate more to the historiography than to the history of
the mutiny. They shed more light on the mutiny's consequences than its causes, offering
a collection of contemporary views and political invective that remained relevant forty-
five years after the event. Curiously, they identify the problem, then provide an example
of historical bias:
when the surprise of the moment had ceased, and the men began to weigh the
causes and probable results of this disastrous intelligence, party spirit undertook to
interpret the views of the sailors, and to attack or defend the ministers, according to
its particular bias.73
Their odd mix of ministerial and opposition newspaper accounts, Tory and radical Whig
opinions should not be read as an accurate or even a coherent history of the mutiny, but
definitely should be read. They provided an evocative description of the contemporary
debate inherited and pointed to the blind alleys so eagerly pursued by historians whose
real interests lay elsewhere:
The assailants of government maintained that the system of procrastination and
mismanagement, visible in every branch of the naval and military services, together
with an accumulation of arrears undischarged, had long ago sown seeds of disgust in
the minds in the minds of the privates and their officers, of which the fruit and the
harvest were now to be reaped and gathered. They alleged, moreover, with a view to
exaggerate the formidable aspect of affairs, that the fleet was under sailing orders, but
refused to meet the enemy. Both of these statements were met with a flat denial by
the adherents of Mr. Pitt, and the indignant retort was hazarded, that a republican
leaven had been secretly introduced by designing and traitorous politicians into the
vitals of the navy. But neither could this allegation be supported; for it was discov-
ered, upon calm inquiry, that the defects in discipline, and authority, and, in fact, the
unsound principles upon which the navy was managed, were sufficient of themselves
to account for the mutiny, without any elaborate production of more distant causes.
While more sympathetic to the plight of the seamen and less sympathetic to the prob-
lems of government, like James, they went to the root of the controversy:
Again the old report was revived, that the men were the dupes of designing political
agents; and that upon the supposition of treason alone could the honest character of
the British sailor have been lowered to such a depth of degradation. The language of
the opposition newspapers was contrasted with the doings at Spithead; and from
72 i Neale G Roberts, Hitoty of the Mutiny at Spithead and the Nor (London Thomas Tegg 1842), 1
Ibid, 15
26
their presumed affinity it was argued, 'the government is to be overthrown by the
disorganization of the fleet.' In fact, the public were at a loss to understand the spirit
of determination which seemed all of a sudden to inspire the seamen, and to make
them doggedly indifferent either to the honour or the safety of the country, except
upon their own terms; and therefore it was generally, although foolishly inferred, that
the intrigues of the Jacobins - not the real pressure of real and intolerable wrongs -
had knit together this formidable confederacy. Many favourable symptoms existed, in
the midst of this most serious disorder, which might have assured any reasonable
mind that the discontent and its causes were confined to the actual state of the sew-
•	 74ice.
Fifty years later and nearly a hundred years after the mutiny, the subject remained un-
pleasant and controversial:
Though they are necessarily mentioned by all historians, whether of the navy or of
the time, more or less at length, it may be doubted whether they have ever received
the attention which they deserve. ... the general historian is too busy to look into
their causes and consequences ... to naval historians ... they have not been an agree-
75
able subject.
Beyond identifying the problem, David Hannay did little to redress it. He offered a useful
insight, but neglected to pursue it 'The very men on whom the officers had to rely for
the direct handling of the crew were themselves discontented.' Paradoxically, he argued
the mutinies were worth studying because 'they supply within manageable limits, and in
singular perfection of development, the history of the rise, the explosion, the degrada-
tion, and the end of sedition.' Ultimately, concerns about the state of naval discipline in
1891 shaped Hannay's understanding of circumstances in 1797:
Even if we do not feel interested in the past of the navy, there is in these times of
slackening discipline both instruction and warning to be got by seeing how a revolt
against authority, though provoked by undeniable grievances and conducted at the
beginning with extraordinary moderation, degenerated into pure disorder, which had
forcibly to be rigorously dealt with.76
Laird Clowes had little to say about the mutiny. He ignored the seamen's grievances to
concentrate his comments on the threat to discipline:
One of the most painful features of the period under review is the whole subject of
the discipline of the Navy. Not only did nearly everyone of these eight eventful years
[1793-1802] witness mutinous outbreaks such as hardly ever before had disgraced the
service; not only was mutiny more than once accompanied by murder and by treason;
74 IbuL, 23
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but also disaffection became so general that, for a time, it threatened to imperil the
very existence of the country.
With a slight demur, Clowes followed the Tory view that the seamen were incited to mu-
tiny. To him it was more in the manner of an infection than a revolution:
although there were undoubtedly many excuses for discontent upon the lower
deck, it would almost seem as if the state of unrest among the seamen was rather of
the nature of an epidemic, the germs of which were afloat in the air of the age, than
the result of any more obvious causes. In France, there had been a revolt against all
constituted authority. Britons, as a body, suffered little from the infection from
across the Channel; but, in cases where there was already a nidus favourable to the re-
ception and propagation of the germs, some Britons caught the contagion in a very
severe form, and were as completely dominated by it as the most susceptible of
Frenchmen.78
Conrad Gill was a political and economic, rather than a naval, historian. He lectured in
economic history at the University of Belfast. Naval Mutinies of 1797 was based on his
master's thesis and was his only contribution to naval history. J H Owen, then a lieuten-
ant commander assigned to the Admiralty's Training and Staff Duties Division, identified
Gill's strength and weakness:
Mr Gill wrote as a young man just down from his university, knowing nothing of the
sea and very little of the world in general; and having verified some of his references,
I consider him too ready to take the statements of discontented seamen at their face
value and to disregard as prejudiced the statements of responsible officers who in-
vestigated complaints. Even so, his work is a most important contribution to our
knowledge of the Service and a truly remarkable piece of pioneer scholarship.79
Gill's naiveté surfaced when he took a passage from the delegates petition out of context
to suggest the mutiny had a theoretical basis in enlightened philosophy:
the conclusion that the seamen were influenced by the new political theories is not
based on argument alone; for there is direct evidence of political feeling, in the inci-
dents of the revolt and in the writings of the mutineers. In the first place, the change
of opinion, the development of a sense of individual importance, which underlay the
mutinous movement, is reflected in the words of the delegates at Spithead: 'We, your
petitioners, do not boast of our good services for any other purpose than that of
putting you and the nation in mind of the respect due us.'2°
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The full statement provided no support for his argument. Instead of claimmg a right for
all men, it merely reminded government and the public of an obligation due to naval
seamen:
we your Petitioners do not boast of our good services for any Other purpose than
that of putting you and the Nation In mind of the Respect due to us nor do we Ever
intend to Deviat from our former Carracter so far from any thing of that Kind or
that an Englishman or men Should ever turn their Coat we likewise agree in Opinion
we Should Suffer Double the Hardships we have hitherto Experienced before we
would Suffer the Crown of England to be in the least upon By that of any other
powers in the world ...
As might be expected, Gill's argument reflected the contemporary debate over Home
Rule. He approached the subject with a predilection to make, rather than prove, a point:
the spirit of revolution invaded the navy itself, and the most important arm of the
national defence was paralysed by internal revolt. For two months at the very crisis of
the war, the fleets lay in port mutinous and ineffective. It is not hard to understand
the anxiety felt by the government and the people when tley found themselves to all
appearance abandoned to drift into the chaos of revolution.
Gill assumed the mutiny was political He argued the 'importance of the new political
opinions as an underlying cause of the mutiny was recognised by thoughtful observers at
the time.' He compared seamen with French or Irish peasants, whom he dismissed as
'too simple-minded to rebel on their own initiative'. From this, he deduced 'the Muti-
nies were of alien growth, and the seed of disaffection was sown by seditious men.' In
lieu of evidence, Gill offered 'scattered allusions':
From scattered allusions in the documents relating to the Mutinies it is possible to
gain a more exact knowledge of a few of the ringleaders. A characteristic example of
the dangerous type of volunteers is found in Evans, the 'pettyfogging attorney', who
acted, under an assumed name, as a delegate at Spithead.
The pejorative 'pettyfogging' did not appear in any surviving letters, documents or news-
papers, other than John Heriot's True Briton, an observer who cannot be considered
thoughtful and a source that should not be considered reliable. Apparently unaware such
fictions were inserted in newspapers to distract readers and protect government from
criticism, Gill offered them as proof of his hypothesis. In doang so, he diminished the
value of his research and led those with similar predilections astray. The majority of





whom, despite greater access to the documents and familiarity with naval history, turned
a blind eye to his shortcomings, accept his conclusions and recommend his work as 'bal
anced and scholarly'.85
In Flzghts of Naval Genius, Brian Tunstall offered an account of Lord Howe's role in the
mutiny that managed to be both vivid and fancifuL
Howe at the time of the Mutinies was a feeble invalid, racked with gout, whose ven-
erable appearance and sentimental urbanity had much to do with saving a desperate
situation which was largely the result of his own incompetence. But at the same time,
his treatment of the mutmeers, judged by the standards of the day, was an act of
genius in the sphere of civil statesmanship. He bowed to the inevitable, but his bow
produced triumphant harmony where only sullen acquiescence was expected.
Tunstall criticised the Admiralty and government for neglect. He borrowed heavily from
the popular histories to describe intolerable conditions and ignored the fact that they did
not figure in the seamen's complaints. His most damning remarks were reserved for the
fleet's officers:
but for the combination of stupidity, brutality and slackness amongst the officers,
the mutinies might never have happened at all. Stupidity must come first, for it was
precisely that lack of understanding born of arrogance and ignorance of the age
which forced the seamen to demand their rights with their own mouths, since their
officers could not and would not do it for them.87
Tunstall entertained Gill's conspiracy theories: 'the ideas of the French Revolution of-
fered a definite political and philosophical setting for what had before been but seamen's
grouses.' He also anticipated Manwaring and Dobrée's suggestion that subversives came
from landsmen recruited under the Quota Acts of 1795 and 1796:
the world-wide demands of the war led the Government to go outside the ordi-
nary press-gang areas for men, and so introduced into the Navy a new type of sea-
man, who, being unaccustomed to sea and seaport life, realised the nastiness of the
conditions and kicked.
In Floating Rtpublic, Manwaring and Dobrée explained government's ulterior motive in
seeking subversives:
85 J Neale, Forecastle and .Quarterdeck Protest, Discipline and Muti,y in the RqyalNaj, 1 793-1814 (Warwick, PhD,
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The Government of the day was extremely anxious to put the trouble down to sub-
versive foreign influence - it is a notion which seems attractive to Government - in-
stead of to its real cause. Some of the men were, no doubt, animated by political
ideas, but how far it is difficult to say. ... To say that many of the mutineers were
imbued with a sense of such doctrines is one thing, but to say that these men had any
effect on the course of events, or in any way directed the Delegates, is altogether an-
other. ... Nevertheless, Pitt and the Government, with a touching fidelity to the idea
of foreign influence, made every effort to discover Jacobin propaganda at the bottom
of the murky business.
As Pitt seemed keenly aware, in the struggle for public opinion, appearances were what
mattered. Unlike Gill, Manwaring and Dobrée viewed newspapers with scepticism: 'The
Times, as a Government organ incapable of believing that anything could really be amiss
with the sailors lot, to put it all blandly down to our old friends the agitators, especially
Joyce and the slippery Evans.'9' Seeing the mutiny at Spithead as a precursor to the mu-
tiny at Invergordon, they stressed poor conditions and harsh discipline. Bonner-Smith
qrnpped
The one and only origin was the failure to give the Fleet an increase in Navy Pay to
compensate for the rise in the cost of living. ... Economics, however, are dull stuff:'
the severity or tyranny of the Captains' make mighty good copy, and who shall dis-
miss them as 'vain and idle offsprings of ignorance and presumption?' A tit-bit from
here, a bit of smut from there, and you construct a very good story for what ought to
have been the cause of the Mutiny.
Bonner-Smith offered his disdain for popular historians, a dissenting view of a critically
acclaimed book and a warning to those who would take the news out of context:
The Service in 1797 would not have suited a person of 1935 standards either of taste
or of living; Messrs Manwaring and Dobrée, whose panacea for all evils (real and
imaginary) seems to be a jolly good mutiny, say: 'it is only surprising that there was
not a general mutiny earlier in the century.' I suppose anybody who took the trouble
could snip out from the newspapers of to-day over, say, merely a week, a sufficient
supply of tit-bits to construct a very good picture of what ought to be our daily mode
of living; certainly if it is done by somebody as many years from to-day as 1797 is
from us, a picture of our mode of living will be presented very different from any-
thing we ourselves are conscious of, but it will have the 'merit' of being true!'
Owen joined Bonner-Smith in defending reputations. He argued the authors' emphasis
on conditions led readers to 'conclusions very damaging to the good name of our fore-
9°Manwaring & Dobrée, 248-249




	 century sea officers'?3 He presented Manwaring and Dobrée's position
with a selection of quotations:
In their view the men were 'never free from the fiendish bullying of officers high or
petty, they lived a life without hope. ... The humane officer was the exception, to
whom the men were touchingly grateful, usually he was little better than a sadistic
devil. ... A man's life could be made a perfect misery, and was u are told on seven
ships out of nine.'
Owen argued, 'the charges against officers colour the whole story as it is told in this
book.' He acknowledged there were abuses and cruel officers, but demed such 'corn-
plaints were all but universal'. If their portrayal is to be believed, he asked:
How could our broken-spirited seamen beat valiant enemies in battle so often? Two
months before the mutinies at home, the Mediterranean squadron took four prizes
from a Spanish fleet of nearly twice their material strength. The North Sea squadron,
which had been in open mutiny in May and June, completely defeated the stout-
hearted Dutch at Camperdown in October. And next year was fought the battle of
the Nile, where ships continued in action at night though one man in three was killed
or wounded (e.g., Bellerophon and Majestic). No officers could achieve such results tin-
less they had the confidence and respect of their men. No men could retain the spirit
to serve their country so gallantly, if the evils were so widespread as this book makes
out.
Questioning Manwaring and Dobrée's choice of quotamen as the ringleaders of the mu-
tiny, Owen suggested they underestimated the intelligence and resourcefulness of sea-
men: Perhaps, the authors rate too highly the influence and intelligence of the "better
educated" landsmen who joined the Navy during this war through the Quota Acts as
opposed to the ignorant men who had known nothing but the sea.'
His sagacity was no accident. Owen had direct access to Admiralty archives and studied
the mutiny closely. His Mutiny in the Royal Nary, 1691-19 19 is required reading for all offi-
cers in the Royal Navy. However, it is often overlooked by academics, as copies are diffi-
cult to come by. Also written in the aftermath of Invergordon, in contrast to the best-
selling Floating Republic, no copies of Mutiny in the Royal Nay were sold. As a Confidential
Book (CB3027), readers were warned:
Attention is called to the penalties attaching to any infraction of the Official Secrets
Acts. ... This book is the property of His Majesty's Government. It is intended for
the use of Officers generally, and, in certain cases, may be communicated to persons
in His Majesty's Service below the rank of commissioned Officer who may require to
Owen, Naval Review, 648
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be acquainted with its contents in the course of their duties. The Officers exercising
this power will be held responsible that such information is imparted with due cau-
tion and reserve.95
It was later re-classified 'RESTRICTED' and a second volume, Mutinj in the Rojal Nay,
1921-1937, appeared after World War II. Written as a training manuals, they remain the
best histories on the subject to date.
Roger Wells dismissed Floating Republic. 'Mainwaring [sij and Dobrée's disbelief of radical
activity is founded in their historiographical stance; their evidence hinges on a rather su-
perficial reading of these magisterial reports.' Wells did not explain what he meant by
superficial. One of Police Magistrate Aaron Graham's reports quoted by Manwaring and
Dobrée suggests why:
Mr. Graham and Mr. Williams beg leave to assure his Grace that they have unremit-
tingly endeavoured to trace if there was any connexion or correspondence carried on
between the mutineers and any private person or any society on shore, and they think
that they may with the greatest of safety pronounce that no such connexion or corre-
spondence ever did exist.97
Had this been the extent of their quotation, Well's criticism would be valid. However and
to their credit, Manwaring and Dobrée offered Graham's report in its entirety. Graham
maintained his suspicions, but admitted that he found no evidence of radical activity at
Spithead and very little at the Nore.
Jonathan Neale argued that Floating Republic 'though the best known of the modem works
is also the weakest'. He revealed his own polemic agenda by adding
Their middle class arrogance leads them to treat the sailors as stupid; animal meta-
phors for the lower deck abound. Their political Fabianism leads them to view the
mutineers as essentially moderate men led by middle class failures, and to underesti-
mate or ignore the influence of working class revolutionaries on the mutineers.
Apparently, Wells and Neale objected to what other historians identify as Manwaring and
Dobrée's principal strength: 'From their researches in the muster books, they established
Valentine Joyce's correct background and presented a truer picture of the long term
'[ Owen], Mutiny in the Royal Nay, 1691-1919, 1 (Framing and Staff Duties Division, Navy Staff, Admi-
ralty, 1933), title page
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composition of the Spithead fleet and its limited revolutionary and Irish input.' Man-
waring and Dobrée failed to take their research to a logical conclusion. Despite this evi-
dence, they still insisted the mutiny was managed by outsiders. Rather than French
revolutionaries, English radicals or Irish rebels, they offered quotamen, the county and
parish recruits brought into the navy under the Quota Acts of 1795 and 1796. Like Gill,
they abandoned their notes 'in favour of assunptions and unsupported by evidence or
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argument.
Nicholas Rodger conceded Manwaring and Dobr& 'use documents and add some mate-
rial facts'. In this context it is a major concession. He compJained:
Almost all historians who have yet published about the mutinies are agreed that they
can only be explained by outside influence, and for all but the naval historians, it is
clearly this which lends the subject its attraction. A purely naval mutiny, 'a parochial
affair of ship's biscuits and arrears of pay', could be of no interest to the well-fed and
well-paid academic unless it involved an issue of historical importance, if not a cause
worthy of the historian's commitment. Little 'writing, and less reading, have been be-
stowed upon the social history of the Navy itself and historians have been happy to
believe the most unlikely facts. ... Almost without exception, the historians of the
1797 mutinies have preferred a leap of faith to a painful crawl through the naval at-
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chives.
Rodger's observation is crucial to understanding what has gone wrong in writing the
history of the mutiny. The subject begs controversy. It now arouses greater interest, but
often without greater understanding: 'The 1797 mutinies were spectacular events, not to
be ignored, and scholars have been ready enough to cite them in support of their argu-
ments, but rather less ready to undertake any serious research into them.' 102
 To historians
whose real interests lay elsewhere, the mutiny embodies a mystery and an irresistible in-
vitation to speculate. Professor Rodger is, however, too kind. Several historians of the
mutiny have made the 'painful crawl through the archives', but eschew empiricism to
make their 'leaps of faith'. They ignore rather than neglect the evidence.
In addition to his criticism of Floating R'public, David Bonner-Smith presented an useful
collection of documents supporting his view that 'in the earliest stage - the state of "on-
gin" - the agitation is purely confined to an increase in Navy Pay.' Admitting it was a
A Coats, 'Spithead Introduction', 2




large and controversial subject he argued 'there is much to be said for the publication in
extenso of the actual surviving records of the Mutiny which do, at any rate, provide a
common starting-point for all these varied interpretations.'103
J G Bullocke, a lecturer at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, expanded upon Man-
waring and Dobrée's work to produce Sailors' Rebellion. However, rather than expanding
upon their research, he rehed on secondary sources and yielded to the temptation of in-
venting dialogue and speculating about what mzght have motivated the seamen.'°4
 Conse-
quently, his work is of limited value.
Bullocke was followed by a series of popular histories that perpetuated the myths and
misconceptions surrounding the mutiny. Irvin Anthony (Revolt at Sea), Warren Armstrong
(Mutinj Afloat), Valentine Dyall (A Flood of Mutinjw), Lawrence James (Mutinj in the Bntish
and Commonwealth Forces, 1797-1956), Jonathan Neale (The Cutlass and the Lash) 105 and
Leonard Guttridge (Muiny: a history of naval insutrection) entertain readers with a tired litany
of inedible victuals, harsh conditions and brutal discipline, without establishing relevance
or disguising their plagarism of Tobias Smollett, William Johnson Neale or John Mase-
field. Readers are expected to suspend their disbelief and enter an 'historical elsewhen'
where arguments are built upon supposition rather than fact.106
James Dugan did examine the relevant records, but still made his 'leap of faith'. While
Jonathan Neale described The Great Mutinj as a 'colourful narrative' and a 'useful com-
plement to Gill', Rodger described it as 'not without merit, but romantic, unhistorical and
wildly partisan'. 107
 To his credit, Dugan demonstrated, not only a familiarity with the
documents, but a determination to place the mutiny within a broader social and political
context. Unfortunately, 'his text hurtles pell-mell at the reader: a succession of images
,108bereft of citations.
In this nadir of imperialism, unsuspected by the government, the last defenders of
the home islands, the seamen of the grand fleet and the North Sea fleet, went on
strike. Their protest is unparalleled in history. In the four main naval bases of Eng-
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land, about half the lower deck of the navy and five thousand marines hauled down
the royal standard and the Union Jack and the pendants of the admirals of the red,
admirals of the white and admirals of the blue. On more than a hundred vessels they
raised the red flag of defiance. They swore oaths of extreme fidelity to their cause
deposed his majesty's officers, and elected their own. They established the first gov-
ernment based on universal suffrage that Britain had ever seen, afloat or ashore.l®
His description, while colourful, is far from accurate. 1797 was not the nadir of imperial-
ism. The mutiny was neither unsuspected nor unparalleled. The seamen were not the last
defenders of the home islands. There was no naval base at the Nore, only an anchorage.
The outbreaks were not simultaneous. No royal standards, no Union Jacks and only one
admiral's flag and were hauled down. While the red flag did have a symbolic significance,
at Spithead it was also the signal for delegates to meet and was flown in only one ship at
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a time. Those delegates were elected to represent their shipmates, not replace their
officers. And the seamen did not establish any sort of government, let alone one based
on universal suffrage. Throughout the mutiny the delegates reassured their countrymen
of their moderation, loyalty to the king and willingness to fight the French. Individually,
Dugan's mistakes may seem trivial. Taken as a group, they suggest a weak grasp of naval
history and maritime traditions. Dugan did not allow the facts to intrude on what he con-
sidered a good story.
Ignoring the preponderance of evidence to the contrary, Dugan perpetuated the canard
that Joyce was a United Irishman planted in the fleet to spread sedition. He also insisted
'the tremendous influence of Paine's ideas was now transmitted by the quotamen to the
ignorant Jack.' 111
 Embracing the speculations of both Gill and Manwaring and Dobrée,
he failed to prove they had any influence on the proceedings. He offered yet another
prejudicial and popularised history of the mutiny. His penchant for inventing dialogue
and providing irrelevant detail without relevant references rendered his work confusing
and virtually useless. Despite his efforts to provide context, his narrative related more to
student unrest in the 1 960s, than seamen's unrest in the 1790s.
'° Dugan, 36
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The assumption that the seamen could not have organised such a large and successful
protest continues to undermine discussion of the mutiny. Marianne Elliott wildly over-
stated the number of landsmen and Irishmen brought into the service under the Quota
Acts to exaggerate their influence in the mutiny. She argued:
It would be a gross assumption to say that all the Irish sailors were republicans; but
most had been nurtured on the tradition of the secret society and opposition to the
law. They were not the stuff from which loyal seamen were made. The volatile nature
of such a body of men cannot be stressed too much, and it would be a misunder-
standing of the nature of popular disturbance to deny the existence of treason in the
navy simply because few sailors were educated enough to be committed republicans.
The conviction that treason had been an active ingredient in the mutinies was voiced
by too many people in authority to be easily dismissed as a desire to conceal the atro-
cious conditions on board the ships.112
She has accepted contemporary propaganda designed to deflect criticism from govern-
ment as evidence. She admitted 'there is no irrefutable evidence of a campaign by France
and the English and Irish republicans to infiltrate the armed forces in the period before
the outbreak of the 1797 mutinies', but insisted 'the cumulative impression of the frag-
mentary information available is that such an attempt was made." 3
 Despite the allusion
to fragmentary information, no evidence was cited.
Roger Wells revisited various conspiracy theories with a view to celebrate, rather than
condemn conspirators. He declared:
The biggest debate between historians over the mutinies has hinged on their political
content. Put simply, are Pitt's claims of Jacobin revolutionary instigators to be ad-
mitted, or were the mutinies purely an unprecedented series of strikes for better pay
and conditions.114
His dichotomy is false. The debate began long before the histories were written. The
mutiny was not unprecedented. And, while the mutiny was inherently political, its politics
lay in the seamen's methods, rather than their message. This was more than a strike.
England was at war. The mutiny appeared to leave the country open to invasion. And the
thirty thousand men of the Channel fleet who refused to weigh anchor were subject to
the Articles of War. This was no revolution. The seamen offered no revolutionary
agenda. Their grievances were confined to the issues of pay, provisions and pensions.




They acted with moderation and repeatedly reassured government and the public of their
loyalty and willingness to fight the French.
Wells offered a valuable insight: 'Naval mutinies cannot be seen in isolation; they helped
to condition the nature of the crisis, and, in turn, were conditioned by it." 5 Unfortu-
nately, by putting this mutiny into a broader social and political context, he has taken it
out of its naval or maritime context. He built a persuasive, albeit circumstantial, case that
attempts were made to 'politicise the seamen's strike', but failed to prove any of those
attempts were successful at Spithead. He claimed the majority of the seamen had 'a
vested interest in peace', which given their circumstances would seem obvious, but failed
to provide any examples prior to the mutiny or proof that a 'peace movement' had any
affect on the mutiny. When the evidence failed to support him, Wells substituted bra-
vado: 'The involvement of democrats and revolutionaries cannot be denied, in spite of
the disclaimers by the mutineers themselves, and by historians who for one reason or
another persist in viewing the mutinies as purely naval affairs.'116
Richard Saxby offered a useful collection of extracts relating to the mutiny from the
Bridport Papers held at the British Library, including letters Julian Corbett neglected to
include in the Sperner Papers. He tried to salvage Bridport's reputation by suggesting that,
uninformed of the seamen's petitions before the mutiny and frustrated by conflicting
instructions, he acted with moderation and restraint and prevented a crisis from becom-
ing a disaster. 7
 However, he did not explain how Bridport managed to be oblivious of
the fleet's mood.
Christopher Doorne subjected the mutiny to academic scrutiny, but undermined his ar-
gument with academic ambivalence.
One of the leading figures of this mutiny was Valentine Joyce, a quarter masters mate
on the Royal George. Jonathan Neale has stated that Joyce was a United Irishman.
However, I have been unable to find any evidence for this. Even if he had been a
United Irishman on entering the Royal Navy, he might not have remained so. Nei-
ther do Joyce's actions appear to have been those of a committed revolutionary.
The comparatively moderate behaviour of the Spithead mutineers together with their
generally respectful behaviour towards their officers indicates that, if there was a Se-
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ditious element in this outbreak, it must have been very weak, and Joyce was almost
certainly not a part of it.118
Caution prevented Doorne from following the evidence to empirical conclusions. Valen-
tine Joyce could not have been a professional seaman and a seditious tobacconist from
Belfast. The muster books, pay books, Home Office reports and a letter from Joyce him-
self remove all doubt. Certainly, historians should not offer interpretations unsupported
by the evidence. However, when evidence is clear, they have an obligation to set the rec-
ord straight.
Nicholas Rodger declined to offer a history of the mutiny. Instead, he argued 'For a
number of reasons, it is - or at least should be - still difficult to write about the 1797 na-
val mutinies.' He complained of inadequate research and offered a sharp warning to po-
litical, social and economic historians who see the mutiny as an excuse to dabble in naval
history. He denied any suggestion that the mutinies 'can only be explained by outside
influence' - arguing that evidence available since 1935 'has been ignored because it does
not support any of the popular theories'. 119 According to Rodger:
the seamen were the heirs of a native political tradition of shipboard organisation,
which went back as far as our evidence allows us to see it. In the Middle Ages mari-
time law expected a ship's company to take collective decisions in matters of com-
merce and navigation, and held the seamen jointly liable with the master for the
consequences of decisions in which they were assumed to have participated. Much
had changed since then, but by no means everything. Seamen in merchant ships were
still liable to bear the cost of damaged cargo, and no doubt many men were serving
in the Navy in 1797 had previously suffered deductions from their wages in conse-
quence. The old traditions of consensus were probably strongest in fishing boats and
coasters rather than deep-sea merchantmen or the Navy, but many of the 1797 muti-
neers would have had experience of one or both, and even in the Navy the law still
required that the ship's company give their consent in certain cases, notably to the
disposing of their common property in prizes. Within recent memory it had still been
customary in certain circumstances for the captains of men-of-war to consult their
men on critical decisions. Professional seamen like the delegates of the fleet at Spi-
thead were heirs of an ancient tradition which owed nothing to outside tutelage. Ar-
guably the harsher attitude towards collective protest adopted by the Admiralty since
the 1780s had forced the men to tighten up their organization, but they did not have
to invent or borrow a tradition of collective action. The whole experience of ship-
board life was an education in teamwork and initiative.'
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Ann Coats put the mutiny firmly within a context and tradition of seamen's labour dis-
putes. She argued that, while distinctions between naval and merchant seamen were
vague, the contrast between seamen and landsmen was stark. As theirs were the lives at
risk, seamen had a far different view of the world and their circumstances than Iandsmen
in London. Theirs was a community under severe stress. Most professional seamen
served by compulsion, but knew that no one else could do their job. Their methods ap-
pear similar, but the seamen at Spithead shared no objectives with radicals and reformers.
While the latter sought the expansion of the electorate as the means to improve the con-
ditions of the working class, seamen saw themselves as a separate community with more
immediate and pressing concerns.
Coats traced the history of naval and merchant seamen's labour disputes throughout the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - noting the parallels present at Spithead. She con-
firmed the delegates were professional seamen and came from sea-faring communities.
She demonstrated the negligible influence of Irishmen and quota-men; and confirmed
that the seamen at Spithead as 'heirs of a tradition of rule by consensus, seamen expected
their voices to be heard, and mutinied if they were not.' 121 Finally, she removed lingering
doubts by tracing the identity of the mutiny's most visible leader, Valentine Joyce.
Methodoloç'v
The thesis is necessarily narrative in form. The role newspapers played in the mutiny
cannot be understood without examining their coverage of the proceedings in both
Portsmouth and Parliament. The narratives are presented, not as they occurred, but as
they were presented to contemporary readers - without the benefit of hindsight, with
original punctuation and spelling and, whenever possible, in extenso. This is done in ap-
preciation of eighteenth century prose, in response to Bonner-Sniith's call for a common
starting point, in an belief that abridgements inevitably rob the original of its impact and
context, and certainly in the conviction that an historian's primary responsibility is to
present the evidence. 'Reductive paraphrases inevitably lose the richness of language, the
subtlety of exposition and do an injustice both to history and the individuals involved.'122
' 21 N Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea (London: HarperCollins, 1997), 322
122 A Coats, 'Royal Dockyards: constructed communities & cultures', Open Museum, National Maritime
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The role newspapers played in the mutiny is revealed in the language used to describe it.
I have focused on the news of four weeks in spring 1797. The mutiny at Spithead did not
occur in isolation. It was followed by outbreaks at Plymouth, the Nore, Yarmouth and
throughout the world. Repercussions continued for years; but Spithead was the begin-
ning. From the seamen's perspective, it was a success. From government's perspective it
was a disaster. While the Channel fleet was pardoned, subsequent outbreaks were
crushed. Discipline was brutally re-established and access to the news was far more ef-
fectively controlled. Spithead set a precedent that could not be countenanced.
This thesis examines a unique circumstance where government, opposition and the sea-
men of the Channel fleet used newspapers to influence public opinion. Ultimately, it
seeks to determine whether newspaper representations or misrepresentations affected the
mutiny's outcome.
Newspapers provide a useful, though not infallible, chronology of the mutiny. Neither
consistent nor complete, they offer a fascinating collection of contemporary views - col-
oured by passion and prejudice, limited by perception, totally lacking perspective, but
incredibly rich in contextual detail. They provide a commentary of the mutiny from a
variety of sources, many beyond government or opposition control. They freely mix ob-
servations and opinions with rumours, speculation and propaganda. While 'the true his-
tory of a nation' may not be found in its newspapers as Macaulay suggested, newspapers
do offer insights that have eluded or unduly influenced historians. In focusing public
attention on specific events and issues, newspapers provide both a chronological and a
thematic structure to this thesis. Four of the six chapters are constructed around stories
that dominated the news between 15 of April and 15 May 1797. The mutiny is presented
as it was reported - with emphasis on the points where newspapers became a part of the
news.
The Burney Newspaper Collection at the British Library is an invaluable resource. How-
ever, while the collection is large, it is by no means complete. To ensure continuity of
analysis, I have concentrated on those papers best represented for the period in question.
Similarly, I have tried to achieve a balance between government and opposition papers.
The following government newspapers were selected. LLrndon Chronicle, Oracle & Public
Advertiser, Sun, The Times, and True Bnton. The following opposition newspapers were
selected. Morning Chronicle, Morning Herald, Morning Post, and Star. Cuttings from each have
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been included as art at the end of each chapter. These cuttings contain several key docu-
ments relating to the mutiny - providing an indication of public opmion and awareness.
Chapter one, Portents & Precedents, provides context. It examines the seamen's complaints
and methods - fixing both within a tradition of seamen's protests. It considers the ob-
servations, warnings and advice offered to the Admiralty before the mutiny, as well as the
circumstances leading up to it.
Chapter two, Spint of Kempenfeldt, focuses on an unsuccessful propaganda effort. It seeks
to understand the rationale behind the effort; and, by tracing the machinations of under-
secretaries, propagandists and sympathetic newspaper publishers, account for its clumsy
execution. This chapter also examines the man who published the squib, John Heriot and
how his newspapers, the True Briton and the Sun, have unduly influenced the history of
the mutiny.
Chapter three, From the Living to the Dead, presents the seamen's responses to the squib -
one that was published and two that were not. While the squib appeared only in the Trite
Briton, the seamen's response appeared in virtually every London and provincial papers -
providing the seamen with an opportunity to secure public sympathies by ensuring their
message received a wide audience. The unpublished responses reveal an acute awareness
of public discussion as well as a diversity of opinion within the fleet. More importantly,
they suggest how differences were resolved and solidarity maintained.
Chapter four, The London Incident, analyses the variable coverage of the mutiny's only vio-
lence. It analyses the text of public and private accounts to determine how rumours,
prejudice and limited perceptions affected the news. It then examines how indiscretions
or misrepresentations that appeared in print affected the mutiny.
Chapter five, The Seaizzen 's Man/èsto, examines another exercise in counter-propaganda.
Confrontational and angry, the manifesto is unique amongst the seamen's public docu-
ments. It differs in both style and purpose; and may have contributed to the outbreak at
the Nore. It was considered a forgery - an assessment now challenged.
Chapter six, Designing Men, answers the question: 'Who was behind the mutiny?' It re-
views contemporary and historical speculation about the ringleaders and examines the
effect contemporary propaganda had on the history of the mutiny.
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CHAPTER ONE: Portents & Precedents
It is singular that hitherto no account has reached the public ye of the importantfact of the sailing of
the Dutch Fleet. We understand upon good authority, that so long ago asyesterdqy night, Ministers
received certain advices of their hating passed the Orknys, sixty-three in number. How many of
these ure line of the battle shzps we have not been able to ascertain. Two diipatches were received
yesterday at the Admiralty, the one from Portsmouth, the otherfrom P/ymouth. We have not learnt
the particulars, but f we may judge from the drcumstances, they were important, Lord SPENCER
was closetedfor several hours, with Mr. NEPEAN on the content.1
On Monday, 17 April 1797, the Morning Chronicle startled its readers with the news that
the Dutch fleet, sixty-three in number, had been sighted on what could only be an inva-
sion route to Ireland. Almost as an afterthought, it mentioned important dispatches from
Portsmouth and Plymouth. The public would soon understand how unimportant was the
false fleet sighting and how very important was the dispatch received from Portsmouth.
In 1797 'Britannia ruled the waves', his Majesty's navy was 'the pride of the universe',
and the jack tars who manned his ships were assumed to be jolly, loyal and stupid.
The day before, on Easter Sunday, the seamen took command of the Channel fleet. They
mutinied. They wanted a pay increase. In 1653 an able-bodied seaman's wages were fixed
at 24 shillings per month. 2
 One hundred and forty-four years later, England's overbur-
dened economy, in the opinion of First Lord of the Admiralty George Lord Spencer,
would not allow an increase. Price increases, crop failures, food riots and
runs were recent memories and worrisome possibilities. Government seemed deter-
mined Britain's taxpayers rather than its army, should wage war on revolutionary France,
by making massive loans to German and Austrian allies, while expanding Britain's trade
empire at the expense of the French, Dutch and Spanish.
Pitt seemed even more determined to stem the tide of revolutionary ideas at England's
shores. Before discovering the press could be of greater use harnessed than shackled,
government concentrated its efforts on suppression, intimidation and harassment 3
 Libel
prosecutions were common. Until in October 1795 Fox's Libel Bill restored to juries the
right to determine both the fact of publication and the question of libel, the latter had
been a judicial prerogative. 4
 Within a month, much the same purpose was achieved with
'Morning Chwnicle, 17 April 1797
2 RNM1993/139 (2) 12450 7.3.0 ADM, Regulations & Instructions.
3 lmpractical before, censorship became impossible 'with the lapsing of the Licensing Acts in 1695.
4 L Reid, Charles James Fox: A Man for the People (London: Longmans, Green, 1969), 272
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a Royal Proclamation against 'wicked and seditious writings'. Government promptly used
it to drive the recalcitrant newspaperman Sampson Perry both out of business and out of
the country; as well as to indict, convict and outlaw Thomas Paine, in absentia. 5 Between
March of 1793 and July of 1795 the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended. 6
 And in October
1795, after the king's close encounter with an angry mob, the Treasonable Practices Act
and the Seditious Meetings Act, the 'Two Acts', effectively stifled popular dissent in Brit-
ain for twenty years. Government informers infiltrated reform societies and reported on
those who spoke out. The courts provided government with the necessary latitude. Sedi-
tious libel was loosely interpreted as:
the expression in some permanent form of opinions made with the intention to
bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection against the king or the gov-
ernment and constitution of the United Kingdom as by law established or either
House of Parliament, or the administration of justice, or to excite British subjects to
attempt otherwise than by lawful means the alteration of any matter in Church or
State by law established, or to promote feelings of ill will and hostility between dif-
ferent classes.7
Troublesome newspapermen could be harassed, arrested and brought to trial, although
the latter was seldom necessary as they could be held and silenced under ex-offlcio infor-
mations without the risk of juries upsetting government plans. Their use became so
common that Richard Sheridan, MP, playwright and opposition's press manager, an-
nounced, 'there were three ways of destroying the liberty of press: excessive taxation of
cheap publications, by oppressive legislation, and by ex-ofiIcto informations'.8
The London Corresponding Society, which advocated reform without revolution, re-
ceived particular attention. Its leaders were followed, their letters opened, homes and
businesses ransacked and families terrorised. 9
 With evidence thus gathered, two of its
leaders, Thomas Hardy and John Theiwell, were tried under the Two Acts. Adding trea-
son to sedition meant, in theory and if convicted, they could be 'drawn to the place of
execution upon a hurdle and there hanged, cut down while still alive, disembowelled and
castrated, beheaded and quartered'. 1 ° They were defended by the celebrated opposition
I Christie, Wars & Ravolution.r B,itain 1 760-1815 (London: Arnold, 1982), 214; J Keane, Tom Paine: A Poti-
ca/Lfr (London: Little Brown, 1995), 334-338
was again suspended from April 1798 until March 1801.
7 P O'Fliggins, Censorship jg Briain (London: Nelson, 1972), 34
Parliamentary Debates, xxxiv (14 June 1816), 1108
9 Thomas Hardy's pregnant wife died as a result of the trauma.
'°J Beanie, Crime and the Courtc in EngIand 1660-1800 (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1986), 451
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barrister Sir Thomas Erskine and acquitted by sympathetic juries." It proved a Pyrrhic
victory, as reform society membership never recovered from the shock. Nevertheless,
their leaders were still followed. The whereabouts of Tom Paine remained enough of a
concern for Evan Nepean, First Secretary of the Admiralty, to enquire, two weeks before
the mutiny, if 'the outlawry against Thomas Paine was still in force." 2 He was reassured
that it was.
Alarmed by the upheaval across the Channel, government saw the threat as both internal
and external. The invasion of French ideas, rather than French troops, was their primary
concern.
The severity of the laws which restricted the freedom of the Press after the outbreak
of the French Revolution shows how keenly aware Pitt's Government was of its sub-
versive power. Windham felt sure the Press was mainly responsible for the alarming
Naval Mutinies of 1797. From one end of the kingdom to the other, the newspapers
gave the lower orders an opportunity of reading the parliamentary debates. From
them they discovered that members of the Opposition were declaring that the Gov-
ernment was fighting to destroy the newly won liberties of the French people, and
that our soldiers and sailors were sacrificing their lives to the folly or wickedness of
their rulers. Lord Grenville considered that the Press was in most powerful on the
agencies which produced the Revolution in France.'3
More perceived than real, the threat:
proved corrosive to British Constitutional complacency, obliging ... Britain's rul-
ers ... over and over again, to mobiliae not just the consent, but increasingly the ac-
tive co-operation of large numbers of Britons in order to repel this recurrent danger
from without.'4
Contemporary critics argued the war, which posed no immediate threat for Britain, was
undertaken for ideological rather than strategic reasons. Opposition leader Lord John
Russell'5 argued 'a fear crept upon the persons of property, that the democratic princi-
ples of France might take root in England; and it was thought, that by turning the
thoughts of the people to foreign war this danger might be averted.' He held 'this view of
the question shows very little trust in the attachment of the people of England to their
own institutions'; and described the war as 'a war of panic', and added, 'the war was an
Home Tooke of the Society for Constitutional Information was also tried and acquitted.
12	 H042 39, Heriot to Nepean, 16 April 1794; PRO ADMI 4172, White to King, 1 April 1797
"A Aspinall, Poktics and the Press, 1 780-1 850 (London: Home & Van Thai, 1949), 1
'4 L Colley, Bñto,u Forgin,g the Nation. 1707-1837 (London: Pimlico, 1994), 4
15 Later the sixth Duke of Bedford.
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unjust war and the panic was irrational fear.' 16
 George Rose, Pitt's Secretary at the Treas-
ury and principal press paymaster, denied the panic, but admitted the fear:
But when there were about thirty clubs in London, the object of which was to dis-
seminate seditious prmciples, besides twenty-two towns in which one or more corre-
sponding societies were established for the same purpose; when it was shown in Par-
liament that in every town, and in almost every village in the kingdom their
emissaries had found means to distribute gratuitously among the lower classes publi-
cations of a very dangerous tendency; that, under the specious mask of Reform, they
had propagated the most destructive doctrines, sparing no pains to excite discontent
in the minds of the populace; that they recommended to imitation the revolutionary
example of France, for attaining their objects; that the time had now arrived for the
people to redress themselves; and had held out to the lower classes the strong temp-
tation of an agrarian law; that they had secretly negotiated with the Jacobms of
France for the subversion of the British constitution; when to their machinations
were imputed the most alarming of the riots which had broken out under various
false pretences; it was not unavoidable, it was not reasonable that the public mind
should feel a considerable degree of agitation, oppressed with anxious forebodings,
and dreadful apprehensions of some political convulsion already in preparation and
ready to explode?
Rose described the threat and justified the repression that followed:
Was there not a cause then, not for a panic, which is a foolish fear, but for rational
alarm, not only amongst the landed gentry, but amongst all owners of property, and
lovers of order? And what could have averted some dreadful catastrophe if they had
not combined to show these traitors, who scrupled not to say, that the attainment of
their objects would be worth the expense of blood, that there was a large majority
against them, determined to frustrate their designs? Whenever a fatal epidemic breaks
out, wise men will not sit down with folded arms to await their destiny; they will
hasten to adopt remedies, to organise sanitary precautions, and to remove, as far as
they can, all predisposing causes; but if they succeed, and because they succeed in ar-
resting its progress, will any sane man argue that, therefore, there was no danger? It
was because the majority of Englishmen were attached to their institutions, that it
was necessary to use strong measures to prevent a turbulent and unscrupulous mi-
nority from disturbing the peace of the country. Yes, it was well for England that her
gentry were at last 'thoroughly frightened', and roused to stand upon their defence.
Lord John would have had them resemble the lamb described by Pope, Pleas'd to the
last he crops theflow 'yfood, And licks the handjust rais 'd to shed his blood.'7
Despite his claim, fear rather than reason was used to mobilise support. John Reeves, a
Tory propagandist, organised a loyalist crusade to defend Britain's constitution by at-
tacking Britons' constitutional rights. 18
 Thus, in addition to official and legal harassment,
the critics of government now faced the middling classes. Reeves' Association for Pre-
'6 Quoted by George Rose; L Harcourt, ed., The Diaries & Correspondsirce of the Right Honourable George Rose
(London: Bentley, 1860), 1, 168
17 Ibid. 168-169
18 The association was founded at the Crown & Anchor Tavern on the Strand.
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serving Liberty and Property against Republicans and Levellers issued alarms, announced
meetings and recruited local support - all through newspaper advertisements. Predicta-
bly, sedition soon appeared in the form of handbills calling for the defence of constitu-
tional rights from their attacks. However, what could arguably be justified in 1792, could
not in 1797. Opposition's Mornin& Chronicle commented on the absurdity of the situation
in their first observations on the mutiny:
The present War was undertaken avowedly for the preservation of our Laws, our
Constitution, and our Property; yet the only changes made in our Laws, the only in-
fractions on our Constitution, and the only damage done to our Property have arisen
from the bungling contrivances and miserable ignorance of our Statesmen.19
After languishing in disfavour for excessive enthusiasm,2° Reeves resurfaced a week be-
fore the mutiny with a plan to disrupt the county meetings organised by Lord Russell to
protest Pitt's handling of the economy and the war. Pitt's chief political adviser, Henry
Dundas, took Reeves' suggestions seriously enough to forward them with a comment:
I wrote to Mr. Reeves and send you his reply. You know his zeal is active, and must
either be extinguished or modified. I confess I agree with him in his general idea, and
if the tone of such a paper as his is adopted, it will be a model of a protest through-
out the country against the Mobbish meetings which seem to be intended on the
other side. I return you the printed paper in case you should think it right to cause
some other body put in the paragraph about Peace.2'
Reeves detailed how to manipulate the press, plant propaganda and mobilise loyal sup-
port22
Government did not take criticism well. It resisted change and struggled to preserve the
status quo. It favoured intimidation over negotiation when dealing with dissent. And defi-
nitely preferred private meetings to public discussion of matters it considered sensitive.
In the spring of 1797, England lacked the funds and Pitt lacked the inclination to deal
with the sailors' complaints.
The Sailor's Complaint
Complaints about wages were as old as the navy. The seamen who manned England's
warships were largely the same seamen who manned her merchant ships. In time of war,
the most significant addition to the naval establishment came from pressed merchant
'9 Monung Chroriele, 18 April 1797
PRO PRO3O 8 159, Miles toPi 11 November 1795
21 PRO PRO3O 8/157/218, Dundas to Pitt, 11 April 1797
Dundas confirmed that while government appreciated Reeves' efforts, it did not direct them.
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seamen. With them came traditions of collective action. On 5 May 1768, 'a great body of
sailors assembled at Deptford, forcibly boarded several ships, unreefed the top-sails, and
vowed no ships should sail till the merchants had consented to raise their wages.' They
'assembled themselves together as Confederates, in Order to Oblige the Captains or
Masters of Trading Ships and Vessels, to raise the Wages of every Seaman in their Serv-
ice, from 32 shillings, to 40 Shillings per Month'. Protests, mass meetings and marches,
one involving over 15,000 seamen, continued throughout the summer. They defined
their grievances and demanded
a wage of 35s. a month, 'alleging that their families would be starving in their ab-
sence'; till this was conceded, 'they would neither engage, nor suffer any ship to sail.'
All outward-bound ships were visited by the sailors' committees ('for the sailors have
their committees') and, by 9 May, the Navy Office had to report that every single
ship on the Thames had been disabled from sailing; one vessels had escaped, but was
boarded at Limehouse Hole and made to toe the line.24
Twenty-five years later the scene shifted from the merchant to the naval service. In No-
vember 1792 Sir Alexander Cochrane wrote to Henry Dundas from Newcastle: 'The
wages of the seamen of this port have not been encreased for a considerable time back,
since which the price of every article of living has encreased very much.' Six months
later naval seamen there were rioting. Again they complained of low wages. Captain Pe-
ter Rothe forwarded a handbill to the Admiralty describing their grievances and what
they considered to be their rights. As the troubles occurred in the provinces and coin-
cided with the news of Louis XVI's imprisonment and execution, London newspapers
had little to say about riots on Tyneside.
Publicly ignored, the sailors' complaints did not pass unnoticed. In March 1795, Lord
Hood in part justified quitting the Mediterranean because:
The crews of some of the ships [are] in a mutinous state, and as force may become
necessary to restore discipline and proper subordination, no officer who looks to the
honour and credit of His Majesty's Navy and the publick service can possibly venture
to take upon him the command of the Mediterranean fleet with one ship less than
twenty sail of the line without risk of becoming the instrument of disgrace to the na-
tion by encountering difficulties that appear great & almost insurmountable, and
which evidently stare him in the face7
Gentleman's Magazine, 1768, 242. The editors noted the participation of naval seamen, confirming that
little distinction can be made between eighteenth century merchant and naval seamen.
24 jj,j1j
PRO H042/22, Cochrane to Dundas, 20 November 1792
PRO H042/24, handbill, 4 February 1793
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While Hood was preoccupied with shortages of ships and men, he advised the newly ap-
pointed Lord Spencer of the seamen's growing discontent.
In April 1795 Rear Admiral Philip Patton submitted his 'Observations on Naval Mutiny'
to the Admiralty. Patton tried to put the matter into perspective for the inexperienced
first lord:
The power of acting with an Army or Navy implies a necessity of having the means
of repressing even the idea of general Mutiny in the forces employed. These means
are supposed to be possessed by every Government, and should they fail in their ef-
fect, the state is in imminent danger. If the Soldiers of an Army Mutiny in the highest
degree, even so as not only to destroy the Officers who might resist them, but by for-
saking the Service of their Country, deliver themselves, their Arms, and Artillery, into
the hands of the Enemy, they have then done all which the basest of mankind, in
their situation, could accomplish. But if a Mutiny to the same extent takes place in
Naval force, the Seamen who seize upon the Ships, not only deliver themselves into
the hands of the Enemy, but they also deliver to them machines of great value, which
cannot be replaced in many years, provided with Arms, Ammunition and Provisions,
which can at once be transferred to another State, and instantly used against their
Country. ... if the State whose Seamen Mutiny and deliver the Ships to the Enemy,
depends principally upon a Sea force for protection, the danger to that state is re-
doubled and the dilemma is dreadful.
He added:
Considering the truth of the facts which have been stated, and the consequence of
mutiny in the sea-force of an island, it is not easy to conceive how a matter of so
much importance hath attracted so little attention. The inattention to this subject is
the more astonishing, when it is remembered, that not only the most threatening
symptoms of a general mutiny took place during the service, but that actual posses-
sion was taken of the command of many capital ships, by mutinous seamen, at the
end of the last war.
Patton referred to the fleet mutinies of 1783. He conceded they were not done with
traitorous intent, but warned Spencer 'if seamen know they can combine and take pos-
session of the ships for one purpose, they must see they can do it for another.' He ex-
plained:
It also deserves the most serious consideration of Landmen that, no force of which
the state is possessed, Ships of War only excepted, can reduce Mutinous Seamen who
are in possession of capital Ships. Nay if the whole Inhabitants of Britain were Sol-
diers, with Arms in their hands, they are unequal to the task of subduing a single Ship
of the Line.
George Spencer, head of a powerful whig family, succeeded Chatham as First Lord of the Admiralty in
December 1794 and remained in that office until Pitt resigned in February 1801.
NMM WYN 109 7 14, P Patton, April 1795
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Patton focused his attention on the evils of impressment and inadequate pay:
Add to ... intimations of danger, the violent manner by which Seamen are supplied
to the Navy during hostilities, and the subject will be found to demand the most de-
liberate investigation. Impressing Seamen has been vindicated upon the principles of
custom and necessity. But what custom can reconcile so violent a measure to those
who are to suffer under it, and what necessity can persuade Seaman that they are to
bear increasing hardships and oppression, of which they find they can clear them-
selves. Before the commencement of all former Wars, the wages of Seamen in the
Merchant service and the wages in King's Ships, were very nearly equaL But before
any demand had been made to Man the Navy in the present War, the pay of the
Seaman Merchant Ships in the River Thames was forty shillings a month, whilst the
Wages of Able Seamen in His Majesty's Navy, is but twenty two Shillings and six-
pence per lunar month, or about twenty four shillings per Kalendar month. Conse-
quently all those Men who have been compelled to serve their Country this War,
have been likewise obliged to relinquish nearly half the profits of their labour. It is
impossible to suppose that the numerous body of Men liable to be impressed will
continue to bear these wrongs indefinitiely.
The problem, Patton argued, was in attracting and retaining 'good seamen' in the king's
service: 'Computing the hardships of confinement, and the operation of a severe Martial
law, added to the low pay, it is absurd to expect good Seamen to enter or continue in the
Navy.' He admitted the 'inexpediency of raising the whole of the Seamen's Wages'. In-
stead, he concentrated on meeting the needs and increasing the attachment of 'prime,
thorough-bred' seamen to the service of their country.
While the Navy was nearly always short of men, these were the men it needed most.
Without them, ships could not sail. Patton considered landsmen brought in under the
Quota Acts to be a poor substitute: 'seamen cannot be supplied from the body of any
Nation, being of a profession of difficult, and tedious acquirement.' He argued that
prime seamen had no incentive to volunteer. Again, he warned Spencer 'It is impossible
to suppose that the numerous body of Men liable to be impressed will continue to bear
these wrongs indefinitely.' He recommended the creation of a new pay category, beyond
able seamen, to distinguish and reward those who could 'reef, hand, steer, heave the lead,
knot, splice, strap blocks, handle the sail-needle, and do every duty in rigging a ship'. He
argued, 'from this class and this class alone' petty officers should be selected and offered
six proposals to increase their number, pay and benefits:
Pt, That the pay of the warrant and petty officers in the Navy be immediately raised
by one third.
2', That the number of the petty officers be increased in every ship, by three Cap-
tains of the Forecastle, three Captains of the Waste, three Captains of the After-
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guard, six Captains of the Tops, and all the Quarter-gunners, making in all an addi-
tion of about thirty-five petty officers to a ship of seventy four guns.
3d, That all these additional petty officers should at least have the increased pay of
quartermasters, and all the advantage of increased pri7e-money.
4th, That the most perfect assurance be given to all the petty officers of every ship,
that they shall have a preferable claim to admission into Greenwich Hospital, and to
the out-pensions.
5th, That all petty officers who have served in that station for five years during arma-
ments or actual hostilities, not having in all that time either deserted or been pun-
ished by the sentence of a Court-Martial, shall have a right to the out-pension of
Greenwich during life, providing only that they shall return to the Navy upon any
armament whilst they are under fifty years of age.
6th, That if any petty officer shall die or be killed in the service, his widow, or children
under a certain age, or his mother, being indigent, shall be entitled to the out-pension
of Greenwich during the lives of the widow or the mother, and during the infancy of
the child or children.
Patton insisted: 'By complying with these Six Proposals the best Seamen in every Ship
will be attached to the Service of their country, and those very men who now excite Mu-
tiny will be most ready to repress it.' Patton insisted his proposals were practical 'even in
time of war' and claimed they might 'in a great measure render compulsion unnecessary'.
He also warned that traditional approaches were unlikely to apply:
With whatever indifferences the discontent of the seamen may have been viewed if
any effectual remedy be not applied, the day seems not to be very distant when it will
be a very serious consideration, and when a general disposition to Mutiny takes place,
the disorder may be past remedy.
He specifically advised against harangues:
The means which have been formerly applied to suppress even those Mutinies which
have appeared in the most dangerous form, seem not to have been well adapted to
that purpose. They have generally consisted in Men of higher rank than the Com-
mander, shewing themselves in order to overawe the Seamen by their presence &
authority. But the consequences were such as might have been expected from a
measure so inefficacious. The Seamen were neither reduced to obedience, nor was
the progress of the Mutinous spirit checked)°
While Patton insisted 'real grievances ought certainly to be redressed'; he did not advo-
cate acquiescence. Instead, he argued that to protect the state 'justice must be done' in-
volving 'the most severe punishment which can be inflicted upon those who are Muti-
nous'. Patton urged Spencer to consider the problem:
3° Also see H Sproule, arnes Burney's Opinions on the Naval Mutinies of 1797', Mariner's Mim,ç xlvi
(1960), 61-2; E Osler, The Life ofAdmiral Viscouni Exmouth (London: Smith, Elder, 1835) 180-184
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The moment of Mutiny is never a fit time to hear complaints, supposing them to be
well founded, and the true spirit of discipline always requires that Mutiny should
never lead to redress, but certainly and infallibly, terminate in punishment. It may
perhaps be said that there are seasons when clemency is necessary to safety, but
when the requisite punishment cannot be inflicted upon those Men who are con-
victed of Mutiny, lest they should produce some greater evil, an irrefragable proof is
produced that discipline is in the last stages of decline, and the force of the Nation is
then become more dangerous to the state, than to the Enemy.
Though determined to put his 'Observations' into the right hands, Patton ensured they
did not fall into the wrong ones. Only eight copies were printed. His brother later ob-
served:
Admiral Patton, who was well acquainted with the manners and ideas of British sea-
men in general, and well informed of the grievances of which they complained, pre-
sented a paper, on this subject, to the First Lord otf the Admiralty, in the year 1795, in
which he predicted the mutinies which afterwardi took place, in the year 1797, and
stated his opinion of the proper means of preventing so great an evil; but naval offi-
cers in general were under no apprehension on this subject, nor did his Lordship pay
any attention to Admiral Patton's predictions.31
Four months before the mutiny, Captain Thomas Pakenham, 32
 a member of an influen-
tial Anglo-Irish family, warned Spencer of the seameia's discontent. His comments were
occasioned by,
a letter from the captains at the Nore containing a memorial to the Admiralty for
increase of pay has been sent for the concurrence of the captains here and is to-
morrow to receive its discussion at a general meeting of the captains called for that
purpose.33
He considered the object of the captains' memorial, a pay increase for themselves, 'so
equitable and the necessity so obvious that no difference of opinion is likely to ensue',
but recognised the effect it might have on the seamen, particularly as it followed success-
ful applications by the army, militia, naval lieutenants and Admiralty clerks, each justified
by the rising cost of living. Pakenham offered an insight Spencer chose to ignore: 'Every
rank must seem to them to have their own immediate advantage for its object and to
have lost sight in that pursuit of every attention to the underpaid condition of the thor-
oughbred seamen.' Like Patton, he focused his attention on the circumstances of profes-
sional seamen. He argued they were:
31 C Patton, 32-33
32 Pakenhain played a controversiai role in settling the mutiny of Cu/loden in December 1794. After he ne-
gotiated a surrender, five ringleaders were hanged. He denied promising a pardon.
33 BL Althorp MS G187, Pakenham to Spencer, 11 December 1796
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the only description of men now serving his Majesty, whose situation by common
exercise of their trade could be better fourfold, if they were released from the service
of their country. That is a truth every seaman knows and a certain loss they endure
with all the patience of subordination, and all the zeal of patriotism.
The shortage of seamen and increased demands made on the merchant service had
caused a dramatic rise in merchant seamen's wages. In 1795 'shipowners, merchants and
principal inhabitants of Scarborough' complained of the 'difficulties ... encountered in
procuring men for the merchant's service wherein the enormous wages of six pounds per
month were paid to seamen of the ordinary description'.TM
Pakenham implied the seamen's patience and zeal had limits, particularly when others in
his Majesty's service were not expected to make such sacrifices. 'They know as well as we
do that the admirals' pay, either on leave or on duty, is payed without interruption or
abridgement, and that is a consideration for their service equal to any they could proba-
bly by their industry or knowledge obtain.' 35
 After criticising his superiors and claiming
the support of his colleagues, Pakenham retreated into deference:
Among their officers many are the men, and many of them are now here, who know
the seaman's value and who know that he is of the only class among us whose intrin-
sic worth is four times the value of the consideration paid to him for it. But, my
Lord, those men among the officers respect your character, they honour your feel-
ings, and they had rather be directed in so momentous a concern by your instruction
than by any proposal which might seem fitting from them, or by any application
from the people serving under their commands.
However, he warned Spencer to expect applications from the seamen 'if some measure
amidst those generally for the army, and for particular ranks of the navy, be not adopted
for the encouragement and advantage of so useful a part of us'. Failing such encourage-
ment, he anticipated trouble: 'It seems to me too probable to give foundation for any
doubt.' He recommended an immediate pay raise for 'accomplished seaman to 30 shil-
lings per month during the war, to be reduced at the peace (when merchantmen's wages
fall) to 24 shillings'. He closed with flattery: 'the gratitude of those fine fellows would be
excessive, and the fame of having done so humane and so just a thing would be, by the
concurrent applause of our profession, bestowed deservedly upon you.' Spencer, unin-
terested in his opinions and immune to his flattery, was polite but dismissive:
I have not at this moment sufficient time to enter at large into the question, but a
very little reflection must I think immediately point out to you the utter impossibility
C Emsley, A Hill & M Ashcroft, eds., No,ib Riding Nazd R,cruit, The Quota Acts and the wota Men 1795-
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in the present state of the country of adopting the measure you mention of increasing
the wages to seamen, the expense of which would, from the great number at present
borne, be an enormous increase to our disbursements akeady sufficiently burthen-
some.
He implied the matter might be considered in 'a more suitable season'; but, rather than
seeing it as an opportunity to right a wrong, he felt an increase 'might perhaps be made
the means of drawing good seamen into the service at the beginning of a war and render
less necessary the extravagant bounties which experience shews us are attended with
many inconveniences'. Meanwhile, he cautioned Pakenham not to pursue the matter
further
At this time no such expedient could be found, and I am most happy to hear that
your suggestions have gone no further, as I am fully convinced that the public discus-
sion of such a point, if it was to take place, would infaffibly be productive of much
mischief from the absolute impracticability of carrying into effect anything of the
kind.
Pakenham said no more, but Spencer's hopes of precluding public discussion were in
vain.37
Eleven Anonymous Petitions
Between 28 February and 10 March, eleven anonymous petitions were sent to Lord
Howe who was convalescing in Bath. 38
 The seamen knew and trusted Howe, looked
upon him as a friend, almost a father. He sailed with Anson, Vernon, Boscawen, Hawke
and Kempenfeldt. Howe's ship, Dunkirk, fired the first shots of the Seven Years War.
During the early stages of the War for American Independence, he commanded the
forces at sea, while his brother, Sir William, commanded those on land. 39 He relieved the
Siege of Gibraltar in 1782 and gave England's its first victory against revolutionary
France at the Glorious 1 s
 of June. During the Royal Procession following the fleet's re-
turn to Portsmouth, Howe pointed to the crew of Queen Charlotte and said: 'Tis not I! 'tis
those brave fellows who have gained the victory!'40
Ibid. Spencer toP, 12 December 1796
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Fourteen years earlier when he was First Lord of the Admiralty, Howe demonstrated his
willingness to listen to complaints and earned the appellation, the 'Seamen's Friend'.
Ships returning from the long and unsuccessful war in North America mutinied. Howe
made several trips to Portsmouth to settle their grievances. Time, rather than money, was
at issue. The seamen were impatient to be paid off. In wartime, merchant companies
competed with and paid far more than the navy for the services of seamen. In peacetime,
the navy reverted to its normal establishment and seamen competed with each other to
secure what berths remained available in the merchant service. For those who could not
find one, life was grim: "What must we poor sailors do by and by, when we cannot get a
voyage? Go on shore and spend our money, then be obliged to either rob or plunder?
Then there [will be] nobody to take our part, but hang us like so many dogs!'41
At the end of February 1783, Howe learned from the senior officer at Spithead, Rear-
Admiral Sir Alexander Hood,42
 'The people ... are quiet, and do the duty of the ships
without murmurs, but with a serious, silent, and fixed determination not to proceed to
sea, but to ports where their ships may be ordered to be paid off.' 43
 Hood rhetorically
added what he would repeat almost verbatim fourteen years later: 'I wish Parliament had
coincided with these sentiments, which in my humble opinion would have prevented this
most extraordinary combination to resist all orders but such as correspond with their
present resolution.'
Howe learned delays in paying the ships off had given rise to rumours. Apparently after
hearing from 'ignorant or mischievous people from the shore, that the ships, just re-
turned from foreign service, would not be paid off; but refitted and sent abroad again',
the crew of Janus confined their officers, refused to let their captain come on board and
'resorted to such precautions as were thought necessary to defend themselves against
force'. Undaunted, Howe:
proceeded to Spithead, having sent word to the Janus he was coming on board.
The side was manned by the mutineers, and the side-ropes put over by the crew, and
his Lordship was received with the usual honours and the greatest respect. He pro-
ceeded to the quarterdeck, and desired all hands to be called; told them how much
grieved he was to hear of such mutinous conduct in British seamen, whom he had
always found orderly and obedient, and for whose welfare he had hoped they knew
he took a very deep interest, but that it was utterly impossible he could give any
countenance whatever, let the cause be what it might, to disobedience of lawful
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authority, and disrespect to their officers. He assured them that he always had been,
and was then, more than ever, as became the high and responsible situation he had
the honour to hold, ready to listen to any complaints they had to make, and to com-
ply with any reasonable request they might address to him; and told them that he had
now come down expressly to know what their grievance was, and what had induced
them to adopt a line of conduct so unbecoming British seamen. He assured them
they were acting under the influence of a false report; that the Janus would be paid
off, although it had been decided by his predecessor that she should be kept in
commission; and, to say the truth, he could not but regret she was not so to be kept,
as it was with great reluctance he parted with so fine a ship's company as was then
standing before him; however, he again assured them she should be paid off. Imme-
diately on this, these brave but deluded men gave three hearty cheers, having, as they
said, the fullest confidence in the declaration of his Lordship, whom they had long
considered as the 'Sailor's friend'!
The seamen may have styled him so knowing 'he affected that character, but naval offi-
cers of that day thought that he did so invidiously to them.' 45 Alfred Mahan suggests it
may have involved 'more of flattery to a man's foibles than credit to his discretion and
his judgement'. Sir John Barrow described Howe as being accorded traditional honours,
treated with elaborate respect, and speaking directly with the mutineers, setting a prece-
dent that was far more important than what he said. As First Lord of the Admiralty, he
met with mutineers, listened to their complaints and complied with their 'reasonable re-
quests' to be paid off. Howe came to Portsmouth with the 'fullest approbation of the
King' and 'spent the best part of two days in visits to the more restless of the ships, from
sloops to three-deckers, "pacifying" the men and apparently telling each ship in turn that
she should be the first to lay up'.47
Memories on the lower deck were collective and long. In 1797 the seamen of the Chan-
nel fleet had reason to believe Black Dick would hear the prayers of their petitions and
champion their cause. They certainly expected him to do more than make perfunctory
enquiries and forward their petitions to the Admiralty.
Unfortunately, Howe was not well. He suffered from gout to the extent that on most
days he could not walk unaided. Before the Glorious First of June he asked to retire. Af-
ter the battle he collapsed into the arms of a young Edward Codrington on the quarter-
deck of Queen Charlotte saying Why, you hold me up as if I were a child.' Again, Howe
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wrote to the Admiralty 'I am with much concern obliged to renew my request to be re-
lieved in the command of the fleet, the important duties of which my infirmities render
me unable to discharge.' 49
 Six months later, he begged to be 'released from a charge, at-
tended with many circumstances of anxiety and dissatisfaction'. With each request,
Howe was prevailed upon, sometimes by the king, to continue. As a concession to his
infirmities, he was permitted to spend most of his time ashore, often in the Pump Room
at Bath. While the public may have been reassured, Howe recogmsed the impossibility of
the arrangement and renewed his request to be relieved. He hoped to precede 'the call,
which may be daily expected, of the public, to quit a situation requiring better constitu-
tional, as well as mental, faculties than I can boast.'5'
He sometimes spoke of the advantages, physical and mental, which fitted younger
men for positions of command. In July of 1796 he referred to himself as 'still very
much an Invalid, and divested of that ministerial countenance by which the exercise
of my authority in the Fleet can only derive support'. He had prwately intimated his
wished to be released from his position: 'to that intimation however, it was not con-
descended to make any reply'.52
On 8 April 1797, after nearly sixty years of distinguished service, Howe had had enough.
He submitted a final letter of resignation:
My advanced time of life, and slow progress in the re-establishment of my health af-
ter a confinement by illness for several months, oblige me to solicit the Lords Com-
missioners of the Admiralty, that I may be relieved in the comnund of the Channel
Fleet, for performing the duties of which important station, my increasing infirmities
leave me little prospect of being again able to undertake.53
Unfortunately, instead of describing what might happen, Howe described what had hap-
pened. For all practical purposes, the fleet had been without a commander-in-chief for
three years. Instead, it was 'administered by the Admiralty as a number of independent
squadrons'. Bridport was given Howe's responsibilities without his authority. Both dis-
cipline and morale suffered.
As acting commander-in-chief, Bridport was in line for succession, but lacked the confi-
dence of the Admiralty, the respect of his colleagues and the affection of his men. Lord
Hugh Seymour, a rear-admiral in the fleet and a junior member of the Admiralty, corn-
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mented 'I suppose he will become commander-in-chief in form, as there are certainly
many reasons which recommend that measure, though we are not ignorant of the contre
which may be urged to balance them.' 55
 St Vincent, who replaced Bridport as com-
mander in-chief of the Channel fleet in 1799, regarded him 'as a poor indecisive, uni-
maginative and uninspiring commander and regularly referred to him as "Old Lady Bnd-
port". Edward Pellew, who commanded the fleet's Western Squadron, spared nothing
in his criticism when Bridport retired:
You will have heard that we are to have a new commander-in-chief heaven be
praised. The old one is scarcely worth drowning, a more contemptible or more mis-
erable animal does not exist. I believe there never was a Man so universally despised
by the whole Service. A mixture of Ignorance, avarice and spleen.57
Apparently, his affections were reciprocated:
Bridport's detestation for Pellew requires explanation. It was not personal, in that the
two men had hardly met. Like most naval feuds, it was a matter of prize-money. As
long as Warren, Pellew, Saumarez, and their like, were given separate commands in
the Channel, very little profit came to the commander-in--chief. Frigates under Acimi-
ralty orders did not share profits with flag-officers. Now, avarice was Bridport's pe-
culiar weakness. His large fortune, based on what he acquired by marrying two heir-
esses in succession, would have been larger still but for Pellew. The continual
presence of the Falmouth squadrons both literally and figuratively to the windward
of him was the commander-in-chiefs perpetual grievance.58
Howe and Bridport allowed their relationship to deteriorate to the point where they sim-
ply did not communicate. Laughton commented, 'Howe, as Bridport's senior and nomi-
nal commander-in-chief expected a degree of deference which Bridport did not pay, and
the neglect offended Howe.'59 Money remained at the root of the matter.
Howe thought the feud began when he was First Lord of the Admiralty (December
1783 - July 1788), because he demanded a sum due to Greenwich Hospital which
Bridport had in his hands. It was sealed by Bridport's neglect to answer several offi-
cial letters written to him by Howe after the battle of 1 June. There must have been
some essential want of harmony in their characters that made it impossible for them
to work together. In 1795 Howe wrote to Sir Roger Curtis: 'Should it be necessary
for me again to resume the command at sea, I shall be compelled to declare my total
inability to serve again with him.'6°
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Bridport's anomalous status deprived him of the commander-in-chief's share of prize
money, which he considered an entitlement, if not a prerogative. Ironically, a magnani-
mous gesture by Howe hurt more than it helped.
Circumstanced as Lord Howe now was, under the probability of never again being
able to hoist his flag, and yet not permitted to resign; prompted by that noble and
generous feeling which actuated him through life, and disdaining to receive emolu-
ments arising from the situation he held in a service in which the state of his health
rendered it morally certain he would never again take an active share, he determined
on making a voluntary surrender of those advantages which every commander-in-
chief, before and after him, whether on shore or afloat, had considered his due, and
made no scruple in appropriating to himself.61
For Bridport, the gesture came too late. In addition to being deprived of the prize money
won by the squadrons operating under Admiralty orders, he was also denied the com-
mander-in-chief's share of the three French ships he captured off Isle de Groix on 23
June 1795, just before Howe submitted his letter. Bridport complained 'the six thousand
reserved by Lord Howe, I shall ever feel the loss of, being unhandsomely taken from
me.'62 Barrow dismissed his resentment as 'mean and paltry', but the sum, although
Howe's by right, was far from paltry.63
Howe ignored Bridport. While commanding the fleet from Bath, he communicated his
wishes and kept abreast of matters through a network of favourites, including Roger
Curtis, Andrew Snape Douglas and Hugh Seymour. Unfortunately, at the time of the
mutiny, Curtis was at Plymouth, Douglas was on his deathbed and Seymour was off, un-
der Admiralty orders, chasing treasure galleons. As a result of their mutual enmity and
despite Barrow's suggestions to the contrary, Howe neglected to inform Bridport of the
petitions received in early March.
The petitions were short, respectful and virtually identicaL While newspapers later
learned of their existence, they never saw them. Nevertheless, as Howe feared, contem-
porary observers were quick to blame him: 'Lord Howe has been
censured as having, by his neglect to the Petitions of the Navy, been instrumental to the
recent disorders.'64 The injury to his pride was complete when the Sun quoted one sea-
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man as saying he had lost his place 'in the harts of British seamen'.65
 Howe's efforts to
salvage his reputation seemed pathetic. An opposition paper commented:
The Seamen principally accuse Lord Howe of forcing them to Mutiny; but we are
convinced, his Lordship will fully justify his conduct. He attended yesterday in his
place, in the House of Lords, dressed in full Uniform, to defend himself; but Minis-
ters did not find it convenient to appearP'
As commander-in-cMef Howe was responsible for the ships and the men of his fleet
regardless of his circumstances. No explanations, no justification mattered. It was true,
but Brenton's criticism was unfair
The seamen, by means of anonymous letters, had stated to Lord Howe, the com-
mander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, the hardships under which they labourecl, but
the noble Earl, ever deaf to the voice of remonstrance or complaint, coming in such
a shape, had no notion of governing the navy by other means than the Articles of
War; the round robins and petitions he received were therefore laid aside, without the
subject being mentioned in the privy council, or perhaps (till just before the explo-
sion) to the board of Admiralty.67
Schomberg offered an equally unsympathetic portrait of Howe:
In the month of February petitions were sent from all the line of battle ships at
Portsmouth to Lord Howe; but being all written by one person, and couched in the
same language, it was presumed they were only the productions of some factious or
mad brained individuals, who were too contemptible for notice; the petitions were
therefore thrown aside, and obtained no answers.68
Although indisposed, Howe was far from indifferent He understood what was asked and
what was expected of him. On 4 March he asked Lord Hugh Seymour, an admiral in the
Channel fleet and a junior lord of the Admiralty, to investigate. Complaints about wages
were common, but polished petitions and measured appeals were not. Howe suspected
the designs of an individual, rather than the feelings of the fleet.
The petitions from the three last-mentioned ships, dated the 28th of last month, are I
think evidently copied by the same person, though the writing appears different on a
cursory inspection. Neither the motive nor the matter of these papers require any
comment; but I shall take them with me to town, when I return thither, for Lord
Spencer's private information. I suspect the whole of them to be the fabrication of
the same individual69
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He did not lay or throw the petitions aside. Out of touch, Howe failed to sense the ur-
gency of the situation. Unaware of Pakenham's warning, he missed the significance of
the petitions. Unwell, he depended on others to make enquiries and gauge the mood of
the fleet, others who provided more reassurance than accuracy in their responses. Inevi-
tably, the arrangements made for Howe to remain in command proved unworkable.
When the crisis arrived, he failed to recognise it. Unable to investigate, he unwisely as-
sumed 'the wisdom of the Admiralty will best decide hereon.'7° When more petitions ar-
rived, rather than forwarding them to Whitehall, Howe 'wrote to the Officer at Ports-
mouth, to whom I was naturally to expect such applications would, in my absence, be
addressed, to inquire whether any such dissatisfaction existed in the fleet'. 7' Captain Gra-
ham Moore, Melamptis, recorded in his diary entry of 16 April 1797:
The cause of this was found to have originated some time back; the ,Queen Charhtte
and a number of ships had sent up a petition to Lord Howe, to be presented to the
Lords of the Admiralty, for an increase of their pay. This was given by Lord Howe to
Lord Hugh Seymour who laid it before the Board, but they did no think fit to take
any notice of it.72
Anonymous petitions posed a problem. Howe explained: 'I could not reply to applica-
tions which were anonymous, nor acknowledge the receipt of them to parties unavowed
and unascertained.' He concluded: 'Demands for an increase of pay, by Fleet or Army on
service, are not to be discussed, I apprehend, in anonymous correspondence.' But, con-
trary to his suggestion, anonymous petitions were not unusual. Considering the 'almost
unbridgeable gulf between upper and lower decks in the navy at this time, communica-
tion tended to take the form of anonymous letters left on the quarterdeck under cover of
darkness'.73
 Round robins and such letters usually received a wise captain's prompt at-
tention and resulted in prompt redress of grievances, as most 'sea officers were too sen-
sible to make an issue of something they were powerless to prevent.' 74
 Those insensible
discovered seamen had ways of making their displeasure felt, shot-rolling, 'accidentally'
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dropping objects from aloft and leaving blocks or buckets in 'dangerous and ill-lighted
spots between decks'.75
When other methods failed, mutiny provided a formal system of public protest to
bring grievances to the notice of authority. It was a sort of safety-valve, harmless, in-
deed useful, so long as it was not abused. It was part of a system of social relations
which provided an effective working compromise between the demands of necessity
and humanity, a means of reconciling the Navy's need of obedience and efficiency
with the individual's grievances. It was a means of safeguarding the essential stability
of shipboard society, not destroying it.76
Such mutinies operated according to unwritten rules and conventions:
- No mutiny shall take place at sea, or in the presence of the enemy.
- No personal violence may be employed (although a degree of tumult and shouting
is permissible).
- Mutinies shall be held in pursuit only of objectives sanctioned by the traditions of
the Service77
In 1797, things were rather different.78
 With the addition of 100,000 men, most of them
unwilling and many of them unfamiliar with naval conventions, the gulf between officers
and their men increased.
Spencer combined his indifference to maritime traditions with an inflexible approach.
Like Windham, he seemed more concerned with the threat to social order. Subordination
to authority and rigid discipline replaced informal understandings, and were assumed to
be the only way to maintain order in a rapidly expanding navy. Mutiny was not tolerated.
Mr Barrow of the Admiralty made its position perfectly clear in his better known work:
The fate that has attended almost every one of those concerned in the mutiny and pi-
racy of his Majesty's ship Boun!y ought to operate as a warning to, and make a deep
impression on the minds of, our brave seamen, not to suffer themselves to be led
astray from the straightforward line of their duty, either by order or persuasion of
some hot-brained, thoughtless, or designing person, whether their superior or equal,
but to remain faithful, under all circumstances, to their commanding officer, as any
mutinous proceedings or disobedience of his orders are sure to be visited upon them
in the long run, either by loss of life, or by a forfeiture of that liberal provision which
the British government has bestowed on its seamen for long and faithful services.79
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Ringleaders were to be found and punished to provide examples. Brenton was far from
unbiased in observing: 'fearful that the leaders in such a cause might have been selected
as examples for punishment, they unfortunately had recourse to such means in prefer-
ence to an open and manly representation, which no doubt would have received due at-
tention'. 8° Although he did acknowledge:
Attention ought not ... to have been withheld under the pretence that no signature
was attached to their petitions .... Had these been duly answered, by granting the re-
quired indulgences in the first instance, which were afterward extorted from the
Government by force, there would have been no general mutiny, the lives of many
valuable men might have been saved, and the navy spared the disgrace of a general
insubordination; nor would the country at large have been subjected to serious ap-
prehensions, amply proved by the fall of the Three per Cent. Consols to 45½.
The Admira/A' Response
In 1797 mutiny was considered an affront to authority and a threat to order, rather than a
protest against poor pay or conditions. As it involved 30,000 men, paralysed the fleet and
appeared to leave the country open to invasion, the mutiny at Spithead was inherently
political. To govermnent, the seamen's grievances were irrelevant as their methods be-
came the issue. Spencer dealt with the mutiny as government dealt with other political
protests. He denigrated the warnings, ignored the petitions and encouraged others to
take a firm hand. He was determined to contain the problem, restore discipline and keep
things quiet. He assumed the Admiralty could preclude public discussion because it con-
trolled the news. It determined which dispatches, reports and letters were released, which
were filed and which were thrown away. Before and after the mutiny, the system worked,
but, at Spithead, it failed.
On Easter Sunday, 1797, the seamen of the Channel fleet took their appeal to the public.
They had exhausted their other options. Each of the seventeen ships-of-the-line at Spi-
thead sent new petitions to Parliament and the Admiralty. Petitions, signed by the thirty-
four delegates representing their shipmates, were published in most newspapers. Their
message was clear. They refused to weigh anchor until they received a reply. In a letter to
Lord Bridport, they hinted at their frustration: 'we sent a petition to Earl Howe for the
augmentation of our wages and has not received the least comfort from that quarter.'81
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Bridport, who had not been informed of the seamen's petitions and was apparently un
aware of their discontent, wrote to the Admiralty:
I have very much to lament that some answer had not been given to the various let-
ters transmitted to Earl Howe, and the Admiralty which would in my humble opin-
ion have prevented the Disappointment and Ill Humour which at present prevails in
the Ships under my Orders. I therefore conclude their Lordships will not direct the
Squadron to proceed to Sea, before some answer is given to these Petitions, as I am
afraid it could not be put into execution, without the appearance of serious conse-
quences which the Complexion of the Fleet manifestly indicates.82
In response, Admiralty Secretary Evan Nepean suggested taking 'the most vigorous &
effectual measures for checking its progress & securing the Ringleaders'. He assumed the
presence of outside influences and advised Bridport to prevent 'as much as may be [pos-
siblej any communication between the Seamen belonging to the different ships, & also
between them & people from the shore who may possibly have in some degree been in-
strumental in exciting the present discontent'. 83
 Bridport responded:
With respect to using vigorous and effectual measures, for getting the better of the
crews of the ships at Spithead, their Lordships will see, that is impossible to be done,
or securing the ring leaders; I therefore see no means of checking the progress of this
Business, but by complying with the Prayer of the Petition.M
His frustration became explicit in his next letter:
Their Lordships desire me to use every means in my power to restore the discipline
of the Fleet, would to God I had influence sufficient for this important object which
nothing in my opinion will be able to effect, but a compliance with their Petitions.85
However, having ignored warnings, precedents and previous petitions, the Admiralty
still hoped to contain and control the situation:
I have their Lordship's commands to acquaint you in return thereto, that if, as you
state in your letter, your Lordship should on a consideration of all the existing cir-
cumstances, think it absolutely necessary that an answer should be given to any of
the Petitioners, such answer should be confined to acquainting them that their appli-
cation has been communicated to their Lordships, and that the subject will have that
consideration which its importance requires.
Whatever Your Lordship may determine with respect to the communication which
you propose should be made, their Lordships are of opinion that no change ought to
take place in the orders which have been given to your Lordship for sending part of
your Squadron to S Helens.
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Bridport was thought to be over-reacting and was advised:
under the present circumstances they feel it impossible for them to authorize
Your Lordship to give any farther answer to the Petitioners than that their applica-
tions will be taken into immediate consideration; but that the subject is of a nature
that it cannot be decided upon without mature deliberation; in the mean time their
Lordship trust that every means will be exerted to restoee the discipline of the fleet,
and for carrying their orders into execution of sending a part of it as speedily as pos-
sible to St. Helens.87
Bridport complied without conviction as he advised his captains:
I am to acquaint the crews of His Majesty's Ships under my command, that I have
transmitted their Petitions to the Lords of the Admiralty, and I am authorized to as-
sure them, that their Petitions will be taken into serious arid immediate consideration,
as their importance requires.
And the commander-in-chief trusts this answer will be satisfactory and that the dif-
ferent Ships' companies will immediately return to their duty, as the Service on the
Country requires their proceeding to sea.88
Admiral Sir Alan Gardner described the seamen's response:
I have myself read to the Company of His Majesty's Ship Rojyal Sorngn, the memo-
randum which your Lordship transmitted to me this afternoon stating that the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty had received the Petitions which you had transmit-
ted to them, and that you were authorized to assure the different ships' companies of
the Fleet, that their petitions will be taken into serious and immediate consideration
which their importance required, and that your Lordship hoped this answer would be
satisfactory, and that the Crews of the different ships would immediately return to
their duty, as the service of their country required their proceeding to sea. On this
occasion I made use of every argument in my power, to induce them to carry the
ship down to St. Helen's, but am sorry to acquaint you, they seem determined to re-
main at Spithead, until such time as the prayer of their Petition is granted, and under
the present circumstances & disposition of their ship's Company, I am sorry to say I
see no prospect of their soon returning to their duty.89
Throughout the mutiny, the Admiralty failed to appreciate either the depth of the sea-
men's frustration, the breadth of their resolve, or the consequence of ignoring them. It
saw the mutiny as a challenge to authority, rather than a protest of pay or conditions. It
concluded the men and officers of the Channel fleet needed more activity, not more
money. It assumed, once the fleet was at sea and the ships wei divided, the men would
return to discipline and subordination. It failed to appreciate that neither the mutiny nor
87 Ibid, Nepean to Bndport, 17 April 1797
PRO ADMI/107, Bridport to fleet, 17 April 1797
PRO ADMI/5125, G2rdner to Bndport, 17 April 1797
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even the news of the mutiny could be contained. Once the seamen's appeal was made
public, government had no choice but to respond in public.
While the Admiralty and government were slow, the seamen were quick to appreciate the
influence of the media. Michael Lewis described them as 'uncannily wise in their dealings
with the nation as a whole, for from the first they meant to get and keep the sympathy
and the good opinion of the country.' 9° This was a mutiny in the public eye. After ignor-
ing the warnings and doing nothing to prevent the mutiny, government did its utmost to
deny it. With the news came the potential for panic. England's 'wooden walls' protected
her trade empire and provided her only defence against invasion. As recent rumours
caused market drops and bank runs, government was understandably concerned as to
how the news from Portsmouth might affect the public mind. Its concerns were justified.
How newspapers covered the mutiny, what they covered, what they did not cover, and,
most significantly, how editors, politicians and the seamen themselves used the medium
to influence public opinion did affect its outcome.
By the afternoon of 17 April, more news arrived from Portsmouth, but it was confused.
The St announced, 'There has been a mutiny on board several of the ships in Lord
Bridport's fleet, but it is happily settled.'91 The following morning, the London Chronicle
denied the sighting of the Dutch fleet and elaborated on the unpleasant intelligence from
Portsmouth:
We are fully authorised to contradict the report of yesterday of 63 sail of Dutch ships
having sailed from the Texel some time since, as it is wholly void of foundation. No
part of the Dutch fleet has put to sea, nor is likely to be formidable if it does. The
Brest fleet, though in a state of respectable force, is not equal to meet either of our
detachments of the Channel fleet. The preparations at Dunkirk are not such as to
give cause for any uneasiness.
The letters received yesterday from Portsmouth brought the very unpleasant inteffi-
gence of discontents having shown themselves on board all the ships of Lord Brid-
port's fleet, on account of the demands made by the seamen for an increase in pay,
and a degree of refusal on their part to go to sea, until these demands are complied
withY
9°M Lewis, Spthea'kAn Informal Hirtory (London George Allen & Unwm Co 1972), 136-137
91 Star, 17 April 1797
92 Lon, Chrs,,ic/e, 15-18 April 1797; The Times, 18 April 1797. Identical statements appeared in both papers,
suggesting the paragraphs were supplied by an official source.
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A Question of Semantics
The news from Portsmouth was bad. How bad, government preferred the public not to
know. Euphemisms, equivocations and prevarications were de rzgueur in government
newspapers. Mutiny became 'discontent', 'a spirit of unwillingness' or 'a degree of re-
fusal'. Opposition papers, more intent on provoking than pacifying the public, presented
a less pleasant picture:
The disagreeable intelligence which was communicated to the Admiralty on Sun-
day morning has now transpired, and, we are sorry to say, it is extremely serious. Or-
ders were sent down to Spithead on Friday last for Lord Bridport's fleet to sail. The
Crews of all the ships, to a man, declared that they would not go to sea, unless their
pay was increased eight shillings per month, which as their month contains only 28
days, is 5L 4s. per annum. They conducted their previous proceedings with great se-
crecy and prudence. It burst out in all the ships at the same moment; but unless in
this demand they shewed no disposition to riot or disorder. Admiral Pole came to
town on Sunday night with further dispatches from Lord Bridport; and yesterday af-
ternoon Earl Spencer, after a conference with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, set
off for Portsmouth, accompanied by Lord Arden, Admiral Young, and Mr. Marsden
Under Secretary of the Admiralty. A Board of Admiralty will be held as soon as they
arrive, and we trust that this most unseasonable affair will be speedily and happily
terminated.93
The editors added a barb at the end:
We lament to learn that the same system of procrastination which runs through all
our services has extended also to our Navy, and that the arrears due to Officers re-
main unpaid, notwithstanding all remonstrances which they have repeatedly made.
While partisan, their observations on government procrastination proved prophetic.
Questioning the ministers' competence and ethics, the Morning Post emphasised arrears:
and now we find that the money due to our gallant seamen has been withheld,
while the Sinecure Salaries of Mess. Pitt, Grenville and Rose have been paid with the
utmost punctuality. The Military, it was conjectured, would only fight for the Minis-
ters if they were paid in Cash; the Sailors, it was conjectured, (without pay) would
fight from a love of their Country. ... It seems that this is not the first time the sea-
men have manifested an unwillingness to sail on account of arrears; but they have
always hitherto been cajoled by an appeal to their affection to their country. The
same expedient it was thought would again succeed; but the fallacy of this hope was
proved in the course of Sunday; the seamen remained finn in their determination,
but orderly and peaceable in their conductY'
Two days later, it suggested:
Mor,srng Chronicle, 18 April 1797
Monring Post, 18 April 1797
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Every effort is made by the government to conceal what is passing at Spithead. We
have reason to believe, that not only are precautions taken to prevent communication
between the town of Portsmouth and the shipping, but that letters are opened, and
some of them stopped at the Post Office.95
One of the letters intercepted was a petition to Charles James Fox, MP from 'The Sea-
men Able & Ordinary & Landsmen of His Majesty's Ship London on behalf of themselves
& the Rest of their Brethren employed in His Majesty's Royal Navy'. 96
 A determination
to politicise their cause by involving opposition was implicit in the instructions given to
the crew of HMS Defence when after some hesitation, they joined the fleet:
Friends
I am happy to hear of your honbL Courage towards redress. We are carring on the
Business with the greatest Expeditions. We Flatter ourselves with that hopes that we
shall obtain our wishes for they had Better go to War with the whole globe then with
their own subjects - We mean the day that the Petitions go to London to take Charge
of The Ships until we have a proper Answer From government - the signal will Be
First made By the Queen Charlotte - The 1t signal is the Union jack At the Main With
2 guns fired - this is for taking charge and sending the officers and Women out of
Every ship the 2d. signal is a Red flag at The mizen topmast Head and 2 guns this is
to send a speaker from every ship - the petitions is to Be ready and go on monday if
posible. You must send them and your Letters to Mr Pink, the Bear and Ragged staff
as that Is our post office - Direct one petition to Evan Nepean Secretary to the Ad-
miralty The other to Honourable Charles James Fox MP South Street Grosvenor
Square
Success to the proceedings97
In the undelivered letter, the seamen reassured the leader of opposition they were
not actuated by any spirit of sedition or disaffection whatsoever; on the contrary,
it is indigence and extreme penury alone that is the cause of our complaints and the
only reason for troubling the Legislative body of the Nation in Parliament assem-
bled.98
Apparently, their post office at the Bear and Ragged Staff was not secure, as the letter
was forwarded to the Admiralty, rather than Fox. While rumours persisted that he would
present another petition on the seamen's behalf, Fox complained 'he knew nothing at all
of the transactions ... except what he had read in the public Papers'Y9
 The opportunity
was missed; and rather than supporting the seamen's cause, opposition saw their actions
as proof of a breakdown in naval discipline and government's incompetence.
IbüL, 20 April 1797
PRO ADM1/107, Londons to Fox, 15 April 1797
PRO ADMI/1022, Royal Sovereigns to Defences, 16 April 1797
PRO ADMI/107, Londons to Fox, 15 April 1797
Morning Post, 20 April 1797; The Times, 25 April 1797
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After providing the first report of the mutiny, the T,we Briton did its best to deny the mu-
tiny's existence. Its denials actually preceded the mutiny. On Saturday afternoon, 15
April, the editors felt compelled:
to refute the malignant assertion of the complaints of the seamen originating from
arrears of pay. The usual regularity has been observed in the payment of the fleet;
and the assertion alluded to could only be made with views the most insidious and
wicked. 100
Coming two days before the seamen's complaints appeared in print, the comment con-
firmed public awareness of the seamen's discontent and hinted of official involvement,
particularly as the Admiralty had been warned of an imminent outbreak. 101 The True
Briton reassured the public, minimised the dangers and concealed ministerial sins. It in-
sisted the 'discontent on the subject of wages' onboard 'some' of the ships at Spithead
had 'subsided'. When the facts failed to fit its descriptions, it explained:
If we have said little upon the subject of the discontent that has shewn itself amongst
the Seamen of the Ships under the command of Lord Bridport, it was from an im-
pression of the delicacy of the subject, of its importance, in a national point of view;
and of the danger, of misrepresentation or exaggeration, into which our Contempo-
raries have almost generally fallen, from their systematic malignity, or precipitate
folly.102
The news from Portsmouth was deemed to be either too delicate or too important to
share with readers. Instead, they were assured the Admiralty was aware of the problem
and had several plans under consideration, 'which would not greatly burden the State', a
curious choice of words as four months before Spencer dismissed Pakenham's modest
proposals because they would involve 'an enormous increase to our disbursements a!-
ready sufficiently burthensome'.'°3
On 18 April The Times, whose ties to government were more tenuous, also hesitated to
publish the news from Portsmouth. It focused on the unreliability, rather than the mdci-
cacy of reports. Scrupulously avoiding the word mutiny, the editors justified their ap-
proach:
100 True Briton, 15 April 1797
101 Captain Charles Patton, Transport Office at Portsmouth, warned the Admiralty by telegraph of the mu-
tiny, three days before it occurred. C Patton,A Sketch of the Lsfe Services &CharacteroftheLateAdmira1Phiip
Patton (Gospore Johnson, 1818, 32; PRO ADM3/136, Admiralty Minutes, 13 April 1797; ADM1/1022,
Parker to Nepean, 14 April 1797; NMM WYN1O9/7/14, P Patton, 8 December 1797, 3; Hannay, 362.
Charles Patton is frequently confused with his brother Philip.
102 True Briton, 19 April 1797
103 BL Althorp, MS G187, Spencer to Pakenhain, 12 December 1796
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As we have every reason to expect that the circumstances of what has passed will be
very grossly perverted by some for the purposes of faction, and by others through
ignorance, we have made it our business to inform ourselves of the true state of the
case, and although it must be confessed that the affair is extremely unpleasant, yet we
are sure that it is not so serious as it is generally represented to be)°4
The Times and opposition's Star offered the same description of the situation until sum-
marising the seamen's grievances. The Times suggested:
They therefore prayed for an increase of allowance; and a hope was expressed that an
answer would be given to their prayer before they were ordered to sea again. This
expression was however qualified with an exception - unless the enemy's fleet should
be known to be at sea.
While the Star bluntly and somewhat inaccurately stated:
They therefore prayed for an increase of wages, and an equal distribution of prize
money. Till these are complied with, they one and all positively refuse to weigh an-
chor, unless it shall appear that an enemy's fleet is on the coast, or a convoy for mer-
chant ships should be required. It is also insisted on, that one Captain charged with
cruelty and oppression, shall be discharged from the fleet.105
The Times was vague, while the Stai though providing more detail, included the issue of
prize money, which, like arrears, was a common complaint, but was not mentioned in the
seamen's petitions.
A week later, The Times criticised opposition papers for loose and indecent sarcasm's
which have been thrown out ... with an air of exultation' but, in a comment hinting of
an emerging sense of responsibility to their readers and the public, it also condemned
rival government papers:
We must also condemn either the ignorance or the affectation of it that has marked
two of the Daily Papers (the Ttia Briton and the Sun) which have very indecently been
assuring the Public day by day since Tuesday last, from the highest authority, that the
business was happily settled to the satisfaction of all parties.'°6
As the petitions to Howe were never made public and those to Parliament and the Adnii-
ralty were not published until 20 April, the confusion was understandable. Those com-
nutted to presenting news (rather than propaganda) depended on official sources and
correspondents to provide details. Unfortunately, official sources were reticent and cor-
respondents in Portsmouth could only supply rumours.
104 The Times, 18 April 1797
105 Star, 18 April 1797
106 The Times, 24 April 1797. Both the True Briton and the Sun were published by John I-knot, who several
years before had earned The Timels enmity.
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From government's perspective, there was no point in publishing the earlier petitions. It
certainly had no wish to publicise the fact that, when the seamen's requests had been
modest and submitted through proper channels, they were ignored. It could not admit
that the mutiny could have been avoided or that now that the requests had become de-
mands, it had no choice but to comply. To avoid public humiliation, government dis-
missed the 28 February petitions as the machinations of designing men. In their 15 April
petitions, the seamen obligingly supplied a scapegoat, Lord Howe. Unaware that Howe
had forwarded their petitions, they assumed they were left 'unprotected by him who had
seen so many Instances of our Intrepidity in carraying the British Into every part of the
sea with Victory and Success'. 107 The 15 April petitions were published along with a rec-
ord of the Admiralty's successful negotiations on 20 and 22 April; and Howe, rather than
government, suffered humiliation. The seamen provided their own interpretation of what
happened as well as a sense of the determination and discipline governing their actions:
The aforesaid Petition being transmited to his Lordship and Six weeks Expired with-
out any answear various were the Resolutions proposed to get what they aimed at last
another Petition being drawn to the Hon. House of Commons and one to the Admi-
ralty at the same time, the fleet was Determined not to go to Sea till they got what
they aimed at on Saturday the 5" of April the day apoint." for Sending the Petitions
away the Signal was made for sea, amedetely the Queen Charloit Ships C.° made
their Officers acquaint.' with their Desing Likewise the Determenation of the fleet
and gave three Cheers to the fleet which was answered by the fleet.'°8
The seamen's petitions were no longer addressed to their commander-in-chief, whether
Howe or Bridport. Instead, they circumvented the chain of command and assumed the
right to petition Parliament.
'° PRO ADMI/5125, Detail of the Proceedings
108 Ibid.
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WHEREAS a WRITTErS PAPER
was fome Time in the Night of the
30th Inftant, thick to a Gateway in
Butt-Lane, St. Paul, Deptford, con.
taming Seditious Ref1etions on the
Government and Conftitution of the
Country.
Whoever wilt give Information, lb that
the Pcrfon who Wrote or Stuck up the
fame, may b apprehended and taken
before a Juftice of thc Peacc,
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Friends and Fellow Seamen!
'1HE Afrociation has offcrcd a Bounty of One Guinca a Man, in Addition td
jI_ his Mnjcfly's Bounty, to induce us to cntcr on l3oard his Majefly's Ships of
War ;—but Bounties, however large they nuty appear at firfi, do not lail long; mci
when they arc expended in Gloaths and other Neccifaries, we are obliged to live
upon ihc fame Pay as before, •which we well know from Expãrhnce we cannot
live upe ri.__Wbat then is . intended by this fccniing Kindncfs ? Evidently
to induce us to engage durfelvcs to zuin our Families, to lofe our Limbs
Lives; nd at the End of a War, which, from all We can Icarn, is at iàft unnc-
ceffaiy, 10 be paid ofl or, in other Words, to be turned adrift, at a Diflance from
our Friends, without the Means of procuring an honcft Livelihood :—Bcfides;
does nc't this Offer of additional Bounty plainly fhew, that the Aflbciation and
jther. are of Opinion that . our prefcnt Pa)' is not fufficient? Life why do they
.,fer it We have always fhewn a Readinefs to meet the Enemies of our Coutitiy,
b that oUr prefent Objeaions do not proceed from Cowardice, but from the drc:ul.
Ilil M;Jrics which we have known 1 fecn, and Icit, in our Families and Co6ncaions
then.L . we cannot confcicntioufly-, cithcr as Men, Briton, or Cbtitiians,. any
longer i :iuntcnance by Comnplianc, fuch ihocking Abufc of Powcr.—Twcnty-two
.ini! inj s a Month, FcIiow-Scazien, is Five Shillings a week! A Sum too fniullThr
.:'vc a Jingle Man to live upon; but many of us have Wives and Familcs, many
!oUicrs, Siflers, and other Relations, whofe very Exificnce dcpnds i4ion. diir Lives
•d Succefs: From thefe we re torn and compelled to accept Lius fmnall Suu; v1mIch
U')t Half what we receive in the Merchants' Scrvicc: Is .not this very hard?
Nw . c oi us chooft a life of War: And if wd arc fuch Fricnds to our Countryuc4
that we are always ready to Itep forward in their Defence, why fimould our Sitna.
tion in 'i mc of Wr be rcnderc4 fo much worfe th*n in Time Of Peace? We call timed
li-'e comniortably,. fupport our Families decently, give our children an konefl and
• iii Education, and make them good and worthy Members of Sociciy.—Iu Tiniç
- Var r;% cannot, from the miferably fmnll Pay, even livc ourfclvcs But (big
z. :,ot t;ic •
 worlt,—ourChildren nd Dependents arc ncgeftcd: They arc
tO all the Mifcrics of Poverty, and ar hindered in their Courfc of Life bj
?rot eaion and Edication. Thefe are great Calamities; and it is to reñiedy i/uj.,
o crcaie Dj/Iurbance:, that we dclirc you .
 to confider fcrioufly hefe Griestinces:
) .0 ho' Wi hope they will be redreffed, yet in ordef to attain .fp dc1irbk.nh Erd,
w' will prcfcrvc Peace and Order; no Violànct . fhall dlfgract 'the Coidua oiMch
who nrc engaged in Co good a Caufe an that in vhich w e cigiccI; tud WtI
we only fcek thc fame Rights of ProteEtion fmth Fccnihig1 hbfcÜ . dwr, im t1i
r of our Fellow-citizens, We doubt nbt but w. fhil bp aicted t cvqt ogd rind
• rus Man in the KLndomn.
I*wcaflle, Fcbruàry .1793.
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Sailor's Complaint
You are welcome to London, dear Jack,
What news have you brought us, I pray?
'From Portsmouth I have lately come,
And now I am discharg'd from the sea.
I have never a copper, brave boy;
I've wages and prize money due.
Damme Jack, truly do say,
You will be hard set to get it, it's true.
Dear shipmate, I've been here for a month,
And cannot get mine for the truth;
On board a man-of-war I went
When I was a frolicsome youth.
My king and my country to serve
I fought like a sailor so bold.
Now that the wars are all over
I really cannot get my gold.
To the navy office each day I did go;
I've been both hungry and dry.
My money I then did demand.
You cannot have it, they cry.
My life I have ventur'd for gold,
My king and my country to serve.
Now the wars are all over
Brave sailors may perish and starve.
Suppose that the war should break out,
Then what will Old England do?
Bad usage we plenty receive
By not paying us our due.
They will cavvil from day to day,
To-morrow you your answer shall have.
Damme Jack, I really do say,
For I think they are acting the knave.
Then truly I don't mean to rebel
Against my good king and his Iaws
Did he then know my distress
He soon would relieve my just cause;
We should be paid with great speed.
The taverns we'd make them to roar,
We'd sp[end it like brave jolly tars;
What else should we do on the shore?
C Firth, ed., Naval Soiigs avd Ba/huh (NRS, 1907), xxxiii, 230-1
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CHAPTER TWO: The Spirit of Kempenfelt
The mutiny came at an awkward moment for Willett Payne. While he convalesced at the
George Inn in Portsmouth, his ship, Lwpetueux, mutirned with the rest of the fleet at Spi-
thead. Given his reputation, his indisposition was more likely to be seen as the product
of an extravagant life ashore, than the rigours of life at sea. 1
 Payne was an intimate of the
Prince of Wales; and, according to John Laughton, an 'associate of the prince in his vices
and a supporter in his baser intrigues'. 2
 Indulging in one such intrigue during the Re-
gency crisis led the captain to make an indiscreet remark about Queen Charlotte. This led
to public censure from Jane, Duchess of Gordon, an intimate of Her Majesty: 'You little,
insignificant, good-for-nothing, upstart, pert chattering puppy, how dare you name your
royal master's mother in that style.' While his impertinence did not go unrewarded, given
his royal patron's temperament, Payne could expect little support in this crisis.3
Aware of the seamen's discontent, the Admiralty 'encouraged' officers of the Channel
fleet to remain on board their ships at Spithead. Even the new commander-in-chief's
presence was expected. Spencer made this, though not his reasoning, clear in a response
to Bridport's request to be allowed to attend to some pressing financial matters ashore:
We deem it very important to keep all the officers of the Fleet under your command
as much together as possible in order that you may be in a constant readiness to put
to sea on any occasion which may arise for it & at the shortest notice. Under the cir-
cumstances I own that I should have wished your Lordship to have remained with
them, as I know of how much efficacy the presence of the Commander in Chief be-
comes in order to keep everything as it should be, especially in a case like the present,
where at any moment an urgent call may happen for the sailing of the Fleet. I hope
therefore that unless the business to which you allude is of a very pressing nature in-
deed, your Lordship will not apply for leave of absence, & in case it is absolutely nec-
essary for you to do so, your absence will be very short.4
Bridport took this as a suggestion, which could be ignored, rather than an order, which
could not. In any case, he absented himself from the fleet until 10 April. As Bridport de-
nied knowledge of discontent within the fleet, he could only assume Spencer alluded to
the imminent sailing of the French fleet. As the first lord was aware of discontent in
'After years of 'precanous health', he was 'seized with an apoplectic fit' and died on 17 November 1803.
Naval Chronick, x (1803), 439
2 DNB, xv, 556
3 He was made a Member of Parharnent for the pocket borough of Huntington and received several lucra-
tive smecures Treasurer of Greenwich Hospital, Comptroller of the household of his Royal Highness the
Prince of Wales, and Lord Warden of the Stannaries.
4 BL Addi MS 35.197.90, Biidport Papers, vii, 31, Spencer to Bridport, March 1797
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Portsmouth and disorder in Brest, the allusion was disingenuous. It also revealed the
depth of Bridport's ignorance. Irrespective of Howe's failure to inform him of the
anonymous petitions, Bridport seemed oblivious to what was considered common
knowledge. The Morning Post, with the advantage of hindsight, reported that when the
fleet had returned to port on 30 March, 'a gloomy discontent pervaded every crew'; and
added 'in every public house in Portsmouth' the seamen's discontent 'has been the
common topic of conversation during many weeks, and the most fatal predictions have
been made'.5
As matters progressed beyond preventive measures, Nepean approved the precautionary
measures already adopted and advised Port Admiral Peter Parker
to order the several Captains & Commanders & every subordinate officer, to re-
main constantly on board their respective ships, so far as their necessary Duties will
admit, and upon discovering any disposition to Mutiny amongst the Crews of their
said ships, to take immediately the most vigorous & effectual measures for checking
its progress & securing the Ringleaders, preventing as much as may be any commu-
nication between the Seamen belonging to the different ships, & also between them
& people from the shore who may possibly have in some degree been instrumental in
exciting the present discontent.6
It was too little too late, but the Admiralty's concerns were justified. Morale had suffered
when the fleet failed to intercept an attempted invasion of Ireland. On 5 January, Burke
wrote to Windham:
the Enemy's design pointed at Ireland, in the Name of God, how did it happen,
that no fleet was off Ireland to oppose the Enemy on his approach, or on failure to
intercept him on his return? While the Jacobin Fleet was at Anchor in Bantry Bay,
Lord Bridport was at Portsmouth, and Colpoys, after going God knows where, re-
turned himself into harbour. The French leave Bantry on the 27th of December, and
Lord Bridport Sails from Portsmouth to look for them on the 3rd of this month; if he
meets any of them it is a miracle, and it must be owing to the terrible condition
which they are in. So much for Intelligence, Foresight, Precaution.7
Maintaining constant blockades and escorting convoys up and down the Channel meant
poor conditions, harsh weather and few opportunities for prize money. The fleet's offi-
cers shared the hardships at sea, but not the opportunities for liberty ashore. As a result,
discipline suffered, not of the men, although it led to resentment, but of the officers, as it
led them to neglect basic responsibilities. On hearing of the mutiny, St Vincent corn-
5 Mornin,g Post, l8ApnI 1797
6	 ADM3 136, Nepean to Parker, 15 April 1797
1 EarI of Rosebery, ed., iV,ndbam Paperr (London: Jenkins, 1913 ,38
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mented: 'all your disorders have arisen from the total dereliction of the most material
part of the duties of Sea Officers.8
Discipline had long been a concern in the Channel fleet. Sixteen years earlier, Rear Ad
miral Richard Kempenfeldt advised Charles Middleton, a kindred spirit and Comptroller
of the Navy, the 'one grand object of the Admiralty should be to restore a strict, orderly
discipline in the Fleet.'9 He observed:
Without discipline is well planned and strictly supported, a military corps or a ship's
crew are no better than a disorderly mob; it is a well formed discipline that gives
force, preserves order, obedience, and cleanliness, and causes alertness and dispatch
in the execution of business. We want in the navy such a discipline which should be
general; and all commanders, &c., required to put it strictly in practice. It has been
for want of this that such a spirit of insolence and licentiousness has so daringly
showed itself of late upon so many occasions.1°
Kempenfeldt's criticism did not stop at the lower-deck. He insisted: 'Captains should not
be absent from their ships, nor lay on shore when at Spithead.'" He was committed to
the reform of naval discipline. His ascetic habits and devotion to duty served as an ex-
ample. To him, it was an organisational problem:
if six, seven, or eight hundred men are left together, without divisions, and the of-
ficers assigned no particular charge over any part of them, who only give orders from
the quarter-deck or gangways - such a crew must remain a disorderly mob, business
will be done awkwardly and tumultuously, without order or dispatch, and the raw
men put into no train of improvement. The officers, having no particular charge ap-
pomted them, the conduct and behaviour of the men are not inspected into; they
know nothing of their proceedings; and the people, thus left to themselves, become
sottish, slovenly and lazy, form cabals, and spirit each other up to insolence and mu-
tiny.12
To remedy the situation, Kempenfeldt supported a divisional system where crews were
divided and sub-divided into groups with officers and petty officers to oversee them.13
Kempenfeldt's colleagues saw him as a theorist, a reformer and a stern disciplinarian.
While some may have resisted his tactical or signalling innovations or resented his pen-
chant for quoting French naval authorities in French, they respected him. Despite his
8 NMM NE4, St Vmcent to Nepean, 27 May 1797
9 J Laughton, ed., Litters ofL,rdBarham (London: NRS, 1907), i, 299
'° IbitL , 304-305; Kempenfelt to Middleton, 28 Dec 1779
IbuL, 299; Kempenfelt to Middleton, 19 Sept 1779
'2 IbitL, 305-306; Kempenfelt to Middleton, 28 Dec 1779
'3 While Admiral Thomas Smith was the first to formally adopt a divisional system (in 1755) and Howe was
an early proponent, Kempenfelt was its most articulate advocate. In 1779 he wrote to Charles Middleton
The only way to keep large bodies of men in order is by dividing and subdividing them, with officers over
each to Inspect and regulate their conduct, to disapline and form them'. IbijL, 306
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austerity, the lower-deck had reason to appreciate the admiraL Kempenfeldt added to
their physical comfort with his measured approach to ship management and to their
material comfort with his darmg capture of twenty prizes off Ushant while a large French
squadron under the command of de Guichen watched helplessly from the leeward.
The Admiralty adopted most of Kempenfeldt's recommendations, including his signal
books and the divisional system. However, having reorganised the lower-deck,' 4
 they
failed to impose any sort of discipline on the quarter-deck. When in port, officers con-
tinued to find excuses to go ashore. Twenty years later, upon assuming command of the
Channel fleet, St. Vincent offered his opinion of the fleet's officers with typical candour:
'You cannot conceive how few men are qualified to command ships of the line." 5
 In
June 1800, he noted that his officers' 'dilatory conduct in port annoys me beyond expres-
sion'.16
On 15 April 1797, while the rest of the fleet's officers remained on board, Willett Payne
was ashore, enjoying the comforts of the George Inn. Thus, he had reason to suspect,
unless he came to be seen as an advocate of discipline and direct action, his reputation
would suffer. Fate provided Payne with an opportunity for redemption. On the morning
of the eighteenth, 'between eleven and twelve o'clock, Earl Spencer, with three other
Lords of the Admiralty, arrived at Mr. Fielding's, the Fountain Inn, Portsmouth'. 17
 The
captain sent a hasty missive from his sickbed, a few hundred yards away:
Weak as I have been, I could not help putting my thoughts upon paper that I might
make an offering of them to your lordship, on the present unhappy posture of our
fleet. I meant to have shaped those loose thoughts, but as they are only meant for
your own private eye, I cannot let slip the opportunity of your being upon the spot of
sending them as they are.18
Rather than accepting responsibility for an internal problem, Payne shifted the blame to
an external source. He boldly declared, 'The character of the present mutiny is perfecfly
French.' He supported this conclusion with an observation he was in no position to
make: 'The singularity of it consists in the great secrecy and patience with which they
'4 lronically, by delegating power to petty officers, the divisional system facilitated the planning and imple
mentation of the mutiny.
' 5 WJames, Old Oak. Life ofJohnJervis (London: Longmans, Green, 1950), 149
'6 B Tunstall,Anatonrji ofNeptune (London: Routledge, 1936), 265
'7 Star, 19 April 1797. Actually, there were only two other Lords, Arden and Young, and the Second Secre
tary, William Marsden.
18 BL Akhorp MSS G197, Payne to Spencer, 18 April 1797
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waited for a thorough union before it broke out, and the immediate estabhshment of a
system of terror.'
Payne would not admit seamen were capable of organising a mutiny on this scale. There
was no terror at Spithead and certainly no need to import systems from France. Their
organisation emerged from long traditions of English labour disputes and food riots.
They were deeply rooted in maritime traditions and reflected the seamen's pride and
power. The need for secrecy and patience was obvious. Having heard countless readings
of the Articles of War, the seamen knew the instant they refused to obey the order to
weigh anchor their actions would be interpreted as mutiny.
Payne's evocative phrasing did not describe what was happening at Spithead. Instead, he
described what was feared - the end of naval discipline and the beginning of social up-
heaval. In doing so, he provided the lords of the Admiralty (and himself) with a diversion
from what would otherwise be seen as negligence. His argument, while specious, was
seductive. He offered no evidence to support his claim, but provided genuine insights
into the disturbance. 'It cannot be dealt with like mutinies in individual ships. System and
management must be met with the like, nor can anything be executed with success till
some apparent disunion is created in the Fleet.' Payne understood the men's strength lay
in their resolve and their oath of fidelity. He saw what most contemporary observers and
historians of the mutiny missed: 'They are perfectly sensible that their force arises from
agreement, and the principle of it, namely, the increase of wages is so seductive that they
cannot probably [be] divided thereon.' 19 However, having offered such a useful observa-
tion, Payne negated its value by suggesting. 'holding out the impropriety of increasing the
lowest classes of seamen with the higher ones, would tend to spread difference of opin-
ion, and call on the higher to keep down the claims of the lower oirders'. He stated the
obvious, but understated a warning 'Irregularities will be sure to produce schisms, but
delay may produce serious mischiefs.' He continued to devise ways of dividing the in-
divisible, but saw certain ships, other than his own, as irredeemable.
If any thing could be proposed that could satisfy one ship only to express a satisfac-
tion, it would run through the fleet with the exception of the Queen Charlotte, Royal
Geoe, and Royal Sowreign, which are seriously in revolt, and should certainly be pun-
'9 Wilham Johnson Neale came dose to recognising Payne's point when he observe& The gnevances
themselves were of such a nature as ought never to have been permitted to exist in any well regulated de-
partment of the public service; and their reasonableness was at once admitted, when presented in a form
and in language which could not be slighted without danger'. Neale Roberts, Historj of the M,rn,rj at Spithead
and the Nore (London: Tegg, 1842), 29-31
20 BL Althorp MSS G197, Payne to Spencer, 18 April 1797
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ished, if possible in the most serious manner. The first might afterwards be sent to
the West Indies.
Payne offered another observation he was in no position to make, coupled with another
insight Spencer ignored:
The disgust shewn by many ships at Spithead (though at present stifled) might be
gradually fomented, and no means should be omitted to excite it. No deviation, how-
ever, has taken place among the crews on the original compact respecting wages.
His most significant point, one taken by contemporary observers, but missed by most
historians, was that 'the mutinous state of the Fleet is not the greatest enormity that pre-
vails.' It was not the disorder, but the order of their actions that worried him. Discipline
was maintained and the business of the fleet continued, provisions were taken on board,
repairs were made, complaints from illegally pressed men were heard and drills (including
small and heavy arms) were conducted - but, according to Payne, with delegates, rather
than officers in charge:
It exercises executive functions. It stops convoys, directs their sailing, distributes or-
ders to the fleet, and the frigates at sea, that have gone from hence, is by their direc-
tion, so that they not only throw off all obedience to the Admiralty, but usurp their
authority. It is therefore a revolution of the fleet, and should be opposed with the
whole vigour of the country. Parliament should come to animated resolutions on it,
and the country be advised to address, particularly the trading towns, whose com-
mercial interests must hereafter suffer (by the employment of these mutineers in the
merchants' service) should the ringleaders be allowed to escape.
He suggested the fleet at Plymouth, if approached carefully and given incentive, might be
turned against their brothers at Spithead:
If the fleet at Plymouth or elsewhere could be brought, jointly, to express their ab-
horrence of the proceedings of the first rates here in particular, without being called
upon to give up their petition for the increase of wages, which might (if proper) be
held out to them at the same time, it might have the best possible effect, and partly
remove the stain on the navy.
He did not scruple to threaten violence or cut off allotments:
I cannot help thinking that this should be accompanied with mounting mortars on
the batteries and Fort Moncton, and as much appearance of vigorous preparation -
this would alarm all the well disposed, who dread a civil conflict, on account of their
families - all allotments might be stopped from this squadron, and they would rally
round their officers.
To secure public sympathies and alienate the seamen from friends and families ashore,
Payne proposed propaganda:
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It is even worth while to procure the insertion of plain written papers in the Star, ex-
pressive of the indignation of the country, and to awaken the pride of the good sea-
men. There have, I know, been measures taken from the fleet to have no other paper
sent off which is generally read.
Defending their honour and insisting the officers of the fleet should effect any solution,
Payne continued to divert responsibility:
With grounds like this to act upon, much useful and effectual exertion might be
made by the officers of the fleet, which would now be only misspent, and serve
rather to raise suspicion and excite mischief in the respective ships, and cripple the
influence which may be exercised hereafter, when exertions may be attempted with
success.
Great assiduity should be used to explore the root of the existing evil, and the pres-
ent irregular communication with the ,Queen Charlotte will throw light upon that sub-
ject hereafter, and the naval difficulties will never be thoroughly adjusted until the Ja-
cobin springs that now direct it, are fairly disclosed and removed; and our best
security is, that the fleet is generally so well affected, that I have no fear of their em-
bracing such doctrines when fairly exposed.
It is necessary, however (in my humble opinion), that they should not be irritated,
immediately, into any act of violence, by which they should be united on a more
criminal and dangerous principle than the present bond that unites them. I have no
doubt of the vigour of the officers, when called into action, with anything of support.
The result of Payne's letter, according to conventional wisdom, was a squib appearing in
the Sun, signed the 'Spirit of Kempenfeldt'.21
 However, the squib was published on the
afternoon of 18 April, the day Spencer's entourage arrived at the Fountain Inn and the
day Payne sent his missive from the George Inn. While Payne could not have seen the
Sun before writing his letter, neither could the squib have been written by him or at his
suggestion. His suggestions were not followed, they were anticipated.23
The Hireling
Payne was anticipated by John Heriot. Considered more adept and certainly more experi-
enced in manipulating public opinion, Heriot not only anticipated Payne, but added a
touch of his own: a reference to a tragic loss of RIyal George in 1782. His play on sea-
21 Manwaring & Dobrée, 52; Dugan, 100.
An express dispatch, delivered by horseman, took at least seven hours to get from Portsmouth to Lon-
don. London Chronicle, 22-25 April 1797
At the conclusion of the mutiny, Aaron Graham, the magistrate sent by the Home Office to investigate
the mutiny, similarly suggested 'an appeal to the passions and interests of the seamen couched in manly
eloquent and at the same time technical language'. BL Add MS 37877 folios 72-73, Wmdham Papers, xxxvi,
Hints on the Fleet & Navy, June 1797
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men's sentiments and superstitions was far from subtle, as the wreck remained a naviga-
tional ha7ard, its masts and bowsprit protruding from the anchorage at Spithead.
However, the squib appeared in government's Sun, not opposition's Star. 24 The Sun was
not merely pro-government. It was government-owned. Its editor and proprietor, John
Heriot, was in government service. Not service in the sense of holding office; but Heriot
was paid by government to perform a definite service. Heriot was a hireling, the sort of
person William Pulteney had in mind fifty years before when he described journalists as:
contemptible scribblers of ministerial vindication: a herd of wretches, whom nei-
ther information can enlighten nor affluence elevate; low drudges of scurrility whose
scandal is harmless for want of wit, and whose opposition is troublesome from the
pertinacious of stupidity, why such immense sums are distributed amongst these rep-
tiles it is scarce possible not to inquire; for it cannot be imagined that those who pay
them expect any support from their abilities. If their patrons would read their writ-
ings, their salaries would quickly be withdrawn, for a few pages would convince them
that they can neither attack nor defend, neither raise any man's reputation by their
panegyric, nor destroy it by their defamation.
Of course, the reptiles argued government's money was well spent. Heriot saw no dis-
honour in what he did:
No pay can be more honorable than that which is given in exchange for services cal-
culated or at least aiming to uphold the Government and Constitution of the country
against those whose object it was to overturn both. This is the very principle of mili-
tary pay and service, and it matters not whether a man achieve this object by his pen
or by his sword. It has been my fortune to use both weapons, with what success is
not for me to say; I have felt as little consciousness of dishonour in the use of one as
in the use of the other2
Heriot was implicated in a notorious libel suit during the regency crisis. The Times pub-
lished paragraphs, reputedly written by Heriot, suggesting the king's sons were remiss in
their filial obligations. The Prince of Wales and the royal dukes sued for libel. As Heriot
did not admit authorship, John Walter was tried instead. He refused to reveal his source.
Instead, he prevaricated, insisting he
received IIQ reward whatever for giving insertion to such paragraphs. They were
such as the temper of the day required. Unless newspapers contained what the tem-
per of the day required, they would be read by none but the printer, and the trade
would therefore become useless.
Absent an admission, authorship can only be inferred - from its style, content and the fact that it was
published in the Skis. Regardless, it could not have been published without government's unplicit and Her-
iot's explicit approvaL
PajrL I-hit, xi, 880,2 December 1740
Annual Bwgrapb:es & Obituane.c, 1834,45
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Walter was convicted, fined, imprisoned and ordered to stand in the pillory. While the
pillory was pardoned and the fines were secretly paid from government funds, Walter
spent nearly sixteen months at Newgate Prison. Nothing more could be done without
admitting complicity. Government could not be seen as condoning, let alone initiating, a
libelous attack on the royal family.
Walter's silence had a price. He later admitted to Lord Kenyon: 'Expecting remunera-
tion,' he wrote to Lord Kenyon, 'I gave up no author.' In addition to remuneration, John
Walter expected relief. He left prison a bitter man, content to leave the day-to-day man-
agement of his newspaper to his capable sons. As a result, The Times grew more inde-
pendent and prosperous. The transition, however, was slow; and the paper still indulged
in the occasional libeL On 23 February 1797, the Oracle and Public Advertiser responded to
its suggestion that the Prince of Wales was neglecting his responsibilities:
These wicked insinuations contain the most direct libel on the patriotism and loyalty
of the PRINCE OF WALES, whose political conduct has hitherto remained unim-
peached, and might have continued to pass with all its well-merited praise, had not
the Conductor of the Times, forgetful of the memorable obligations due on his part to
His Royal Highness, endeavoured to wound the feelings of his benefactor by the
most unmanly assertions. But it is the nature of some men to be ungrateful and ia
solent, not withstanding, as in the present instance, the PRINCE himself should inter-
pose his Royal Influence to save the culprit from the pillory.V
In addition to its subsidy and occasional gifts from secret service funds, the Walters en-
joyed the lucrative printing contract for HM Customs, received a steady stream of gov-
ernment advertising (primarily naval victualling and supply contracts), and 'through the
Admiralty was enabled to secure news in advance of its competitors'. Of these prefer-
ments, the latter proved the most valuable. As Walter's sons understood better than he,
newspaper circulations were built on news.
The desire to know the events of the day, to be told what distant friends are doing,
and to hear of occurrences in far-off countries is an instinct implanted in human na-
tare. Keener when those near and dear to us are concerned, it is ever at its height
when the tragedy of human life is involved, and as the climax of that tragedy has al-
ways been attained in the time of war, so shall we find in war - first abroad, and then
at home - the origin of English newspapers.
The war merely accelerated the process. 'The French Revolution produced a deep and
abiding impression upon London journalism. News from France created a new appetite
v Orack ô Pub/icAdwrtiser, 23 February 1797
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and a new audience.'3° Circulation growth stimulated advertising and lessened depend-
ence on subsidies. Daniel Stuart, editor and proprietor of opposition's Morning Post, rec-
ognised the symbiotic relationship between circulation and advertising
I encouraged the small and imscellaneous advertisements in the front page, preferring
them to any others, upon the rule that the more numerous the customers, the more
permanent and independent the custom. Besides, numerous and various advertise-
ments interest numerous and various readers, looking out for employment, servants,
sales, and purchasers, etc. etc. Advertisements act and react. They attract readers,
promote circulation, and circulation attracts advertisements.31
Earlier, Stuart discovered that 'fashionable intelligence', forerunner of gossip columns,
stimulated readership. He offered the predictable response to the inevitable criticism:
Newspapers have long enough estranged themselves in a manner totally from the
elegancies of literature, and dealt only in malice, or at least in the prattle of the day.
On this head, however, newspapers are not much more to blame than their patrons,
the public.32
With The Times, the Morning Post and the Morning Chronicle leading the way, the press
slowly learned 'to represent what they considered to be public opinion rather than the
opinion of the Government. It paid them to do so'.
Loyalties, dependencies and priorities shifted. John Walter's sufferings merely hastened
the process, proving to his sons more than himself that government did not repay loy-
alty. In 1799 John Walter's f300 annuity was abruptly withdrawn 'ostensibly on the
grounds The Times had libelled the House of Commons, but more certainly because its
support had become increasingly erratic.M His eldest son hoped to remind William
Windham of government's obligation:
my father was imprisoned 15 months in Newgate on the Prosecution of the
Prince of Wales & Duke of York, for two Paragraphs written by Persons employed
by Mr. Steele, then Secretary of the Treasury, signed with his private Mark, & still in
my father's Possession. I have long known that there were certain Persons, who hold
confidential Situations, who think that a fulsome adulation of Ministers is the best
Criterion of attachment; & that no Man has a right to maintain Independence, who
enjoys the smallest Degree of emolument from the Government.35
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Until John Walter II took complete control in 1803, The Times remained nominally pro-
government; but, as it prospered, it proved less manageable. Tn December 1800, Lord
Grenville commented 'The Times is a paper which, under cover of a pretended support of
Government, is in decided hostility to it'
As the press proved unmanageable, government took a more direct approach. Burke en-
couraged the Treasury to establish 'a newspaper on which the government could rely,
and which it could, in a great measure, direct'. 37
 Twenty years before, he admitted the
importance and implied the pernicious influence of newspapers: 'There are three Estates
in Parliament; but in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sits a Fourth Estate more im-
portant far than them all.' He considered newspapers to be 'a more important instrument
than is generally imagined; they are part of the reading of all; they are the whole of the
reading of the far greater number'.38
Burke feared, if left unchecked, 'eventually newspapers would govern the country'. 39 He
wrote to William Windham: 'Opinion (never without its effect) has obtained a greater
dominion over human affairs than ever it possessed; and must grow just in proportion as
the implicit reverence for old institutions is found to decline.'° Fifty years earlier Baron
de Montesquieu, said much the same thingi
For a free nation it is very often a matter of indifference whether individuals reason
well or badly; it is enough that they reason: from this ensues liberty which guarantees
the effects of this reasoning. Similarly in a despotic government, it is equally perni-
cious to reason well or badly; that one reasons is enough for the principle of gov-
ernment to be shaken.4'
William Godwin observed: 'The true supporters of government are the weak and unin-
formed, and not the wise. In proportion, as weakness and ignorance shall diminish, the
basis of government will also decay.'42 Newspapers posed a threat because they gave the
public a role in public affairs. Government made no secret of its attitude.
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To opposition, newspapers afforded an opportunity 'to mould public opinion and mar-
shal support for its struggles with the Crown'. 43
 Guided by the able pen of Sheridan,
'Opposition ... made increasing use of the Press, whose influence upon the public mind
was recogni'ed to be growing rapidly during these years.' After the Portland whigs were
co-opted by government, newspapers gave opposition both a voice and an influence dis-
proportionate to their numbers in Parliament.
When censorship proved impractical and punitive taxation, selective subsidies and legal
harassment proved ineffective; several under-secretaries in the Pitt ministry launched a
direct experiment in press management. 45
 They saw newspapers' independence, rather
than their conflict of interest, as their only obstacle. James Bland-Burges explained their
scheme to Lord Auckland early in 1793:
Have you heard that we have got two papers perfectly attached to us and considered
as the authentic vehicles of such matters as Government chooses to make them?
Their titles are The Sun and the True Briton and I really think they are much superior
to any we have seen. It was indeed high time to look a little serious upon our daily
vehicles of inteffigence for almost all of them were in the pay of the Jacobins and
contained the most extraordinary libels upon Government, the King and all those
who were not known to be attached to the French interest. A very good man at this
moment volunteered as a friend to government and in return Government has taken
him by 'the hand' and his paper flourishes accordingly.
The 'very good man' who volunteered to run government's newspaper was John Her-
iot.47
 Although accounts differ as to who actually owned the Sun and the True Briton,
Treasury supplied the capitaL Of their origins, William Cobbett commented: 'The True
Briton and the Sun are, in some sort, the property of the ministers. They are, at any rate,
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as absolutely at their command as the Moniteur is at the command of Bonaparte.'49
 He
saw the flaw in Burke's logic and the under secretaries' scheme:
A publication, addressed to the passions and prejudices of the multitude, may raise a
mob, and may, in some cases, quiet a mob; it is a desperate remedy that is sometimes
made use of to destroy, and sometimes to preserve, lawful authority. But it will never
produce a lasting effect; it will never work a change in the temper and feeling of a
whole nation; it will never raise that gentle steady flame of patriotism, which alone
can lead to great national actions.5°
Heriot, unaware and undeterred by such scepticism, wasted no time in presenting his
credentials to First Secretary of the Admiralty Philip Stephens:
I take this liberty of addressing you, as Proprietor of the new Daily Paper called "The
Sun", to solicit the favour that the Advertisements from the Admiralty Office may
appear in that paper. I should not have presumed to have made this requisition, were
I not particularly encouraged by Mr. Rose and Mr. Long. To the latter Gentleman I
beg leave to refer you for information respecting me.51
In addition to securing a large share of government advertising, Heriot arranged to pre-
view government-supplied foreign news, an advantage previously enjoyed by The Times.52
The Sun made its appearance on 1 October 1792 and according to one one observer
'immediately replaced The Times as the most detested paper in Britain'. 53
 In addition to
giving the Sun priority of intelligence, 'if the news was of consequence, the Government
bought up the edition for free distnbution.M As a result, Heriot claimed unparalleled cir-
culation.
To aggravate the offense, the Sun presented its information (and misinformation)
belligerently, and most of the belligerence seemed to be directed at papers themselves
in the pay of the Treasury. ... But the ultimate outrage, so far as journalists were
concerned, was the Sun's 'dullness'. Abuse they could forgive, abuse being the pre-
rogative of a newspaper, but abuse without 'point' they could not. The 5un was a dis-
grace to the profession; or, in Dr. Wolcot's words ... the Sun 'was a Sun without a ray
of light'.55
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W S Bourne, founder and editor of the Observer, discerned government's purposes:
A paper has been instituted by Government called the Sun, the real purposes of
which are to garble the debates of Parliament and to send them into the world in
such a state as to bias the minds of the unwary in favour of whatever measure the
ministry may think proper to adopt, and against whatever may derive from real inde-
pendence.
Two years later, his older brother and principal backer offered to sell the struggling Ob-
server to government. He wrote to Nepean, then a Home Office under-secretary:
I write to you, Sir, without disguise, and, whatever may be the result, trust that you
will have the goodness to excuse me. I know the operation of the public prints upon
the public mind, and that emolument might be made to equal the effect of opinion.
My zeal could not be increased by any act of the Government. Should it be pleased
to transfer the property of the Observer, I should submit the time and mode of com-
pensation to you or to them, satisfied of the liberality of both. I entreat at your leisure
a line directed to Dawson Street, Dublin, and would, if you thought proper, set off
for London on the receipt of it.57
Meanwhile, Bland-Barges seemed more amused than concerned by The Times response:
I have just had a visit from young Walter, who is furious about the success of char-
acter of the Sun and came to me, as to an impartial person, to complain of the parti-
ality shewn by Government and especially by Mr. Rose to that paper, which he said
was very unjust considering his long services and the many advantages which Gov-
ernment, and especially Rose, had derived from the Times. He told me it was well
known that Rose recommended the Sun and patronised its publisher; and he threw
out sundry hints of Mr. Aust giving early accounts of Foreign Transactions, which he
also stated to be very ill-usage .... On the whole he was very sulky and impudent; and
said if he found things went on as they were now doing, and if he did not find some
support from me, who he knew by experience never interfered in the newspaper
business, he certainly should not suffer himself to be ruined by the success the Sun
must certainly meet with from a priority of intelligence which he had undoubted in-
formation came from the Treasury and our office.58
Favouritism and complaints continued. The feud became public and increasingly bitter,
with Heriot referring to his rival as 'the Morning Weather-Cock'59 and offering classical cli-
chés: 'Tempora mutantur et nos mutantur in i/list60 The Times responded:
We wish not to trouble our readers with observations on our own, or on those news-
papers belonging to other proprietors. The Public will always, and very properly,
judge for themselves. As the paper in question has however chosen to give an opin-
ion of this, we shall for once condescend to notice it, by observing - that it is a corn-
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pilation of absurd bombast, fulsome panegvrc. libelous calumn y, and is conducted
under the most abject servility that ever disgraced a newspaper.61
The Times was not alone in its criticism. The Gaetteer charged John Heriot and William
Augustus Miles, another government hireling, with manufacturing stories to 'please their
employers'.62 Not content with waging a public campaign, William Walter complained to
Home Secretary Henry Dundas:
As Proprietor of The Times I humbly address you, complaining of the unbounded and
unprecedented influence given to the True Briton & Sun Newspapers, by persons in
high official situations, which I am sure would never be dared to be given but with
the acquiescence of the Cabinet Ministers.
It is notorious, & I could prove the fact, that scarce a Dispatch comes from the Ar-
mies, or is there a Paris Journal forwarded to any of the Public Offices, but what is
immediately transmitted to the Sun office. This system is now become so general,
that I foresee my property in particular must suffer, if it continues. Probably I may
feel the more vexed at this circumstance, because I know my conduct deserves a dif-
ferent treatment from Government. My father was imprisoned sixteen months in
Newgate for Paragraphs written by the Conductor of the two Papers in question, &
another person employed by Mr. Steele. I submit it to you, Sir, whether such treat-
ment would not abate the attachment of any person to any sett of men; the more so,
when he sees daily attempts to injure his property. State Papers are published, Paris
Gazettes are forwarded to the office, and in short, the Columns of these Newspapers
are filled with writings from persons either paid by Government or Gentlemen in of-
fice.63
More importantly, young Walter questioned Heriot's ability to 'answer the purpose in-
tended'. He argued, 'I have no doubt that even you, Sir, have much fault to find with the
numberless indiscretions and absurdities daily published' by the True Briton and the Sun.
He closed with a threat 'sorry, very sorry should I be, were he ever forced through ill-
treatment to be lukewarm in any cause to which he has ever been strongly attached, since
he became a Proprietor of a public Print.'
William Walter may have impressed Dundas with his arguments or intimidated him with
his threats, but, more likely, the shrewd politician realised that by concentrating prefer-
inents, government had alienated the other government papers. The point was made
clear to him by Charles Stuart!' who sought employment as a press engineec
I am afraid that Government are proceeding upon a wrong plan. They do not con-
sider that by monopoli7ing Intelligence to a Morning and an Evening Paper, they
61 The Times, 15 May 1793
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render the other papers hostile to them. ... They do not consider that while Gov-
ernment is pleased and most highly flattered by an article of intelligence which is no
other of the Morning Papers but one - that at the same time thousands of pamphlets
are circulated on that day, primed with lasting materials that totally destroy the
ephemera of the day. They do not consider that while they circulate News, the others
circulate Sentiments. While Government circulates an evanescent cloud, the others
circulate a shower that falls and nourishes, and brings forth fruit.65
Thirty-two years later, Prime Minister and erstwhile press engineer George Canning
would remark: 'it was very difficult to retain the allegiance of a ministerial paper if infor-
ination was denied it' Stuart continued:
The truth is, every thing is to be managed, by managing the press. The artillery of the
French could not be managed a month, without they managed the artillery of the
Press. I look upon the press as flint to a gun, or potfire to a cannon. Whenever I hear
of a French victory, I in general ascribe it to their artful circulation of Journals and
Bulletin's throughout every municipality in every department. What has convulsed
the mind, here, of late, but the press? What can do it away, but by taking every ad-
vantage of destroying, and multiplying the same engine? I say to Government, that
you must either lead it, or I am afraid it will destroy you. When I hear of the French
casting cannon, I think of them nothing at all, provided you can only prevent them
from casting types!
Never slow to get the point, Dundas instructed Nepean to restore former news priorities,
particularly those enjoyed by The Times. Heriot appealed his decision:
When you told me you had received directions from Mr. Dundas to exclude me from
your office, I readily submitted to such high authority, because I felt convinced it
must be proper, & that it would likewise be general. That has not been so however
The Times has lately fully proved - it having frequently contained the most important
official details which could only be procured from your office. As I cannot suppose
that Mr. Dundas would condescend to make any distinction between Papers sup-
porting Government, or if he did so that such distinction would be in favour of a
Paper supporting Government upon more disinterested principles than any other,
you will pardon me if, in justice to myself I make an appeal from your partial exclu-
sion to the liberality and justice of Mr. Dundas.
I am not conscious, Sir, of having at any time given you cause of offence. I then feel
peculiarly mortified that you should mark me as the particular object of your dis-
pleasure. You know, Sir; & it is daily proved in the Times, that there are points of in-
formation which it is advantageous to Government to give & to have stated in a
proper manner. In any intercourse which I have or may ever have with any member
of the Government, I can only have one object in view, to serve Government by
every means in my power, without a wish to obtain what it may be proper & prudent
to withhold. With these sentiments & principles, I feel much hurt that by your so de-
cided a preference should be given to a man whom all who know him view him with
contempt & distrust.67
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Neither Nepean nor Dundas were moved; and Heriot took his place in the queue of
newspapermen awaiting intelligence behind The Times. The Morning Post reported:
Mr. Dundas, consistent with the dignity of his situation, has issued orders that Under
Clerks in the service of Government shall be instantly dismissed, if detected in future
betraying the confidence reposed in them, by giving information to the Newspapers.
This notice has operated like an electric shock, from the highest to the lowest public
Officer, particularly in the Treasury.68
Daniel Stuart, brother of Charles and editor of the Mor7ling Post could not resist gloating:
The Underlings of the Treasury, who set up a gross and Vulgar Print, for the purpose
of attacking, like Assassins, those respectable Characters, from whose presence they
shrink in Parliament, have equivocal/y disclaimed having any future connection with
this foul Vehicle of Slander. To prove to Mr. DUNDAS, and other persons in
Power, that they have abandoned this ungentlemanlike business, all official intelli-
gence has been withdrawn from that quarter, though their intelligence in dull and
vulgar personal paragraphs still convinces us, that the very men who were near bring-
ing an innocent Printer to the pillory for their libel on an illustrious character, are still
determined not to desist from their precious labours.69
The underlings were publicly embarrassed and privately forced to divest themselves, but
Heriot was far from finished. Six months later, he wrote to Nepean:
I beg you will excuse the liberty I take in requesting that you will be kind enough to
send me occasionally any communications which you may think should appear in a
newspaper. It may sometimes happen that Intelligence is wished to be given to the
Public through other mediums than that of the Gazette, and if so, I shall be flattered
by any such information. I have disinterestedly devoted my Paper to the service of
Government - for this I receive no pecuniary reward nor do I ever mean to receive
any. I wish to serve, to the best of my power, what I know to be a good and just
cause, and I only in return wish to receive the assistance of those who are of the
same opinion. I have desisted from calling at your office, because I thought you dis-
approved of it, and if Mr. Dundas and yourself think any such communications im-
proper, I must submit; but I cannot help thinking that upon many occasions it is
more for the interest of Government to let the Public know the truth than to leave us
to guess at it, and perhaps to mislead them. I certainly expected when I established
my Papers that I should have had occasional information given to me, but this is a
point for you to decide upon. I shall always send you any intelligence I may acciden-
tally get that may be of use, and I wish only to say that in doing my best to support
Government, if there is at any time any thing you disapprove of in the Paper, it shall
be corrected upon your suggestion, as I have no object but that of making it as ac-
ceptable as I can to the friends of Government.70
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For Heriot, the truth was what he could persuade the public to believe. John Heriot and
John Walter both served government, but their approach was fundamentally different.
While Walter saw government service as the means to provide for his newspapers, Her-
jot saw his newspapers as the means to serve government. Heriot was a clever man, and
politicians always need clever men. They understood the difference between news and
sentiments. While the experiment in concentration failed, no one questioned the need to
influence public opinion. Thus, when the royal family was reconciled, Heriot was asked
to inform the public. The irony was not lost on the Morning Post
The underling of the Treasury, who wrote the licentious and wicked libel against the
Duke of York, for which an innocent and obscure Printer was near losing his ears, is
now employing his brilliant talents in a manner diametrically opposite. Such is the ac-
commodating disposition of this snivelling genius, that he is now bespattering his Royal
Highness with ill-judged compliments, which are as fulsome and unnecessary, as his
former attacks were base, cruel, and cowardly.71
No longer the favourite, but neither a pariah, Heriot faithfully served Pitt until Pitt died
in January 1806. Though held in equal contempt by those he offended and those he
served,72
 Heriot prospered until he became embroiled in a libel suit from a more formi-
dable adversary, Lord St. Vincent. Although convicted, Heriot was spared the discom-
forts of Newgate or the humiliation of the pillory. 73
 Instead, he paid a small fine,
amassed a large fortune, sold his newspapers and retired.
John Heriot received a Commissionership in the Lottery Office in 1806 when he
gave up the Sun. Later, he was further rewarded with the office of Deputy Paymaster-
General of the Forces in the Windward and Leeward Islands, and finally, in 1816, the
Duke of York gave him the Comptrollership of Chelsea HospitaL74
Heriot made no secret of his success: he served government. Government rewarded
faithful servants, as long as they remained faithful and subservient. It also rewarded si-
lence, when the alternative might prove embarrassing. Heriot made his intentions clear in
the True Briton's first issue:
To the Public
If ever there was a period when we were all invited to exert ourselves in the defence
of those Public Principles which we have adopted as the foundation of our actions,
to counteract the effect of false Theories, and to establish those which have stood
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the test of time and experience, that period is now arrived. It shall be our task to per-
form this useful, and, at the present moment, peculiarly necessary duty. No person
who feels as a Briton ought to feel, can be indifferent to the Public Acts of the Na
tion, or to those events in other Countries with which the state of our own is neces-
sarily so intimately connected.75
The legend beneath the True Briton's masthead, Nolumus Le,ges Angliae Mutari,76 removed
any doubts about his commitment. Heriot continued:
It is impossible for us to address the Public, without expressing our Gratitude for the
distinguished favours which have been conferred upon us. We trust, that by our per-
severance in defence of the Constitution, we shall be best entitled to a continuation
of such support.
Heriot discovered serving government and resisting change could be combined in a very
profitable enterprise. The evidence can be found both in the True Briton's coverage of the
mutiny and the Sun's squib 'From the Spirit of Kempenfeldt'. His influence on historians
who do not distinguish propaganda from news is unfortunate.
April Showers: A Week of the True Briton
On Saturday, 15 April 1797, the True Briton announced:
The fact is that at no period except the autumn of 1792, was the British Press ever so
licentious as it is at present. And, unless, by due exertion of public spirit, some ef-
fectual check be speedily imposed on it, the consequences of its licentiousness it is
much to be feared, will prove fatal to the country.
It was an unusual position for a newspaper to take. That it appeared a fortnight before
government announced a seventy-five per cent increase in the newspaper stamp duty was
hardly coincidentaL Excepting the Sun, no other newspaper supported a measure so
clearly calculated to curtail the influence, if not threaten the existence, of newspapers. In
fact, no other paper mentioned the subject until it was broached in the House of Corn-
mons.
On Monday the True Briton was the first to announce there was a problem in Portsmouth:
We are very much concerned in hearing, that the seamen on board the fleet at Spi-
thead, have signified their determination not to go to sea, until their wages are raised
True Briton, 29 January 1793
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to one shilling per day; and it is said this determination is universal through the
fleet.78
That identical announcements appeared in other government papers suggests it was a
paid insert. In any case, it was not the sort of news Heriot liked to print.
On Tuesday he took premature pleasure in announcing:
We are happy in being able to state, that the discontent on the subject of wages,
which is mentioned in our Portsmouth Letter of the 16th, to have prevailed among
the Seamen on board some of the Ships at Spithead, had happily subsided without
any ill consequences having resulted from it.79
Not content with misinforming his morning readers; that afternoon, beneath the legend:
So/em quis dicerefalsum auded° and adjacent to the squib 'From the Spirit of Kempenfeldt',
Heriot confounded his readers:
The discontents on board the Fleet at Spithead, which we mentioned in our Paper of
yesterday, had assumed a very serious and alarming appearance; but by the firm and
determined conduct of Lord Bridport, and the respective Officers under his Com-
mand, the ferment, which seemed to be gaining strength, was speedily allayed.81
This was not news. It did not inform readers of what was happening in Portsmouth. In-
stead, it reassured them.
His Lordship on Saturday made the Signal for the Ships under his command at Spi-
thead to drop down to St. He/en's, but was astonished to find that the Signal was not
obeyed; and he then learnt for the first time, of the mutinous spirit which had taken
possession of the Fleet. On Sunday it shewed itself more fully, by several acts of riot
and disorder. His Lordship calmly expressed his determination to enforce obedience
to his orders at whatever personal risk, at the same time recommending it to the Men
under his Command, if they had any complaints to make, to lay these temperately
and respectfully before the Admiralty Board, who he doubted not would do them
ample justice. His Lordship's remonstrances and spirit had their desired effect, and
discipline and obedience were soon re-established.82
Heriot concealed the truth. Bridport, far from expressing his calm determination or tak-
ing any personal risks, denied responsibility for the problem, declared there was nothing
he could do and begged the Admiralty not to order the fleet to sea. 83
 The Admiralty,
aware of the seamen's discontent, but determined to restore discipline, gave the order
regardless.
78 IbaL, 17 April 1797
Ibid. 18 April 1797; Sun, 18 April 1797
80 
'The sun does not hear false voices.'
' Sun, 18 April 1797
82J/
ADM1 107, Bndport to Nepean, 15 April 1797
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Heriot's priorities were clear: to serve government and resist change. Four years earlier,
he promised Nepean: 'I can only have one object in view, to serve government by every
means in my power, without a wish to obtain what it may be proper & prudent to with-
hold.' However, on Wednesday 19 April 1797, in seeking to reassure the public and
conveying sentiments rather than news, Heriot blundered upon a truth: 'The Admiralty
were not ignorant of the sentiments of the seamen or the subject; and several plans have
been under consideration, by which some additional advantages might be accorded,
without greatly burdening the State.' 85 Confirmation came in the Morning Pose 'The dis-
content of the seamen respecting their low rate of wages, existed before Lord Bridport
went last to sea; it was known to the Admiralty, and several plans of amicable adjustment
have been under consideration.' For Henot, the preservation of appearances was more
important than the truth. The True Bnton could hardly admit that, while discipline was
maintained, the officers were not in control.
The combination that had been entered into then became apparent; and though a
slight disposition to disorder became apparent, by the firmness of the Officers, its
dangerous effects were in a great measure averted. Much praise we understand to be
due to the coolness, firmness, and moderation of Lord Bridport, and the Officers
under him, who soon brought their men back to a sense of their duty. Their demands
were, of course, referred to the board of the Admiralty; but meanwhile, order and
discipline were completely restored.87
The charade proved difficult to maintain. In the same article, the True Briton baffled,
rather than reassured, its readers:
During the whole transaction, the Sailors expressed, in the strongest manner, their
heartfelt attachment to their Sovereign, and the cause of their Country. Though, to
gain their object, whether just or not, they thought it necessary, for a while, to throw
aside the order and discipline which are the characteristics of the British Navy, yet we
are confident, their sense of duty to their King and love for their Country, were never
for a moment abated; and that their hearts glowed with those generous and ardent
feelings which rank a British Tar as the first of characters.
Heriot hinted of a meeting between the seamen and the lords of the Admiralty:
A Petition or Memorial of considerable length was transmitted to the Admiralty, set-
ting forth the supposed grievances of the Seamen, and representing what their ex-
pectations were. Upon the business being discussed with them, however, in a calm
dispassionate manner, the generous nature of their character appeared pre-eminent.
They unanimously declared, that if their Country could not at present afford an in-
crease of wages, they would be satisfied, and even fight her battles for nothing; but
PRO H042/27, Henot to Nepean, 10 December 1793
85 TrusBntoii, 19 April 1797
Mormng Post, 20 April 1797
True Bnton, 19 April 1797
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that when a proper opportunity offered, they had no doubt but all their just claims
would be attended to. In this confidence they may implicitly repose. The best wishes
of the Nation must ever be with those men, who display such heroic conduct in her
defence; and there is certainly no reasonable recompense which it can be the wish of
any friend to his Country to withhold from a set of men at once so useful and men-
torous.
On Thursday Heriot further confused readers by reassuring them everything was under
control:
We yesterday made a statement respecting the recent proceedings at Spithead which
derived from authentic information. To that we have only to add that accounts re-
ceived in town yesterday, from the Highest Authority at Portsmouth, fully corrobo-
rate our statement. The discontents in the Fleet are settled to the perfect satisfaction
of all parties concerned.88
With no foundation in fact, the True Bn'ton reported:
The Board of Admiralty sat on board the 2ueen Charlotte, the flagship of Lord Brid-
port. Complaints were heard with attention and such explanations made as led, we
understand, to a conclusion honourable alike to members of the Executive Govern-
ment concerned and to the good sense and loyalty of British Seamen.89
On Friday Heriot clarified his position and criticised his colleagues for reporting the
truth:
We have heard reports of excesses committed at Portsmouth by the Seamen, which
we conceive to be greatly exaggerated; if not altogether unfounded. We have re-
frained from retailing such reports, as they seemed to us tending to the most serious
and alarming national consequences. Scarcely two accounts, indeed, received from
Portsmouth, for the last few days, agree in their circumstances; and the most palpable
contradictions are evident in every paper that presumes to enter upon details. We
have stated nothing upon this delicate subject but what we considered to be derived
from the best authority. We have still reason to believe, that the discontents of the
Seamen are appeased, in consequence of the dispassionate and judicious conduct of
the Board of Admiralty held at Portsmouth.
So may different causes of complaint have been assigned to the Seamen, that we will
not insult the character of British Tars, by staining our Paper with their enumeration.
We believe an increase of wages was the principal, if not the only demand they made;
and that, we have reason to suppose, will, upon principles of justice, be awarded to
them.9°
Ibia, 20 April 1797
Ibid, 20 April 1797. There was no such meetmg,.Queen Charlotte was Howe's (not Bndport's) flagship and
an honourable conclusion was three weeks away. London Chi'v,ucle, 18 20 April 1797; Morning Chronicle, 20
April 1797
9° True Briton, 21 April 1797
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The Squib
On 18 April the squib 'From the Spirit of Kempenfeldt' appeared an page three of the
Sun. 91 It did not shower, so much as flood, readers with sentiment. Empty platitudes
overwhelmed meagre facts. It flattered, shamed and ultimately berated the seamen. It
assumed they had been misled or misused by 'Banditti, Incendiaries, and Ruffians' whose
purpose was subversion. It trifled with their pride, patriotism and piety.
This was Reflections on the Revolution in France for the 'swinish multitude', a poorly con-
ceived mixture of Tory clichés and misconceptions. Its essence is found in the phrase:
'they evinced that obedient fidelity and subordination to their Officers, which have ren-
dered them respectable in the memoirs of discipline.' Mutiny, particularly in the form of
a well-organised and disciplined collective action, was considered a threat to order. Ac-
cording to the squib, the seamen's misbehaviour would lead to the 'extinction of Man's
dearest Rights'. Metaphors ran rampant. It was simultaneously condescending and con-
frontational. Other than to denigrate or dismiss them, the squib ignored the seamen's
grievances and dwelt on subjects only marginally relevant to what was happening in
Portsmouth. Instead, it addressed 'the passions and prejudices of the multitude'. The
squib was neither news nor editoriaL It was propaganda and as such [proved an embar-
rassment rather than a service to government.
Government service was not what Captain Payne had in mind in his missive to Lord
Spencer. By using the press to express the indignation of the nation, he hoped to awaken
the pride of the seamen and create 'some apparent disunion or schisms within the fleet'.
Instead, Heriot incurred their wrath. Instead of alienating the seamen from the public, he
invited a response and provided the seamen with an opportunity to secure public sym-
pathies. Instead of creating disunion, the squib united and helped the fleet resolve its dif-
ferences and publicly declare its purpose. The squib inadvertently invited the public to
consider the legitimacy of the seamen's grievances.
Heriot offered a vague and romantic view of life at sea, ignoring its harsh realities and
evoking a mythical past to distort the present. With passing references, it dismissed the
seamen's complaints. It invited no negotiation, only submission to discipline and re-
submission of their grievances through proper channels. Heriot was unaware or chose to
91 Sun, 18 April 1797; BL Add. MSS, 35 197, f. 109, Spirit of Kempenfelt Handbill
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conceal that the seamen had akeady done so. In selecting the 'Spirit of Kempenfeldt' as a
pseudonym, Heriot erred badly. He assumed the memories evoked would suit his pur-
pose, either shaming the seamen into submission or turning public opinion against them.
However, he failed to recognise the public, the quarter-deck and the lower-deck versions
of what happened on 28 August 1782, why it happened and who was responsible for it
happening, differed.
Three Tales of a Tragedy
On the surface, the tragic loss of a ship in 1782 and the mutiny in 1797 have little in
common. The connections are circumstantial: the Roj'aI George capsized at Spithead, sur-
vivors remained in the fleet and witnesses, including Howe and Bridport, helped con-
struct the official version of the sinking. 92 The squib preyed on collective memories and
lower-deck superstitions. A buoy marked the site of the navigational hazard. At low tide,
the hazard itself protruded from the anchorage at Spithead to remind those who needed
no reminder of the hazards of their profession.
The Spirit of Kempenfeldt was merely a literary conceit; but it achieved a far different
purpose than intended. Rather than undermining the seamen's morale, it focused their
attention on 'a human event of the most extraordinary nature' 93 and on lessons not
learned. On 31 August 1782, the Morning Herald reported:
Yesterday morning as express arrived at the Admiralty, from Admiral Lord Howe at
Portsmouth, informing the Board of the melancholy disaster of his Majesty's ship the
Rqyal George of 110 guns, with most of her crew, being lost at Spithead, about half
past ten o'clock in the morning of the preceding day. This unfortunate accident hap-
pened while the ship was hove upon a careen, in order to have the water pipe to her
cistern repaired, at which juncture a strong squall at NNW came on, and her keel ly
-ing across the tide current, she fell suddenly on her beam-ends, and before they could
right ship she filled, and went down, her topmasts only appearing at the water's edge!
At the time of this calamity 848 officers and seamen were on board, 331 only of
which were saved by the boats of the fleet.94
The public was informed that the tragedy was an accident - an act of God or a fluke of
nature. The report inspired William Cowper to write 'On the Loss of the Riyal George',
but it was not the truth. James Anthony Gardner, then a midshipman on HMS Panther,
In commenting on Queen Char/ott/s role in the mutiny, Bndport observed: 'I have often thought that had
she been under the Buoy of the late Rojyal George it would have been a blessing to the country'. BL Aithorop
MSS. GI 91, Bndport to Spencer, 24 April 1797. Bridport assumed Kempenfelt's place in the relief of Gi
braltar. BL Add MS 35193, Bridport Papers, Stephens to A Hood, 30 August 1782
' W Nichelson, A Treatise of Seamanshi, and Navigation (London: Gilbert & Co., 1796), appendix, 2
'4 Morn:ng Herald, 31 August 1782
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witnessed the sinking and commented: 'God knows who the blame ought to light on, for
blame there must be somewhere, for never was a ship lost in such a strange and unac-
countable manner.'95
 The official version of the tragedy, provided at Captain Waghorn's
court-martial, absolved the officers of responsibility - suggesting the Navy Board or the
dockyards were to blame:
It appeared that the ship was not overheeled ... that the Captain, Officers and Ship's
Company used every exertion to right the ship as soon as the alarm was given of her
settling; and the Court is of the opinion, from the short space of time between the
alarm being given and the sinking of the ship, that some material part of her frame
gave way, which can only be accounted for by the general state of the decay of her
timbers, as appears upon the minutes. The Captain, Officers and Ship's Company are
acquitted of all blame.96
The lower-deck version of the tragedy argued that a dangerous manoeuvre was at-
tempted to effect an unnecessary repair, against the advice of the master attendant at
Portsmouth Dockyard and the warnings of the crew. Master Attendant William Nichel-
son did warn Kempenfelt against heeling the old and fully-laden ship in the unpredict-
able waters of the Solent. He insisted that he used 'every argument in my power to dis-
suade my much-esteemed friend from his design of heeling the Rfya1 Geoie' by running
out the larboard guns and running in the starboard guns. Nichelson opposed the in-
tended repair to replace a blocked sea-cock, insisting cit
 was not a work of necessity,
therefore the less to be said for the risk there was to be run in heeling her without an ab-
solute necessity.'97
The risk was compounded when provisions were taken on board and stacked alongside
the larboard, lower-deck gunports while the ship was careened. The tragedy occurred
shortly after the carpenter's warnings were ignored by the ship's officers. When the dan-
ger was finally admitted, minutes before Rya1 Geoe sank, Captain Waghom ordereth
'Beat to Quarters on the Lower-deck, get the Weather Guns out and the Lee ones in and
hous'd as soon as possible and send the people aft that are Quarter'd here to get these
Guns over.'98
 As a result, most of the crew, almost seventy tons of human ballast, ran to
the wrong side of the ship, compounding rather than correcting the imbalance. Nichel-
son's account and analysis of what went wrong appeared in an appendix to the 1796 edi-
R Hamilton & J Laughton, R,colkctions ofJamesAntho,y Gardner (NRS, 1906 ,24
' PRO ADM1/5321, Waghorn Court-Martial, 7 September 1782
To further increase the angle of the heel, stores were moved to the larboard and the starboard guns were
removed from their breechings and moved axnidship. Nichelson, 5
9'	 ADMI 5321, Waghom Court-Martial, 7 September 1782
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tion of his Treatise of Seamanship and Narngation, published six months before the mutiny.
His implication of negligence was unmistakable:
Providence at times permits us to conduct ourselves in such a manner as to bring on
our ruin and destruction, and also that of others, which occurred by the dreadful ac-
cident that happened in the loss of that Ship, and so many hundred lives. ... This is
what is called an accident; I call it a human event of the most extraordinary nature,
and should be held up to posterity as a beacon or sea-mark to them to avoid such
danger in similar cases, as it is more profitable to improve by other men's miscar-
riages than by their ownY9
A faulty premise brought Heriot to stir memories of the loss of Rya1 Geo,e. Far from
achieving Payne's objective of 'expressing the indignation of the country, and awakening
the pride of the good seamen', Heriot provided them with a poignant reminder of what
could happen when officers neglected basic responsibilities - the care of their crew and
the safety of their ship. The squib also provided them with an opportunity to win public
sympathies. Like so many others, Heriot underestimated seamen.
Seamen are now a days a thinking set of people, and a large portion of them possess
no inconsiderable share of COMMON SENSE, the most useful sense of all; they are
capable certainly of judging when they are well treated, whether those in authority
over them exercise it with mildness, and in due attention to their comforts; and it is
natural to suppose they sit lighter under the yoke of a man who they see knows and
does his duty.10°
Nichelson, 2 3


























- -	 ___ _____
•	 -	 •- 	 •. 	 --- 	 -	 ••.- ..-






p 1 ,y	 £é L	 -	 t,r/1
/ ..', ,v, ij	 ,f,l,,/,'rI
i
,u'	 6d	 t.e€.-/ /sr/IL.4?e,'/, ) u. 4S? 1(6 L2't a,'I
h0d.#'P F•f/4I'? #1f.
A iV1/4y4-.) )af# l'-'	 // .4',e ,.. ." ." /3.ie
g14g 74. , / p, iiL ,	 •p,,,
4 ?I"I
''" 'i
- ,L1	 _/ 4,/,, /V /.11(/	 .	 -	 /




- 4ir4v	 L.) i
//ie,
i' I7We ..4-4.4'Ø'/ i/i%i "e' ,.((J
441 14	 ____	 -
,1s
15 P" j)Øfl
PRO ADMI/5125, Delegates' Petition, 15 April 1797
	




.e#. .^Zc ./iw %7.e .frp	 /L#aei" /I/i7'
4	 riJ *_dj pSi g'.e.j 1r	 1 /
""' ,	 ?f•V 6€g.J? )di4'
e. ,444fl'1	 'i'.,-
.ip.i1.// 11	 .•ç'/i.c	 .t4f Cd
	
4'	 ,	 .&#'&	 d'6#' dj'.	 4/
.AII#J






4/i,4i1, ).e,z.'/i%,,, ,jg j./r14,i/i ./4"i
€e,ve. I-f e.'e	 ///L4e1 //('1'(
_::' 
S4%DfV< %1%'-






















./14.J f."1	 ,çdji f/.1/


















c t4# j'7.'4"1f'1 y,i.ee4.iI.e1rJ.4 -.
____	
,
- v4t'Z/ " '
..
15 April Pe.üon







pie7' i	 ,ii1 .#Zl')lh' i/i" ) 44
.,,)Ji1' "a	 t" 1a7 /,,i/h	 F.p,. '..,
-'r' 
/,	 _/Ii'€1
.4 il ."4 I7	 ,	 . 
'"	
.-.-' ,,,,, '/ ,i.-/%'i ,%i/7/







,/,/4J /a2y ._—.	 -
"4ø ra	 ' 4'	
#111 4se-,i
if .	 )
d&?i	 i; ,e','/'' ,,,,he,' /J
C-	 '- ,















'1 €' ;3/ C y..,6 - ,
,,
, Id7:4	 .I7c)






















PRO ADMI/5125, Delegates' Petition, 15 April 197
	
Courtey of the Pub/ic Reconi Office
118



















Yefterday morning art exprefs arrived at the
Admiralty, from A rtl LQrd 1-fowe at Port I-
mouth, informing the. Board of the meln:hol
difafter of is M.ajeily's (hip the Royal George
of 1 10 guns, with moil of her crew, bdrtg lot
at Spithead, about hailpaft ten c'cicck in the
morning of the preccding day. This unfortu-
na:e	 ci4ent happened while the (hip
hove upon a- careen, in order to have the
water,ipe to her ci1ern re paired, at which
junlare a firong fquall a: N. . W
came on, and her keel lying crofs the tide cur-
rent, (he 'fel fuJdeii: on her beam-enis, and
bcfore tiev could right flip the SUed, and
went cown, her topm3fts only apearin; at
the v.-.:cr's edge !—A: :he time of this 	 lanii-.
tcus even:, 43 crcer and fearen wcre on
;i only of which	 cre faid by thc
b.,a cf die ?e :.
"e cflicers lo periihed. i: is w:h the
utn;1 ccern we n:e. tki hat brvc and cx-
Tstrred cc:nmander, Rear Airal Kern?en-
fdr,	 hu was writing i his cabin when the ,hi.
wen: !own. Mr. &aur.ders, his Lieucen:i,
the lflh Lieutenant, together with Major Gra-
h.m, tr.d two Lietenant of the m:ri'cs, tc
£irC3fl rd CJ r? CIeT , !bared the lame f.:r.
r. ft 01 the -ocers were for:unt:ey Iavci.
Vhaadt to the itiional lois, o; this occ.ifion,
j, thtt t".c crew ci trie .oyal George prnd.
pa 1 ly confiaed of the beft Icarnen of the whole
fict.
.1ornisvg Herald, 31 ugust 1 2
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ON TN! LOSS OP THE ROYA. GlOCE.
BY ILLtAM COWPB.
From HAY LEY'S Lfe and Posthumous Poem: of that JI'rier.
OLL for the brave!
Thc brave t at arc no more,
All sunk beneath the wave,
Fast by their native shore.
Eight hundred of the brave,
\Vhose cor3ge well was tried,
Had made the vcscl keel,
And Lid her on her sde.
A Land-breeze shook the shrots,
And she was overset,
Dowfl went the Royal George,
With a! her crew complete.
Toll for d;e brave!
Brave KCM?EiFELT is gone
1i i	 sca-:
}i work of glory done.
It was not in the battle,
No tempest gave the shock,
She sprang no fatal leak,
She ran against no rock.
His sword was in its sheath,
His hngcrs hcld the pen,
When KEMPES PELT WCflt dowo,
With twice four hundred men!
Weigh the vessel up,
Once dreaded by our foes,
And mingle with the cup
The tcar which England owes.
Her timbers vet are snund,
And she may float again,
Charg'd with England's thunder,
Across the distiit naiu.
But lMPE?rELT 13 gone,
His victories .ire o'er,
Ar.d he and his eight hundred
Shall ploug1 the wave no more.
Naval Cbro,üde, x (1803)
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Ijt Jfloriuug Qfronidz
Tues4 18 Api! 1797
The disagreeable intelligence which
was communicated to the Admiralty
on Sunday morning has now tran-
spired, and, we are sorry to say, it is
extremely serious. Orders were sent
down to Spithead on Friday last for
I A)rd lridport's l'leet to sail. The crews
of all the ships, to a man, declared they
would nc,t go to sea, unless their pay
was increased eight shillings per
month, which, as their month contains
only 28 days, is 5L 4s per annum. They
had conducted their previous proceed-
ings with great secrecy and prudence.
It burst out in all the ships at the same
moment; but unless in this demand
they shewed no disposition to riot or
disorder. Admiral Pole came to town
on Sunday night with further dispatch-
es from Lord Bridport; and yesterday
afternoon Farl Spencer, after a confer-
ence with the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, set off for Portsmouth,
accompanied by Lord .'trden, Admiral
Young, and Mr. Marsdvn, Under
Secretary of the Admiralty A Board of
Admiralty will be held as soon as they
arrive, and we trust that this most
unseasonable affair will be speedily and
happily terminated.
We lament to learn that the same sys-
tem of procrastination which runs
through all our services has extended
also to the Navy; and that the arrears
due to Officers remain unpaid,
notwithstanding all the remonstrances
which they have repeatedly made.
The present War was undertaken
avowedly for the preservation of our
Laws, our Constitution, and our
I'roperty; yet the only changes made in
our Laws, the only infractions on our
(:onstitmion, and the only damage
done to our Property have arisen from
the bungling contrivances and miser-
able ignorance of our Statesmen.
We hear much of the distinction
between public and private virtue and
vice. But it is certain, that if the private
men were to borrow money as public
men attempt to dc; they would be
apprehended as common swindlers,
and sent to join their brethren in
Botany Bay No trick or quibble is too
mean for a modern financier.
he Øtorniii 'oft
Theida;. l8lpiir'c
And now we find that the money due
to our gallant seamen has been with-
held, while the Sinecure Salaries of
Mess. Pitt, Grenville and Rose have
been paid with the utmost punctuality.
The Military, it was conjectured, would
only fight for the Ministers if they were
paid in Cash; the Sailors, it was conjec-
tured, (without any pay) would fight
from a love of their countrt We have
no doubt that both these conjectures
are well founded; but the Sailors have
resolved, that they will be paid as well
as the Soldiers.
On Friday orders were sent down to
Portsmouth for lord lridport to sail
with the Channel I'leet. On Saturday
his I irdship made the necessary sig-
nals to prepare, but not a ship moved;
and it as soon found that the Seamen
in ev ship together with the petty
Officers, had resolved not to do their
duty till their wages were paid. 'Je
understand that upwards of a year's
wages is due to several of thc crews,
and that many months are due to alL
The demand for arrears was accompa-
nied by a demand for an increase of
pay. 'flie losses which our seamen have
sustained by selling their arrears to the
Sharks in the ships and seaports, have
reduced the actual value of a months
wages, from twenty-two shillings to
about fourteen, in consequence of
which they now demand to have their
wages raised to thirty shillings per
month.
It seems that this is not the first rime
the seamen have manifested an unwill-
ingness to sail on account of arrears;
but they have always hitherto been
cajoled by an appeal to their affection
to their country. 'The same expedient it
was thought would again succeed; but
the fallacy of this hope was proved in
the course of Sunday; the seamen
remained firm in their determination.
but orderly and peaceable in their con-
duct.
It is but justice to remark, that the
blame of this misfortune does not fall
upon the Admiraltt It is, indeed, true,
that the Admiralty should have made
every exertion to pay the seamen; but
we make no doubt that the Admiralty
did its duty in this respect. The guilt is
with the leasur It was the duty of
the Treasury to provide the money;
and if the money had been provided, it
would no doubt have been paid imme-
diately. The same cause now threatens
to destroy the discipline and affection
of our seamen, which a few months
ago prevented our fleet from sailing
and capturing the French in Bantry
Bat 'fhe cause is a want of monet The
fleet was not then properly victualled;
now it is not properly paid. While
Ministers boast of our opulence, our
revenue and our resources, our dearest
interests suffer by a want of monet
Our seamen mutiny at Spithead, on
account of a want of their wages, while
Mr. Pitt has a week's cnquetr with
Loan Jobbers, in I)owning Street.
We cannot contemplate this mutiny
among our seamen without the most
awful emotions. The seamen will prob-
ably triumph, and if they do there is an
end of all the charm, of all the disci-
pline which has rendered our fleets
superior to all the world. If once the
seamen find that they can obtain what-
ever they ask by a general mutiny, they
will mutiny often; for though they are
generous, they are nor reasonable. A
general mutiny in a flevt for wages,
never occurred before in the I listory
of England. It seems a new era, and we
fear it is not a very auspicious one.
The guilt of Ministers in neglecting to
satisly the just demands of our Seamen
is the less to be forgiven, as the
impending misfortune was many
weeks ago foreseen. The complaints of
the Sailors, on account of their arrears,
were as loud, and as generally heard in
Portsmouth, as the complaints of the
poor were lately heard on account the
dearness of bread. When the fleet
came into harbour, a gloomy discon-
tent pervaded every crew, in conse-
quence of finding that they could not
obtain a shilling to go on shore and
enjoy themselves; and their discontent
was aggravated by observed, that a few
of their comrades, who could com-
mand money or friends, went on shore;
and by hearing them recount their
merry adventures. In every public
house in Portsmouth the discontent of
our Seamen on account of their
arrears, has been the common topic of
conversation during many weeks, and
the most tjtal r&tlictions have been
made.
ruJE,). 1	 1 '97
We mentioned vv 'tcrdav. that a mutiny
had broken out on board Lord
l3ridport's fleet. With great concern we
learn from our Portsmouth correspon-
dent that subordination is not yet
restored. 'I'he mutiny broke out on
Saturday last, it appears to have been
thoroughly preconceived and is at this
moment in a state of perfect organisa-
tion.
For some days, a spirit of unwilling-
ness has manifested itself throughout
the fleet at Portsmouth, and anony
-mous letters have been addressed to
the superior officers there, and to the
Board of .dmirahv, stating the hard-
ships which the seamen suffered from
the smallness of their pa At length
this dissatisfaction showed it self in a
more open manner, by pcmtions signed
by the large body of seamen of the
fleet, having been presented to lmd
Bridport, Sir Alan Gardner, the Port
.dmiral, and other Officers of rank at
Portsmouth. Their petitions set forth,
that while the Military, the Marines and
other public bodies of men, had at var-
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bus times received marks of the boun-
ty of (;overnmeflt, by allowances of
bread, money, and other perquisites,
the pay of the seamen had not been
augmented, through the distresses of
the times fell equall y hard on their fam-
ilies as on other parts of the communi-
ty. They therefore prayed for an
increase of wages, and an equal distri-
bution of prize money. Till these are
complied with, they one and all posi-
tively refuse to weigh anchor, unless it
shall appear that an enemy's fleet is on
the coast, or a convoy for merchant
ships should be required. It is also
insisted on, that one Captain charged
with crueltr and oppression, shall be
discharged from the fleet.
•fhey carry on the strictest and most
systematic discipline, and the Captain
of the forecastle has the command:
sobtiety is not only str ngly enjoined,
but intoxication or riot is to be pun-
ished in the most exemplary way, and a
rope is fastened to the main yard, to
trace up by the neck; without the small-
est hesitation or ceremony, persons
guilty of particular crimes. The creç
however, perform all the duties of the
ship, except weighing anchor as usual.
There is every reason to hope, howev-
er, that the affair will be accommodat-
ed without coming to extremities, the




So1er qrs ikcersfalsam audiat.
Address to the Seamen of the Fleet at
Spithead, under the orders of the Right
lion. Lord Bndport, K. B., &c., 8cc.
Friends, Countrymen and Fellow-
Subjects,
\our extraordinary conduct of yester-
day, and the repetition of it this day;
with strong circumstances of aggrava-
tion; your public procession through
the Fleet in a line of boats, at the time
appointed to l)ivine Service; your
refusal to weigh anchor and proceed to
Sea; your sending deputations from
Ship to Ship, at a crisis the most
momentous in the Annals of Naval
I listory - fill the breasts of your
Gracious Monarch's most well-affect-
ed Subjects with the most poignant
grief. Consequences absolutely subver-
sive of England's proudest boast, must
inevitably follow your perseverance in
behaviour so totally opposite to the
genuine spirit of British Seamen.
Suffer me to ask you, What will be the
remorse of your hearts, when the
World, to whom you have hitherto
been known only by acts of the most
splendid Bravery in the service of your
Country, and of the most heroic
Magnanimity to its bitterest Enemies,
when once in your power - what will be
your feelings, when your natural
Enemy - the common Enemy of all
Civilized Nations - whose object is the
total extinction of Man's dearest
Rights, under the specious names of
l.ibertv, Equality, and Fraternity - when
they can boast, that their Banditti, set
in motion by Incendiaries, and led on
by Ruffians, under circumstances the
most depressive to the human feelings
- in the hour of distress, hunger and
nakedness, and in the day of defeat,
when the hand of the oppressed must
recoil on the murderous plunderer -
when they evinced that obedient fideli-
ty and subordination to their Officers,
which have rendered them respectable
in the memoirs of discipline - those
men, who otherwise would have only
been known to the world as the lawless
50fl5 of rapine? What will not their
gasconading orators say; whose con-
stant practice it is to mislead their
deluded People b' the most consum-
mate acts of misrepresentation and
falsehcx)d? What will they not have
room to say, when ENGI.ANI)'S
TARS, the legitimate Sons of libert
under a Constitution comprising the
wisdom of the ages and the envy of
the world - a rock which has succes-
sively braved the summer's thunders
and the winter's storms, when they
refuse their Country's Service in the
hour of National Embarrassment; and
like the ravenous offspring of the
Pelican, crave for the last drop of their
affectionate mother's vital blood,
though not in wand
Men of common observation see such
a miserable train of evils arising from
your present conduct, as makes me
wish to drop the curtain, and veil the
horrid prospect from your sight.
My brave Fellows! be not deceived -
calm reflection will soon await you -
Then will you start aside from the
unhappy path of disobedience design-
ing men have surprised you into - then
will you lament having even for a
moment refused your services to your
Countr bleeding in the most just
cause.
You have a Father in your KING, who
values your hitherto gallant Character -
You have Friends in your
Commanders, who have spent the
prime of their lives in the honourable
line of the Wooden Walls of England.
.nd with so brilliant an example fresh
in your memories, as the glorious
Action of Valentine's Day - let not
those I leroes, on their arrival with their
well-earned Prizes, hear, that on the
quick succeeding festival of Easter,
their deserved Laurels must fade, from
the mutinous disobedience of their
well-paid and well-fed Brother 'tars at
Spitheadll!
Make known your wishes and wants in
an official and respectful manner, and
be assured the love your King and
Country bear you, will dispose them to
give you every comfort and reward a
grateful Country can bestoc consis-
tent with its existence as a Nation.
(:(msider this Address as the overflow-
ing of a heart panting for the preserva-
tion of I lonour and I Iappiness of I us
native land of liberty; and let me
trust, when next my ears are saluted
with Three Cheers, that I shall not be
ashamed to add to that animating
sound, Rule Btitannia, and God Save
the King, with which honest wish I for
the present bid you farewell, under the
assumed character of
l'he Spirit of Kempenfeldt, The Buoy




In the course of Sunday, several
rumours reached our hearing of
unpleasant news having been received
from Portsmouth respecting Lord
Bridport's Fleet. As they were told in
so confused a manner, and evidently
without a true knowledge of the case,
we treated them with disregard, and as
unworthy of notice.
The letters, however, received yester-
day from Portsmouth unravelled the
mystery of these rumours, and
brought the very unpleasant intelli-
gence of discontents having shewn
themselves on board all the ships of
Lord Bridport's fleet, on account of
demands made by the Seamen for an
increase of pay, and a degree of refusal
on their part to go to sea, until these
demand are complied with.
As we have every reason to expect that
the circumstances of what has passed
will be very grossly perverted by some
for the purposes of faction, and by
others through ignorance, we have
made it our business to inform our-
selves of the true state of the case, and
although it must be confessed that the
affair is extremely unpleasant, yet we
are sure that it is not so serious as it is
generally represented to be.
For some days past, a spirit of unwill-
ingness has manifested itself through-
Out the fleet at Portsmouth, and
anonymous letters have been
addressed to the Superior Officers
there, and the Board of Admirah,
stating the hardships which the seamen
have suffered from the smallness of
their pat At length this dissatisfaction
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shcwcd itself in a more open manner,
b Petitions si,med by the large body of
seamen of the fleet having presented
to Lord l3ridport, Sir . !ilan Gardner,
the Port .dmira1 and other officers of
rank at Portsmouth. These Petitions
set forth, that while the Military, the
Marines, and other public bodies of
men, had at various times received
marks of the bounty of Government,
bo allowances of bread, money, and
other perquisites, the pay of seamen
had not been augmented, thought the
distresses of the times fell equally hard
on the families as on other parts of the
community. They therefore prayed for
an increase of allowance; and a hope
was expressed that an answer would be
given to their prayer before they were
ordered to sea again. This expression
was however qualified with an excep-
tion - unless the enemy's fleet should
be known to be at sea; in which case we
arc sure every man would forget his
grievances, whether real or supposed,
and feel a return of that enthusiasm
and gallantry, which has on all occa-
sions distinguished this brave and gen-
erous dass of our countrymen.
The Petition, such as we have stated it
to be, met with that general concur-
rence finn every seaman on board
I .ord Bridport's fleet, as to become an
object of very serious concern; for
though it was couched in the most
respectful terms, and though the
Seamen have shewn a more than usual
exemplary behavior on board their
ships, yet as a species of peremptory
language was otherwise held, of
demanding an answer before the fleet
should be ordered for sea, it became
necessary to take some immediate and
decisive step on that subject.
It would ill become us to give an opin-
ion in the present stage of the busi-
ness, as to the justice of the application
itself for an advance of pay, which is
now 9 3/4d. per day, including all
allowances. Every person must blame
the kind of demand held out for an
immediate answer before they go to
sea; but in other respects, nothing can
exceed the general good behavior and
submission of the Seaman; and we
have great pleasure in observing that
there is no reason to suspect the small-
est disaffection in any one man to his
Majesty's service and Government.
They declare their eagerness to meet
the enemy, and glory in the name of
their honourable profession. This con-
duct will certainly be a strong recom-
mendation to grant the some further
mark of his Majesty's favour, and, as
we have before said, we have no doubt
but this unpleasant business will soon
be terminated to the satisfaction of all
parties.
We speak from the best authority when
we say, that the assertion made in a
Morning Paper of yesterday of 63 sail
of l)utch ships having sailed from
Texel some tie since, is wholly void of
foundation. No part of the l)utch
lleet has put to sea, nor is it likely to be
very formidable if it does.
The Brest fleet, though in a state of
respectable force, is not equal to meet
either of our detachments of the
Channel fleet. The preparations at
l)unkirk are nut such as to give cause
for any tiflti$iiii.
rbe jt
WedtIa;. /( lpi/ I -
It was with indignation and regret that
we yesterday stated the situation of our
Seamen at Portsmouth; indignation at
the Government for not paying them
their arrears, regret that an example
should have occurred, so destructive of
Naval Discipline. We have good reason
to think that the Seamen were stimulat-
ed to their present conduct by the dif-
ficulty of obtaining their wages. We
have heard it from various quarters;
their arrears have long been a topic of
general complaint at Portsmouth. But
the Ministerial Prints assert, that the
Seamen affect to have no other cause
of complaint, then the low rate of
their wages. It was to be expected the
Ministerial Papers would say this; it was
to be expected that they would endeav-
our to shield their Employers from a
most heavy charge. We know that in
Portsmouth every effort is made to
conceal the true cause of the Mutiny;
and the letters from thence arc very
unsatisfactory on the subject. Still,
however, we believe -- nay, we hope
that their arrears is the true cause of
the seamen's conduct. If that be the
cause, the Ministers are to blame; if a
demand for rise of wages be alone the
cause, the sailors are to blame. We can
punish the negligence of Ministers; but
how can we punish for misconduct the
seamen of a whole fleet? If it be true
that the seamen have demanded an
increase of wages, because the subsis-
tence of the soldiers has been
increased, we condemn the demand;
for a sailor lives, even noç in a state of
comfort, compared with that of the
soldier, or even compared with that of
the Labouring class of society. It was
with indignation and regret that we
stated this business yesterday; but if it
be true that the seamen have no other
cause of complaint than their low rate
of wages, we must regard it as much
more alarming than we at first imag-
ined. It will be a most delicate talk to
appease them: it will be setting a most
dangerous example to comply with
their demands.
I)ispatches were yesterday received at
the Admiralty from Portsmouth; and
the private letters from thence agree in
saying, that the seamen continued to
persevere in their demands, conducting
themselves in a cool, deliberate, order-
ly manner. The fleet continues under
the command of the private seamen,
who perform all the duties, excepting
that of weighing anchor. It is said, they
have resolved, that if anyone, before
their request is granted, offers to obey
the commands of the Officers for sail-
ing, he shall instantly be hung up at the
yard arm; and the same punishment
was to be inflicted on any one found in
liquor, that being regarded as the
means by which attempts could be




No public event has taken place, either
at home or abroad, since the com-
mencement of the war, however
unfavourabk it may have been to the
national prosperity, which has not been
falsely commented on and industrious-
ly exaggerated by the prints devoted to
the Opposition, to gratify the hatred
and jealousy of the Pam' against the
Administration. Steady to this principle
of gross misrepresentation, a Morning
Paper of yesterday has seized with
avidity the recent discontent manifest-
ed by the seamen on board the Grand
Ileet, and has, with its accustomed
malignity and falsehood, made it the
ground-work of a most violent invec-
tive against his Majesty's Ministers. But
as the plain statement of facts could
not authorize the inferences which the
writer wished to establish, he found it
necessary to sift his ground, and assert
that the discontent arose from thc
wages of the men being one year in
arrears, whereas it is positively known,
that it has only been produced by a
demand for an increase of pay in
future.
Then the circumstances of this pas-
sive insurrection, and the secret and
prompt manner in which it has been
organized and executed, are compared
with the various measures obstinately
pursued by a dangerous faction
throughout the country to poison the
public mind against the Government,
it is impossible not to perceive the inti-
mate connection which exists between
the means employed in exciting this
discontent, and the systematic plan
uniformly adopted by a few men in the
Opposition to weaken the constitu-
tional energy of the Executive Power,
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and to impede the exertions of nation-
al strength.
'Ihe cause of the discontents of the
seamen at Portsmouth was the want of
an increase cif pay, and a more equal
distribution of prize-money. 'fhc
broke out in a very sudden and unex-
pected manner, and were clearly the
result of much secret deliberation. On
Lord Bridport!s making the signal on
Saturday for the ships to weigh anchor,
to drop down to St. I lelens, the sailors
refused to obey; and on Sunday the
spirit of disobedience rose to such a
height, that a deputation was sent from
each ship to confer cm the steps neces-
sary to be taken; and during the time of
divine service, parties of seamen
rowed in public procession through
the fleet in a line of boats, and actually
forbid the crew on board the Romnev
man of war, which was appointed as
convoy for an outward bound fleet, to
weigh anchor. A Captain of their own
was appointed on the forecastle of
each ship to keep watch, and preserve
regulatit
trI)c rruc fltiton
.\o/umas let/s .- lig1i mit/an
lfednesdsj; 191-lpñl 1797
If we have said little upon the subject
of the discontent that had shown itself
amongst the seamen of the ships
under the Command of Lord
Bridport, it was from an impression of
the delicacy of the subject, of its
importance, in a National point of
view; and of the danger of misrepre-
sentation or exaggeration, into which
our contemporaries have almost gener-
ally fallen from their systematic malig-
nit); or precipitate folly.
The discontents, which have latel y bro-
ken out, existed before the fleet under
the command of Lord ltidport when
last to sea. 'Ihe seamen in general
thought they were entitled to an
increase of wages, and resolved tc, gain
this object by firm and unanimous cci-
operation. The Admiralty were not
ignorant of the sentiments of the sea-
men or the subject; and several plans
have been under consideration, by
which some additional advantages
might be accorded, without greatly
burdening the State.
The Seamen of the lleet, who have
disclaimed all intention of mutiny,
thought the present a proper time
openly to declare their alleged griev-
ances; and they therefore resolved to
make them known before the l'lect
again put to sea. 'l'here was a perfect
understanding amongst the Seamen of
all the Ships at Spithead; and the signal
for making public their resolutions,
was, - those of the Queen Charlotte
running up the fore shrouds and giving
three cheers, at the moment when the
signal was made by the Admiral to pre-
pare for sea. lhe combination that had
been entered into then became appar-
ent; and though a slight disposition to
disorder became apparent, by the firm-
ness of the Officers, its dangerous
effects were in a great measure averted.
Much praise we understand to be due
to the coolness, firmness, and modera-
tion of I .ord Bridport, and the
Officers under him, who soon brought
their men back to a sense of their duty
Their demands were, of course,
referred to the Board of the Admiralty;
but meanwhile, order and discipline
were completely restored.
on Mcmda after a Council had been
held at the Admiralty, as well as a
Hoard, Lords Spencer and Arden, and
Admiral Young, with Mr. Maraden, set
off for Portsmouth, to hold a Board
upon the spot, to investigate the com-
plaints and conduct of the Seamen,
and to make such arrangements as the
important nature of the business
might seem to demand.
l)uring the whole transaction, the
Sailors expressed, in the strongest
manner, their heartfelt attachment tc,
their Scwereign, and the cause of their
Country. Though, to gain their object,
whether just or not, they thought it
ncccssar; for a while, to throw aside
the order and discipline which are the
characteristics of the British Navy, yet
we are confident, their sense of duty to
their King and love for their Country,
were never for a moment abated; and
that their hearts glowed with those
generous and ardent feelings which
rang a British Tar as the first of char-
acters.
A Petition or Memorial of consider-
able length was transmitted to the
Admiralty, setting forth the supposed
grievances of the Seamen, and repre-
senting what their expectations were.
Upon the business being discussed
with them, however, in a calm dispas-
sionate manner, the generous nature of
their character appeared pre-eminent.
•l'hey unanimously declared, that if
their Country could not at present
afford an increase of wages, they
would be satisfied, and even fight her
battles for nothing; but that when a
proper opportunity offered, they had
no doubt but all their just claims would
be attended to.
In this confidence they may implicitly
repose. The best wishes of the Nation
must ever be with those men, who dis-
play such heroic conduct in her
defence; and there is certainly no rea-
sonable recompence which it can be
the wish of any friend to his Country
to withhold from a set of men at once
so useful and meritorious.
After the statement which we have
made, it is unnecessary for us to refute
the malignant assertion - c,f the com-
plaints of the Seamen originating from
arrears of pay. The usual regularity has
been c)bserved in the payment of the
Fleet; and the assertion alluded to,
could only be made with views the
most insidious and wicked.
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CHAPTER THREE: Frvm the IJving to the Dead
A squib, written in the name and under the character ofAdmiral Kempenfeldt, appeared in the Sun
newspaper, severeiy criticising the behav'iour of the seamen, and the purity of their motives. The fol-
owing repv, compo.ced with no mean smartness and abili"y, was immediate'y published; it attracted
notice, bj the sort of assurance it gave, that the sailors were well actuated ly properfeelin<gs, as well
asfor the indication it afforded, that the men offair talents were managing the perilous enterprise.'
Forty-five years after the event, the first history of the mutiny noted the response to
Heriot's squib was well written. At the time, The Times also detected the presence of an
able pen: 'The answer to the Ghost of Kempenfeldt ... is so far important, as it shows
the spirit of the sailors at Portsmouth, and is evidently written by some able pen, which
has probably served them on other occasions.' 2
 'From the Living to the Dead', was better
written and did attract more notice than the squib. It began with a question:
'Art thou a spirit of earth or goblin damn'd?'3
In the Sun, of the 8 instant, we have seen your address, and which greatly surprised
us, wherein we are accused of those crimes, which disgrace the name of a British
seaman, and which may prejudice the minds of our countrymen against us; as we are
called upon to make known our wants and wishes in an official and respectful man-
ner.4
It mocked Heriot's literary pretensions and ridiculed his clumsy appeals to assumed su-
perstitions. Yet, from its sarcastic salutation to its caustic close, 'From the Living to the
Dead' was a model of restraint. Rather than outrage, the response expressed surprise.
Rather than shame, his heavy-handed allusion to the tragedy evoked pride.
The delegates refused to be patronised. They recognised what was and what was not
relevant to their purpose. They were, in every instance, practical and determined men,
qualities, which in other circumstances, accounted for much of the Royal Navy's success;
qualities, which in these circumstances, persuaded the public they were actuated by
'proper feelings'. Rather than responding to an insult, they took the opportunity to make
'Neale Roberts, Hictotj of the Muthy at Spithead and the Nore (London: Tegg, 1842), 39
2 The Timer, 24 April 1797
3 Shakespeare, Hamlet, I, iv. Their choice demonstrated both an ability to quote Shakespeare from memory
(albeit inaccurately) and a definite sense of irony. It should read:
Angels and ministers of grace defend us!
Be thou a spirit of health or goblin damn'd,
Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell,
Be thy intents wicked or charitable,
Thou com'st in such a chantable shape,
That I shall speak to thee
ADMI/5125, Detail of the Proceedings; BL Add MS 35197.115; Sun, 20 April 1797; Morning Post, 24
April 1797
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their wants and wishes known and to convince the public they were reasonable men who
had exhausted all other avenues of redress. They insisted they petitioned Parliament only
because their previous petition had been ignored:
We, the subjects of a loyal country, presented our petitions to that Honourable Earl
Howe, who wore the laurels of the First of June, who was in the hearts of British
seamen represented as their friend; but sorry are we to say that we found to the con-
trary, in his not representing our petitions to the Lords Commissioners of the Adnii-
ralty.
Although he had not been to sea with them for two years, the seamen of the Channel
fleet saw Howe as their friend, their father and their most likely advocate. They expected
him to return their loyalty by supporting their cause. They expected more than perfunc-
tory enquiries and forwarding their petitions to the Admiralty. They felt betrayed and in-
sisted they reluctantly took their case to the public:
But to convince our country at large, that there is not anywise the least spark of re-
publican spirit, we have caused to be inserted the most private of our concerns: sorry
also we are to remark the words, 'French agents', as our country may think, by that
assertion, we now take into our arms the people that a British seaman detests the
name of. But to the contrary, we have our country's good as much at heart as any
other description of men whatever, and that our request is nowise injurious to our
country.
The delegates' documents, both public and private, resounded with such assurances.
They did more than protest their innocence. They stood condemned by assertions, asser-
tions based on rumours, not fact; assertions appearing in print and poisoning the public
mind against them. On 21 April the London Chronicle explained the one of the principal
difficulties of eighteenth century journalism:
As a matter of the first national importance at the present moment, we have been at
great pains to collect information on the subject of the present unhappy dispute
which prevails on board the fleet at Spithead, but find all the accounts so disguised
by the operation of passion and prejudice, that we are at a loss to pledge ourselves
for the truth of what we may nevertheless think it our duty to lay before our readers.5
'From the Living to the Dead' invited a comparison of the seamen's motives and patri-
otism with those of 'any other description of men'; thus challenging those who would
cast aspersions or judge them, and implying they were entitled to the same rights as other
Britons.
We ask for that comfortable subsistence which our country can easily bestow, and
that those barbarities which are practised by some (sorry, indeed, we should be to say
London Chronicle, 20 22 April 1797
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the whole, as there are among us men of every description, both good and evil) be
erased out of this well instituted service.
They anticipated the public's concern with the expense, as well as the risk to the country.
Resigned to their circumstances and sensible to the necessity of a 'well instituted service',
they objected only to the arbitrary application of discipline, not discipline in general.
Gunner Richardson observed: 'In all my experience at sea, I have found seamen grateful
for good usage, and yet they like to see subordination kept up, as they know the duty
could not be carried out without it.' 6
 As lives frequently depended on quick attention to
orders, maintaining discipline was considered a fundamental responsibility of a ship's of-
ficers. Richardson continued, 'whenever I hear of a mutiny in a ship, I am much of the
opinion of Admiral Lord Collingwood, who said it must assuredily be the fault of the
captain or the officers.'7
 Phillip Patton, a keen observer of the mutiny, echoed Lady
Spencer's damning comment: 'Strange to relate! this scheme was in agitation four months
without coming to the knowledge of any Quarterdeck-Officer in the fleet.'8
Despite their claims of moderation, the seamen no longer limited their demands to the
single issue of a pay increase. However, rather than mentioning the 'prayers' of their 15
April petitions, 'From the Living to the Dead' asked only for a 'comfortable subsistence'.
This was coupled with a challenge to Heriot and the suggestion that, in addition to not
receiving a pay increase, they had not received all that was due them:
We, the subjects of your address, coolly as the representatives of that body which has
so long lain under the well-known Buoy, wish you to come forward in a fair and
manly way, in your real and corporeal state, and for one week if the scanty allowance
we are obliged to subsist, will keep you in the spirited state which men of our de-
scription require, but are at this moment without the assistance of at least two-thirds
of their pay; and our wives [and] families languishing in want, whilst this country, that
abounds with plenty, ought to be ashamed of the word Want!
As the squib invited a response, the authors seized the opportunity it presented. They
reminded the public that they were the subjects of Heriot's address and 'the representa-
tives of that body which has so long lain under the well-known Buoy'. Their carefully
chosen words and the absence of other long-standing, but less easily justified, grievances
made their intentions clear. 9
 In the process, they provided the press managers with a les-
6 WPjcJdson,A Manner ofEngland (London: Murray, 1908), 38
7 Ibid; E Hughes, ed., Private Conspondcnce ofAdmiral Lord Co/b ngwood (London: NRS, 1957), 85-86
NMM WYN 109 7/14, P Patton, Observations on Naval Mutiny, 4-5
When complaints involving arrears, prize money and tnal by a jury resurfaced at the Nore, they were
taken as proof of the mutineers' unreasonableness.
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son in press management. They closed with another reference to the tragedy, another
challenge and another reassurance of their loyalty:
To the brave Admiral Kempenfeldt's GHOST,
Buoy of the Royal George, Spithead.
If the clamours of justice daily echoing from the mouths of the loyal tars should
again awake the SPIRIT of KEMPENFELDT, let not his ethereal, but his corporeal
part, make itself known, and we will convince him, that those who have made Bri-
tannia rule the main, know also their duty to their Sovereign.
A postscript to the manuscript version of 'From the Living to the Dead' suggests their
issue with the editor of the Sun was personal.
The following lines are addressed to the Editor of the Su,r
The well paid and well fed tars of Spithead begs leave to inform the Editor of the Sun
that they have seen and read the complaint from the Other world as mentioned in
the last of the 18 inst. and is desirous that in their next they will be pleased to observe
that we advise them to be careful how they insert any Burlesques whatever. Other-
wise they may be made to dance another tune than that of 'God Save the King' or
'Rule Britannia'.
OtherAnswers to Kempenfeldt
Two other responses to the squib have survived. Neither was restrained or subtle. Nei-
ther was published. Both express outrage rather than surprise, sarcasm rather than wit.
They overstate what the published response understates. They spoke to John Heriot, not
the public, and expressed the anger 'From the Living to the Dead' only hinted at) 0 If the
published response represents the consensus of the delegates, those not published reveal
the diversity contributing to it. Significantly, while these alternative responses were not
published, they were carefully preserved.
'To the Editor of the Sun' and 'Perturbed Spirit' are found in 'A Detail of the Proceed-
ings on Board H. M. Ship Queen Charlotte at the time the Men in the Fleet got their Wages
and Provisions at Spithead Settled to the Preasent Estableishment In the Year I 797h1
The file includes fair copies of the key documents of the mutiny, including 'From the
Living to the Dead' (with the postscript), 'To the Editor of the Sun' and 'Perturbed
Spirit'. Originals or published versions survive to confirm the authenticity, though not
'° On 20 April the Morning Post reported, 'They will not suffer the Sun Newspaper to be brought on boaxd
any of the ships.'
"PRO ADMI 5125, Detail of Proceedings
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always the accuracy, of the documents included in 'A Detail of the Proceedings'. The two
transcnbed above are exceptions. There are no other copies.
While their provenance remains a mystery, the delegates apparently wanted these docu-
ments to survive. 12
 To present their case and ensure their actions would neither be mis-
represented or misinterpreted, they also supplied a commentary. Some of the documents
were printed and distributed as handbills. Referring to the 15 April petitions, the London
Chronicle informed its readers, 'They have published their petition, which is now in the
press, and is to be distributed gratis among the fleet to-morrow morning. It is well com-
posed, and consists of several pages.' 13
 Throughout the mutiny, the delegates used hand-
bills and newspapers to keep their shipmates informed. They did not so much lead, as
represent the crews who had elected them. The Morning Post commented: 'The "Ports-
mouth Parliament," as the sailors call it, does not erect itself into a body to control the
wishes of its Constituents, but is considered merely as an organ through which the gen-
eral will of the whole fleet is conveyed.'14
Throughout the mutiny, the delegates sought comment and confinnation. They commu-
nicated their shipmates' concerns to their fellow delegates and the delegates' intentions
back to their shipmates. Those who failed were replaced. Communications within the
fleet were considered vital; and, as a result: 'Their determination to have their demands
complied with is so universal in the fleet, that scarce a man luke-warm in the cause is to
be found.' 15
 Conversely, communications between individual ships and the shore were
seen as a threat and, by common consent, were constrained. Women and slops mer-
chants visiting the ships during the mutiny frequently found they were permitted on
board, but were not permitted to leave. Few seamen were allowed to go ashore. Those
who overstayed their liberty or went ashore without permission found their shipmates as
unforgiving as their officers.
Their handbills were also distributed throughout Portsmouth and succeeded in capturing
local sympathies. By chance or design, copies found their way to newspapers, extending
their appeal to a national audience. However, the language of the published version,
'2 Dad Bonnet-Smith somewhat dismissively suggested the documents were 'compiled by a Rating in the
,Queen Charlotte who had got hold of some of the papers of her Delegates'. Bonner-Smith, 'Naval Mutinies of
1797', Mariners Mayor, xxi, October 1935, 436
' 3 Landon Chronicle, 20-22 April 1797
'4 MorningPost,22Apnl 1797
' 5 London Chronicle, 2022 April 1797
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compared to those unpublished, argued against chance having determined the passage of
this news. 'From the Living to the Dead' began with the concern that the squib 'may
prejudice the minds of our countrymen'; followed by a 'wish to make known to the
world' that they had already made their wants and wishes known in 'an official and re-
spectful manner'; and closed with an effort to 'convince our country at large' of their re-
jection of French or republican influences and their loyalty to the king. In contrast, 'Per-
turbed Spirit' mentioned the public only once, while 'To the Editor of the Sun' neglected
to mention it at all. Together, the unpublished responses contained five direct and forty-
two indirect references to the editor of the Sun. Minus the postscript, 'From the Living to
the Dead' ignored Heriot, addressing only the assumed character of Kempenfeldt. The
published response exploited an opportunity to secure public sympathies. Those unpub-
lished merely responded to an insult. 'To the Editor of the Sun' and Perturbed Spirit'
proves the seamen read and reacted to newspapers. 'From the Living to the Dead' dem-
onstrates, in deciding which response would be published, the delegates did not confuse
the medium with the message.
'To the Editor of the Sun' and 'Perturbed Spirit' took umbrage at the suggestion that
their conduct was disorderly or sacrilegious. 'From the Living to the Dead' ignored the
issue as irrelevant. The unpublished responses dwelt on harshness of naval life and
abuses of discipline, but offered no remedy. 'From the Living to the Dead' approached
the subject with circumspection, yet offered specific complaints and remedies, made
more effective by the restraint shown. Where the published response blamed Howe for
failing to represent their cause, 'To the Editor of the Sun' blamed the Admiralty for not
considering their petitions 'worthey of answer'. While their frustration was understand-
able, it would not have been tactful with negotiations in progress.
The unpublished responses found irony in being identified as 'the legitimate sons of lib-
erty', and made it clear the object of their anger was not revolution, but the recovery of
rights guaranteed by their constitution, but denied by their circumstances. However in
doing so, they raised an issue ignored in 'From the Living to the Dead', the difference
between civil and military rights. The point was belaboured by the Morning Post
A wide distinction must always exist between the Soldier and the Citizen. The Citizen
enjoys his rights in Society, because it is for the good of society that he should do so.
But when the Citizen becomes a Soldier, he puts himself in a state of War, and nec-
essarily relinquishes those rights he possess as a member of Civil society. ... It is a
farce to call the demand of such an assembly, made in such a manner, a Petition!
They have it in their power, in a few hours, to destroy our Dock-yards, Stores and
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Ships; to destroy our Marine, to destroy the very heart of the nation. If this be Peti-
tioning, we may see the Guards surround the Bank, or Ten Thousand Soldiers sur-
round Parliament, and Petition! Mr. Pitt has created an unwieldy Military, which,
when we consider the conduct of the Seamen, we cannot contemplate without ter-
ror.16
'To the Editor of the Sun' and Perturbed Spirit' showed contempt for 'big belly Place
men', 'blustering Patriots', 'french Emigrant Vermin' and officers whose friendship they
carried on their shoulders. They condemned 'those who Perfer the Intrest of a few Inve-
didualls in powr to the Public good', but offered no remedy beyond granting their 'hum-
ble' requests. They assured the public they had reflected before they acted and exhausted
the established avenues for redress before adopting their 'somewhat novel' measures.
In publishing 'From the Living to the Dead', the delegates showed some sensitivity to the
economic, political and social issues involved. Their decision not to ask for anything
more was noted in 'A Detail of the Proceedings'. Their pledge was noted by William
Marsden, the second secretary who accompanied Spencer, Young and Arden to Ports-
mouth:
It is unanimously agreed by the Fleet that from this Day no Grievances shall be re-
ceived in order to convince the Nation at large that we know when to cease to Ask as
well as to begin. And that we ask nothing but what is moderate and may be granted
without Detriment to the Nation or Injury to the Service. And it is unanimously
Agreed that the internal Discipline of the Ships shall be in no means interfered with
by the Ships Company but every Point of Duty shall be regularly Carried on.17
Even such plain declarations were misinterpreted. On 22 April, the Morning Post corn-
mented:
while they declare they will demand redress of no other grievances than those
stated, they at the same time desire the grievances they in the future complain of,
may be redressed. Here a door is left open for any future demand; and if any com-
plaint the Seamen may hereafter make, shall not be redressed, then they may say their
Petition has not been complied with.'8
The accusation was unfair, but consistent with opposition's alarmist approach. Two days
earlier, the Morning Post expressed 'regret that an example should have occurred, so de-
structive of Naval Discipline'; and observed 'It will be a most delicate talk to appease
them: it will be setting a most dangerous example to comply with their demands."9
'6 Morrnn Post, 22 April 1797
ADM3 136, Note from .Qkeen Charlotte, 18 April 1797
'8 Morning Post, 22 April 1797
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Oblivious or insensitive to the consequences, they exaggerated the crisis to undermine
public confidence in Pitt:
We cannot contemplate this mutiny among our seamen without the most awful
emotions. The seamen will probably triumph, and if they do, there is an end of all the
charm, of all the discipline which has rendered our fleets superior to all the world. If
once the seamen find that they can obtain whatever they ask by a general mutiny,
they will mutiny often; for though they are generous, they are not reasonable. A gen-
eral mutiny in a fleet for wages, never occurred before in the History of England. It
seems a new era, and we fear it is not a very auspicious one.20
This was essentially Patton's argument made public. Government's London Chronicle
shared the concern, but not the objective of opposition's Morning Post. Where the latter,
ignoring the risks involved, hoped to use the crisis to bring Pitt down, the former, ig-
noring government's culpability, called for national unity and non-partisan support:
Never, sure, was any Government in so awful a predicament as that which ours is at
present; and never did any stand so much in need of finn support from the nation at
large. The embarrassment in which it is involved, is not the work of this or any par-
ticular Ministry. The question before us is a great national question; and he who
treats it as a party one, is either too short-sighted to be able to see the extent of the
consequences to which it may lead; or too regardless of the safety of his country to
deserve the name of a patriot: The occasion calls for a union of all the talents, abili-
ties, and virtue of all descriptions of public men.21
Unwilling to allow their actions to be characterised as either an embarrassment or the
end of an era, the delegates pledged of their loyalty and willingness to submit to disci-
pline:
we are thoroughly convinced should any real grievance or other cause of com-
plaint arise in future, and the same be laid before your Lordships, in a regular man-
ner, we are perfectly satisfied that your Lordships will pay every attention to a num-
ber of brave men, whoever have, and ever will be true and faithful to their King and
Country.
Opposition's other leading print, the Morning Chronicle, conceded the seamen 'shewed no
disposition to riot or disorder'; yet, in their 'deliberate purpose and systematic measures',
found cause for concern:
Their behaviour is represented on all hands as orderly, but the coolness which marks
their conduct is not the least alarming, as it evinces a deliberate purpose and system-
atic measures. They appear to be submissive in every respect that does not interfere
with their determination not to put to sea till their pretentions and confidence are an-
swered. Till this point is settled, however, the fleet is completely under their author-
20 1bd, 18 April 1797. The editors appeared unaware of the mutinies in 1783.
21 London Chronith, 22 April 1797
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ity. They profess the utmost zeal for the public service, and their readiness to sail
should the enemy's fleet be at sea, or should a convoy be required; but till their ob-
ject is attained they seem determined to enforce a general co-operation of the Sea
men in their plan, by a summary punishment of any conduct that may prove injurious
to their cause, or that is inconsistent with their agreement.
The Mornin<g Post shared their concern: 'the seamen continue to persevere in their de-
mands, conducting themselves in a cool, deliberate, orderly manner.' 24
 Less observant,
perceptive or concerned with accuracy, John Heriot found 'coolness, finnness, and mod-
eration' only in the behaviour of 'Lord Bridport and the officers under him'
In Perturbed Spirit' the seamen's reassurances were accompanied by the that they were
the country's sinews and principal means of support. The London Chronicle agreed: 'The
seamen remain perfectly master of the keys to the real strength of Great Britain.'
Clearly, the seamen understood their rights. More importantly, they understood the
strength of their position. On 17 April Captain Hood noted in his log: 'They now felt
their power over the country and the government.'27
Rides. Orders & Rwmours of Excess
The fleet also understood what was expected of it. To maintain discipline and solidarity,
to prevent the proceedings from slipping out of control, the delegates issued rules and
orders. They too were printed as a handbill, published in most newspapers and preserved
in 'A Detail of the Proceedings'. Confirmation appeared in the captain's log of Mars: 'A
strong remonstrance was made to the Ships CompY to behave themselves, sober and at-
tentive to their Officers, but by no means to unmoor till their Grevance was redressed.'
Their threats were not idle. The rules were enforced. On 18 April the Star observed the
mutiny 'appears to have been thoroughly preconceived and is at this moment in a state
of perfect organisation'. It added:
They carry on the strictest and most systematic discipline, and the Captain of the
forecastle has the command: sobriety is not only strongly enjoined, but intoxication
or riot is to be punished in the most exemplary way, and a rope is fastened to the
main yard, to trace up by the neck; without the smallest hesitation or ceremony, per-
Morning Chronicle, 19 April 1797
24 Morning Post, l9ApnI 1797
Trne Briton, 19 April 1797
London Chronicle, 20-22 April 1797
27 Neale Roberts, 21
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Sons guilty of particular crimes. The crew, however, perform all the duties of the
ship, except weighing anchor as usua1.
Three days later the Star advised its readers: 'One man on board La Pompie had this
morning a severe do7en, with a thief's cat, and was thrice lowered from the main-yard
into the water, for bringing a pint of spirits on board.' 3° On 23 April, the L4)ndon Chronicle
reported several men were flogged or ducked 31
 for disobedience of orders; a crew mem-
ber of the Rya1 Geoie was hanged for attempting to reason with the mutineers; and the
fleet entered 'into a resolution that no seaman should for the future be punished, unless
found guilty of an offence by a Jury of twelve of his companions'. 32
 Three days later it
retracteth
As so many stories and reports were fabricated during the last week, respecting this
ever to be lamented business, we think it necessary to state, that no man has suffered
death; a woman whom the seamen twice ducked for bringing spirits on board, is
since dead; a Corporal of marines on board the Defiance was also twice ducked, for
refusing to take the oath administered by the Delegates, and was threatened to be
hanged, but he still refusing, they sent him on shore.33
The Times also discounted the rumours:
In the mean time we think it necessary to state, that the reports circulated in several
Morning Papers TM
 of yesterday, of the sailors having hung up one of their men for his
attempting to take the part of a gallant officer, and of having flogged others for simi-
lar offences, are without the smallest foundation. Affairs have been sufficiently tin-
pleasant, without the need of exaggeration.35
Under normal circumstances, confirmation of punishments could be found in the ships'
logs. During the mutiny, it was left to the discretion of the ships' captains to record pun-
ishments. While Willett Payne convalesced ashore, his first lieutenant, George Ross, duti-
fully recorded all shipboard activities, including punishments. The log of the Impétueux
reveals that more punishments were awarded or inflicted during the mutiny than imme-
diately before or after. On the morning of 17 April, 'Dennis McLean (Seaman) received
one dozen lashes for drunkenness with small Beer'; and 'at 6 the Ships Company pun-
Star, 18 April 1797; Crafismaie, 23 April 1797
30 Stae2lApd 1797
31 
'The ducking at the main yard-arm is when a malefactor, by having a rope fastened under his arms and
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tion 1784-1812 (Aldershot Scolax, 1989), 80
32 London Ch,vnicle, 18-20 April 1797
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ished David Scott (Seaman) with one dozen lashes for drunkenness and drawing a
Knife.' On 20 April, George Johnson, Jn0 Skinner and Abraham Lee each received a
do7en lashes for 'absenting themselves all night without leave.' On 21 April, Jno Fisher
was 'duck'd from the Fore Yard Arm for sleeping on his post' and Josh May was ducked
thrice for 'quitting the Boat when on Shore'. On the following day Richard Nash was
also ducked thrice for disrespectful behaviour. On 22 April, William Brown, a marine,
was ducked thrice for being insolent to his captain; and Joseph Johnson was both ducked
and flogged for attempting to desert. The strictest discipline was maintained. Order,
moderation and discipline were considered essential to the success of the proceedings.
As a result, punishments were proportionate to the threat to that success, rather than the
crime.
With communications prevented between ships and the shore by order of the delegates,
and most officers remaining on board their ships by order of the Admiralty, those on the
shore could only observe and speculate. Thus, on 21 April, The Times correspondent ob-
served: 'Every ship has a yard-rope ready at the fore-yard-arm' and speculated its purpose
was 'to hang any person who breaks through their own regulations'. Three weeks later, it
still insisted the yard ropes were 'a measure of terror', a view apparently shared by the
Admiralty. Marsden noted in the minutes: 'They have Ropes reeved to the Yards of every
ship to hang up any Person who shall attempt to resist.' 37
 As no one was hanged, the
threat proved symbolic, a visual equivalent of Benjamin Franklin's observation: We
must, indeed, all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.'
The seamen were determined to see their cause through to the end - to avoid violence
and to remain at anchor until their grievances were redressed. As before, threats were
made, but none were carried out. 38 Ironically, this determination was shaken by Admi-
ralty admonitions and one admiral's indiscretion.
PRO ADM51/1195, Captain's Log Impitueux; 17 April 1797
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The board came to Portsmouth determined to do what they assumed the fleet's officers
could not, restore discipline. Marsden recorded his understanding of the situation.
Shortly after their arrival, Bridport and the other flag officers 'came & reported the State
of the fleet'. 39 The board learned:
That the Officers were no longer obeyed in any thing beyond the internal Duty of
the Ships. That a Committee consisting of two Delegates from each Line of Battle
Ship meeting regularly in the Admirals Cabin of the Queen Charlotte regulate every
Thing, and have entire Command of the Fleet. They issue their Orders to every Ship
which are exactly obeyed.
Marsden confirmed: 'The Ships in the completest Order possible & they punish Drunk-
enness & every other Offence with the utmost Severity.' However, he did not conceal his
contempt in observing:
Lord Bridport & the other Admirals stated the disgraceful Situation in which they
stood as well as every other Officer in their respective Ships, and that it was their
Decided opinion that the only Chance of bringing back the Fleet to Subordination, &
the Seamen to their Duty, was by complying with the Demands made in their Peti-
tions.4°
His assessment of the board's approach to the business was more flattering:
The line of policy, however, adopted by our prudent naval administration, in this
delicate crisis, was not to drive desperation by any direct act or show of hostility,
those who wielded such formidable engines of mischief; and the wisdom of this was
evinced by the order and discipline that were gradually, but effectually restored
within a moderate time.
Marsden viewed the mutiny with remarkable detachment. He later argued: 'There are few
instances upon record of an insurrection so little admitting of defence or palliation, or of
one so well planned or so extensive in its effects.' Ignoring all warnings and the respect-
ful, but anonymous petitions of 28 February, Mardsen insisted:
the grievances complained of would have been redressed, upon proper and re-
spectful application to the Board of Admiralty, so far as respected abuses, and to the
Legislature for an increase of pay: for certain it is, that no disinclination to attend to
the comforts either of army or navy has been shewn in modern times; nor can it be
supposed that the officers, who were the immediate object of the vindictive spirit of
the mutineers, could have any interest distinct from that of the men.4'
PRO ADM3/136, Admiralty Minutes, 18 April 1797
4°W Marsden, A BtifMemoir of the Life and Wnhngs of the Late William Ma,cde,, (London: Cox, 1838), 88
41 Ibi€L , 88-90
138
Marsden reported 'after long & serious Deliberation', the board offered a compromise, a
small increase in wages coupled with a vague promise of better care for the sick and
wounded.42
 The board added a touch of flattery, a hint of invasion and a call to duty:
haveing a Perfect Confidence in the Zeal Loyalty and Courage of all Seamen in
the Fleet so Generously Expressed in their Petition and in their Earnest desire of
serving their Country with that Spirit which allways so eminently Distinguished Brit-
ish Seamen We have come to this Resolution the more Readily that the seamen may
have as early as Possible an Opertunity of Shewing their good disposition by return-
ing to their Duty as it may be necessary that the Fleet Should Speadily put to Sea to
meet the Enimey of the Country.43
Despite Howe's precedent and public expectations,' there were no face-to-face negoti-
tions. Apparently, Spencer felt bringing the fleet back to subordination precluded direct
contact Instead, he trusted the same chain of command to communicate his concessions
to the seamen that had so recently failed to communicate their complaints to him. The
London Cb,vnicle reported:
The correspondence between the Board of Admiralty at Portsmouth and the deputa-
tion of seamen on board the Queen Charlotte, is carried on through the superior Offi-
cers of the fleet, who attend the Board, and deliver the result of its deliberations to
the seamen.45
The board ordered Bridport to make their determination known to the fleet, who also
delegated the responsibility:
This was done accordingly by Sir Alan Gardner, Adm. 1 Colpoys & Adm) Pole going
on board the Queen Charlotte & communicating a Copy of the Boards said Order to
these Delegates; who did not appear to be satisfied with the Contents, but said they
must consult their several Ships Companies, and that they would return an Answer
by Ten o'Clock Tomorrow moming.
It was not until 'about 1/a past 5 while we were at dinner' on 19 April that the admirals
returned with an answer. It came in written form and, according to Marsden, 'contained
a variety of new matter & some things quite foreign to the Subject & the King's Service'.
In fact, the only new matter was the request to also increase the pay of 'our Brethren the
42 Th deliberations could not have taken that long as the board's offer was presented to the fleet later the
same day (18 April). It appears they came to Portsmouth with the offer in hand.
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Marines'. Of which, Lady Spencer commented to Windharn: 'They at first agreed to be
satisfied with Ld Sp.'s concessions, but then got off again by insisting on including the
Marines - a most useful subterfuge! By making this hitherto useful body of men a party in
their demands they ensure concurrence in all of the& 7
 The only thing foreign to
the king's service involved a suggestion as to how to fund their pensions and a clear indi-
cation of who was behind the mutiny:
every Seamen employed in the Merchant Service, instead of sixpence per month,
which he now pays shall hereafter pay one shilling per Month, which we trust will
raise a fund fully adequate to the purpose; and as this in time of Peace must be paid
by your Petitioners, we trust it will give a convincing proof of our disinterestedness
and moderation.
The board's attempt to limit negotiations to the single issue of a pay increase had failed.
Either Admiral Gardner did not disclose all that had happened or Marsden saw no point
in recording the unpleasant details. Opposition newspapers revealed what the second
secretary did not. While the delegates prepared a response to the board's offer, the adnii-
ral harangued the crew of the Queen Charlotte. 'Gardner accused the sailors of being
"skulking fellows, knowing the French were ready for sea, and they afraid of meeting
them," this the crew resented, and were going to throw him overboarcL' 49 Gardner's out-
burst exacerbated the situation and 'prevented conciliation'. According to the Star
the sailors would have accepted the offers of the Admiralty, signed, Spencer, Ar-
den and W. Young, and dated the 1 8th inst. if it had not been for the indiscretion of
Admiral Gardner, who, when those offers were on the eve of being finally accepted,
came on board, making loud complaints, calling the delegates a d----d mutinous
blackguard set, who deserved hanging. This irritated them, prevented conciliation,
and indisposed them to comply with the wishes of the Admiralty. In this temper they
prepared their Reply to the Admiralty, dated the 1 9th, in which they make further
demands; and I fear that even the paper of the 19th, does not contain a statement of
all they will yet ask. Had not Admiral GARDNER put ashore immediately after his
conduct, it is reported he would have been very scurvily treated. The Admiral has
made himself very unpopular among the Seamen, who never cease to profess an un-
alterable loyalty to their King, and attachment to their country; but they declare their
firm determination not to proceed to sea till their demands are complied with, and
sanctioned by an Act of Parliament, and till the King, under his sign manual, pardons
the Delegates, and every other person concerned with them. They are resolved to
rely on the King and Parliament alone; they will not trust their officers; and will not
be satisfied even with the engagements of the Admiralty.5°
J Gilson, ed, The C tondnce of Edmund Burke & William Wrncthazpi (Cambridge: University
Press Roxboroughe Club, 1910), 236. The mannes were included in the 15 April petitions.
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A week before, Bridport, intimated to the Admiralty that the men would have 'no objec-
tion to go to Sea provided an answer is given to their Petition.' 51
 At the same time, Ad-
miral Gardner revealed how little he understood the men under his command, how indif-
ferent he was to their grievances, and how thoroughly he misjudged their determination:
I gave the necessary orders this morning to prepare the Ship for sea, and to hoist the
launch in, which orders the Ship's Company have absolutely refused to obey, and to
a man they have declared, that it is their determined resolution and the resolution of
the Seamen and Marines of the whole of your Lordship's Fleet, not to proceed to sea
until such time as their grievances are redressed and the prayer of their petition at-
tended to. When the Ship's Company were all upon deck, and standing around me I
made use of every argument in my power to convince them of the impropriety of
their conduct, and stated to them in the strongest manner I was able, the disgrace
and mischiefs they were about to bring upon themselves and their Country, and the
encouragement which this very extraordinary and unexpected conduct would give to
the Enemy, and I am sorry to say, my admonition and friendly advice was rejected in
a manner which has hurt my feelings exceedingly.52
Apparently, Gardner behaved badly when his feelings were hurt.
Marsden described the board's next move:
At the close of this anxious Evening the whole of which was spent in the most seri-
ous Consideration of all the Circumstances connected with this most Alarming Busi-
ness, which was every Hour assuming a worse Appearance and big with the most fa-
tal Consequences The Disposition to concede, evidently producing new &
unreasonable Demands. It being clear that a Stand must be made somewhere - Lord
Spencer & the rest of the Board unanimously came to the resolution to declare that
having granted as much as in Reason ought to satisfy the Fleet, no further Conces-
sion should be made, & that this Determination should be made known to Lord
Bridport in an Order directing him to communicate the same to all the ships under
his Command, appraising the Seamen at the same Time of the Consequences that
must inevitably attend their persisting any longer in a State of Disobedience & Mu-
tiny.53
With this new order, the board planned to re-extend its offer, but refused to 'alter our
opinion as to what is reasonable and proper to be done in order to afford every necessary
relief to the Seamen & to remove from them all just cause of Complaint'. TM They de-
fended the quality and quantity of provisions and arrangements for the sick and
wounded. Marsden's assertion that the board's 'Disposition to concede' was 'evidently
producing new & unreasonable Demands', was repeated by several newspapers, but was
not supported by the facts. All other demands appeared in the 15 April petitions. Con-
51 PRO ADMI /107, Bndport to Nepean, 16 Apnl 1797
52 1bia Gardner to Bridport, 16 & 17 April 1797
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trary to Marsden's suggestion, the delegates refrained from presenting any new griev-
ances, however justified, that would make them appear unreasonable or jeopardise the
proceedings.
The board ordered Bridport to communicate their determination to the fleet's captains,
that they might inform their crews:
Should they be insensible to the very Liberal offers now made to them And persist in
their preasent Disobedience they must no longer Expect to Injoy those benefits to
which by their former good Conduct they were Intitled that in such case all the men
now on board the fleet at Spithead shall be Incapable of receiving any Smart money
or Pension from the Chest of Chatham or of being adniited at any time into the
Royal Hospital at Greenwich and they must be answerable for the Dreadful conce-
quencess which will occasionally attend their continueally to transgress the Rules of
the Service in open Violation of the Laws of their Country on the other hand he is to
Inform them that we Promise the most perfect forgiveness of all that is past on this
occasion to every Ships Company who within one Hour after the Communication to
them of the above mentioned Resolutions Shall Return to this Duty in every Peticu-
Jar and Shall cease to hold further Intercourse with any men who Continue in a state
of Disobedience and Mutiny.55
A draft of the orders was sent to Bridport and returned without comment. Presumably at
his suggestion, the fleet's captains were summoned to a conference at the Fountain Inn
on the morning of 20 April 'that the Board should hear from them individually the State
of their Ships Companies and also exhort & urge them upon delivery of this order to
take immediate Advantage of any favourable Impression it might make upon the Men'.
When polled seriatim the captains all agreed the board's plan would n?i work.57
 They
maintained, without an 'encrease of Wages to the full extent', the elimination of the purs-
ers' eighths and 'a considerable concession to the Marines', the men would not return to
duty.
According to Marsden, 'The Board was reluctantly induced to change their opinion of
the Night before.' They begrudgingly made the necessary concessions; but with 'the latter
Part of the order remaining as before.' The terms of a settlement were now considered
less important than securing an immediate return to discipline. In this, the board felt the
officers of the fleet needed further instruction.
54 Ibid Draft of Orders to Bridport, 19 April 1797
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In the instructions accompanying this new offer, the board denied allegations of neglect
and encouraged the captains to inform their crews:
No Petition sent by the Seamen to the Admiralty was ever received, some were sent
by Lord Howe, but as he had received them by Post, without their being signed by
any Person, or authenticated by any Officer then present with the Fleet, they were
not believed to have been really sent by the Crews of the Ships from which they were
said to have been sent; that as soon as the Admiralty received a Petition transmitted
to them by Lord Bridport, and said by him to be the Petition of one of the ships
Companies, their Lordships ever ready to hear the complaints of the Seamen, imme-
diately took it into consideration.58
It was a fine distinction. As this first set of petitions was addressed to Howe rather than
the Admiralty, the board's comment, while accurate, was misleading. In a 14 April letter
to Lord Bridport, Spencer admitted:
some time ago L' Howe transmitted to Lc Seymour several letters (in Number
eleven) purporting to come from the Crews of the Ships mentioned in the inclosed
List bearing date as in therein as specified. The Letters are all in nearly the same
Words, & have much the appearance of being composed by the same Person though
they are written in different hands. L" Howe of course took no other Notice of them
but putting them into L' Seymour's hands for the private information of the B d; &
and it appeared impossible to do anything officially on the subject without running
the Risk of di3agrccablc unpleasant Consequences by a Publick assertation of so deli-
cate a Topick it was judged most adviseable by the Board to take no Notice of the
circumstance, hoping that it might go no further.59
This was more than the board would publicly admit. Instead, they left the impression
that Howe, assuming the 28 February petitions were forgeries, pocketed them, an im-
pression reinforced by their insistence that they took the 15 April petitions forwarded by
Bridport into immediate consideration. Some were only too willing to believe the worst
of Howe. On 7 August 1797, Cuthbert Collingwood wrote to his sister
It is impossible that Lord Howe can justify his not having taken proper notice of the
memorials and petitions of the seamen which were sent to him, and which neglect
was the sole cause of this great national calamity which has shook the constitution of
England, and given a wound to naval discipline which will require a length of time
and the most delicate treatment to heal.6°
Ibiti, Private Instructions, 19 April 1797. Unsigned petitions or 'round robins' were common when repri-
sals were feared. PRO ADMI 5125, Petition to Admiralty from crew of Winchthea, 18 August 1793 and
Petition from crew of VesI4 March 1795
59 PR0 ADM3 136, Spencer to Bridport, 14 April 1797
60 Hughes, 85
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Despite the forced concessions, the board remained resolute. The captains were told
what to say and provided with such justification as the board considered appropriate.
They were to advise their crews:
how dangerous their Conduct is to the Country, what Spirits, what hopes, it must
give to their Enemies who are waiting only for any opportunity when Our Fleets
shall be out of their way to run over, which the Easterly Wind will now enable them
to do, and land either in this Country, or in Ireland, and who may have murdered the
Parents, and Children, have ravished the Wives and Daughters of the Seamen, while
they, instead of flying to protect them, are by their Mutinous Conduct, keeping all
our Ships in Port, and exposing to the Ravages of an Enemy, that Country which 'till
now, they have always been so ready to defend.61
They sought to circumvent the delegates. While the delegates had proved immune, the
men were assumed to be susceptible to such histrionics. Thus, after having the board's
concessions read to them, crews were to be harangued and given an hour to submit or
suffer the consequences. They promised preferential treatment to the first to abandon
the cause:
To observe to them, that though Men may at times do wrong it is always most hon-
orable to recover from their Error, as eariy as possible, and return to do right, that
those Ships Companies will deserve most of their Country, and be best entitled to
Attention hereafter, who shew the first Examples of returning to their Duty and
Obedience.62
On the morning of 21 April, Captain Holloway reported his crew's reaction:
Captain Holloway of the Duke is this moment come in & informs us that the offer
has been well received by his Ships Company. That he was in great hopes that he
should have prevailed upon them to have declared themselves satisfied & to have
immediately returned to their Duty but that one of the men who kept in the back
ground, called out that they must do as the Queen Charlotte did, & he soon found that
it would be in vain to prevent their waiting for the Decision of the Delegates on
board the latter Ship before they returned to their obedience.
The board now accepted the need to deal with the delegates, but assumed their threats
would have greater efficacy in print. They remained determined to sow division within
the fleet The was little truth and no subtly in their suggestion:
That the effect already produced by the liberal offers of the Admiralty on the several
Ships Companies is evidently such, that they will be ultimately accepted by the Fleet,
and therefore that if the men from the several Ships now assembled in the Queen
Charlotte do not immediately accede thereto they being all well known) they will be
brought to condign - Punishment and suffer the utmost - vengeance of the Law;
But, on the contrary, should they submit with alacrity, they will experience the For-
61 PRO ADM3 136, Pnvate Instructions, 19 April 1797
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giveness for which the Board of Admiralty have publickly and solemnly pledged their
Faith to them.63
Anticipating a problem, Gardner drafted a note to reassure the seamen that 'the Pardon
held out to them by the Admiralty, was quite sufficient to secure them from any Punish-
ment for their mutinous & disobedient Conduct on this Occasion.'" Following the dele-
gates' example, handbills were hastily printed and distributed throughout the fleet. The
admirals, with Bridport conspicuous in his absence, presented the board's offer to the
delegates. This was meant to be the limit of their concessions. Assuming the men could
be seduced with their liberal offer, they hoped to isolate and intimidate the delegates with
their ultimatum.
However, the mutiny was now public and had progressed beyond such traditional reme-
dies. The delegates in assuming office had identified themselves as ringleaders. They were
understandably sceptical of pledges coupled with threats. The board's refusal to negoti-
ate, their admonitions to the admirals, and their attempts to circumvent the delegates did
little to establish their sincerity. Thus, while conceding virtually all that was asked, their
determination to take a firm stand precluded an immediate reconciliation. Marsden re-
corded:
In the Evening of this day the Admirals Gardner & Pole came to us at Sir Chas Sax-
ton's when we had dined, & Sir Alan Gardner related that the offer had been re-
ceived with the greatest apparent Satisfaction by his Ships Company, but that they re-
served their decision til the Meeting of the delegates in the Queen Charlotte had been
held. The two from Sir Alan's Ship (the Rojal Soverezn) went thither immediately &
promised directly to send their determination to him. However after waiting a long
Time he determined with the Admirals Colpoys & Pole to go on board the Queen
Charlotte, & once more endeavour to make some Impression upon them. He found
them all assembled but 4 viz. Those from the Queen Charlotte & those from the Riyal
Geoe who were gone ashore. The Remainder expressed themselves perfectly con-
tented & satisfied, & Sir A. Gardner prevailed upon them to let him draw up a Paper
for them to sign, expressive of their submission & Gratitude for the Benefits con-
ceded to them. Before this Paper was finished the other 4 delegates returned from
the Shore, & immediately went below amongst the People, & persuaded them that
the Admirals were come aboard to impose upon & deceive them and that unless they
actually had the Kings Pardon they could have no Security in Submission. That the
Mutineers on board the Cullodei had been deceived with Hopes of Forgiveness, &
afterwards some of them executed.65
3 ADM 3/136, Admiralty Minutes, 21 April 1797
' Ibid.; ADMI /107, Spencer to Gardner, 21 April 1797
6 PRO ADMI/107, Nichols to Bndport, 21 April 1797; The Times, 24 April 1797; Morning Herald, 8 May
1797; Mornin,g Post, 9 May 1797; Gill, 366 367
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Marsden added: 'Sir Alan Gardner appears to have exerted himself as much as Man
could do to counteract the false & mischievous Insinuations of these Men, but all to no
Effect.' His description of the confrontation was discreet. Yet, he could hardly criticise
the admiral for following instructions that should not have been issued; nor could he
admit a greater crisis had been averted only because the rest of the fleet's officers had
ignored them. While equally determined to return to discipline, the captains recognised
the volatility of the situation and the need for restraint in addressing the men.
Gardner chose a less diplomatic approach. Closely allied to government, he served as a
lord of the Admiralty from 1790 to 1794. In 1796 he was selected by Pitt to prevent John
Home Tooke joining Charles James Fox as Westminster's member of Parliamentf' By
his own admission a speaker of limited ability, Gardner took it upon himself to address
the delegates aboard Queen Charlotte. All but four were present. 67 All appeared to go well.
The men seemed pleased with the concessions. Gardner seemed pleased with himself, or
was until the absent delegates returned. Having missed the harangue, they focused in-
stead on the board's offer; and declared, that without the king's pardon and ratification
by Parliament, it was an empty promise.
Again, Gardner exacerbated an awkward situation. According to the Star, upon hearing
they would agree to nothing not sanctioned by an Act of Parliament and guaranteed by
the king, the admiral was 'so disappointed and irritated ... that he seized one of the Dele-
gates by the collar, and swore he would have them all hanged, with every fifth man
throughout the fleet'. 68
 The delegates' version of the incident is found in 'A Detail of the
Proceedings':
In the Course of the day Admiral Sir Allen Gardner, Colpoys and Poole Came on
board the Queen Charlotte and tried by Persuasions, threatings and all other means in
their Power to Persuade the Delegates to agree to the Proposals but could not but
they ware Desired to try the Ships Companey and If they agreed to it the Delegates
had no Objection and acordingly the hands were turned up on the Quarter deck
where the paper was again read to them and another which was said to be agreed to
by the Dellegates but this Fraud was useless for the People was Determened and
Shewed their Disaprobation by hissing and Other marks of Contempt at the Admi-
rals Conduct after near tow hours spent in Useless talk and threats on their side they
left the Ship and went on Board Others with the same story that the Queen Charlotte
had agreed to their Perposals the Red flag was hoisted on board the Rqyal Geoe and
the Boats repaired on board of her acording to orders the Duplicity of the Admirals
R. Thome, The Howe of Commons 1790-1820 (London: Secker & Warburg, 1986), iv, 3
67	 and Moms of Royal Geoige and Glynn and Huddlestone of Queen Charlotte.
Stat4May 1797
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was found out but it Occasioned more Disturbencis in the fleet then any Other
Transactions during the whole.69
In a letter to Bridport, the delegates divined the board's purpose and confirmed its fail-
ure:
We think it our duty as well as highly proper with your Lordships Permission to pre-
vent Misrepresentations to state to your Lordship the cause of the confusion that
happened last night and which we do not hesitate to say really originated from the
endeavours of Admiral Gardner to sow division in the fleet and in fact to separate
our Interest which being discovered by the Fleet have called forth such a spirit as his
Lordship is little acquainted with. Nothing now but the most Riged performance of
all the Articles will satisfy whereas there were Many before inclined to the Admirals
proposals. This Second Instance of the failure of an Officer all most believed to be
the Seamens Friend has Convinced us that we have nothing to Depend upon but our
own vigours Exertions to obtain redress of Greavencess Intolerable and Insupport-
able and which the noble Admiral himself confessed to be Just at the very instant he
is Maneuvering for our Destructions we must however hope that your Lordship will
consider the whole fleet as universeally and Zealously Attached to your Lordship and
amidst the Disaffection of our Supposed Friends turn their Eyes to your Lordship
their Father their Friend and in short as a Nobleman willing to assist and further our
Endeavours. We beg leave to Conclude by Assureing your lordship that but for the
unfortunate Cause abovementioned there is every Reason to believe that before this
time every tittle of the Bussness would have been Settled but at preasent it is the
Resolution of all not to lift an Anchor until every Article is Rendered into an act of
Parlement and the Kings free Pardon unto all Concerned.7°
Contrary to reports, the delegates made no further demands. They merely refused to
compromise on those already made. They accepted the Admiralty's offer, expressed their
gratitude, and made their determination clear. In addition to giving their Total & Final
Answer to the board, which appeared in all the London dailies, the delegates issued a
private warning to the fleet confirming their resolve and their lingering suspicions. The
other ships joined in renewing their commitment to the cause nd reassuring the delegates
of their support. The crew of Defiance wrote:
We smile at the simplicity of our officers in attempting to divide us, we know the
consequence of our oath and value it equal to our lives. ... Redress we will have.
Saduced we will not be. ... Unless this is Passed Into an act of Parlement the Admi-
ralty, the Parlement or the whole nation at large may promise to take our Grevences
into Consideration and after that trample them and us under their feet when we are
devided.71
La Pompée's crew offered advice in addition to their support:
PRO M)M1 5125, Detail of Proceedings
ADM1 107, Seamen to Bndport, 23 April 1797
71 PRO ADM1 5125, Detail of Proceedings
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we unannemously Agree that in no Instance will we deviate from the Answer sent
by you to the Board and beg to Convince you that Until these Requests be Granted
You will not by any means Consent to any agreement and that those be Sanctioned
by an Act and not by following the words of those that you can Rest no Reience on
it Being not in their Power to fulfill one of the Promiseis.
Duke's crew confirmed their understanding of the situation and their expectations of the
delegates:
...we hope you will not be led astray by the false insinuating designs the proposals
that the Lords of the Admiralty sent us yesterday could never pass it being more than
they can do to grant us any redress. They can only recommend it to his Majesty and
his Parliament to grant therefore we hope Brothers you will not desist from your
former resolution but continue it until all is granted by Special act of Parliament and
[with] his Majesty's Gracious Pardon for all crimes past and present.
while the marines of Duke expressed their gratitude:
We the Marines of the Duke Unanimously amongst ourselves that all the help we can
give or Asistance Cannot be Sufficent for the good you have done us in Regard of
Redressing our Greavinceiss Gentlemen You may be well Ashured that the Oath we
took we will Stand by while one Drop of Blood Circulates in our viens.
as did the Minotaurs:
As we are Sworn to be Just and true to Each Other Until this bussness is settled you
may rely upon it that it is our intention to stick ito our integrity and not listen to any
false pretenses whatever but still are willing to part with the last drop of our harts
blood to maintain the cause we now labour under and not to flinch until the Act for
the same is passed.
Meanwhile, the Morning Chronicle offered the obvious:
It would have been wise and dignified that this Council had been held on the first
explosion, instead of attempting to chafer and bargain with the fleet. The moment of
negotiation was that when they first made their representation to Earl Howe. The
neglect of their own petition attached a severe responsibility somewhere, and we
trust that the matter will be seriously investigated. We trust that the whole affair will
now be concluded forever; and that our brave and gallant tars will suffer no recollec-
tion of it to influence their future conduct. At the same time we hope it will be an
awful warning to Ministers how they presume to trifle with the petition of an ag-
grieved people. There is an insult in indifference which is more painful to a spirited
mind than injury and there is no part of the conduct of our Ministers so blameable as
the pride with which they overlook the most pressing memorials from all descrip-
tions of men, whom they oppress by delays, that are as injurious to the public service
as they are fatal to the objects.72
72 Mjn Chnrnxck, 24 April 1797
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The business was now assumed to be settled. The fleet, except Mar1bovugh, Mars and
London, was ordered to sea. It remained wind bound at St Helen's while in London more
pressing matters occupied government and the public's attention.
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From the LIVING to the DEAD.




N the Sun of the i8th Inflant, we have (cen yogi Addrefs, arid wticb
greatly furprized u, wherein we are accufcd of thofe Crisnes which
dilgracc the Name of a Britith Seaman, and which may prejadice th.
Minds of our Cosntry men againif us; as we are callod upon to make
known our Wanu and Withes in a.n offidal and rclpeaful Manner.
Therefore we, His Maje[ly's moft Loyal Subjeas, with to snake known
to the World that wc have dime fo.
We, as the SubjeEs of a Loyal Country, prefented our Petition to that
honorable ERL who wore the Laurels of the Glorious FIRST OF
JUNE, and who was in the Hearts of Britith Seaiaien reprefented as their
Friend, but lorry are we to iay that we found to the Contrary, in his not
reprelenting our Petitions to the Lords CommiflioneTs of the Adrniraity.
But to convince our Country at large, that there is not in anywife the
lcatt Spark of Republican Spirit, we have caufed to be inferted the moff
private of our Concerns; lorry alfo we arc to remark the Words (Fre-ncIs
Ageni!) as our Country may think, by that Aflèrtion, we now take into our
Arms the People that a Biicilh Seaman dercfts the Name of. Bu to the
contrary, we h 'cc our Country's Good as nnieh- ot H cart zy cv De_
fcription of Men whatever, and that our Requeft is nowifc mjurious to
our Country.
We alk for that comfortable Subliftence which our Country can eafily
be(low, and that thofe Barbnties which are praElifed by fome, (lorry indeed
we Ihould be to lay the whole, as there are among us Men of every Defcrip-
Lion, both good and cvii) be ertfed out of this well-initituted Service.
We, the SubjeEIs of your Addrefs, coolly as the Reprefentatives of that
Body which has lo long lain under the well-known Buoy, with you to
come forward in a fair and manly way, in your real and corporeal State,
and ry for one Wek if the (canty Allowance on which we are oblicd
to fubfift, will keep you in the Ipirited State which Men of our Defcripuoa
require, but are at this Moment wuhout the Afliftance of at leaft Twe-thirdj
ol their Pay and our Wives and Families languifhing in 4 Wanr, whilft this
Country Lhit aboi4nds with Plenty, ought to be athamed at the word Wt.
To i/i.e Brave 4dmiral Kempenfeldi's GHOST,
1luo, ojt4c R.l Gore 5fithcad.
P. S. If the Clamours of Juflice, daily echoing from the Mouths o( ike
LoYAL TAILs, (hould again awake the SPIRiT of KIssPINILLDT, let not
his ethereal but hIs corporeal Parr make itlelt known, and we will convince
huii, that thofe who have made Brii*ni Rik 4/i.e Maui, kaow aLfo .ir
Duty to their Sovereign.
$rLTiissa, April 10, 1797.
lrom the Living to the Dead Handbill
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Rear Admiral Sir Charles Pole
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Rear Admiral Sir Alan (;ardner
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By the CommilTioners ibr executing the
Office of Lord High Admiral of Great
Britain and Ireland, &c.
JjAvi NC iikcii into Conlideration tile Petitions Lraiifniticd byyour Lor(Lfllip, from tlic rews n1 Ilis I\[.jcfly's Ships nuder
your Coinmaiicl, and having the flioiigcll I)clire It) a(tcII(l to all
Complaints of the Scaincn in ills Majehiy's Navy1 and to grant them
every jii( and reafnabk Redicis, and having coiilikred the Dif-
ference of the Price of Nccufliries of Lik, at this and at that Period
when the Pay of Seamen was dllabliflied, We do hereby require and
dirca your Lordthip to take the fpecchie!l Method of collimunicating
to the Ficci,
'l'liat we have rcfolvc4 to recommend it to Ilis MajefLy, to propofe
to Parliament to increale (hc\'1Lgcs of Scainemi in I us Majclly's Navy,
in time following Proportions, viz.
To add four Shillings per Month to the Wages of Petty Officers
anti Able Scamnemi, 't/ncc SIulli,s pet- Monili to the \\'ages of Or-
tlinary Scamneim, amid fleo S/ull,,uj j)cr l%loimihi to the \Vmgcs of
Landzncn.
That we have rciolved, that Seamen wommndeil iii A&ion luau be
cotitititicti ill Pay until tliiit tlltir%VOtmfl(lS are lWalC(.i, (W iiiitil, being
dcclarcd uiikrviceahk, they Ihahl receive a Penhion, or be received
into the Royal 1-h)fpital at Gicenwichm; amid that, hiavimig a perk&
Confidence in the Zeal, I.oyahiy aIi(l Courage oh au (lie St-amen iii
the Vhcct, lb generally cxprchlcd in their Pcliiion, and in their earneft
Dcfirc of fci-ving their Coumtry with that Spirit which alwmys to cmi-
ncntiy di lii ngtui limed Britifh Scamcn,VVe hmat'c conic to this Refol I itiOli
the more readily, that the Seamen may have, as early as pollible, an
Opportunity of fhcwing their good 1)ifj)oIitions, by returning to their
DLlty, as it may be nccef1try that the Fleet fhoiml(1 fj)cediIy put to Sea
to meet the Enemy of the Country.





'l'o time Iighit I Iouiom irabic 1.)LiI 1R I l)PO ItT, 1ç• /'.
1duiiim al cl thi&: \\'hmitc, (ç)muIuImuuIIler iii ('hit-i of
a S(JuI.l(II(,il olilis MaJeII)"s Ships CiIIpI())&(l ill
time Channel Service.
The Admiralty's First Offer, handbill




E received your Lordihips' Anfwer to our Petition, and in
order to convince your Lordihips and the Nation in general
of our Moderation, beg Leave to offer the following Remarks to•
your Confideration, viz.
That there never has exifled 'but Two Orders of Men in the
Navy, Able arid Ordinary, therefore the Diftinaion between Ordi-
nary.and Landmen. is totally new; we therefore humbly propofe
to your' Lordfhips that the old Regulations be adhered to, that of
the Wagerof Able'Seamen be raifed to One Shilling' per Day1 and
that of Petty Officers and the Ordinary in the ufual Proportion.;
And as a further Proof of our Moderation, and that we are a&uated
by a true Spirit of Benevolence çowaçds our Brethren, the Marines,
• who are not noticed, in your Lordihip's Anfwer, we humbly propofe
chat their Pay be augmented while ferving on Board, in the fame
Proportion as Ordinary Seamen; this we hope and trufi will be a
'convincing' Proof to your Lordfhips that we are not a&uated by a
Spirit of: Contradi8ion, but that we earnefily with to put a fpeedy
Exid tp the prefent Affair.. We beg Leave to ftate to your Lordihips.
that the Penfions from Greenwich College, which we earnefily with
to be raifed to Tc Pounds per' Annum, and in oI'dcr to maintain
whjch, we humbly ropofe to your Lbrdlhips tht every Seaman
.employed in tic Merchant Service, inflead of Sixpence per Man,
which they no pa* fh'all hereafter pay One Shillmnj per Month,
• which .we trüft wilJraife a"Furid fully adequate to tPe Purpofe; and
as thiin Time"óf Peace 'tnuft be paid by your Petitiçnerswe truft
will give a convincing Proof of our Difintereflednefs and Moderà-
tiQfl: We would alfo recommend that this Regulation be extended
to the Seamen in the Service of the Eaft India Company, as we
knnw by Expericnce that there are few Sailors employed by them
but what have been n the Royal Navy, and we have feen them with
our own Eyes,.after Sicknefs, or other Accidents has difabled them,
without any Hop of Relief or Support, but from their former
Services in the Navy.
As to Provitlons, . that they be augmented , to fixteen Ounces to
tlicPound . of Bread and Meat, Cheefe, Butter, and Liquor in Pro
portion, and of a better Quality, and a fufficient Quantity of Vege:
tables, and, that no Flour be ferved with Frelh Beef. And we fur-
ther beg Leave to inform your Lordfhips, that it is unanimoufly
agreed, that until the Grievances before flated are redreffed, and an
A& of Amendment paffed, we are determined not to Lift an Anchor;
And the Grievances of particular Ships muft be redreffed.
Given under our Hands, the Delegates of the Fleet, on Board
the Queen Charlotte, at Spithead, April 19, 1797.
The Seamen's Reply
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One of the letters from Purtsnu,uth
received yesterday positively states,
"that the seamen not only demand a
rise of pay, but a more equal disthbu-
iion of prize mone and to be regular-
ly paid to them lhev unanimously
express their determination to face the
French, if they attempt an invasion.
A Board of Admiralty had been held in
the Royal William; after which the
Lords (:ommissioneis proceeded on
board the Royal George, where Earl
Spencer, expostulating with the sea-
men, assured them, that their reason-
able requests would be complied with.
This declaration was received with
much applause; but it is added, that the
claims of the sailors have increased in
proportion as Government has mani-
fested a disposition to accede to their
first demands. We hope, for the hon-
our of the British naval character, that
this is not true; as also, that the report
is unfuunded, of their having been
guilty of several acts of outrage on
board the fleet, such as threatening to
throw one of the Admirals (Gardner)
overboard, for having upbraided them
with sluggishly remaining in port while
the enemy's fleet were on the eve of
putting to sea - hanging up one of the
crew who attempted to reason with
them upon the Impropriety of offering
any violence to the gallant Admiral -
flogging and ducking several others for
disobedience of orders - taking posses-
sion of the cabbins of the different
(:ommanders - and entering into a res-
olution that no seaman should for the
future be punished, unless found guilty
of an offence by a Jury of twelve of
his companions. These distressing cir-
cumstances arc related in several letters
received from Portsmouth.
All the advices received yesterday agree
in stating, that notwithstanding the sea-
men expressed themselves satisfied
with the liberal promises made to them
in the name of the Admiralty Board by
Lord Spencer, they continue deter-
mined not to proceed to sea until their
demands for an advance of wages, and
a more equal distribution of prize, shall
be fully complied with, and sanctioned
by Parliament, except they shall in the
mean time be assured of the sailing of
the French fleet; in which case they are
determined to prove that their sense of
duty to their King, and love for their
country, were never greater than they
are at the present moment.
One of the letters from Portsmouth
positively states, 'that the seamen not
only demand a rise of pa'.; but a more
equal distribution of prize mone '.; and
to be regularly paid to them. They
unanimously express their determina-
ti' si to face the French, if they attempt
iii invasion, like Britons. They have a
'hip, which is the Queen Charlotte, on
board of which every thing is regulat-
Ld; they call her the l'arliament ship,
and four seamen from every ship at
Spithead go on board in the morning,
to consult what measures to pursue,
and solemnly take an oath, adminis-
tered to them with the greatest deco-
rum, that they will not go to sea unless
their demands are complied with,
except the enemy are at sea, and a con-
voy wanted; and if their demands are
not promised, they will convey the
ships into Portsmouth harbour on
Saturday morning They have posses-
sion of the magazines and small arm;
obey no officers, but shew them every
respect.
'Ihe four men from each respective
ship return on board their ships at
night, and give three cheers to the
Queen Charlotte, which is returned by
her, the sick seamen at I laslar I lospital
cheer the ships at Spithead, which they
return.
The Romney man of war is still
detained at Portsmouth, with her con-
voy, waiting the result of this business.
It is to be observed that all communi-
cation with the fleet and the town of




l)ispatches were yesterday received
from Earl SPENCER and Lord
.RDEN, at the .dmiralr'.; the con-
tents, have not publicly transpired; but
some private letters come to hand
which state that order and tranquility is
not yet restored. After a Board had
been held in Admiral PARKER's ship,
Earl SPENCER and the rest of the
lord (:mmissionL Went On board
the Royal George, Lord BRIDN)R'l's
ship; the noble Earl cxposulated with
the seamen on their conduct and
informed them that the advance of
wages, which they requested, had been
taken into consideration, and would be
granted, if they behaved in a manner
becoming the station in which they
were employed. Admiral GARDNER
was on board the ship, and accused the
sailors of being "skulking fellows,
knowing the French were ready for sea,
and they afraid of meeting them;" this
the crew resented, and were going to
throw him overboard; one of them,
more temperate than the rest, endeav-
ouring to bring them to reason, was
instantly hung up; another, for disobe-
dience of orders, was flogged; and four
more were ducked; in this distressing
state the fleet remained on Tuesda;
but from the judgement and discretion
of Earl Sl'ENCER and the Lords of
the Admiralty; hopes are entertained of
order being accomplished.
It is further stated, that the sailors have
taken possession of the Cabins of the
several Commanders, and entered into
a resolution, that for the future no sea-
man shall be punished for any offence,
unless found guilty by a jury of twelve
of his companions.
The following letter we copy from an
Evening Paper of yesterday:
The seamen not only demand a rise of
pay, but a more equal distribution of
prize money, and to be regularly paid to
them. They unanimously express their
determination to face the French, if
they attempt an invasion, like Britons.
Ihey have a ship, which is the Queen
Charlotte, on board of which every
thing is regulated; they call her the
Parliament ship, and four seamen from
every ship at Spithead go on board in
the morning to consult what measures
to pursue, and solemnly take an oath,
administered to them with the greatest
decorum, that they will not go to Sea,
unless their demands are complied
with, except the enemy are at sea and a
convoy wanted and if their demands
are not promised they will convey the
ships into l'ortsmouth harbour on
Saturday morning 'They have posses-
sion of the magazines and small arms:
obey no Officers, but show them every
respect. The four men from each
respective ship return on board their
ships at night, and give three cheers to
the Queen Charlotte, which is returned
by her, the sick seamen at I laslar hos-
pital cheer the ships at Spithead, which
they return.
Lord Spencer is arrived, endeavouming
to appease them. ljnd Rridport's flag
is flying at Spithead.
be 1ornni c&
ThNn4 20 Apiil 1 -
I verv effort is made by Government
to conceal what is passing at Spithead.
We have reason to believe, that not
only precautions are taken to prevent
communication between the town of
Portsmouth and the shipping, but that
letters are opened, and some of them
stopped at the Post Office. We do not
blame this conduct. It may be neces-
sary. ihe business is most delicate, and
requires the most cautious mode of
proceeding
'Ihe letters that arrived yesterday sa';
Admiral POLE returned to
Portsmouth on Monday, but brought
no answer to the demands of the sea-
men, that being reserved for I .ord
SPENCER and the Board of
Admiralty which proceeded to act on
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liesdav; but its proceeding have beii
kept a most profound secret. The
Board sat at the Fountain Inn, and
broke up at three o'clock. Admirals
BRII)PORT, (:ol.poys, CARl)-
NER, and POI.l were present. The
Board dined with Admiral Sir Peter
IRKIR.
The seamen, when the letters came
away at seven o'clock at night, still
retained the command of the fleet, and
in the greatest tranquillity and order
prevailed; but they remained firm in
their resolution of carrying their point.
lhe mutiny is, without exception, gen-
eral, insomuch, that on Monday the
sick and convalescents in I laslar
I lospiral displayed flags, composed of
handkerchiefs tacked together, with
three diecrs, which were returned by
every ship of war at Spithead.
The discontent of the seamen respect-
ing their low rate of wages, existed
before Lord Bridport went last to sea;
it was known to the ;dmiralts; and
several plans of amicable adjustment
have been under consideration. The
seamen thought the present a proper
time for enforcing their demands, as
rio enemy was at sea, or likely to put to
sea. Their worst enemies do not accuse
them of disaffection to the
Government. Their signal for making
public their resolutions was, the sea-
men of the Queen Charlotte running
up the fore shrouds, and giving three
cheers, at the moment the Admiral
made signal for weighing. Their cheers
were answered; their signal was
obeyed; and it was manifest in a
moment that the combination was
complete. The plan was arranged and
concerted with the utmost secrecy.
Each ship deputed two men to manage
and direct the business; those who
would not join were threatened with
immediate execution at the yard arm.
All were obliged to sign the Round
Robin. The headquarters of the opera-
tion is on board the Queen Charlotte.
11w sailors call it their Parliament Ship;
and four seamen come on board of it
every morning from each of the ships,
of which they are representatives.
These consult together, and arrange
the proceedings of the day. They
return at night to their respective ships.
and getting on board give three cheers
to the Queen Charlotte, which are
returned. iliey have possession of the
magazines and the small arms, obey no
Officers, but show them ever, respect.
They declare they wiH not sail till their
demands are complied with, unless the
Enemy should put to sea; for they are
as much as ever determined to give the
French a drubbing, if they
 can meet
them. I)uring the time of divine serv-
ice on Sunday, parties of seamen
rowed in public procession through
the Fleet, in boats; and they actually
succeeded in forbidding the crew of
the Romnev, appointed as a convoy for
an outward-bound fleet, from weigh-
ing anchor.
Since the above was written; we find
that dispatches were last night received
from Lord S1'ENCER and Lord
.RlWN, the contents of which were
not very readily divulged, as we appre-
hend they are not of a very favourable
nature. But form the information we
could collect, we understand that some
tumult now prevails. After a Board had
been held in .'idmiral PARKER's ship,
Earl SPENCER and the other and the
other Commissioners went on board
the Royal George, Lord BRII)P( )R'l's
ship, and expostulated with the
Seamen. An .dmiral is said to have
reproached them with skulking,
because they knew the enemy was
ready for sea; in consequence of which
it was with difficulty he was saved from
very rough treatment. It is said, that
one seaman has been hanged, and four
ducked the seamen themselves for
disobeying their orders. Every seaman
guilt) of any offence, is tried by a
of twelve. They have taken possession
of the Captain's Cabins, and threaten
to carry the ships into harbour on
Saturday, and leave them unless their
request is complied with. They will not
suffer the Sun Newspaper to be
brought on board any of the ships.
We have now stated every circum-
stance that had transpired at a late hour
last night respecting this awful busi-
ness. The sailors demand an increase of
about six shillings per month to their
pay, and a more speedy payment of
prize-money, as well as a more equal
distribution of it. .rrcars, particularly
of prize-money, are, we find, the great
root from which all the mischief has
sprung. Of their arrears the sailors may
have reason to complain; but we can-
not see that they have much reason to
complain of their wages. sincerely
wish this business happily terminated.
The system, as well as the objects of
the sailors appear to us most alarming
A compliance or refusal are equally
dangerous. It is said Mr. Fox is topres-
ent a Petition to the I louse of
(:c,mmns fri,m thi ..iilr,r.
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The Lords of th .dmiraltv are still
here, but have not yet gone to
Spithead. The seamen have hitherto
received no satisfactory answer to their
demands, and remain perfectly master
of the keys to the real strength of
Britain.
It is with the greatest satisfaction we
learn from good authority, that it was
the resolution of the Board of
Admiralty yesterda); to recommend to
vernment a compliance with the
request of the seamen, which are nar-
rowed to the following articles:
An inconsiderable increase of pay.
11w whole allowance of Provisions,
&c. provided by the Public. .'tt present
the Pursers deduct one eighth.
Better attention on the sick and
wounded by the Faculty;
It is but common justice to say, that the
seamen have conducted themselves
through the whole business with a
sobtier; steadiness, unanimity, and
determined resolution, that would no
honour to any other cause.
FROM TIll l.IvlNc; •l() TIlE
L)EAI)
Art thou a spirit of earth or goblin
damn'd?
Sir, - In the Sun, of the 18th instant, we
have seen your address, and which
greatly surprised us, wherein we are
accused of those crimes, which dis-
grace the name of a British seaman,
and which may prejudice the minds of
our countrymen against us; as we are
called upon to make known our wants
and wishes in an official and respectful
manner.
Therefore, we, I us Majesty's most loyal
and dutiful subjects, wish to make
known to the world that we have done
so.
We, as subjects of a loyal country, pre-
sented our petitions to that
I lonourable Earl, who wore the laurels
of the Glorious 1st of June, and who
was in the hearts of British seamen
represented as their friend; but sorry
are we to say that we found to the con-
trary, in his not representing our peti-
tions to the Lords Commissioners of
the .dmiralty
But to convince our country at large,
that there is not anywise the least spark
of republican spirit, we have caused to
be inserted the most private of our
concerns: sorn also we are to remark
the words, "French agents," as our
country may think, by that assertion,
we now take into our arms the people
that a British seaman detests the name
of. But to the contran; we have our
country's good as much at heart as any
other description of men whatever,
and that our request is nowise injurious
to our country.
We ask for that comfortable subsis-
tence which our country can easily
bestow, and that those barbarities
which are practised by some (sorry,
indeed, we should be to say the whole,
as there are among us men of every
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description, both good and cvii) be
erased nut of this well-instituted serv-
ice.
We, the subjects of your address, cool-
ly as the representatives of that body
which has so long lain under the well-
known Buoy, wish YOU to come for-
ward in a fair and manly way, in your
real and corporeal state, and try for one
week if the scanty allowance we are
obliged to subsist, will keep you in the
spirited state which men of our
description require, but are at this
moment without the assistance of at
least two-thirds of their pay; and our
wives families languishing in want,
whilst this country, that abounds with
plent ought to be ashamed of the
word Want!
To the brave Admiral Kempenfcldt's
(;l lOSi,
Buoy of the Royal George, Spithead.
PS -- If the clamours of justice daily
echoing from the mouths of the loyal
tars should again awake the SPIRFI of
KEMPENI :l1D, let not his ethereal,
but his corporeal part, make itself
known, and we will convince him, that
those who have made Brirannia rule
the main, know also their duty to their
Sovereign.




The discontcnts which have for several
days existed, and still exist, on board
the Grand I'leet at Spithead, have the
most serious appearance, and have
assumed a very formidable and system-
atic character. 'Ihe determination is so
universal in the Fleet, that scarce a man
luke-warm in the cause is to be found.
The business of the Seamen is con-
ducted by a Committee, chosen from
amongst themselves, of two men from
each ship, who hold their discussions
in the Admiral's cabin of the Royal
George. They have published their
Petition, which is now in the I'ress, and
is to be distributed gratis amongst the
fleet to-morrow momin It is weH
composed, and consists of several
pages. 1 understand the purport is,
first, an increase of Pay to Is. per day -
full Weight of Provisions of Sixteen
Ounces to the pound - a greater
Propornon of I'rize-money, and an
Asylum of I'ension fur all Persons
wounded in the Service. It is under-
stood that the two first demands have
been acceded to by Earl SPlNClR, so
far as promising to lay the same before
his MAJESi but this promise the
arc not satisfied with, and are deter-
mined to know the result of his
MAJ IS'lY's deliberations on their
Pentuin. .tt the present the whole fleet
is entirely at their command; and to
guess at the event of this business
would be absurd. The officers as corn-
pletelv under the Men, as Men in due
subordination are under their Officers.
'Ihey take the boats at pleasure, and
communicate ship with ship. \sterday
they sent on board the Romnev, of 50
guns, and ordered her to sea the crew
was anxous to stay, to know the result
of the l'etition; but the L)eputation
that was sent on board said, it was for
the good of the Country they should
go with the convoy, and absolutely
ordered them to proceed to sea; and in
consequence the ship got under weigh,
and went down to St. I Iekn's immedi-
ately, where she only waits fur a fair
wind.
c;osport, April 19
The seamen in I laslar I lospital have
joined the sailors, and express their
approbation of their proceedings by a
flag which they have flying, and 1w
huzzas. I understand the prayer of
their I'etition is, One Third of all the
Prizes they take - an Advance of wages
from 22s. (xl. to 30s. per month, and to
be paid every Three Months, and then
in Cash, not Paper - not to be punished
for any trifle, as inferior Officers think
proper - and 16 ounces of l'rovisions
to the pound, instead of which they
now have but 12. In the words of the
Premier, they desire "Indemnity for the
past, and Security for the future."
There are other demands, which I am
not acquainted with. Indeed, it is a new
organization of the Navv They have a
rope fixed to every ship's yard-arm,
ready to hang any Sailor or Officer that
behaves amiss.
The Minister's Writers never fail to
remind their readers of his great abili-
ties. This is what we have never denied.
In mismanaging the affairs of a great
nation, we question whether he has a
parallel in histor); and in doing that
the bare hint of which a few years ago
would have been accounted sheer mad-
ness, he has discovered a genius, the
magnitude of which no words can
reach.
In the midst of all the proofs we have
of the necesstr of the present war,
one trifling circumstance is generally
overlooked. If it was necessary, has
that necessity ceased?
The conduct of the Sailors at
Portsmouth has been attributed to fac-
tions incendiaries. It is no such thing
They are only taking a hint from their
betters squabbling about their salaries,
and exerting a vigour beyond the law
There cannot be a more striking proof
that the Ministerial writers are as desti-
tute of argument as of shame and
decency, than there Isici having
recourse to personal invectives against
Mr. Fox, which would disgrace the pol-
luted lips of the lowest and vilest of
mankind.
That a body of men who profit by the
Slave hade should refuse to petition
for the dismissal of the Ministry, is not
at all surprising Ihere is a relative con-
necuon of opinion: which must not be
broken, and what is worse, Were there
no slavery in this country, it is more
than probable, there would be none in
the West Indies.
One great cause of the unexampled
success of the French is their change
of Ministers when found to be inca-
pable or treacherous; butj( )l IN BULl.
goes patiently on till he is goaded to
death; meanwhile the spirits of our
ancestors sit in the clouds and mock us.
In reading the history of our once
flourishing island, those Sovereigns
who lived and died the happiest were
those who were the least attached to
fav uriws nd mi to their people.
EPidCi. 21 . lpi/ 1 9
11w Mutiny in the fleet still cntinues
in full force; but we learn with pleasure,
and from respectable authority, that the
seamen's claims are in all respects coin-
plied with.
The strictest discipline, particularly
with regard to sobriety, continues to be
preserved throughout the fleet. One
man on board l.a Pompee had this
morning a severe dozen, with a thief's
cat, and was thrice lowered from the
main-yard into the water, for bringing a
pint of spirits on board.
Dispatches were yesterday received
from larl SI'INCIR and Lord
.RI)lN, at the Admiralty, the con-
tents, have not publicly transpired; but
some private letters come to hand
which state that order and tranquility is
not yet restored. After a Board had
been held in Admiral PARKER's ship.
Earl SI'ENCIR and the rest of the
Lord Commissioners went on board
the Royal George, Lord BRIDPORTs
ship; the noble laxJ expostulated with
the seamen on their conduct and
informed them that the advance of
wages, which they requested, had been
taken into consideration, and would be
granted, if they behaved in a manner
becoming the station in which they
were employed. Admiral GARI)NER
was on board the ship. and accused the
sailors of being "skulking fellows,
knowing the French were ready fur sea,
and they afraid of meeting them," this
the crew resented, and were going to
throw him overboard, one of them,
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more temperate than the rest, endeav-
ourrng to bring them to reason, was
instantly
 hung up another, for disobe-
dience of orders, was flogged, and four
more were ducked; in this distressing
state the fleet remained on Tuesdav
'Our own letters however do not men-
tion these circumstances, and stare, on
the amtrary, that the sailors conduct
themselves with great propriety, on1v
they are determined to carry their
point.'
the sailors conduct themselves with
great prnprict only they arc deter-
mined to carry their point.
•fhey regulate every thing on board the
Queen Charlotte, which they call the
l'arliament ship, to which each ship at
Spithead sends four representatives
even' morning to consult on the meas-
urea to hr piit-.iiI
It is with great reluctance we are
obliged to state the progress of the
present discontents among the seamen
at Portsmouth, because they arc of
that nature as ought to make Britons
blush. Never could we have believed
that the honest character of a gallant
British sailor could have suffered itself
to be imposed on by the artful
intrigues of designing men, who are
traitors to their country. From the sys-
tem observed throughout the present
discontents, there cannot now be a
doubt but that some secret enemies
not only to our own, but ti) any form
of Govemments to enlist themselves
into our fleet, for the purpose of dis-
organising it; and we are sorry to say,
that they find very able advocates in
some of our newspapers, whole licen-
tious comments throughout this busi-
ness prove that they are ready to con-
cur in any measures which may tend to
harass his Majesty's Ministers, and
finally to overthrow the Government.
Let any man compare language of
some of Opposition prints with the
disorderly proceedings now going on
at Portsmouth, and say whether there
is not a very close affinity
 between the
two parties.
In the mean time we think it necessary
to state, that the reports circulated in
several Morning Papers of yesterday;
of the sailors having hung up one of
their men for his attempting to rake the
part of a gallant officer, and of having
flogged others for similar offences, are
without the smallest foundation.
Affairs have been sufficiently unpleas-
ant, without the need of exaggeration.
ShIP NEWS
Portsmouth, April 19
Yesterday sailed hi Majesty's ship
Romney, with a convoy, to
Newfoundland, after being liberated
from an embargo laid upon her by the
sailors of the fleet, who were resolved
no ship should sail until they were
assured their demand should be com-
plied with. 'flie duty of the fleet is not
suspended, though the seamen are per-
fectly masters, and do just what the
please. lvery ship has a yard-rope
ready at the fore-yard-arm, to hang any
person who breaks through their own
regulations; still no insults are offered
to any of the Officers, whose neces-
sary orders are carried on as before this
confusion commenced. I fear it will be
difficult to comply
 with all the
demands of the sailors, who have been
evidently set on by villains who are
known traitors to their King and
(:untr
The Royal William's crew not cheering
morning and evening, were sent to by
the people of the Royal Sovereign to
say that if they did not, they would fire
into them.
The discontents which have for several
days existed, and still exist, on board
the Grand I1ect at Spithead, have
assumed a very formidable and system-
atic character. The business of the
Seamen is conducted by a (:cmittee,
chosen from amongst themselves, of
four men from each ship, who hold
their discussions in the Admiral's cabin
of the Royal George. They have pub-
lished their Petition, which is now in
the press, and is to be distributed gratis
amongst the fleet to-morrow morning
It consists of several pages. 'Ihe pur-
port is said to be, first - An increase of
Pay to Is. per day - full weight of pro-
vision of Provisions of 16 ounces to
the pound - a greater proportion of
Prize-money, and an Asylum of
Pension for all persons wounded in the
Service. It is understood that the two
first demands have been acceded to b
Earl Spencer, so far as promising to lay
the same before his Majesty; but this
promise they are not satisfied with, and
are determined to know the result of
his Majesty's deliberations on their
Petition. At the present the whole fleet
is entirely at their command. They take
the boats at pleasure, and communi-
cate ship with ship Yesterday they sent
on board the Romney, of 50 guns, and
ordered her to sea; the crew was anx-
ious to stm; to know the result of the
Petition; but the l)eputation that was
sent on board said, it was for the good
of the country they should go with the
convo; and absolutely ordered them to
proceed to sea; and in consequence the
ship got under weigh, and went down
to St. I helen's immediarel; where she
only waits for a fair wind.
Gosport, April 19
The Seamen in I laslar I lospital have
joined the Sailors, and express their
approbation of their proceedings by a
flag which they have flying, and by
huzzas.
There is not so much as a woman per-
mitted to leave the ships. If any of the
men get drunk, they are punished.
They will not suffer a line of battle
ship to leave Spithead - only frigates
with convoys. 'I'here are very few boats
suffered to go on shore, and scarce an
Officer is to be seen in l'ortsmouth,
Portsea, or Gosport. A ship went out
of harla)ur this day, and, directly she
got to Spithead, gave three cheers, the
signal for joining the fleet. The slop-
merchants are not even permitted to
come on shore - they let boats come
along-side to bring them goods. 'Ihe
whole of the Marines on board arc dis-




We have heard reports of excesses
committed at Portsmouth by the
Seamen, which we conceive to be
greatly exaggerated; if not altogether
unfounded. We have refrained from
retailing such reports, as they seemed
to us tending to the most serious and
alarming national consequences.
Scarcely two accounts, indeed, received
from Portsmouth, for the last few days,
agree in their circumstances; and the
most palpable contradictions are evi-
dent in every paper that presumes to
enter upon details. We have stated
nothing upon this delicate subject but
what we considered to be derived from
the best authority. We have still reason
to believe, that the discontcnts of the
Seamen are appeased, in consequence
of the dispassionate and judicious con-
duct of the Board of Admiralty held at
Portsmouth.
So may
 different causes of complaint
have been assigned to the Seamen, that
we will not insult the character of
British Tars, l) staining our Paper with
their enumeration. We believe an
increase of wages was the principal, if
not the only demand they made; and
that, we have reason to suppose, will,
upon principles of justice, be awarded
to them.
letters have been received in town
from Sir Sydney Smith at Paris. I he was
confined in the 'l'emplc at the time of
writing, and no person was admitted to
have any intercourse with him; but he
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Brest, .pnl lii. It i tipos.ibk to
imagine the state of disorganization of
our fleet. The artillery soldiers of the
marine have received no pay for two
months; the soldiers desert in cn)Uds,
declaring that they are only to be
thrown upon the coasts of Ingland
because they cannot longer be fur-
nished with provisions ship On the
other hand, the General Officers dis-
gust all the others by their insolence
and brutality; the greatest part of
whom, raised from inferior stations in
the navy, have preserved their former
habits, It is time that the Government
paid the most serious attention to the
navy, because it is impossible to calcu-
late the consequences of thepresent
disorganization, which becomes every-
day more irremediable and formidable.
As a matter of the first national impor-
tance at the present moment, we have
been at great pains to collect informa-
tion on the subject of the present
unhappy dispute which prevails on
board the fleet at Spithead, but find all
the accounts so disguised by the oper-
ation of passion and prejudice, that we
are at a loss to pledge ourselves for the
truth of much of what we may never-
theless think it our duty to lay before
our readers.
'l'hc following private letters came to
hand yesterday:
Portsmouth, April 19
'11w discontent among the seamen on
board the grand fleet have assumed the
most serious and formidable aspect.
'l'heir determination to have their
demands complied with is so universal
in the fleet, that scarce a man luke-
warm in the cause is to be found. 'l'he
business of the seamen is conducted
by a Committee chosen from among
themselves, of two men from each
ship, who hold their discussion in the
.dmiral's cabin of the Royal George.
'l'hey have published their petition,
which is now in the press, and is to be
distributed gratis among the fleet to-
morrow morning. It is well composed,
and consists of several pages. 1 under-
stand the purport is, first, "increase of
pavtols.perdav-fullwcightofpro-
visions of sixteen ounces to the pound
- a greater proportion of prize money
- and an asylum or pension for all per-
sons wounded in the service." It is
understood that the first two demands
have been acceded to by l':arl Spencer,
so far as promising to lay the same
before his Majesty; but this promise
they are not satisfied with, and are
determined to know the result of his
Majesty's deliberations on their peti-
tion. At the present the whole fleet is
entirely at their command; and to guess
.it the event of this business would be
jl,urd. 'l'he Officers are as completely
under the men, as men in due subordi-
nation are under their Officers. 'I'hey
take boats at their pleasure, and com-
municate ship with ship Yesterday they
sent on board the Romnev of 50 gun;
and ordered her to sea: the crew were
anxious to stay, to know the result of
the petition; but this deputation which
was sent on board said, it was for the
good of the country they should go
with the convoy, and absolutely
ordered them to proceed to sea; an, in
consequence, the ship got under way,
and went down to St. I Iclen's immedi-
ately, where they only waited for a fair
wind.'
Portsmouth, .pril 19
'l'he Lords of the Admiralty are still
here, but have not yet gone to
Spirhead. 'flie seamen remain perfectly
master of the keys to the real strength
of Great Britain.
It is with the greatest satisfaction we
learn, from good authority, that it was
the resolution of the Board of
Admiralty yesterday to recommend to
(;OVei'liment a compliance with the
request of the seamen, which are nar-
rowed to the following articles: - An
inconsiderable increase of pay - the
whole allowance of provisions, &c.
provided for by the Public (at present
the l'ursers deduct one-eighth, better
attendance on the sick and wounded by
the Faculty. It is but common justice to
say, that the seamen have conducted
themselves through the whole business
with a sobriety, steadiness, unanimit
and determined resolution, that would
do honour to any other cause.
Gosport, April 19
'l'he seamen at I laslar I lospital have
joined the sailors, and express their
approbation of their proceedings 1w a
flag which they have flying, and by
huzzas. I understand the prayer of
their petition is, one third of all the
prizes they take - an advance of wages
from 22s. (Id. to 30s. per month, and to
be paid every three months, and then
in cash, not paper - not to be punished
for any trifle as inferior Officers may
think proper - and 16 ounces of provi-
sions to the pound, instead of which
they now have but 12. 'I'here are other
demands, which I am not acquainted
with. Indeed, it is a new organization
of the nav 'they have a rope fixed to
every ship's yard-arm, read y to hang
and sailor or Officer that behaves
amiss. They will not suffer the Captains
to come on shore; but if the business
is not settled to their satisfaction in a
few days, they mean to land their
Officers. What they mean to do then is
a secret. On Monday they were going
to hang a lieutenant, and had got the
rope fixed round his neck.
PS. 'Ihere is not so much as a woman
permitted to leave the ship If any of
the men get drunk, they are punished.
'I'hey will not suffer a line of battle
ship to leave Spithead, only frigates
with convoys. 'I'here are very few boats
suffered to go on shore, and scarce an
Officer is to be seen in Portsmouth,
Portsea, or (losport.
'l'he letters from his Lordship
ISpencerl to Mr. Pitt urge the necessity
of the business being brought before
Parliament without delay; and it is said
to be the intention of the Minister to
submit to the I louse of Commons a
proposition for raising the wages of
the seamen employed in his Majesty's
navy to 30 shillings per month.
In whatever points of view we consid-
er the events that have lately taken
place in Portsmouth, they appear the
most serious and alarming. In some sit-
uations, it is dangerous to advance, in
others to retreat; but in that which the
conduct of the seamen has put us, it
would seem as if it is impossible to
advance or retreat without the most
imminent danger to the l'ublic.
Never, sure, was any Government in so
awful a predicament as that which ours
is at present; and never did any stand
so much in need of firm support from
the nation at large. 'l'he embarrassment
in which it is involved, is not the work
of this or any particular Ministry 'I'he
question before us is a great national
question; and he who treats it as a party
one, is either too short-sighted to be
able to see the extent of the conse-
quences to which it may lead; or too
regardless of the safety of his country
to deserve the name of a patriot. 'l'he
occasion calls for a union of all the tal-
ents, abilities, and virtue of all descrip-
tions of public men. 'I'he manner in
which the seamen have urged their
claims is such, that Parliament cannot
but see that while the seamen were
deliberating upon them, all discipline
was superseded in the fleer, and the
ships, guns, ammunition, &c. in the
possession not of those to whom they
had been committed by lawful authoti-
ty, but of men, who, in defiance of that
authority, have assumed the power of
commanding those whom it was their
bounden duty to obc Parliament may
perhaps be disposed on this occasion
to act on the grounds of expedience;
but it would do well to look to the
probable consequences of a triumph
gained by mutiny over discipline.
When the Public places arms in the
hands of individuals, it is in the special
trust that those who bear them shall
not emplor them against the public
But is it not so employing them, when
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those to whom the have been entrust-
ed, make use at least of the terror of
them, to extort conditions from the
nation, which they were not willing to
let stand for success of the ultimate
intrinsic justice and equity of the
demands? Who, whatever call there
may
 be for them at sea, however press-
ing may be the necessity for them to
act against a foreign enem refuse to
weigh anchor until terms dictated by
them shall be ratified by Parliament?
The foe is left at liberty to sail at what
point he pleases, and the national com-
merce exposed to depredation, while
our seamen are negotiating, or rather
dictating the conditions on which they
will return to duty.
What is to be done in this case? Is the
nation to break with the nav; the dar-
ling branch of the public service? The
consequences might be such as would
appall the stoutest heart. Is it to give
way to the demands of the seamen?
l)iscipline, which alone prevents an
armed force from being a public
scourge, would receive a wound that it
would be strange indeed if it ever
could survive. In what light is the navy
to be viewed - as the servant, or as the
master of the liublic? These are ques-
tions which cannot fiol to occur to
those who look beyond the present
moment, and tremble at the idea of the
contagion of example; who know not
how many other demands Concession
on this occasion may give birth,
demands that may be urged in as deci-
sive a manner as the present, and
backed by arguments as convincing as
numbers and arms can make them.
These observations intrude themselves
between the regard that we have for
the nation, and the very sincere respect
which we have always entertained for
the British navy The latter we have
ever considered as the great bulwark of
the country, as at once its security and
its pride; but it is when covering them-
selves with glory in the defence of the
State, carrying the terror of the British
name to the most distant parts of the
earth, and braving every danger to
maintain the safety and the honour of
their native land, that we have cher-
ished, admired, nay almost adored the
British 'lrs: they themselves will be
the first to excuse us, if on this occa-
sion, we prefer them, what they them-
selves have hitherto preferred to all the
world, Old Ingland. The time, the cir-
cumstances, the nature of their
demands at this moment, all concur to
bring their countr into danger, and
enable her natural rivals to triumph
over her, while her natural defenders,
unwilling to trust to her justice, are
endeavouring to extort from her by
terror, what could not be either given
or received with grace, if it did not
flow from good will on the part ot the
I'ublic.
In the present crisis, all of our fellmv-
subjects of every denomination ought
to bring to the discussion of the
important business which now agltates
the public mind, coolness and dispas-
sionate dispositions; they ought to
reject all party-distinction and party-
spirit in an affair in which all are so
deeply interested; and recollect, that let
who will be in power, there must be a
navy and an army; and that if these two
bodies are intended to be a tower of
strength to the counrr}
 a terror to for-
eign and domestic enemies, and the
protectors of all good subjects, thete
must be discipline to regulate their
conduct, insure subordination, restrain
licentiousness, and enforce obedience
to lawful authorits.
Portsmouth, April 20
Lord Spencer, with other Lords of the
Admiralty, held a Board at Admiral Sir
Peter Parker's, which did not break up
till after four odock - a messenger was
immediately dispatched for London.
From the best information I have been
able to obtain, the result of the Board
was neatly as follows:
'In consequence of the dutiful and
respectful behavior of the Seamen of
the fleet towards their Officers, who
having in consequence supported their
claim, the Lords of the Admiralty have
granted their demand.'
'Ilie claim you will find in the inclosed
petition, which they caused (without
conscnt)* to be published this day.
lb the Right I lonourable and the
I lonourable Knights, Citizens,
Burgesses in Parliament assembled,
The humble Petition of the Seamen
and Marines on board his Majesty's
Ships, in behalf of iliemselves,
I iumblv Sheweth,
lliat your petitioners, relying on the
candour and justice of your
I Ionourable I louse, make bold to lay
our grievances before you, hoping, that
when you reflect on them, you will
please to give redress, as far as your
wisdom shall deem neccssar
\ beg leave to remind your august
Asrcemblv, that the Act of Parliament
passed in the reign of King Chark. II.
wherein the wages of all Seamen serv-
ing on board his Majes's fleet was
settled, passed at a time when the nec-
essaries of life, and s1ops of every
denomination, were at least 30 per cent
cheaper than at the present nine, which
enabled Seamen and Marines to pro-
vide better for their families than we
can now do with one half advance.
We therefore request your I lonourable
I louse will be so kind as to revise the
act before mentioned, and make such
amendments therein, as will enable
your petiticmers and their families to
live in the same comfortable manner as
the Seamen and Marines did at that
time.
\our petitioners, with all humility, laid
their grievances before the lion. Earl
I lowe, and flattered ourselves with the
hopes that his Lordship would have
been an advocate for us, as we have
repeatedly under his command, and
made the British flag ride triumphantly
over that of our enemies. But to our
great surprise, we find ourselves
unprotected by him, who has seen so
many instances of our intrepidity in
carrying the British flag into every part
of the seas with victory and success.
W profess ourselves as loyal to our
Sovereign, and zealous in the defence
of our country, as the army or militia
can be, and esteem ourselves equally
entitled to his Majesty's munificence;
therefore with jealousy we behold their
pay augmented, and their out-pensions
of Chelsea College increased to thir-
teen pounds per annum, while we
remain neglected, and the out-pension-
ers of Greenwich have only seven
pounds per annum.
We your petitioners therefore humbly
implore that you will take these matters
into consideration, and with your
accustomed goodness and liberality,
comply with the prayer of this petition,
- and your petitioners, as in duty bond,
will ever pray; & etc.
We, the l)elegates of the Ileet, here-





























Robust -	 l)avid Wilson,
John Scrivener
I .'lmpetueux -	 John Wima,
William Porter
l)efence -	 George Galaway,
James Barerick







	 I )ennis Lawlev,
(h,rge (;nisland
Defiance -	 John Saunders,
John I lusband
l the Right I lonourable the lords
(;Ommissicmers of the .dmiralrv.
My Lords,
We, the Seamen of his Majesty's navy,
take the liberty of addressing your
Lordships in a humble petition, shew-
ing the many hardships and oppres-
sions we have laboured under for many
years, and which we hope your
l.ordships will redress as soon as possi-
ble. We flatter ourselves that your
Lordships, together with the nation in
general, will acknowledge our worth
and good services both in the
american war as well as the present;
for which good service your Lordships'
petitioners do unanimously agree in
opinion, that their worth to the nation,
and laboriously industry in defence of
their country, deserve some better
encouragement than that we meet with
at present; or from any we have experi-
enced. We, your petitioners, do not
boast of our good services for any
other purpose than that of putting you
and the nation in mind of the respect
due to us, nor do we ever intend to
deviate from our former character, so
far from any thing of that kind or that
an Englishman or men should turn
their coats, we likewise agree in opin-
ion, that we should suffer double the
hardships we have hitherto experi-
enced before we should suffer the
Crown of England to be in the least
imposed upon by that of any other
Power in the world; we therefore beg
leave to inform your Lordships of the
grievances which we at present labour
undet
We, your humble petitioners relying
that your Lordships will take into early
consideration the grievances of which
we complain, and do not in the least
doubt but your Lordships will comply
with our desires, which are in even'
way reasonable.
The first grievance which we have to
complain of is, that our wages are too
lo and ought to be raised, that we
might be the better able to support our
wives and families in a manner com-
fortable, and whom we are in duty
bound to support as far as our wages
will allow, which, we trust will be
looked into by your Lordshipfç and the
lion. House of Commons in
Parliament assembled.
We, your petitioners beg that 'our
Lordahips will take into consideration
the grievances of which we complain,
and now lay before you:
First, 'Ihat our provisions be raised to
the weight of 16 ounces to the pound,
and of a better quality; and that our
measures may be the same as those
used in the commercial trade of this
country;
Secondh; That your petitioners request
you I Jonours will be pleased to
observe that there should be no flour
served while we arc in harlx)ur, in any
port whatever, under the command of
the British flag; and also that there
might be granted a sufficient quantity
of vegetables of such kind as may be
the most plentiful in the ports to which
we go; which we grievously complain
and lay under the want of.
'l'hirdly, That your I ordships will be
pleased seriously to look into the state
of the sick on board his Majesty's
ships, that they may be better attended
to, and that they may have the use of
such necessaries as are allowed for
them in time of their sickness, and that
these necessaries be not on any
account embezzled.
Fourthly, That your l.ordships will be
so kind as to look into this affair, which
is in nowise unreasonable, and that we
may be looked upon as a number of
men standing in defence of our coun-
try, and that we may in some wise have
grant and opportunity to taste the
sweets of liberty on shore, when in any
harbour; and we have completed the
duty of our ship, after our return from
sea, and that no man may incroach Isici
upon his libert there shall be a
boundary limited, and those trespass-
ing any further, without a written order
from the Commanding Officer, shall
be punished according to the rules of
the Navy; which is a natural request,
and congenial to the heart of man, and
certainly to us, that you make the boast
of being guardians of the land.
Fifthly, That if any man is wounded in
action, his pay be continued until he is
cured and discharged and if any ship
has any real grievances to complain of,
we hope your Lordships will redress
them, as far as is in your power, to pre-
vent any dismrbances
It is also unanimously agreed by the
fleet, that from this day no grievances
shall be received, in order to convince
the nation at large, that we know when
to cease to ask, as well as to begin, and
that we ask nothing but what is moder-
ate, and may be granted without detti-
ment to the nation, or injurious to the
service.
Given on board the Queen Charlotte,
by the Delegates of the l'lect, this 18th
day of .pril 1797.
We, the I)elegates of the Fleet, here-
unto sign our Names for the Ships'
(:ompanies:





Royal Sovereign -	 Joseph Green,
John Richardson
London -	 Alexander I larding,
William Ruly













Robust -	 1)avid Wilson,
John Scrivener
l.'Impetueux -	 John Witna,
William Porter
I)efence -	 George Galaway,
James Barerick
Terrible -	 Mark Turner,
(;erge Salkcd
l.a Pompéc -	 William Potts,
James Melvin





'lhe advices received from Lord
Spencer yesterday state the determina-
tion of the Board at Portsmouth to be
favourable to the demands of the sea-
men, and that various considerations
induce him to remain there longer than
he first intended. I us Lordship pro-
fesses himself to be perfectly satisfied
of the loyal disposition of the several
crews, and hopes to be enabled to
return in the course of a day or two.. In
the meantime, the seamen continue in
complete possession of the fleet,
throughout the whole of which the
strictest discipline, particularly with
regards to sobriety, is preserved. One
man belonging to l.a Pompee, and
another of the Royal William, having
been found guibr of bringing spirits
on board, were severely flogged and
ducked on Thursday morning; every
sailor pays the utmost respect to his
Officer. 'Ihe universal sentiment
among the different crews is, that they
will fight the enemies of their countr
whenever called upon for that purpose;
and, as a proof of their good inten-
tions, they have ordered the Romney
man of war to sail on Thursday with a
fleet of merchantmen for
Newfoundland, not withstanding the
wish of the people on board not to put
to sea until the differences should be
finally settled.
Although the seamen had rather nar-
rowed their pretensions, as expressed
in their petition, and even abandoned
the claim first started of a more equal
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distribution of pre.e monet; vet the
principal points in discussion were
none of them decided upon when the
last advices left Portsmouth. - The cor-
respondence between the Board of
Admiralty at Portsmouth and the dep-
utation of seamen on board the Queen
Chalotte, is carried on through the
superior Officers of the fleet, who
attend the Board, and deliver the result
of its deliberations to the seamen.
The seamen continue to behave with
the greatest good order and sobriety
on board ship and shew every respect
to their Officers, in the performance of
their ordinary duties. 'l'hroughout
every part of the investigation of this
business, there is no appearance what-
ever of disaffection to his Majesty,
though the conduct of the seamen in
other respects is reprehensible in the
extreme,
We arc extremely concerned to find,
that the height to which the discon-
tents of the seamen arrived, is to be
imputed very much to some Officers
in the Navy, whose duty it was to make
them known in the first instance. 'l'his
is a business into which, we doubt not,
the Board of the Admiralty will make
every proper and necessary inquiry
The freedom of the Corporation of
Portsmouth was on Thursday present-
ed to thc Prince of Wirteinberg, Count
Zippelin, Baron Goerbitz, and Sir John
I lippesle on his Serene I Iighness's
arrival in that town, on Vdnesday, he
was received by larl Spencer, Lord
Bridport, Sir William Pitt (the
Governor), Commissioner Saxton, and
General Cuylcr. In the afternoon of
that day he visited the dock-yard, and
as he passed through the harbour in
the Commissioner's barge, he was
saluted by the different ships. lie after-
wards walked with Sir Peter Parker to
Solebay Battery, from which he had a
view of the fleet. 0 his return, he
dined with the Governor, the
Admiralty (.ommiiisioners, and the
Officers of the troops in garrison, at
the Governor's house. His Serene
I hghness was yesterday expected to
visit the Isle of Wight.
jt .,Mornuig Qbrentdt
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'te have avoided all discussion of the
subject of the grievances of the
Seamen. 'the matter was too important
to be lightly or loosely canvassed.
Representative Government actually
established on board the British fleet,
and a Commission of Admiralt y gone
to treat with a Convention of
I)clegates, is an era in the annals of our
Navy which no man who madly gave
his suffrage for the present War of
I)isorganisation ever expected to see.
;od (;cid, what a spectacle for
England! But, though the independent
Prints have, with becoming prudence,
abstained from all unseasonable com-
mentaries the devoted agents of a pre-
sUmptuou5 Ministr have nor shown
equal discretion. They have dared to
libel the wise and virtuous men who
have zealously endeavourcd to avert
from England the horrors which have
fatally come upon us, by asserting that
emissaries of the Opposition have
been the authors of the confederac;
and that the whole is the fatal fruits of
their machinations. It is enough to say
that this unprincipled aspersion is con-
tradicted by the tenor of the proceed-
ings of the seamen themselves; and
Englishmen will know how to treat a
calumny so base and diabolicaL
It makes it necessary
 to examine the
real cause of the present calamit; We
refer our readers to the Petitions of the
Seamen, for even in their erroneous
accusation of a Noble Admiral, we
shall see that a decent, seasonable
attention to their remonstrances would
have saved England from a calamity,
which no man can contemplate with-
out dismay.
'the Sailors, in one of their Petitions,
complain of the inattention of Lord
I lowe to their interests in not laying,
the Petition, which they delivered to
him near two months ago, before the
Board of Admiralrv If it should turn
out, that the Noble Earl, so far from
being unmindful of their interests or
unimpressed by the importance of that
Petition, went personally to Mr. Pitt,
urged the propriety of taking some
steps for granting them the relief
which they desired, and warned him of
the consequences which might ensue
from a refusal; if, moreover, their old
and gallant Commander presented the
Petition to one of the Lords
(:ommissk)ners of the Admiralt;
accompanied with a strong reconimen-
dation to the Board to take it under
immediate consideration, the censure,
which the irritated and disappointed
Seamen have attached to the character
of that deserving Officer, ought to be
transferred from him to his Majesty's
Ministers, who, with a consistent folly
and stupidity; approaching to insanity,
entirely neglected the prayer of a body
of men on whom depend the hopes,
the safet); and the very being of the
Count What do they deserve, who,
after being seriously warned of
impending dangers, took no measures
of prevention till they were roused
from their stupor by a voice which
unstrung the firmest nerves, and made
the blood of every thinking man run
cold? What ought to be the punish-
ment of those, who, at a moment
when they were calling on the
Inhabitants of the Country
 to arm, at
the peril of being subjugated b'. an
invading enemy; madly demolished
those bulwarks to which we can akme
look for our defence? What respect can
that Government claim which gives to
threats what it withhold from prayer,
and which harkens to the dictates of
fear rather than of policy? Yet these are
the Ministers to whom all is committed
all that is valuable to us as men, or dear
to us as Englishmen! 'these are the
Ministers who are presumptuous
enough to think they are qualified ti, sit
at the I 1dm of the State, and to direct
her course amid the storms and tem-
pests which threaten every moment to
throw her irrecoverable wreck upon
the beach! 'l'hee are the Ministers who
we are told it is illiberal to criminate
and whom it would be unjust to dis-
miss! Good God! 'l'here was a time
when Englishmen had the penetration
to see when they were mocked and
aggrieved, and the spirit to punish the
authors of their insults and their
wrongs! We trust that this time is not
gone by never to return, and that when
patience retires in disgust from the
scene, justice will arise and assert their
long forgotten rights.
At a late hour no accounts had been
received of a reconciliation having
taken place. We understand that the
artide in their Petition which claims
the liberty of going ashore is that,
above all others, which Government
hesitate to comply with, and we trust
the seamen will have the good sense
and virtue to relinquish a claim which
would be fatal to the service.
be fflonm nft
Sarnniai. 22 i-lpi/ I
It is with pain we find it out of our
power to confirm the opinion enter-
tained yesterday foremxn, of the ter-
mination of the mutiny at Spithead.
Neither Lord SPENCER, Lord
.'iRDEN, Admiral YOUNG, or
Secretary MARSDEN, had returned to
town at a late hour last night, nor were
they expected. And so far from an
adjustment having taken place between
the Admiralty and the Seamen, we are
well informed, that information was
received by the 'I'elcgraph, from
Portsmouth yesterday at five o'clock,
signifying that the business remained in
much the same unsettled stare in which
it was left on the preceding da
In our paper, this day, will be found
Copies of the Petitions from the
Seamen to the Admiralty and to the
Ilouse of Commons. i'hese papers are
as important as any that ever came
before the British nation. The
demands which they contain are not all
of them reasonable, and the spirit
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which runs throughout is of a very
senous nature. It is reasonable they
should ask to have the stipend of their
Out-pensioners increased as much as
that of the Out-pensioners of Chelsea
I iospital; that they should have vegeta-
bles when in port, and that the wound-
ed in action should be paid till cured
and discharged; but when we view the
condition of the solider, the labourer,
and the mechanic, we cannot say that
the condition of the Seaman is less
comfortable. The Seaman has to pay
for neither provisions, house-rent,
coal, nor candle. lie is well provided
with food and lodging, and he has five
shillings and sixpence per week to pur-
chase cloths, (for which no men are at
less expense), and to assist his family.
This sum, small as it is, amounts to
more than the labourer, or the majori-
ty of mechanics can command; and is
even affluence itself, when compared
with the subsistence of the soldier. .
sailor's life, except when he is on shore
is the least expensive of any we know.
lie has not the temptation of public
houses, he is not provoked to dress, he
is excluded from all those incidental
expenses which too often reduce men
with a comfurtable pittance on land, to
a state of embarrassment. With regard
to the increase of the ounces in the
pound of provisions, and of the meas-
ure of their drink, we ask, what has
been the custom hitherto? I lave not
the Navy for a century been provided
with the same number of ounces, and
the same measure? If they have, the
present Seamen have no more reason
to complain than their predecessors
had. The advanced price of provisions
makes no difference to them, while
they have the same quantity and the
same quality
We shall not examine these Petitions,
as if they come from men accustomed
to express themselves clearly and defi-
nitely. But we must observe, that while
they declare they wiH demand redress
of no other grievances than those star-
ed, they at the same time desire the
grievances they in the future complain
of, may be redressed. I lere a door is
left open for any future demand; and if
any complaint the Seamen may here-
after make, shall not be redressed, then
they may say their Petition has not
been C(xnphcd with.
We find no complaint made respecting
prize-money or arrears. We wish
arrears had been the only complaint,
because it could have been readily and
properly obviated.
It is unreasonable in the Stamen to
assign the increased subsistence of the
Soldiers, as a ground for their
demands. ilic soldier was and still is in
a state of poverty compared with that
of the Sailor, if the reasoning of the
Sailors of the Sailors bc just, George
Rose may demand an increase of his
sinecures. Neither is it liberal or just in
the Sailors to assume to themselves a
peculiar utility and importance to the
countr it is true that our navy is our
glor as well as our best defence. Hut it
is not our present Seamen that have
made it what it is. it is the genius of the
country; and if those who are now our
Soldiers had been bred to the sea, they
would have made as good Sailors as
those who seem to think themselves
born with peculiar qualities.
We speak thus freely cm this subject,
because we think it is one that should
be met and discussed without reserve.
We disapprove one half of the com-
plaints in the Seamen's Petition, we
totally disapprove the spirit of them,
and above we disapprove of the steps
they have taken to obtain redress. The
'l'reasury Journals have adopted a
cringing treacherous language that may
produce the greatest mischief, as it is
calculated rather to encourage than
repress the spirit of revolt. Let the
Seamen's complaints, be met fairly; let
them be told what redress may reason-
ably be expected, and what redress
should not be dcmande& let this be
done, and the Journalists may produce
a very salutary effect upon them. It is
on such occasions thatJoumals may be
of service to the State. But fawning on
Seamen, or fawning on Ministers, is
alike pregnant with mischief.
We have already alluded to the spirit of
the l'etitions of these Petitions, and we
never can allude to it too often. Upon
reading them we arc lead to suppose
they are the production of Citixens
deliberating on their rights as Members
of Society, rather than as the produc-
tion of men armed for war, and neces-
sarily put under martial law A wide
definition must always exist between
the Soldier and the Citizens. The
Citizen enjoys his rights in Societ';
because it is for the good of society
that he should do so. But when the
Citizen becomes a Soldier, he puts
himself in a state of 'ar, and ncces-
jlv relinquishes those rights he pos-
sess as a member of Civil societ
It is a farce to call the demand of such
an assembly, made in such a manner, a
Petition! 'I'hev have it in their power, in
a few hours, to destroy our Dock-
yards, Stores and Ships; to destroy our
Marine, to destroy the very heart of the
nation. If this be Petitioning, we may
see the Guards surround the Bank, or
'l'cn Thousand Soldiers surround
l'arliament, and Petition! Mr. Pitt has
created an unwieldy Militan; which,
when we consider the conduct of the
Seamen, we cannot contemplate with-
out terror.
'l'he Seamen state, that they long since
complained to lord I lowe. We make
no doubt his Lordship discharged his
duty in making the necessary represen-
tatioms to the ;dmirahy. By making
complaints in this manner, the Seamen
acted with great propriety; and we
lament that they seem to have been
driven to their present situation by the
criminal negligence of persons in
office. We hope this fact will be
enquired into, and the guilty punished.
No adjustment can repair the injury
which our Naval discipline has sus-
tained. If the men arc subdued by vio-
lence we lose their affection; if their
desires are complied with, we invite
them to make the most unreasonable
demands in future.
'The "Portsmouth Parliament," as the
sailors call it, does not erect itself into
a body to control the wishes of its
(:onstituents, but is considered merely
as an organ through which the general
will of the whole fleet is conveyed. In
this respect, it is worthy the imitation
of that high Court, whose forms it
adopts, but whiic spirit it rejects.
Ube	 tine.
SaJ,,rda. 22 lpti/ I ;'97
The Petition, or rather the
Remonstrance, of the Sailors (Xi board
Lord l3ridport's fleet, is now before the
l'ublic, and we most sincerely wish that
it was not our duty to publish it.
Not withstanding all the idle and igno-
rant reports which the Public will
probably see detailed in many of the
Morning Papers of this da of the dis-
contents at Portsmouth having been
happily adjusted, we are sorry to sa;
that no such good news had been
received in town at 12 o'clock last
night. A Messenger was even moment
expected with the result of yesterday's
Board, but none had arrived at the
hour we have mentioned, from which
we should conclude that the
Commissioners must have sat to a later
hour than usual.
At the moment we are writing, we
lament to say, that although the
Seamen had rather narrowed their pre-
tensions, as expressed in their Petition,
and even abandoned the daim first
started of a more equal distribution of
Ptizc-Mone yet the principal points in
discussion were none of them decided
upon when the last advice left
Portsmouth. The correspondence
between the Board of Admiralty at
Portsmouth and the Deputation of
Seamen on board the Queen Charlotte,
is carried cm through the supenor
Officers of the Ileet, who attend the
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Board, and deliver the result of its
deliberations to the seamen. lhc true
knowledge of what passes is therefore
very difficult to be obtained; and it is
probably owing to this cause, that so
many false reports are in circulation.
Our readers may readily believe that we
shall be most happy to give the earliest
information of a reconciliation, when-
ever we are warranted to do so by the
fact.
The seamen continue to behave with
the greatest good order and sobriety
on board of ship and show every
respect to their Officers, in the per-
formance of their ordinary duties.
Throughout every part of the investi-
gation of this business, there is no
appearance whatever of disaffection to
his Majesty, though the conduct of the
seamen in other respects is reprehensi-
ble in the extreme.
lhe new budget is to be brought for-
ward in the course of the ensuing
week. The augmentation of the
Seamen's pay, in consequence of their
late Petition, will amount annually to
an increase of half a million sterling
The Jacobin Papers have turned all
their speculations from the Bank, to
the meeting at l'ortsmouth.
The English Republicans of the last
century were the most determined ene-
mies of France. flow comes it that
those of the present day are its spies
and confederates? Because that age
was the dupe of speculative virtue; and
this is the victim of practical wicked-
ness.
When we see the means some persons
take to get into power, can we doubt of
the means they would take to keep in
power; or of the use they would make
of power.
The success of the enemy in corrupt-
ing our brave tars is truly formidable.
What have we to expect, if we are not
true to ourselves at this dreadful
moment, when we are betrayed on
every side?
Is there any man so sanguine as to
think that Mr. Fox, or Mr. I tome
loolw, could retrieve the general anar-
chcv that threatens us? Is there this
virtue in the handle of their spear?
Some of the Petitions offered to his
Majcsrs, put us in mind of an .ddress
of I)rouet Ithe postmaster who recog-
nised Louis XVI at 'arennes, arrested
and briefly imprisoned in the Spring of
1797 as an associate of Babeufi and his
accomplices, at 'endome, to one of
their fellow prisoners, 'It is our humble




This forenoon the Prince of
Wirtemberg was made an honorary
Burgess by the Mayor, Alderman, and
Burgesses of this Corporation.
I us Serene I Iighness afterwards,
accompanied by (iovernor Pitt,
(;eneral Culyer, and other Officers of
distinction, reviewed the West-Kent
Militia.
'the strictest discipline, particularly
with rqard to sobtiet continues to be
preserved throughout the fleet. One
man on board La Pompee had this
morning a severe dozen, with a thief's
cat, and was thrice lowered from the
main yard into the water, for bringing a
pint of spirits on board.
.pril 20.
Several persons on board the fleet have
been punished to-day various offences.
.t sailor of the Royal William was
flogged by the crew for theft, and sev-
eral others were ducked.
.i Council was held of all the Admirals
and Captains of the fleet, on shore,
this day, presided by Lord Spencer,
and, it is reported, that the Petition is
to be complied with, by granting an
addition to their pay, and allowing
them the full weight of 16 ounces,
instead of 12 Isicl, to the pound.
01w tEruc fltttou
Samrdat, 22 lpnI I
We are happy in being able to lay
before our Readers the following
letters, which we yesterday received
from our Portsmouth Correspondents.
They confirm in every respect the
statements which we have made, dur-
ing the course of this business, of the
dispositions of the Seamen, and of the
nature and probable issue of their
application. The conduct of the
Seamen joined to the recommenda-
tions of their Officers in their behalf;
as recorded in the resolution of the
Board of the Admiralty as the founda-
tion of compliance with their
demands.
Portsmouth, April 20
Lord Spencer, with the other Lords of
the Admiralty, held a Board at Admiral
Sir Peter Parker's, which did not break
up till after four o'clock - a messenger
was immediately dispatched for
London. From the best information I
have been able to obtain, the result of
the Board was nearly as follows:
'In consequence of the dutiful and
respectful behaviour of the Seamen of
the llect towards their Officers, who,
having in consequence supported their
Claim, the Lords of the Admiralty
have granted their l)cmand.'
Their Claim you will find in the
inclosed l'etition, which they caused
(with consent) to be published this day.
April20
With what pleasure, what heart-felt
pleasure, I do tell you that every thing
is settled, and I hope to-morrow will be
a day of perfect reconciliation.
This morning the different .dmirals
made the signal for all Captains of
their 1)ivisions, and a consultation tixk
place with the Admiralty Board on
shore till three o'clock, when the fol-
lowing was ordered, or something very
near to it: 'That in consequence of
their dutiful and respectful behaviour
through the whc,le business, and their
claims having been supported by their
respective officers, they were to be
granted.'
Such is the termination of an affair,
during which several of our
Contemporaries have attempted most
grossly to misrepresent the objects and
the conduct of the British Nav and
have daily inserted in their columns
long accounts from the l'leet, while
they have represented the intercourse
between the vessels and the shore as
interrupted. The event has shown, that
these accounts were alike false and
malignant: the Character of the British
Seamen is at this moment so high, that
we are convinced they will never forfeit
it by those actions which the
Opposition Prints have attributed to
them.
though what we have stated was from
authentic information received yester-
day from Portsmouth, corroborated by
numerous private I .etters from thence,
yet we deem it proper to add, that no
advices had reached the Admiralty last
night of the acceptance of the
Resolution of the Admiralty Board by
the Seamen, which, however, was not
to be communicated to them till yes-
terday.
The officers of the Fleet were of the
opinion, that the Resolution ought to,
and would, satisfy the Seamen; and we
entertain the strongest confidence that
such is the case.
Portsmouth, April 19
I us Serene I Iighness the I leredirary
Prince of WIRTEMBERG, accompa-
nied by Count '/.IPPEI.IN, Baron
(;oEsliiZ and Sir John IHPPES-
t.l arrived this morning at the
Fountain Inn - I us Serene I tighness
was recuved by Earl SPENCER, Lord
BRI1)POR'l, Sir Wm. PI'li'
((l,emor), Sir Peter PARKER, Hart.
(Port .Admiral, Commissioner Sir
Charles SAX'I'ON, Hart., General
(:uyl .ER, &c 'l'he Troops were drawn
up in front of the Inn.
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The Comminiinner, soon after, con-
ducted the Prince and his suite to his
house in the l)ock-yard, where an ele-
gant breakfast was prepared, after
which his Serene I Iighness visited the
l)ock-yard, with which he seemed to
be highly pleased. lie then embarked
with his suite in the Commissioner's
Barge, and returning through the har-
bour, received three cheers from the
Crews of the different Ships as his
Serene I Iighness passed them.
The Prince then walked, attended by
Sir Wm. l'itt, &c. to the Salute Battery,
to enjoy thc fine view from thence of
the Fleet at Spithead, the Isle of Wight,
&c.
Ilis Serene highness and suite after-
wards dined with the Governor, in
company with the Admirals,
(:(missi(mer, and Staff Officers of
the lioops and Garrison.
April 20th.
I us Serene I Iighness, attended as yes-
terday, viewed the works, round which
he was conducted by the (invernor. In
the forenoon the Prince, Count
Zippelin, Baron Gocidir,., and Sir John
I lippesley received the Freedom of the
(;cirpciration, the Mayor and other
Members thereof attending in their
regalia.
I us Serene I iighness was followed by a
vast concourse of People, who
expressed their satisfaction in seeing
him by repeated acclamations of joy.
The I'rincc returned these marks of
respect and regard in the most polite
and condescending manner.
Ijt iflormug Qb3utI2
Monda 24 ,lpri/ I 97
A Cabinet Council was held at Lord
Grenville's Office, Downing Street, on
Saturday, at which the I .ord chancellor,
Mr. Pitt, L)uke of Portland, Earl
Spencer, Lord Grenville, Mr. I)undas,
&c. were present, which sat upwards of
three hours on account of the urgency
of the business, which was the
(:onven&m on board the fleer.
After the deliberations of the Cabinet
Council were over on Saturday, at I 'ord
Grenville's Office, Earl Spencer,
accompanied bs the Lord Chancellor,
left town for indsor, at which place
the rest of the Cabinet Ministers
arrived at seven o'dock, where they
met the King .! Privy Council was
immediately held, which was not over
till past nine o'clock, when the Order
of Council was passed under his
Majesty's Sign manual, to which the
Cint Seal of England was affixed,
granting indemnification to the
I)elegates who signed the Sailors'
Petition, and an assurance that their
demands would be recommended to
the two I louses of Parliament by a
Royal Message. As soon as the Meeting
broke up, Mr. Powell, the Messenger,
left Windsor, with dispatches contain-
ing the pleasing intelligence to Lord
Bridport at Portsmouth.
The Privy Council consisted of the fol-
lowing Members:








Sir Stephen Cottrell, Clerk of the
Council.
It would have been wise and dignified
that this Council had been held on the
first explosion, instead of attempting
to chaffer and bargain with the fleet.
The moment of negotiation was that
when they first made their representa-
tion to Earl I lowe. The neglect of their
own petition attached a severe respon-
sibilitv somewhere, and we trust that
the matter will be seriously investigat-
ed. We trust that the whole affair will
now be concluded forever; and that
our brave and gallant tars will suffer no
recollection of it to influence their
future conduct. Ar the same time we
hope it will be an awful warning to
Ministers how they presume to trifle
with the petition of an aggrieved peo-
ple. 1here is an insult in indifference
which is more painful to a spirited
mind than injury and there is no part of
the conduct of our Ministers so blame-
able as the pride with which they over-
look the most pressing memorials
from all descriptions of men, whom
they oppress by delays, that are as inju-
riOUS to the public service as they are
fatal to the objects. Thus we see that
the arrears of half-pay, the arrears of
off-reckonings, the undischarged
King's Warrants for military services,
lying in masses in the icasur; War,
and Pay-offices, are subjects of severe
grievance, upon which the complaints
are loud and heavy I low long are we to
endure a system of prevarication and
disregard of all public engagements it
is impossible to say; but that system
was never so scandalously developed as
in the printed communications
between the ChANCELLOR OF
filE EXCIIEQLER and the Bank.
We sincerely hope that that correspon-
dence will be printed in a form that will
make it generally known. It will show
the character of Mr. PIl1 in its true
light. It would prove that though the
l)irectors never had the courage to
refuse any one of his applications for
money, they never ceased to declare to
him that his demands would bring ruin
on the I louse; and though he regularly
promised that each demand should be
the last, he accompanied each distinct
apology with a new Petition. We shall
give the public a specimen of this curi-
ous amour on the first open day.
As the disorder in the fleet is likel y to
be at an end this day, we forebear to
state all the circumstances which we
related yesterday of alarming disposi-
tions on board. It was said that they
put on shore a number of their
Officers; and that parties of the Sailors
themselves were coming on shore.
A Messenger was sent off at a late
hour last night from the Admiralty,
with dispatches to Admiral PARKER
and Lord BRIDPORT
be fttorrnn .é
.%londi,;. 24 ,lpñ/ I9
Mutiny at Spithead




About ten minutes before eight o'clock
this morning. every seaman in the Fleet
took his station in the rigging, and at
eight precisely, the crew of the London
gave three cheers, which were returned
in succession by every other ship in the
Meet. This has been practiced, instead
of firing the Morning Gun, ever since
the men refused to obey their Officers
commands.
You will no doubt hear that the men
on Friday night struck Lord
BRII)PORVs flag, and hoisted the red
or bloody flag This is true; but as the
fact may be much misinterpreted, I will
state to you that Iord BRIDPORTs
flag was not struck from an y disrespect
to his Lordship, as some have reported.
The red flag was at first hoisted for the
purpose of summoning the l)elegates
together, to consult on the final answer
of the Seammen to the Admiralty
Board. At this Lord BRIDPORVs
officers took offence, and declaring
that his Lordships flag should not fly
on board while the red flag was out,
they struck it themselves.
I am well assured the sailors would
have accepted the offers of the
Admiralty, signed, Spencer, .rden and
W Young, and dated the 18th inst. if it
had not been for the indiscretion of
Admiral Gardner, who when those
offers were on the eve of being finally
accepted, came on board, making loud
complaints, calling the delegates a
d mutinous blackguard set, who
deserved hanging This irritated them,
prevented concthatum, and indisposed
them to comply with the wishes of the
.dmiralt In this temper they pre-
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pared their Reply to the AdmiraIt
dated the 19th, in which they make fur-
ther demands; and I fear that even the
paper of the 19th, does not contain a
statement of all they will yet ask. I lad
not Admiral GARI)NER put ashore
immediately after his conduct, it is
reported he would have been very
scurvily treated. The Admiral has made
himself very unpopular among the
Seamen, who never cease to profess an
unalterable loyalty to their King, and
attachment to their country; but they
declare their firm determination not to
proceed to sea till their demands are
complied with, and sanctioned by an
Act of Parliament, and till the King,
under his sign manual, pardons the
I)clegates, and every other person con-
cerned with them. They are resolved to
rely on the King and l'arliament alone;
they will not trust their officers; and
will not be satisfied even with the
engagements of the Admiralty.
BY 'Ii Il' (:c )MMISSI( )N IRS FOR
EXE(:UTIN(; 'l'llE OFl:ICE OF
LORI) hIGh Al)MIRAI. 01:
GREAT BRITAIN ANI) IRELANI)
"having taken into consideration the
Petitions transmitted by your Lordship,
from the Crews of his Majesty's ships
under your command, and having the
strongest desire to attend to all com-
plaints of the Seamen of his Majesty's
Navy, and to grant them every just and
reasonable redress, and having consid-
ered the difference of the price of nec-
essaries of life, at this and at that peri-
od when the Pay of Seamen was estab-
lished, We do hereby require and direct
your Lordship to take the speediest
method of communicating to the
Fleet:
"That we have resolved to recommend
it to I his Majesty to propose to
Parliament to increase the wages of
Seamen in his Majesty's Nav' in the
fullowing proportions, via.
"To add Four Shillings per month to
the wages of petty Officers and Able
Seamen;
"Three Shillings per month to the
wages of Ordinary
 Seamen; and
"Two shillings per month to the wages
of landmen."
"That we have resolved, that Seamen
wounded in action shall be continued
in pay until that their wounds are
healed, or until, being declared unser-
viceable, they shall receive a pension,
or be received into Royal I lospital at
Greenwich; and that, having a perfect
confidence in the Zeal, Loyalt; and
Courage of .lJ. the Seamen in the
l'leet, so generally expressed in their
Petition, and in their earnest desire of
serving their country with that spirit
which always so eminently distin-
guished British Seamen, we have come
to this resolution the more readily, that
the Seamen may have, as early as possi-
ble; an opportunity of showing their
good dispositions, by returning to their
duty; as it may be necessary that the
Fleet should speedily put to sea, to
meet the Enemy of the Countr
Given under our hands at Portsmouth,
the 18th day of April, 1797 Spencer,
rden and %V ung
To the Right hionourable Lord
Biidport, K. B, Admiral of the White,
Commander in Chief of a Squadron of
Ills Majesty's Ships employed in the
Channel Service.
ilie Seamen's Reply -
"We received your Lordship's answer
to our Petition; and in order to con-
vince your hiirdships, and the Nation
in general, of our moderation, beg
leave to offer the following remarks to
your consideration, viz.
"That there never has existed but Two
Orders of Men in the Navy, Able and
Ordinar therefore the distinction
between Ordinary and Landmen in
totally new; we therefore humbly pro-
pose to your I nrdships, that the old
regulations be adhered to, that of the
Wages of Able Seamen be raised to
(Me Shilling per day, and that of the
Petty Officers, and the Ordinary, in the
usual proportion: And as a further
proof of our moderation, and that we
are actuated by a 'true spirit' of benev-
olence towards our brethren, 'the
Marines, who are noticed in your
l.ordships' answer, we humbly propose
that their pay be augmented while serv-
ing on board, in the same proportion
as Ordinary Seamen. 'liis, we hope
and trust, will be a convincing proof to
your I ordships that we are not actuat-
ed by a spirit of contradiction, but that
we earnestly wish to put a speedy end
to the present affair We beg leave to
state to your l.ordships, that the pen-
skins, from Greenwich College, which
we earnestly wish to be raised to Ten
Pounds per annum, and in order to
maintain which, we humbly propose to
your l.ordships, that every Seamen
employed in the Merchant Service,
instead of sixpence per month, which
he now pays shall hereafter pay one
shilling per Month, which we trust will
raise a fund fully adequate to the pur-
pose; and as this in time of Peace must
be paid br your Petitioners, we trust it
will ve a convincing proof of our dis-
interestedness and moderation: we
would also recommend that this regu-
lation be extended to the Seamen in
the Service of the East India
(:onpan, as we know by experience
that there arc few Sailors employed 1w
them but what have been in the Royal
Navy: and we have seen them with our
own eyes, after sickness, or other acci-
dent has disabled them, without any
hope of relief or support, but from
their former services in the Navt
"As to the provisions, that they aug-
mented to sixteen ounces to the pound
of bread and meat - cheese, butter and
liquor in proportion, and of a better
quality, and a sufficient quantity of
vegetables; and that no flour be served
with fresh beef. .nd we further beg
leave to inform your Lordships, that it
is unanimously agreed, that until the
grievances before stated are redressed,
and act of amendment passed, we are
determined not to lift an anchor: and
the grievances of particular ships must
be redressed.
Given under our hands, the l)elegates
of the Ilect, on Board the Queen
Charlotte, at Spithead, April 19, 1797.
EXPRESS from Portsmouth
Sunday, I half past l :ive o'Clock
I have waited to this moment, to send
you the final event of the affuir in
question here.
i'his morning at half past seven a
Messenger (M. l'OWEI.L) arrived
from Windsor, with dispatches from
the KING to Admiral Lord BRID-
POR'l lie set off from Windsor at
half past ten last night, and arrived
here at the time above named. lie
brought with him a Proclamation of
Pardon only to the Sailors, which was
pnnted at Strahan's, a copy of which I
could not obtain; but it merely relates
to the l'ardon for the Mutiny. The sec-
ond Paper issued by Government, alias
the Admiralty, and the Seamen's final
determination, I have incloried.
About twelve o'clock, Admirals lmd
BRII)PORT, Sir A. GARDNER,
POlJ, and COI.P()YS, went on board
to declare the determination of
Government. It is now half past five,
and they are not yet returned to shore.
The suspence is painful, and their
return looked fur most anxiously.
Signals were made for the presence of
all Captains on board the Royal
George, that signal is flying at this
moment. If any thing particular hap-
pens I shall send another Express.
'lire Sailors chcer'd this morning six
times • all dressed in their best.
Nothing further particular has hap-
pened.
The moment here is awful in the
extreme.
By the Commissioners, for executing
the Office of Lord I ugh Admiralty of
Great Britain and Ireland.
I having taken into our consideration a
paper containing several
Representations from the Seamen of
I his Majesty's ships at Spithead,
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respecting, an Advance of their wages,
and being desirous of granting them
every
 request that can with any degree
of reason be complied with, we have
resolved to recommend it to I lit
Majesty that an addition of five
shillings and sixpence per month be
made to the wages of Petty Officers
and Seamen belonging to his Majesty's
Navy, which will make the wages of
Able Seamen One Shilling per day,
clear of all deductions; an addition of
four shillings and sixpence per month
to the wages of every ordinary
Seamen; and an addition of three
shillings and sixpence to the wages of
l.andmen; and that none of the
allowances made to the Marines when
on shore shall be stopped, on their
being embarked on board any of Ills
Majesty's Ships. We have also resolved,
that all Seamen, Marines and others,
serving in his Majesty's Ships, shall
have the full Allowance of provisions,
without any deductions for leakage or
waste; and that until proper steps can
be taken fur carrying this into effect,
Short Allowances money shall be paid
to the men in lieu of the deduction
heretofore-made; and that all men
wounded, in action shall receive their
full pay until their wounds shall be
healed, or until being dedared incur-
able, they shall receive pension from
the Chest at Chatham, or shall be
admitted into the Royal I Icapital at
Greenwich. And your Lordship is
hereby required and directed to coin-
municate this our determination to the
(:aptain of each of I his Majesty's Ships
under your orders, directing him to
make it known to the Ship's Company
under his command, and to inform
them, that should they be insensible to
the very liberal offers now made to
them, and persist in their present dis-
obedience, they must no longer expect
to enjoy those benefits to which, by
their former good conduct, they were
entitled: that in such case, all the men
on board the Fleet at Spithead, shall be
incapable of receiving any Smart
Money or Pension from the Chest of
Chatham, or of being admitted at any
time into the Royal I lospital at
Greenwich; and that they must be
answerable fur the dreadful conse-
quences which will necessarily attend
their continuing to transgress the rules
of the service, in open violation of the
Laws of their Countrt On the other
hand, he is to inform them, that we
promise the most perfect forgiveness
of all that has passed on this occasion
to every Ships Company, who within
one hour, after the communication to
them of the above mentioned resolu-
tions, shall return to their duty in every
particular, and shall cease to hold fur-
ther intercourse with any men who
continue in a state of diso,bedience and
Mutin
Given under our hands, at Portsmouth,
the 20th April. 1797. Spencer, .rden,
W Young.
'l the Right lion. Lord Bridport, K.
W, Admiral of the White, Commander
in Chhf of a Squadron of his
Majesty's Ships to be employed in the
Channel Soundings, &c. By the
Command of thdr Lordships. (Signe
W M Marsden.
Tu the Right lion. The Lord
(:(immissi(mLrs of the Admiralty.
, the Seamen and Marines in and
belonging to his Majesty's Ileet now
lying at Spithead, having received with
the utmost satisfaction, and with hearts
full of gratitude, the bountiful
Augmentation of l'ay and Pr visions,
which your I.ordships have been
pleased to signify shall take place in
future in I his Majesty's Royal Nav by
your Order, which has been read to us
this morning, by the command of
Admiral Lord Bridport.
Your l.ordships having thus generous-
ly taken the prayer of our several
Petitions into your serious considera-
tion, you have given satisfaction to
every loyal and well disposed Seaman
and Marine belonging to I his Majesty's
hicet and from the assurance which
your Lordshipa have given us respect-
ing such other grievances as we
thought right to lay before you, we are
thoroughly convinced should any real
grievance or other cause of complaint
arise in future, and the same be laid
before your Lordships, in a regular
manner, we are perfectly satisfied that
your Lordships will pay every attention
to a number of brave men, whoever
have, and ever will be true and faithful
to their King and Country. But we beg
leave to remind your Lordships, that it
is a firm resolution, that until the I'lour
in Port be removed, the Vegetables and
Pensions, augmented the Grievances
of Private Ships be redressed, an Act
passed, and I his Majesty's gracious
Pardon for the Ileet now lying at
Spithead be granted, that the Fleet will
not lift an .nchor; and this is the total
and final answer - April 22.
SE(X)Nl) EXPRESS
Portsmouth, Eight o'Clock - Sunday
Night
Every thing is happily settled! The
Seamen are satisfied! i1e Fleet sails on
Tuesday!
The dispatches which were brought
down by Mr. Powell, in the extraordi-
nary short period of seven hours, were
instantly carried to the Port Admiral,
who sent for Lord Rridport, Admirals
Gardner, Pole, and Colpoys, and after
consulting a long time together, about
11 o'clock they proceeded on board
the Royal George, where Lord
Bridport's flag had been again hoisted.
A signal was immediately made for all
c:aptiiins, who having gone on board
the Admiral's ship, the nature of the
l)ispatches was divulged. Every
Captain then returned to his own ship,
and communicated to the Crews, the
contents of the l)ispatches from
Windsor. l'he Seamen unanimously
declared they could give no answer till
the proposals were submitted to the
Court of Delegates On assembling the
Court, it was found that Jovce and
Glynn, two of the l)elcgates, were on
shore. 'Ihe Court would not proceed
without them.
A boat was sent on shore, and they
were brought on board in as much
form as if rhc had been two Officers.
The Court of 1)elegates being com-
pleted, proceeded to business. 'The
proposals were discussed and finally
agreed upon at half past six. 'Ilie signal
of approbation being three cheers, was
first given by the Queen Charlotte, and
then went through the whole h'leet,
every ship giving in this manner its
consent.
Captain I holloway, of the l)uke, first
came on shore about seven o'clock, to
announce the happy tidings to the
thousands of anxious spectators wait-
ing the result on the platform. All the
boats from the other ships followed,
and the Seamen in each on landing,
declared the business happily settled.
'Ihe Seamen are satisfied: 'l'hey have
unanimously agreed to resume their
duty, and it is understood the fleet will
sail on 'luesday.
The intelligence was received with the
most excessive joy by the People on
shore
Before they return to their duty, they
desire their demands may not only be
granted by the Admiralty, but that the
grant may be sanctioned by Parliament,
and that a Pardon, under the King's
Sign Manual, may be sent down, for all
their l)elegates, and others who have
been the most active.
'Ihese despatches contain a full com-
pliance with all the demands of the
Seamen, an affluence of obtaining the
sanction of Parliament as soon as pos-
sible, and a free Pardon for all the
l)elegates, &c. in the I'leet, signed with
the King's own hand. 'The whole
passed as an Act of Council. It is, in
fact, the unlimited submission of the
British Government to the Marine
Republic of Spithead.
The Seamen attribute to Lord I lowe's
negligence of their complaints of all
the present disturbances. Many months
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ago, they presented to him a Petition,
stating their grievances: his Lordship
laid it both before the King and
Admiralty, and predicted the very
events that have taken place, if these
grievances were not redressed; but the
Petition was not attended to! We
understand his Lordship intends to
vindicate himself in the house of
Lords.
If passive Citizens lawfully petition for
a Reform of Parliament, which Mr. l'itt
once recommended, they are branded
as Traitors, and transported to Botany
Bav though they neither offer nor
threaten any violence; but when a body
of Seamen unlawfully demand they are
caressed, their loyalty is praised, and all
they ask is granted, because they are
formidably armed, and, cannot be con-
quered! We shudder to think on the les-
son that is taught the People by this
contrast. The Convention of the
Marine Republic of Spithead presents
a more awful and alarming spectacle to
this Country then the (:c)nv(nti(m of
France, at which so many have affected
to tremble. We do not blame our
(;OvcmmLnr fur submitting to Seamen
under the present circumstances; but
we lament that the Officers of the
I'leet did not foresee and prevent the
rupture; we lament that, after it broke
out, there were none like Oliver
Cromwell, of that intrepid mind and
transcendent abilit to suppress it; and
we never shall cease to invoke the most
signal vengeance on the heads of those
men, 1w whose negligence so great a
calamity has been brought upon the
Country, as the confession of the King
in Council, signed by I us Majesty's
own hand; that the Seamen of a l'leet
can dictate to Government, can obtain
whatever they ask; that they can even
rebel with impunity!
.IoAIi,. :4 . Iptil !9
A Cabinet Council was held at Lord
Grcnville's Office, Downing Street, on
Sanirda; at which the Lord Chancellor,
Mr. Pitt, Duke of Portland, Earl
Spencer, Lord Grenville, Mr. Dundas,
etc were present, which sat upwards of
three hours on account of the urgency
of the business, which was the
Convention on board the fleet at
Spithead.
After the deliberations of the Cabinet
Council were over on Sunday, at Lord
Grenville's Office, Earl Spencer,
accompanied 1w the Lord Chancellor,
left town for Windsor, at which place
the rest of the Cabinet Ministers
arrived at seven o'docic, where they
met the King 'i Privy Council was
immediately held, which was not over
till past nine o'clock, when the Order
of Council was passed under his
Majesty's sign manual, and to which
the great seal of England was affixed,
granting an indemnification to the
l)elegates who signed the Sailors'
Petition, and an assurance that their
demands would be recommended to
the two I louses of Parliament by a
Royal Message. As soon as the meeting
broke up, Mr. Powell, the Messenger,
left Windsor, with dispatches contain-
ing the pleasing intelligence to Lord
lridport at Portsmouth.
Much fear has been expressed that the
issue of the business may be consid-
ered as a death-blow to the discipline
of the Nav3 We hope otherwise - nay
we are confident that our brave seamen
will prove, by their conduct, that the
professions of attachment to their
country, which were held out in their
different memorials, were from the
heart. British seamen do not say one
thing, while they mean another, and we
are sure they will now be as unanimous
in their attention to duty and submis-
sion to their officers, as they were firm
in demanding a redress of grievances.
lhey are not so short-sighted as many
people may imagine, and the man who
would attempt to sow among them the
seeds of insubordination would speed-
ily find that they have discernment
enough to see his real character, for
they would consider and treat him as
their enemy.
I am well assured the sailors would
have accepted the offers of the
.dmiralt; signed, Spencer, Arden and
W 'loung, and dated the 18th inst. if it
had not been for the indiscretion of
Admiral Gardner, who, when those
offers were on the eve of being finally
accepted, came on board, making loud
complaints, calling the delegates a d----
d mutinous blackguard set, who
deserved hanging This irritated them,
prevented conciliation, and indisposed
them to comply with the wishes of the
.dmiraIt In this temper they pre-
pared their Reply to the .dmiralty,
dated the 10th, in which they make fur-
ther demands; and I fear that even the
paper of the 19th, does not contain a
statement of all they will vet ask. I lad
not Admiral Gardner put ashore
immediately after his conduct, it is
reported he would have been very
scurvily treated. The Admiral has made
himself very unpopular among the
Seamen, who never cease to profess an
unalterable loyalty to their King, and
attachment to their countr ; but they
declare their firm determination not to
proceed to sea till their demands are
complied with, and sanctioned by an
Act of Parliament, and till the King,
under his sign manual, pardons the
Delegates, and every other person con-
cerned with them. They are resolved to
rely on the King and Parliament alone;
they will nor trust their officers; and
will not be satisfied even with the
engagements of the Admiralty.
Sunday Night - eight o'clock.
Everything is happily settled! 'Ihe
Seamen are satisfied! The fleet sails on
Thcsday!
Th the eight on the Lord
(;cmissioners of the Admiralty. We
the Seamen and Marine belonging to
his Majesty's fleet now being at
Spithead, have received with the
utmost satisfaction, and with hearts
full of gratitude the bountiful augmen-
tation of Pay and I'rovisions which
your Lordships have been pleased to
signify, shall take place in future in his
Majesty's Royal Navy by our order,
which has been read to us this morn-
ing, by the command of Admiral
Iridport.
Thur l.ordships having thus generous-
ly taken the prayer of our several peti-
tions into your serious consideration,
you have given satisiliction to every
loyal and well disposed seamen and
marine belonging to his Majesty's
fleets; and from the assurance which
your I ordships have given us respect-
ing such other grievances as we
thought right to lay before you, we are
thoroughly convinced, should any real
grievance or other cause of complaint
arise in future, and the same be laid
before your Lordships, in regular man-
ner, we are perfectly satisfied that your
Lordships will pay every attention to a
number of brave men, who ever have
and ever will be true and faithful to
their King and (:c,untr
But we beg leave to remind your
I ordships, that it is a firm resolution,
that until the flour in port be removed,
the vegetables and pensions augment-
ed, the grievances of private ships be
redressed, an Act passed, and his
Majesty's gracious pardon for the fleet
now lying at Spithead be granted, that
the Fleet will not lift an anchor; and
this is the total and final answer.
br	 'tn
24,1. 1
The teolutioti were then, finally sub-
mitted to the I)elegates on board the
Queen Charlotte, of whom thirty were
then present on board. lhey also unan-
imously expressed themselves satisfied,
when at the moment that the business
was on the point of being happily
adjusted with the concurrence of all
parties; the remaining four delegates
who were absent, came on board the
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Queen Charlotte. and having heard the
resolutions read, they
 declared them-
selves satisfied with them, but at the
same time started an objection, which
was immediately adopted by all their
associates. •fhis was, that his Majesty
should sign a pardon, forgiving all that
had passed, and promising that there
should be no retrospect; and they
insisted that this should be made by the
King himself.
From these unpleasant circumstances,
we are obliged to draw our attention to
the disctmtents at Portsmouth, which
we hope by this time completely set-
tled.
In respect to the point urged by the
Delegates, of obtaining the King's
Pardon, it is supposed to have taken its
rise from a circumstance which hap-
pened on board the Culloden man of
war, where there was a mutiny, and
some of the ringleaders were after-
wards hanged.
The Public will have observed, that
throughout this business, we have cau-
tiously avoided all kind of comment, as
the business was of that nature that
none could have been made which
would either have been pleasant to our
own feelings, or to those of our read-
ers. ! have deprecated all the loose
and indecent sarcasms which have
been thrown out by some of or con-
temporaries, rather with an air of exul-
taflon; and we must also condemn
either the ignorance or the affectation
of it that has marked two of the l)aily
Papers (the True Briton and Sun),
which have very indecently been assur-
ing the Public, day by day, since
Thesday last, from the highest authori-
ty, that the business was happily settled
to the satisfaction of all parties.
in the above letter from our
(:OrwspOfldent at Spithead, it will be
observed that he refers to enclosures;
these are the papers which follow. The
answer to the Ghost of Kempenfield,
whose letter was also sent to us for
publication, is so far important, as it
shows the spirit of the sailors at
Portsmouth, and is evidenth Written by
some able pen, which has probably
served them on other occasions.
After the business was concluded, the
l)elegares wrote a very respectful letter
tolmd Bridport declaring, that there
was no officer in the British navy under
whom they would serve with more
cheerfulness than his Lordship.
According to intelligence received yes-
terday the Thlegraph, we have the
pleasure to state, that Lord l3tidport's
fleet dropped down yesterday morning
to St. I lelen's; but the wind was not fair
for the ships to put to sea.
1c .Morimg Qfrouid
Tsesda,. 25,-lpriII97
retail all the mischievous reports of
the Platforms at Portsmouth, and col-
lect all the stones which were magni-
fied on every repetition, would only
serve to sow the seeds of future jeal-
ousy and discord in the fleet, and pre-
vent the union to which the natural
generositY of the hearts of our seamen
is inclined.
We deprecate also the lamentations of
those who pretend to see in this great
event, a revolution in the system of
British discipline. This whining cant
may make the change which they affect
to deplore; since it is an acknowledge-
ment of weakness that would engender
and animate disobedience. Rut let us
view it without prejudices, and we shall
view it without alarm. The grievances
must have been severely felt and long
suffered that could give rise to a con-
federacy so general, so systematic, so
well combined, and Sc) temperately
conducted. Its management is a proof
that it was not the effect of sudden
passion - nor was the feeling local. In
what new light then, does this event
serve U) make us consider the British
Seamen. Are we to learn from this, that
they are patient and forbearing, but
when roused, firm, constant and
unconquerable. Ihank God, it was
always their character, and it will con-
tinue to be their character. This event
has created no change; except, as we
have said before, that it will serve as a
useful admonition to Government not
to fight the grievances of the seamen
when presented in the prudent and
humble guise of a petition without sig-
natures. It is a painful talk for pride to
grant to remonstrance what was
refused to prayer.
That part c)f the sailors' request which
respects their being put on the pension
list, and the pension increased, accords
exactly with the opinions of the
Ministers' ablest supporters. They are
only sutprized the petitioners say noth-
ing about reversions. We are gravely
assured that so far from the Ministers
being to blame on any account of the
mutiny at Portsmouth, "the bursting
forth of this mutiny was as much
unforeseen and unexpected by his
MAJESTY's Ministers as it was by the
rest of the communitt There can be
no doubt of this. His Majesty's
Ministers have the singular merit of
having conducted the nation from
prosperitY to unexampled calamity; and
through all the maxes of a most disas-
trous war, without exerting an iota of
foesight. or ever indeed supposing that




I louse of I 'ords
be supposed to be anxious for some
information respecting the rumours
which have lately been in circulation.
Whether those rumours were false, or
whether they were founded in fact, he
was unable to determine; but of course
he concluded they were false because
he had no authority to state them to be
true. Their l.ordships, must have
known, through the medium of the
public prints, and popular report, that
three very great and alarming events
were said to have taken place during
the recess. Ihe first was a separate
Negotiation for l'eace between his
Imperial Majesty and the French
Republic which must be impossible,
since no person in Administration had
chosen to apprise their IA)rdships. The
second was the report of increased dis-
turbances in Ireland, which must be
equally erroneous; and the other was a
sort of detailed and circumstantial
account of the Insurrection of the
Seamen on board of his Majesty's fleet
at Portsmouth, which must be equally
untrue, or their l.ordships would have
been officially acquainted with it, and
informed of the measures adopted to
restore peace and subordinaticm.
The Lord Chancellor informed the
Noble l)uke, that he could not speak
with more authority than himself, con-
cerning the points which he had stated.
In respect to the first, the Negotiation
of the Emperor, he had only seen the
account of it this morning in a public
print; but as he understood a Mail had
arrived this morning from the
Ccmtinent, he conjectured that the
Government must, by this time, have
received a denial or a confirmation of
it. In regard to Ireland, he did not hear
that, unless with a very few exceptions,
it was in any other than its usual state.
And, in respect to the Seamen at
Portsmouth, he believed he could state,
upon authority, that every discontent
had subsided, and that the sailors had
cheerfully
 returned U) their dur lie
excused the attendance of Ministers,
not only because he conceived they
could not have any idea that the Noble
Duke would have made any observa-
tions on the first day after the recess,
which was not allotted to any particular
business, but because he supposed they
might be occupied otherwise, in conse-
quence of the arrival of the Mail.
Iomorrcsaç however, he trusted the
Noble l)uke would receive every prop-
er information.
I louse of Cc)mmcms
Mr. hut rose to take notice of a recent
event of the greatest magnitude and
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importance - an event to which the
attention of even body was directed at
the present moment. Gentlemen
would easily perceive that he alluded to
the conduct of the Seamen on board
his Majesty's fleet at Portsmouth. I Ic
knew nothing at all of their transac-
turns which took place there, except
what he had read in the public Papers;
but as his Majesty's Ministers must be
in possession of better information on
the subject, he thought it necessary
therefore to ask, whether they intended
to communicate such information ci,
the I Iuue, and how soon?
bt lrnfbon QtljroiñcTL
25-2,-lti/ !9
'lire following is a faithful and literal
copy of the Rules and Orders
observed by the Sailors during the late
Mutny:
Rules and Orders
1. Every ship shall diligently keep a
quarter watch, and even man found
below in his watch shall be severely
punished.
2. Every ship shall give three cheers,
morning and evening.
3. No woman shall be permitted to go
on shore from any ship, but as many
COOIC in as please.
4. .iny person attempting to bring
liquor into the ship, or any person
found drunk, shall be severely pun-
ished.
5. The greatest attention shall be paid
U) Officers' orders; any person failing
in the respect due them, or neglecting
their duty, shall be severely punished.
6. Every Seaman and Marine shall take
an Oath of Fidelity, not only to thc.m-
selves but to the fleet in general.
7. No ship shall lift their anchors to
proceed from this port, until the
desires of the fleet be satisfied.
8. That there be no liberty given from
ship to ship till all are settled.
No private letters to be sent on shore.
be *lornini
2 l;ni I
.'idditional lax on Newspapers and
.%dvertisements:
Pitt The next article will, I am per-
suaded, engage something more than
verbal discussion out of doors; it is a
Tax upon a vehicle which will be the
means of conveying to the whole
country tomorrow what I am saying
this evening It is a Tax which will nei-
ther be thought unfair nor impolite,
considering the facility and prevalence
of this vehicle, considering that it is a
luxury so generally felt; that it is a taste
so deeply rooted, as not to be shaken
by such an addition; considering all
these circumstances, and that it is an
article of luxury, I have nor much rea-
son to apprehend this further Tax will
be much disliked in this I louse. The
Duty now is 'Iwo-pence on each
Newspaper, the price c,f the Paper is
I'our.pence half-penn In the last rise
that took place such beneficial regula-
tions were made in supplying the
Paper; and with respect to discount
that there can be no reason for the
Proprietors, or Editors to complain of
being injured, or to make advance of
P0CC beyond this, new l)utv; I propose
to make the additional Duty Three
I Ialf-pvnce on each Paper; the produce
will be 114,0001; besides this, I suggest
some further additions and modifica-
tions of the l)utv on .dvertisements,
there is now no distinction in the duty
between an advertisement of three
lines, for which six shillings are paid.
and an advertisement of any length
which rises to the dignity of pounds.
Neither is there any distinction with
respect to the part of the paper where
advertisements are inserted. I shall
therefore propose something like a
proportion, which will product
20,0001.
Iormerlv Ministers thought an addi-
tional Duty of a I lalenny as a great
rise in the price of Newspapers, and an
additional Tax of Sixpence on the
Advertisement, as sufficient for one
advance. Now they clap three half-
pence on the stamp, propose a regula-
rion, and increase of duty on the
advertisements, of which we cannot
yet form a proper idea; but of tis the
public may rest assured, that the price
of Newspapers will be very consider-
ably increased, notwithstanding the
imprudent assertion of Mr. Pitt that
they would not be entitled to raise the
price more than the duty to be levied
by the Government. 'We first ask on
behalf of the newsmen; when the
price of a Newspaper was three-pence,
they then had a profit of one halfien-
ny on every paper, and one paper on
every quire; will not the doubling the
price the price of newspapers entitle
them to double the profit? Will not the
necessity of employing a double capi-
ad, and of running a double risk, both
be the Newsmen and the Newspaper
Proprietor, justify in each the doubling
their profits? It certainly will, and so
the Public will find it.
Another ground, and perhaps a fairer
ground upon which to put the rise in
the price of Newspapers, is this: On
account of the increased expense of
Newspapers, there cannot remain a
doubt that many persons will discon-
tinue them. This tax, 1w dropping one
half the customers, will reduce the
profit; and how are the l'roprietors to
indemnify themselves, but by raising
their profits in proportion U) the 'Fax?
We argue this way at present, for no
other purpose than that of shewing the
Public the fallacy, the impudence of
Mr. Pitts assertion, that the Newsmen
would not be entitled to raise the price
of the Paper more than the new Duty.
It is not our wish to raise the price of
Papers upon the Public because we
know the dearer they are, the narrower
is their circulation, and the more con-
fined is the information of the I'ublic;
this is Mr. Pitt's object; he wishes to
Tax the press so heavily that none but
his rich, corrupt, l'hick and Thin
Supporters may be able to read a
Newspaper. 'l'hese present taxes will
most certainly rather reduce than
increase the Revenue. 'I'he number of
Newspapers sold, and Advertisements
issued will fall in proposition to the tax;
and this will accomplish Mr. Pitt's
wishes, which are manifestly to smoth-
er the liberty of the Press, as he finds
that his ruinous career cannot be pur-
sued while it eIt5.
Th,oyda. '.l',j/I797
Budget -
I Ic had estimated the Ordinary and
Extraordinary of the Navy for the
year, at	 12,661,000
Of this sum he had provided for c)pen-
ing the Supply befc,re Christmas,
10,161,000
I Ic had proposed to take credit in addi-
tion to this of	 3,000,000
Making the service of the year for the
Navy	 13,161,000
By this credit of 3,000,000L he made
ample provision for every possible
exertion, and the report of the
Q,mmittec showed the coincidence of
their opinions tc) be as close as in
accounts of such magnitude could be
expected, for their estimate amounted
to 12,935,496. 'Ihere was, however, still
a further sum which was not included
in this estimate, as the value had not yet
been ascertained, but which prc)bably
might amount to about 800,000L 'l'his
was the charge on neutral cargoes. It
was also to be observed, that part of
the Navy Bills was carried forward, and
which gave him a sum applicable to
this service, be which the vote of cred-
it applicable to it would be 1,800,0001.
instead of 3,000,0001. In this account
of the Nav; he had not made any pro-
vision for the further sum that might
be required for the pay and mainte-
nance of the Seamen, in consequence
of the recent event that had happened
at Portsmouth. The reason that he had
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not included this sum, was, that it
would make the subject of a specific
discussion upon au early day, and as the
magnitude of the sum would not be
material, he thought it better to leave it
altogether to that discussion.
e
F,ida). 28lp,i/1797
Mr. Pitt calls a new duty of three half-
pence on a Newspaper a trifling
increase; when his predecessors have
not, in the course of 50 years found it
expedient to lay on more than a pro-
gressive duty of 2d. We believe the
Public will think this trifling increase
rather more than flier choose to pay.
V know not who have been Mr. Pitt's
advisers in proposing an additional tax
of three half-pence on every
N.wspaper; but we will venture to say
and to prove, that they must have been
meat grossly ignorant of the fact,
when they instructed him to say, that
the Proprietors had no equitable claim
to an increase in their price. We con-
sider this observation both ungenerous
and unfair.
.'ts it is evident thnwghout the whole
of this investigation, that Mr. Pitt can
only have consulted one party, who
know nothing of the detail of a
Newspaper, we shall submit to the
I lonourable Gentleman one calcula-
lion only, which is so plain, as to be
unanswerable:-
lle present daily sale of the limes is
known to be between 4 and 5,000
Newspapers. lor the salce of perspicu-
ity, we will make our calculation on
4,000 only; and it will hold good in
prnportlon to every other Paper.
The News vendors arc now allowed by
the Proprietors of every Newspapers;
two sheets in every quire, viz. 26 for
every 24 papers sold. The stamp-duty
on two papers in every quire in 4,000
Papers daily, at the old duty of 2d.
amounts to a loss of 7801. a year,
besides the value of the paper. An
additional duty of I 1/2d. will occa-
sion a farther loss of 585L in this one
instance only, for which there is not,
according to Mr. Pitt's view of the sub-
ject, to be the smallest remuneration to
the Proprietors. Is it possible that any-
thing can be so unjust?
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CHAPTER FOUR: The London Incident
On 8 May 1797, three weeks after the fleet first refused to weigh anchor and one day af
ter its second refusal, the opposition Morning Herald offered some pointed observations
about the causes and probable consequences of the mutiny. They took the form of a
public letter to Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty. It began:
My Lord, the statements I have hitherto made, of the probable consequences of so
relaxed a state of our marine discipline, have been too prophetic of the calamity
which has now befallen the country. The revolutionary triumph of the PORTSMOUTH
MUTINEERS has completed the catalogue of its misfortunes. That a confederacy of
such magnitude should have been planned, and organised into a controlling power,
without the knowledge of Government, as to suppose a new case in the history of
human events.1
The letter appeared under the banner 'The Naval Register The Nation's Best Hope'
which proclaimed it to be the fifteenth in a series written by Lord John Russell, the out-
spoken brother of the outspoken Duke of Bedford. His theme was familiar to critics
both of and within the navy. Cuthbert Coilingwood, who was with Mediterranean fleet
during the mutiny, suggested something similar in his observations on the mutiny:
For this fleet is not yet republican; we have no delegates to determine what our
movements shall be, or whether we shall move at all. The state of the fleet in Eng-
land has given me the most poignant grief. How unwise in the officers, or how im-
politic in the administration, that did not attend to, and redress the first complaints of
grievance, and not allow the seamen to throw off their obedience and to fell what
power there is in so numerous a body. What is conceded to them is not received as a
provision which justice makes them, but as what they have extorted, and they now
know how they may extort, what in justice they have not the same claim to.2
The similarities were superficial. By attaching alarmist rhetoric to his observations, Rus-
sell obscured his criticism. This would seem counterproductive if he had anything useful
to say about naval discipline or what might be done to resolve the crisis. Instead, Russell
recklessly pursued a partisan campaign to undermine confidence in government. The
mutiny merely provided another example of Pitt's supposed shortcomings. He ignored
the legitimacy of the seamen's complaints and the neglect of their petitions. He de-
nianded censure of government 'Whether the want of vigilance in preventing, or the
concession which has now sanctified this treason, demands the severest censure, I shall
not at present determine.' In his only mention of the seamen's grievances, he rhetorically
'Orade &Pub&Adve,iiser, 8 May 1797
2 E Hughes, ed., The Private Correipondence ofAdmiral Lord Co/ling,od (London NRS, 1957), 82-83
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asked why they had not been 'redressed as a boon' before they could be 'extorted as a
right'?
Russell added currency, if not support, to speculation that Howe's resignation on 8 April
was connected with the crisis. By suggesting the rumours were 'circulated with much of-
ficial industiy', he implied Howe had become a ministerial scapegoat. The Obserir also
invented a defence for Howe that brought the blame back to government:
Lord Howe has been censured as having, by his neglect to the Petitions of the Navy,
been instrumental to the recent disorders. We are, however, assured, that no blame
should attach to the Noble Earl; that he repeatedly urged, both the Admiralty Board
and Mr. Pitt, the justice of the Seamen's claims, their worth, and the consequences to
be apprehended from resisting the prayer of their petitions.3
Like Russell, they based their assurances on assumptions, rather than any knowledge of
the facts.
Howe's situation was untenable. He was a legend, but he had his faults. He rarely spoke
without being misunderstood. 4 Throughout his distinguished career, he managed to con-
fuse, confound or alienate several respected officers. 'Howe was an inarticulate man, who
may have become interested in signalling systems because he had such difficulty con-
veying his intentions in any other way.' 5 An admirer described him as 'too forbearing'.6
Laughton quipped he was 'a man universally acknowledged to be unfeeling in his nature,
ungracious in his manner, and who, upon all occasions, discovers a wonderful attach-
ment to the dictates of his own perverse, impenetrable disposition'.7 In the fleet mutiny
of 1783, Howe negated the good effect of meeting every ship by promising each crew
they would be the first to be paid off. According to Lt Phillip Beaver 'After the battle of
the 1st June, Lord Howe hinted, if he did not actually promise, he would endeavour to
get the seamen's pay increased.'8 Beaver, who remained with the fleet in 1797, added:
several petitions have been sent out from the seamen of the fleet to Lord Howe,
requesting this increase of pay. Similar ones were sent by the seamen to the lords of
Observer, 23 April 1797
4 J G Bullocke commented 'Those who have come across Lord Howe's letters ... know that their amazing
circumlocution of style was matched in his conversation'. Bu]locke, Saüorr' Rebellion: a century of naval mutinies
(London: Lyre & Spotliswoode, 1938), 229
5 N Tracy, Nelson's Battles: TbeAr of Victory in theAge of Sail (London: Chatham, 1995), 73
6 Jdy Bourchier, Memoir of the Life ofAdnural Sir Edward Codrington (London: Longmans, Green, 1873), 32
DNB, x, 97
8J Laughton, ed., Naval Miscel/a,y I (London: NRS, 1902), 408-409; E Hallam Moorhouse, ed., Letters of the
English Seamen: 1587-1 808 (London: Chapman & I-Jail, 1910), 180
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the Admiralty, and others I believe to the minister; to none have they received any
answer; they have been treated with contemptuous silence.9
A banging Sense of Responsibility
Journalists were slow to develop a sense of responsibility to their readers. The possibility
that his readers might include the seamen he condemned either did not neither occur or
did not matter to Russell.'° He attacked without considering the consequences. In pub-
lishing his letters, the Morning Herald fed public opinion, shaping it according to political
dictates, rather than reflecting it according to readers' tastes or needs. With circulation
limited by taxes and technology, most newspaper publishers assumed they had no
choice. 11 Survival depended less on the sales than subsidies, bribes, paid insertions and
advertising, much of it coming from government or politically controlled sources. oppo-
sition saw newspapers as a way to ensure their attacks on government received a wider
audience. Like the man he criticised, Russell ignored the reasonableness of the seamen's
demands, the restraint with which they behaved and, indeed, the volatility of the situa-
tion. He closed with a statement that confirmed the delegates' worst fears:
And now, my Lord, it may reasonably be asked, in what state of security is placed the
BRITISH NAVY, in consequence of this degrading submission made by its rulers? The
delegate mutmeers still remain on board their respective ships, and you have neither
ventured to separate, nor remove them. Should it be necessary, on any future occa-
sion, to attempt to enforce punishment on the person of Mr. JOYCE, or remove him,
or his co-equalizers from their respective ships, will not the delegate flag of defiance
be rehoisted? Will it be safe to trust the fleet, so commanded off the enemy's coast?
You, my Lord, know well enough the effect of power gained by a departure from
public principle, to decide whether men, so intoxicated with its extorted sweets, are
likely to return with cheerfulness to the sober duties of dependence, and subjection?
or whether the people of England can rely on seamen so transmuted, for their future
defence and protection?12
9 Moorhouse, 180
° The editors showed both restraint and a strange sense of timing when they added the following note to
Russell's letter We lament that we had not the power of givmg the above an earlier publication'.
H Until the introduction of Frederick Koenig's steam-driven presses in 1814 enabled The Times to increase
print production from 250 to 1,100 copies per hour, newspaper circulation rarely exceeded 2,000 copies
per day (eight hours of press time). G Cranfield, The Press and Sociqy: From Caxton to Noiihcliffi (London:
Longman, 1978 , 152; A Wadsworth, 'Newspaper Circulation 1800 1954', Transactions of the Manchester Statis-
ticalSociqy, 9 March 1955
' 2MO,UNS Herald, 8 May 1797
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Four years before Russell accused Pitt of entering a war of panic to protect 'persons of
property' and prevent democratic principles from taking root in England. 13
 His views
had changed, but his view of the circumstances accounted for the apparent inconsis-
tency. He saw the mutiny as inherently political. Again, the seamen's grievances were ir-
relevant. As the king's servants, they were not entitled to the same rights as the king's
subjects. Ironically, his view was shared by the object of his scorn, the Admiralty. Of
course, while publicly sharing his concern over the threat to naval discipline and privately
agreeing it posed a threat to established order, government could hardly blame them-
selves. Thus, rather than neglect, a want of vigilance, a lack of resolve or a pusillanimous
compliance, they invented Jacobin springs or designing men and held a licentious press
responsible.
With the mutiny seemingly settled and the public's attention diverted, the lords of the
Admiralty focused their attention on the restoration of discipline. Throughout the mu-
tiny, they were far more concerned with restoring discipline than redressing grievances.
On I May they provided the fleet's officers with further instruction:
Whereas, from the disposition lately shown by the seamen belonging to several of his
Majesty's ships, it is become highly necessary that the strictest attention should be
paid by all Officers in his Majesty's naval service, not only to their own conduct, but
to the conduct of those who may be under their orders: the more effectual to insure a
subordination and discipline, and to prevent, as far as may be, all discontent among
the seamen, your Lordship is hereby directed to be particularly careful to enforce, so
far as the same may depend on you, and to give orders to the Officers employed un-
der your command to enforce, all the regulations for the preservation of discipline
and good order in his Majesty's navy, which are at present established for that pur-
pose; and you are more especially to give the following directions, i14
The instructions announced the end of the fleet's relaxed habits. Five of the seven in-
structions related to the duties and responsibilities of officers. They addressed petty tyr-
annies and abuses of authority not mentioned in the seamen's petitions. Officers were
enjoined to enforce existing regulations to hold frequent musters, to recite the Articles of
War to their crews once a month and to remain on board ship while in port. They were
admonished not to reserve the better portions of meat, wine or spirits for themselves, or
to allow surgeons to embezzle the seamen's medicines or necessaries. Captains were en-
couraged 'to be very careful to rate the ships' companies according to the merits of the
'3 L Harcourt, ed., The Diaries & Corrrspondence of the Regbt Honourabk George Rose (London: Bentley, 1860), I,
168
ADM2/133, Instructions, 1 May 1797, London Chronicle, 9-11 May 1797; Mornrng Post, 10 May 1797
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men, in order that those who may not be deserving thereof may not receive the pay of
able or ordinary seamen'. They were instructed to 'see that the arms and ammunition
belonging to the marines be constantly kept in good order, and fit for their immediate
service, as well in harbour as at sea'. Finally, they were instructed 'to be particularly at-
tentive to the conduct of the men under their command, and that they be ready, on the
first appearance or mutiny, to use the most vigorous means to suppress it, and to bring
the ring leaders to punishment'.
The Morning Post later insisted these instructions bore 'no retrospect to any proceeding
antecedent to the time it was given,' but were calculated 'only to prevent disturbances
and discontent in future'.' 5
 However, on the morning of 7 May, Admiral Sir John Col-
poys assumed he was acting under Admiralty instructions when he ordered his marines
to fire upon his crew.
Misrepresentations or Further Indiscretions?
On 8 May the Morning Herald was among the first to announce the renewal of the mutiny.
It indicated that it was now attended 'with the most alarming violence'. Although the an-
nouncement appeared below Russell's diatribe, the editors apparently saw no inconsis-
tency in now criticising government for not satisfying the seamen's demands and bring-
ing the matter before Parliament more expeditiously.
The discontents which produced this unfortunate event originated, we understand, in
a supposition that the promises held out to the Sailors by the Board of Admiralty
were not meant to be fulfilled by Government; which no doubt was founded not
only upon the unaccountable neglect of Ministers, in not bringing the affair immedi-
ately before Parliament, but also upon the language made use of in the House of
Lords, a few evenings since, by one of his Majesty's Secretaries of State.16
Ministerial delays and procrastination quickly became the cause celèbre of the opposition
press. However, Lord Grenville was a curious choice for criticism. His only contribution
to the discussion was to plead with the peers not to discuss a matter of such delicacy. As
a member of government, he could be criticised, while those who actually made the
damaging remarks could not.
15 MorningPost, 10 May 1797
16 MormngHera/d, 8May 1797
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The exchange began on 3 May when the Duke of Bedford rose to ask 'whether any of
his Majesty's Ministers had it in charge, from his Majesty, to make any communication
upon the recent important transactions which had occurred in the Marine department?'17
According to the Morning Cb,vnicle, Spencer responded, 'he had it not in charge to make
any communication to the House, nor did he foresee, that any communication would be
made upon that subject.' Subtle variations were introduced in transcribing and editing his
remarks. Thus the Morning Post added a note of arrogance by suggesting Spencer said, 'he
had it not in command from his Majesty to make any communication to the House on
that head, nor did he believe he should have.' 18
 The Trne Brton removed the sting and
transferred the responsibility to an unimpeachable source by reporting, 'he had it not in
Command, from His Majesty to make any communication to the House on the subject,
nor did it appear to him as likely that he should be ordered to do so.'19 The Times simply
reported: 'he had nothing to specific at present, nor had he his Majesty's commands to
bring the late transactions of the fleet at Spithead before that House.' 2° While Bedford's
question was rhetorical, Spencer's refusal, particularly as it was presented in opposition
newspapers, appeared to abrogate a ministerial responsibility. As First Lord of the Admi-
ralty, Spencer was required to give the members of Parliament 'the opportunity of ob-
taining from him in person an account and, if necessary, a defence both of his own ad-
ministrative acts and of the naval policy of the Government'.21
If Spencer's reticence aroused the seamen's suspicions, Lord Howe and the Duke of
Clarence's ill-advised candour confirmed their worst fears. Howe, presumably still in full
uniform, rose to defend his honour. While offering to postpone his comments, he pro-
ceeded to say what nearly everyone thought, but had the sense not to say in public. The
Morning Chnrnicb reported:
He expressed a wish, however, that for the sake of the service, the business had
never brought under discussion, for the Legislature would be brought by it into a
most delicate situation. Either they must approve of transactions which there was no
man who did not wish had never happened, or they must withhold that approbation,
and thus acknowledge that they have made concessions under the pressure of the
moment which they think improper to confirm.
' 7 Mormn Chrornc/e, 4 May 1797
18 MornrnPost, 4May 1797
' True Bnton, 4May 1797
20 The Timeç4May 1797
21 Ofy, The Admiralty', Manner's Mirror, xxiii (1937), 22
Morning Chronicle, 4May 1797
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Again transcriptions and interpretations varied. The Morning Post reported Howe as en-
treating
their Lordships to be extremely cautious how they entered into any discussion on
the subject. He begged them to consider that if they came to any resolution, approv-
ing of the demands of the Sailors, it would materially affect the future discipline of
the Fleet1
 by conveying an acquiescence to their conduct. If they disapproved it by
any resolution, it would convey to the Seamen of the fleet an idea that the promises
which had been made to them were not meant to be performed.
Irrespective of its phrasing, Howe's comment should not have been made, certainly not
in a forum which guaranteed publication. That he added 'all engagements made to them
should be punctually complied with' in no way compensated for the enormity of his er-
ror and was, in any case, lost in the ensuing controversy.
Grenville merely tried to limit the damage. Ignoring what Howe said, he 'agreed entirely
with the Noble Earl of the inexpediency and impolicy of bringing the subject under dis-
cussion, and entreated their Lordships to allow matters to rest as they were'. 24 The Duke
of Clarence also 'rose to deplore further discussion', but tactlessly added:
It was a question that deeply involved the material point of naval discipline. It ap-
peared to him, in the arrangement that had taken place, ... with a view to the funda-
mental rules of discipline, to be improper to have complied with the demands of the
seamen, however the concession might have been politic or proper in other points of
view.
According to Patton, his comments 'tended to excite a doubt whether the demands of
the seamen should have been granted'.26 Howe rose in appreciation, but again said the
wrong thmg
what appeared to him to be the question, in a Parliamentary discussion of the
business, was, Will you agree to the terms made by the Admiralty with the Seamen,
or not? If the terms were fully ratified, it would virtually be giving a sanction to their
conduct. If refused, it would show the Seamen that no reliance was to be placed on
the promises of Government77
Morning Post, 4May 1797
24 Morning Cb,vnide, 4May 1797
Star,4 May 1797
P Patton, 'Account of the Mutinies at Spithead & St Helen's', Papers on Naval Affairs (Edinburgh: Murray
& Cochiane, 1807), 7
True Bñton, 4May 1797
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Following such statements, it required no misrepresentations for the seamen to suspect
'the promises held out ... by the Board of Admiralty were not meant to be fulfilled by
Government'. Captain Moore commented on 9 May:
The pretext for this new outrage appears to be the manner the subject was discussed
in the House of Peers on the motion of the Duke of Bedford, which created doubts
in the minds of the seamen lest the concessions granted them by the Admiralty might
be negatived by the Parliament.
The seamen were well informed of the discussion as it was thoroughly, though variously,
reported by the press. Gardner advised Nepean:
The Public Newspapers are read by almost everybody in the fleet, and the speeches
contained in that of Thursday the 4th instant said to be delivered on Wednesday last
by sundry personages therein named on the subject of the late Mutiny have been ea-
gerly perused, and have been productive of incredible mischief, by misleading & poi-
soning the minds of the Seamen who I believe are fully convinced (from the
speeches of that day said to be delivered in the House of Lords) that it is not the in-
tention of Government to pay any attention to their petitions; and several of this
ship's company have told me, that they have been written to, and informed, that their
Bill (as they term it) is thrown out?
Patton observed:
The seamen had clearly seen their own power, and they knew that at any time, on the
subjects which interested their whole body, they could call that power into action.
The newspapers that contained the conversation in the House of Peers were no
sooner circulated in the fleet at St Helen's, than a considerable fermentation was
produced in the minds of the seamen. They concluded that there was a least some
hesitation in fulfilling the promises which had been made by the Board of Admiralty.
They looked to the House of Commons as the only branch of the Legislature which
could dispose of the public money, and they conceived that nothing was certain until
the law sanctioning the promise which had been made to them had passed in Parlia-
ment. It is indeed probable that they might even doubt if Administration possessed
the power to carry their promises into effect: or they might be led to imagine that the
influence of the Ministers would not be exerted to procure the concurrence of Par-
liament, and their demands thus fall to the ground. I do not say that there was the
least probability of any of these things happening; but uninformed seamen will be apt
to determine erroneously and rashly, as other men do when they are pretend to de-
cide on subjects of which they have not acquired a sufficient knowledge.3°
Government and its supporters insisted the second outbreak of mutiny was 'wholly, or in
a great degree, to be ascribed to misrepresentations' of these remarks in newspapers.3'
MorningHera1d 8May 1797
PRO ADMI 107, Gardner to Nepean, 8May 1797
°P Patton, 'Account of the Mutinies at Spithead & St Helen's', Papers on Naval Afcths (Edinburgh: Murray
& Cochrane, 1807), 8
' London Chivaick, 6 9 May 1797. Sheridan artfully responded 'the second discontents were wholly to be
ascribed to the procrastination of Ministers'.
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The Times argued such misrepresentations were deliberate efforts 'to inculcate a notion
abroad, that the Administration of the country was disposed to evade the promises made
by Earl Spencer to the seamen'. 32 Its version of 'what had passed in the House of Lords'
made no mention of Howe's question; and quoted the royal duke as saying:
He entertained the highest opinion of the abilities and conduct of the Noble Admi-
ral; at the same time that he could not but deprecate a discussion in that House of
the late discontents of the fleet. It might do much harm, and could be productive of
little, if any, good.33
To avoid misrepresenting the aged admiral or the future king, The Times chose not to rep .-
resent them at allY' Readers and historians were left to wonder why there had been so
many calls for silence in the House of Lords on 4 May. In any case, the calls came too
late.
Fleet S:ghtings
The first news of the second outbreak of mutiny was again coupled with a fleet sighting.
The Morning Herald reported:
This morning a cutter arrived from Sir John B Warren. It is stated that the French
Fleet had worked out into the outer road of Brest, consisting of 17 sail of the line and
a number of transports, which appeared ready for sailing at a moment's notice; in
consequence, a message by the Telegraph was conveyed to the Admiralty, and an an-
swer returned on the cutter's going to St. Helen's with the Admiralty orders, the sail-
ors, instead of obeying, immediately manned the yards and cheered as heretofore:
soon after, boats were seen plying from ship to ship, and every mind on shore is agi-
tated with the most poignant alarm and suspense, as no direct communication is
permitted.35
Other opposition papers confirmed, that while the sighting had not caused, it certainly
had triggered the second outbreak of mutiny at St Helens M The sighting first appeared
two days earlier in the Star and contained enough detail to identify its source:
The Aigus Lugger, commanded by Lieutenant Clark, arrived Tuesday morning at
Falmouth, with dispatches from SirJ B Warren, whom he left cruizing off Brest. On
the 29th nit. they spoke with an American vessel, which left Brest the night before,
32 The Times, 9 May 1797
Ibid. 4 May 1797
3' While the official version of what was said conftrrns the damaging remarks, the impressions created by
newspapers were all that mattered.
3' Morning Herald, 8 May 1797. The same paragraph appeared the next day in government's London
Chronide.
3'Morning Post, 9 May 1797; Star, 9 May 1797
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who informed them of seventeen sail of the line, and several frigates, lying in the
outer road, ready to sail; and that at Brest, and the country adjacent, they were
crowded with troops ready to embark on transports.37
On 21 April Sir John Borlase Warren wrote to Lord Spencer:
I have sent in the Aius Lugger with the Statement of the Enemy's Force, obtained
by Captain Keats,38
 and which I believe is perfectly exact and near the Truth. I un-
derstand upon convening with him, that only two of the Line of Battle Ships have
their Sails bent; and that according to his opinion, they seem not quite ready, but
waiting for some Event or Orders.
I cannot however think that they are much to be trusted, for the last time the Ships
bent their Sails altogether and after forming at Anchor in different Divisions, soon
put to Sea. It seems the Transports do not appear arranged in any order. They talk of
having expected the Spaniards, but are not a little doubtful upon that subject.39
The next day later he wrote to Nepean: 'The Fleet, it is understood, is undoubtedly to
come out.'40
 On 1 May he recorded his 'Observations made on the force of the enemy in
Brest Road':
18 Sail of the Line, two of them getting their topmasts through
6 or 7 Frigates
Most of the above ships have their sails bent, and are apparently ready for sea. It is
reported that there are one hundred sail of Transports in the Harbour. Six Frigates
are reported to be fitting, to come out after His Majesty's Squadron under my com-
mand.4'
Warren attached a letter from the captain of a cutter in his squadron, Phillip Durham. 42
 h
was he, not Clark, who had interviewed the American merchantman. He learned from
John Pntchain, master of Three Sisters who left Brest on 28 April:
The French have fourteen Sail of the Line including one 3 Decker with her Topmasts
pointed through in the Outer Road, two of which have their sails bent and are appar-
ently ready for Sea, and ten Frigates. One three Decker they put into dock yesterday;
and another is rigging in the inner harbour. The ships in general are so deep in the
water as to bring the upper part of their Copper Line just above the water.
Pritchain added the French had 'a very considerable number of Transports equipping in
the inner harbours'. The American suggested:
' Star, 6 May 1797; Observer, 7May 1797
Richard Goodwin Keats, captain of the frigate Galatea, part of Warren's inner squadron.
BL Add! MS 35.197.116, Warren to Spencer, La Pomone off Ushant April 21st 1797. He referred to
General Hoche's expedition to Bantry Bay on 17 December 1796.
4° PRO ADM1/107, Warren to Nepean, 22 April 1797
41 PRO ADM1 107, Warren to Nepean, 3 May 1797. Pellew's inner squadron was similarly lured away at
the beginning of the Bantry Bay expedition.
was Kempenfeldt's signals lieutenant when Ri'?yaI Geo,e sank.
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• they are preparing them for a grand Expedition, as there is reported to be one
hundred thousand of the military in Brest and its environs. They expect at Brest a
considerable force from Spain and Toulon, none having as yet arrived from those
quarters.43
Again Warren warned Nepean: 'I rather think the above number [eighteen] are in the
Road notwithstanding the intelligence received from the American.' He also insisted
most, not just two, of the ships observed had their sails bent and ignored the American's
comment 'they will not be all ready in eight or nine weeks.'
However, the Morning Heralds 'Letters from Portsmouth' took the news a disturbing step
further. One reported 'the Brest Fleet is at Sea, with a vast number of transports, troops,
&c.' Another announced the seamen of the Channel fleet had 'declared they will not go
out to fight the French fleet'. The editors seized the opportunity to condemn them:
The refractory spirit of the Seamen on the present occasion has been manifested in a
manner that reflects very little credit on their boasted loyalty and attachment to their
country's cause. What! The natural defenders of Old England refuse to put to sea,
and sluggishly remain in port, under a frivolous pretext, at a time when her coasts are
menaced by a daring and enterprising foe! Such behaviour is surely unworthy of the
character of British Seamen; and yet, if we are rightly informed, such has actually
been their unfortunate instance to which we now allude.
The Morning Post stopped short of saying, but certainly implied, a sailing was imminent.45
The Star recklessly reported 'the French fleet are at sea, and have a fleet of transport with
them', then tried to distance itself from the alarming news with an ineffectual disclaimer:
'the account is said to have been brought from Falmouth, and received there from Sir
John B Warren. The truth we do not vouch for.' Government's London Chronicle also
reported the French were at sea, but chose to chastise, rather than condemn, the seamen:
It is with the utmost concern we have to notice a second mutiny on board the fleet
under the command of Lord Bridport at St. Helen's. After the very ample conces-
sions which had been made by the Lords of the Admiralty, and his Majesty's most
gracious pardon, it might have been expected, that every feeling of discontent would
have subsided, and that the British seamen would have returned to their duty more
heartily attached than ever to the glory of their Country; and been inspired with a
more than common share of emulation to meet the enemy, and testify their gratitude
for the favours they had received; but by letters from Portsmouth received yesterday
morning we learn with regret, that on the signal being made by Lord Bridport on
Sunday morning for the fleet to sail, the seamen again refused to weigh anchor, al-
ADM1/107 f238, P C Durham to Warren, 29 Aptil 1797; ADMI/6033 f215
4'Morning Herald, 8May 1797
45 Morning Post, 9May 1797
4'Skr,8May 1797
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leging as a reason that nothing had yet been settled by Parliament, confirming their
rncrease of pay
Contradicting the above and admitting ignorance, one of these letters from Portsmouth
offered optimism in lieu of observation as it reassured readers:
What terms they have made I am ignorant of, as there is no immediate communica-
tion with the fleet from the shore; but am told, that on its being made known to the
seamen that the French fleet were at sea, and that it was very unlike the character of
British seamen to be engaged in quarrelling with each other when they should be
fighting the enemy, they agreed to drop down to St. Helen's and join the fleet, saying,
that after they had beaten the French, they would then return to port and settle their
differences.
On 9 May The Times took a more cautious approach: 'There is no reason to believe that
the BREST FLEET is yet at sea; though according to very recent advices; it was in a very
forward state of preparation and of considerable force.' 49 Two days later, the True Briton
offered what it presumed to be government's opinion without actually offering any news:
A report has been prevalent for these two or three days past, that the French Fleet
consisting of seventeen sail of the line, with a considerable number of transports,
were lying in the outer road of Brest ready for sea, and it was even stated yesterday,
that this Fleet was actually at sea. If this be the case, our seamen will be furnished
with an opportunity of evincing the sincerity of their return to their duty, by giving
such an account of the Enemy as they have hitherto ever been accustomed to do;
and we trust that they will soon atone for their present misconduct, by some great
naval achievement.50
The mutiny began and ended with reports of enemy fleets at sea, both false. At no point
during the proceedings in Portsmouth were the French, Dutch or Spanish fleets 'daring
or enterprising' enough to put to sea, let alone 'menace Old England's coasts'. However,
the unusual number of fleet sightings appearing in the press did not pass unnoticed:
The stories of the French being at sea are fortunately without foundation. Such false-
hoods ought not to be circulated. God knows we have already suffered too much
from the Jesuitical policy of false alarms! What might be the consequence to Eng-
land, if by these very cunning alarms, we should prompt the impetuous seamen to
hurry the fleet to sea, of their own accord, without instructions, without concert,
without a rendezvous, and without auspices! If there was nothing material to the
conduct of a Fleet, but bravery in the hour of action, we should have pleasure in
seeing the British Seamen, self-organised, opposed to the enemy however numerous,
but the detail of signals, the co-operation of the Admiralty at home, and with all the
other stations of the service, the mtelligence with respect to the enemy, and a thou-
London Chronicle, 6-9 May 1797
The delegates had ordered the ships to St Helen's.
The Times, 9 May 1797
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sand other considerations which depend on concert and establishment, must con-
vince the sailors themselves that even their own strength, their importance, and their
success must depend on system, on discipline, on duty, and that they can only hope
to retain the glory they have acquired by returning to the order which has made them
the pride of the Universe.5'
The Morning Chronicle's editors implied ministerial manipulation of the media, a deliberate
and cynical attempt to exploit the seamen's promise to suspend their protest and face the
French, if they attempted an invasion. 52 Their suggestion was both unfounded and un-
fair. Government had no need to manipulate, fabricate or falsify alarms. All that was re-
quired was a selective or inadvertent release of information to feed journalists' natural
impulse for speculation. These news fragments were immediately interpreted according
to political dictates, personal prejudices or commercial priorities, a point proven by the
Morning Chronicle itself when, a fortnight earlier, it garbled the contents of an obscure and
hysterical letter to the Home Office reporting a Dutch fleet 'sixty-three in number' off
Kirkwall in the Orkneys to criticise government for not taking such sightings seriously
enough.53
The news arriving from Falmouth on 6 May was authentic, but not official. It came from
the garrulous lieutenant or an indiscreet crew member of Aus, not the Admiralty.' And
its most irresponsible permutations appeared in opposition, not government newspapers.
The news was used to prompt impetuous seamen and influence public sympathies, but
not by government. The Morning Chronicle again demonstrated its hypocrisy in comments
on the Bantry Bay expedition:
The Ministerial papers seem to be exceedingly offended at our presumption of cen-
suring the conduct of the Admiralty in detaining the British Fleet in port, when they
knew the French fleet to be at sea, though at the same time they cordially enough
confess that they cannot account for the proceeding. We appeal to public opinion
upon the subject, and let the voice, not of a few despicable retainers of the admini-
stration, who if Ireland was sunk into the ocean would vindicate the propriety of the
51 Morning Chronicle, 10 May 1797
52 London Chronicle, 18-20 April 1797
PRO ADMI 6033 1200, Letters from Kirkwall, 15 & 21 March 1797; Morning Chronicle, 17 April 1797
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deed, so it was only performed by their patrons, but of the country at large, decide
upon the conduct of the government in the business.55
Government's handling of Warren's fleet sightings was, perhaps, more jesuitical than the
Morning Chronicle imagined, involving withholding, rather than releasing information. The
opportunities afforded to the French were well publicised. Fleet sightings featured
prominently in coverage of the mutiny. Just as continental newspapers provided English
readers with intelligence of activity in Texel, Brest and Cadiz, English newspapers smug-
gled across the Channel kept the French apprised and apparently amused by the pro-
ceedings in Portsmouth.
France was elated at Britain's embarrassments. La Reveil]ière was reporting on British
press reaction to the mutinies at a full meeting of the Directory. The use of the term
'floating republic' by one newspaper to describe the current state of England's
vaurned navy caused him to collapse in fits of laughter; 'toutes st's bosses s' agitèrent deju-
bilation as he exclaimed 'Un ripubliquefiottante! Mon Dieu, que c'estjoli
The French recognised the opportunity, but could manage no more than the show of
force at the outer roads that Warren's inner squadron observed. Plans were made and
orders were issued, but the opportunity was lost. 57 A hint of why appeared in the London
Chronicle on 22 April in the form of a paragraph translated from an unnamed French
newspaper:
Brest, April 10. It is impossible to imagine the state of disorganization of our fleet.
The artillery soldiers of the marine have received no pay for two months; the soldiers
desert in crowds, declaring that they are only to be thrown upon the coasts of Eng-
land because they cannot longer be furnished with provisions. On the other hand,
the General Officers disgust all the others by their insolence and brutality; the great-
est part of whom, raised from inferior stations in the navy, have preserved their for-
mer habits. It is time that the Government paid the most serious attention to the
navy, because it is impossible to calculate the consequences of the present disorgani-
zation, which becomes everyday more irremediable and formidable.
This paragraph was sufficiently obscure to be lost in the panic produced by Warren's ob-
servations, but government had access to information that escaped the public eye. On I
55 MorningChronick, 25January 1797
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March, Spencer reassured Bridport, although the French were assembling a large force at
Brest, 'from all accounts ... it does not appear that they have either men or stores enough
to enable them to put to sea.' 59 Captain Philip d'Auvergne, the Royal Navy officer who
oversaw intelligence-gathering operations from Jersey, reported on 22 March:
There are 18 Line of Battle Ships in the Road, all extremely ill-fitted and badly
manned, there are also five Frigates in rather better order.
There are likewise under repairs and equipment in the Harbour, Nine Ships of the
Line, and three or four Frigates; most of these were of the Irish Expedition; The ex-
treme penury (denouement) of the Stores, leave great doubts whether those in the
Roads will be completed, much less, those in the Harbour refitted, without fresh
supplies from either Holland or Spain, both of which Countries have engaged to fur-
nish the Republic with means to compleat the Annaments, destined to join them in
the Spring; a whisper circulates again that another Frigate Expedition will take place
soon. ... The soldiers appear to be very careless in stopping the sailors who continue
to desert in crowds, insomuch that the forced levies, which continue with vigor,
scarcely compensate for them that leave the servicef'°
Ships sighted at the outer roads normally indicated a sailing was imminent, but as Dur-
ham noted in his observations of the same ships a month later, the French were awaiting
supplies and reinforcements.61
 On 31 March d' Auvergne advised Dundas: 'their only
exertions are limited, for the present moment, to the equipment of a swann of small pri-
vateers.'62
 Ten days later, a transport officer in Portsmouth learned from a recently cap-
tured privateersman 'there are 20 sail of the line at Brest, besides frigates nearly ready for
sea; but that seamen are not to be got.' 63 On 20 April Sir Robert Strachan confirmed 'a
great scarcity of seamen in France and that those they have in the Navy are continually
deserting'." On 23 April d' Auvergne reported sixteen ships of the line and five single-
decked ships at the outer road, but emphasised they were 'ill-manned and ill-provided with
ezy necessary or store and in the utmost confusion'. 65 He was shocked to discover 'the officers
are not even paid their little pittance; and the crews insist on and are paid in compleat
effect the system of equality, obliging their officers to draw their rations with them and
eat a Ia Gamille.'66 Another agent explained, while there were, indeed, sixteen or seven-
BL Addi MS 35197.85, Bridport Papers, Spencer to Bndport, 1 March 1797
ADMI 4172, d'Auvergne to Dundas, 19 & 22 March 1797
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teen ships-of the line at the outer roads, 'there was scarcely a sufficiency of seamen or
marines on board to do the ordinary duty of the ships - almost all having deserted from
want of victuals, clothing, and pay'. 67 He doubted their ability to put to sea, held this to
be 'the general opinion of people at Brest', and added 'stores of all kinds are extremely
deficient'. On 28 April, d'Auvergne reported slow progress at Brest 'owing to the great
confusion that prevails in every department and the extreme penury of means'; and he
confirmed 'the great dependence for the present Campaign by Sea therefore principally
rests on the juncture of the Spanish Fleet'. 68 While the ports of northern France and
Holland remained scenes of feverish activity, 69 involving the construction of thousands
of flat-bottomed boats, the assembly of hundreds of thousands of troops and the for-
mulation of countless invasion plans, 7° all apparently depended on the juncture with the
Spanish fleet, a juncture the Admiralty had taken precautions to prevent.
On 28 March the board ordered its junior sea lord, Hugh Seymour, to sea with a small
squadron, ostensibly to escort the outward bound East India convoy and convey instruc-
tions to Admiral Six Roger Curtis, but also with sealed orders to be opened fifty leagues
south-west of the Scully Isles. 71 Admiral Seymour was the 'officer at Portsmouth' to
whom Howe cryptically referred before the House of Lords:
I wrote to the Officer at Portsmouth, to whom I was naturally to expect such appli-
cations would, in my absence, be addressed, to inquire whether any such dissatisfac-
tion existed in the fleet. The answer was 'that no such appearance has been heard of
there, and it was supposed the Petitions had been framed for the purpose I sus-
pected'.72
Seymour received and reviewed the eleven original petitions, then made perfunctory en-
quiries without advising Lord Bridport or the port admiral, Six Peter Parker. Of course,
all was tranquil as the seamen awaited an answer to their petitions. After a short delay,
the convoy gathered and Seymour set sail, leaving the channel six days before the mutiny.
However, instead of following his sealed orders, he acted on intelligence received from a
67 PRO ADM1 6033, Foreign Letters, 3rd serIes, 1796-1798, Information communicated by Mi. Brum-
meU, 24 April 1797; BLAddI MS 35.197.123
PRO ADMI/4172, d'Auvergne to Dundas, 28 April 1797
PRO ADMI 3974, Boyton to Stiles, 13 February 1797;
° The possibilities included the Isle de France, Portugal, Ireland, Scotland and England. A detailed, but
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British brig, Coro, which narrowly escaped a Spanish squadron that slipped out of Cadiz
and sighted a larger group of ships thirty leagues southwest of Madeira.73 Seymour set off
in pursuit.
On 10 May a rumour of his mission surfaced on the stock exchange:
It was currently reported this morning at 'Change, that Admiral Sir John Jervis has
fallen in with the homeward-bound Spanish Manila fleet, and captured several of the
ships. The captured ships are stated to have from ten to twelve millions of Dollars on
board. We do not know on what authority this intelligence rests, but it had a consid-
erable influence in raising the funds.74
Like most exchange rumours and false sightings, this earned an immediate and emphatic
denial. However, like most rumours, it involved an element of truth. Predictably, gov-
ernment's denial appeared in the Tr,e Briton: We mentioned that a report was yesterday
in circulation, that Admiral Jervis had fallen in with and taken Five Spanish Register Shs.
The report, we are sorry to learn, is wholly unfounded.' 75 The truth was that Seymour,
not Jervis, was chasing the Spanish treasure galleons. His squadron had been ordered to
the northwest coast of Africa, in an ideal position to intercept the homeward bound flo-
tilla. The squadron Coro had earlier encountered was its escort. The ships sighted
southwest of Madeira, however, were Portuguese, not Spanish. Distracted by the escort
and this false sighting, Seymour failed to intercept the flotilla. However, the threat he
posed, combined with Jervis' close watch on Cadiz, and the poor condition of the Span-
ish fleet following its defeat at Cape St Vincent precluded any possibility of the Spanish
joining the French at Brest. 76 The French were not pleased:
We hear the French are very much enraged with the King of Spain. They have
abused him in the grossest terms. They say the Spaniard, once an honourable and
brave people, are now the most dastardly, with various compliments of the kind, and
threaten to use force if he does not show himself more hearty in the cause and send
the fleet to sea77
Perhaps, providence played a role in preventing any French expeditions; but providence,
as always, belonged to the prepared.
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Clearly, Spencer took the invasion threat seriously. He could hardly dlo otherwise. Upon
receiving Warren's observations, he had no choice but to order the fleet to sea. However,
unlike Warren, Spencer knew that, despite appearances, the French fleet was in no con-
dition to sail. Specifically, he knew until the French were re-supplied, they could do no
more than hold exercises at the outer roads and wait. While they had the ships, they
lacked the men and provisions to mount a grand expedition. Spencer adn1itted there
were other advantages in ordering the fleet to sea. A week earlier he advised Bridport
'when at sea the unpleasant agitation of mind naturally the conseqvience of what has
passed will by regular and constant employment subside.' 78
 On 8 May, even when faced
with a second refusal to weigh anchor, he continued to extemporise:
I do not see any means at present so likely to obtain the very desirable end of restor-
ing order and subordination in the fleet as their being at sea where their situation will
necessarily find them in constant employment and bring them back into their old
habits of regularity and obedience to their officers.79
The first public report of Warren's observations appeared on 6 May. However, instead of
denying that the French had sailed, government provided The Times witlh enough detail to
publish a full account of their fleet. The list included ships severely damaged in the Ban-
try Bay expedition,8° ships in dry dock, and ships at l'Orient and Toulou. 81
 The qualifica-
lion, 'provided they have their complement of men', was lost in the alarming suggestion
that the French may have double the number of ships observed, 'all ready for sea at this
instant'. The lists included the names of the ships, their armament, their captains, but not
their condition. This was no oversight. The information was available Ito the Admiralty.
No intelligence report would have been meaningful without it. Indeed, it appeared in the
reports filed by Captains Keats and Durham. However, had the condition of the French
fleet been revealed, it would have been clear that very few of them were in condition to
sail. The editors revealed government's purpose at the end of the first paragraph: 'When
our Seamen read this list, we hope they will not temponae a moment longer, but cheer-
fully weigh anchor in search of the enemy.' However, government, rather than the sea-
men, temporised and waited another day, a full week after the first published reports and
three days after the mutiny was settled, to inform the public: We can state on the most
positive authority - that there is no advice of the French fleet being at sea.' 82 It would
78 BL, Althorp MSS, Spencer to Bridport, 25 April 1797
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appear the same demands of total war and want of money contributing to the crisis in
England precluded the possibility of invasion from France.
A week later, when the Channel fleet was safely at sea, government, through the auspices
of The Times, admitted:
The French fleet is certainly in a very disorganiaed state. The Government having no
money to pay the sailors in specie; according to the resolutions of the two Councils,
the desertions have been very great; and a large body of troops is drawn down to-
wards Brest to stop their further progress.83
The news was based on the latest report from d' Auvergne:
The desertions of the seamen continues in an excessive degree. The Bishoprick of
Leon is full of them. They are supported by the peasants. Colonnes Mobiles have been
marched in the country, but the soldiers either avoided taking them up or sent them
notice to keep out of the way for their expedition has been fruifless. The ships in the
Road are not above half manned.
The Second Outbreak
Making no distinction between news and comment, the Morning Herald began its report
of the second outbreak of mutiny:
Admiral Lord BRIDPORT, we are informed by our Portsmouth letters, received intel-
ligence on Sunday of the Brest fleet having dropped into the outer harbour, pre-
paratory to their putting to sea, and some accounts even state that they were then
actually at sea in great force. It was under this pressing consideration that the Noble
Admiral determined to lose no time in proceeding in quest of the enemy. He ac-
cordingly, on the morning of that day, made the signal for the fleet to weigh from St.
Helen's, which instead of being obeyed, was universally disregarded, and the several
crews, after having given their accustomed mutinous cheers, assembled the Delegates
of the fleet, and sent their High Mightinesses to confer with the Sailors on board the
LONDON, the flagship of Vice-Admiral COLPOYs.85
The report was accurate and left an impression consistent with editorial policy. Soon,
however, the Morning Herald reported facts at odds with that policy:
On their approaching the LONDON, Admiral C0LPOYs gave orders to his men to
prevent them from coming on board his ship, which the crew obstinately refused to
obey. The marines were then ordered up, and, all remonstrance proving ineffectual,
the Admiral commanded them to fire upon the sailors.
83 Lond9n Chronicle, 13-16 May 1797; The T:mes, 18 May 1797
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Uncomfortable with the news, the editors were 'at a ioss to ascertain' whether or not the
admiral's order was obeyed, as letters 'varied extremely upon the subject':
Some say that the marines did fire ... that several men ... were killed and wounded;
that the sailors immediately flew to arms, attacked the officers and marines, killed a
Lieutenant of the LONDON, and another officer, wounded some privates, subdued
the remainder, and put the Admiral and Captain in clo6e confinement, both of whom
they threatened to hang on the following morning; while others positively state that
the marines refused to fire, and threw down their arms; by which means the crews
obtained quiet possession of the ships.
Elsewhere in the same issue of the Morning Herald a correspondent from Portsmouth
wrote: 'we learn that when the boats attempted to go on board Admiral Colpoys' ship, he
and his officers resolved to oppose their coming on board with force, and in the en-
counter seven of the boat's crew were killed, and nine wounded.' Another letter from
Portsmouth offered another description:
After post, and before the mail coach set out, we have learned the following particu-
lars: - The Delegates from the different ships at St. Helen's, came alongside the Lon-
don, Admiral Colpoys, about three o'clock in the afternoon of this day, and solicited
admittance, the Marines were ordered to fire on them, but declined, and grounded
their arms, on this the Officers closed the hatchways, and, on the men forcing their
way up, the Captain fired a pistol, which mortally wounded a lad through the grat-
ings; in the conflict three seamen and one marine were also mortally wounded. On
the other side, Lieutenant Sims, on the Marines, received balls through both arms,
and a Midshipman also was dangerously wounded. The privates now took complete
possession of the ship, and would have hoisted Lieutenant Bouvier up to the main
yard, but from his solemn declaration that he acted by the Admiral's order, on which
he was respited for the present; but he is, with all other officers on board, at present
in close confinement, and God knows what even this night may be their fate.
The editors admitted reports from Portsmouth were 'so very contradictory we cannot
pretend to reconcile' them. They hoped 'the whole affair will prove to have been greatly
exaggerated, if not grossly misrepresented.' Instead, eyewitness accounts degenerated
into rumours. Speculation replaced observation. Lacking both perspective and news from
the fleet, editors published everything except what might conflict with editorial policy or
political agendas. Reports in the same paper, on the same day, and sometimes from the
same correspondent, were at odds. However, despite getting several facts wrong, mis-
spelling officers' names, and general confusion, these early reports conveyed a better
sense of what was happening than those following. Later reports in both government
and opposition papers dissembled, carefully concealing that Colpoys provoked the con-
frontation by giving the order to fire.
86 Ibia
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On 8 May the Star announced, with 'heart-rending pain ... the distressing intelligence,
that the mutiny in the fleet at Spithead and St. Helen's had broken out again with much
alarming violence. Already some blood has been spilt both on the side of the officers and
of the men.'87
 It admitted: 'As no boats are allowed to go on board the ships, our corre-
spondents have not been able to procure such full information as we could have wished.'
It reported men were killed on board 'one of the ships' when the officers attempted to
quell a disturbance and enforce order. 'This enraged the seamen to such a degree that the
most serious consequences can hardly be avoided.' The Stat's correspondent described
the scene in Portsmouth: 'Terror and consternation prevail through our streets, and it is
not improbable but my next letter may contain an account of the wealthy inhabitants
moving their property into the interior of the country.'
There were also indications of growing sympathy for the seamen:
the present alarming discontents have originated from a conversation that oc-
curred a few days ago in the House of Lords, from which the men considered that
the faith pledged to them had been broken, as no steps had been taken in Parliament
to carry into execution the solemn promise that had been made to them in the name
of his Majesty. They thought it indispensable to their security that an Act of Parlia-
ment should be passed before they proceeded to sea; and they have ever since talked
of the unaccountable delay of Ministers in not bringing forward the business. They
also said that the language of Ministers in the House of Lords was not satisfactory, as
they had said that the matter was not to be discussed or that it was too delicate for
discussion, or words to that effect.
The Star intimated a breach of faith. It alluded to promises of amnesty being made and
broken when the Cu/loden mutinied three years before. While the officers involved, in-
cluding Pakenham and Colpoys, persuaded the court, including Bridport, they made no
promises, the lower-deck perceived that they &d. Those perceptions were all that mat-
tered. Spencer noted in his diary that the seamen felt 'unless they actually had the King's
pardon, they could have no security on submission. Mutineers on board the Cu/loden had
been deceived with hopes of forgiveness, and afterwards some of them executed.' The
Morning Herald explained the precedent to its readers:
a mutiny happened on the supposition, supported by the opinion of the carpen-
ters, that she was unsafe to perform a voyage. A gentleman high in rank in a neigh-
boring kingdom, and of great authority in the Navy, restored subordination on a so!-
Star8May 1797
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emn promise of indemnity to the men. A short time afterwards, however, five men,
supposed to be ringleaders, were picked out, tried by a Court martial, and executed.9°
Son of the Irish peer Lord Longford, Pakenham was the gentleman in question. When
removed from his ship by his crew at the conclusion of the mutiny, he wrote to Spencer:
I hope your Lordship will pardon my commenting upon this business, but when I see
the same exceptions to some of the best officers in His Majesty's Service, I could not
presume to escape, and I trust their disaffection to me will be considered as an argu-
ment of my having watchfully and with zeal attended to the interests of my King and
Country.91
The general distrust of officers' promises was confirmed by the crew of La Pompée
Brothers,
You must as well as ourselves see with the greatest regret that no attention has yet
been paid by their Noble Lords who came forward with their faithful promises of an
immediate recommendation to Parliament for the grant of advance of our wages, the
notes circulated round the fleet respecting the cheese that if you have 16 ounces,
which they now call a traditional indulgence, you must rest satisfied with the future
quality of your provisions; now Brothers, when you give this a serious thought, we
call upon you to consider and to decide upon this equivocal business with that spirit
of independence that chariactys a British Seamen, our opinion is that there not the
least reliance to be place in their promises which I am sorry to say like our Oath of
Fidelity is broke if we do not remain unshakned until the whole is sanctioned by an
Act of Parliament. Now Brothers, your steady friends the Pompees beg you to give
them a final answer and whatever may be your proposal, we, one and all, will never
deviate from being Determined to Sink or Swim.92
The London Chronicle was published only twice a week and had an extra day to absorb the
shock. Despite this advantage, its coverage proved less, rather than more accurate. It re-
ported when the delegates' boat came alongside the London, Colpoys refused permission
to board and warned 'if they persisted, the consequences would be fatal, as he was de-
termined to see discipline preserved.' According to the Lirndon Chronicle, when they per-
sisted, Colpoys ordered his marines to fire, killing five delegates. The crew then secured
the ship and 'declared vengeance against Admiral Colpoys and his Officers'. Another
letter insisted: 'when the boats attempted to go on board Admiral Colpoys' ship, he and
his officers resolved to oppose their coming on board with force, and in the encounter
seven of the boat's crew were killed and nine wounded.' After presenting contradictory
reports and getting most of the facts wrong, the London Chronicle declared:
9°Mormng Herald, 8 May 1797; Mormn,g Post, 9 May 1797; The Times, 24 April 1797
91 BL G197, Althorp Papers, Pakenhani to Spencer, 16 May 1797
PRO ADMI 107, Pompees to Delegates, 7 May 1797
203
It would be improper to detail all the unpleasant reports we have heard on this sub-
ject; but such was the confusion and anxiety of mind at Portsmouth, that the precise
truth was not known, as there was little communication between the ships and the
shore.
The editors considered improper what government considered unpleasant. They had no
qualms about publishing contradictory and unpleasant details that made no mention of
ministerial neglect. Thus, they alarmed and confounded their readers with the news 'the
sailors seiaed some arms and fired upon the Officers' killing the First Lieutenant and
wounding several others; and added: 'Admiral Colpoys and the Officers of the London are
threatened to be hung at sun set.' 93 Two days later the London Chronicle reported:
Admiral Colpoys has been tried by a Tribunal instituted by the seamen, the verdict of
which is to the following effect "That in every part of his late conduct on board the
London man of war, he conducted himself as became a British Officer; he is there-
fore free to reassume the command, of his ship, or decline it, as he thinks proper."
Every thing is amicably settled.94
The Morning Post also noted the unreliability of reports from Portsmouth:
The Mutiny on board the Fleet at Portsmouth has again burst forth with redoubled
violence, threatening in its consequences the most unfortunate calamities to our
Navy. We might occupy the whole of this Paper with the different letters received re-
specting this melancholy business; but as the various accounts would only perplex
and confound our Readers, we shall endeavour to give an accurate general statement,
founded upon letters of the best authority, and at the same time, we give some of
those letters a place in our Paper.95
Of course, the Morning Post did not agree that misrepresentations of what passed in the
House of Lords caused the second outbreak. Yet, rather than risk exposing the indiscre-
tions of a naval legend or royal duke, it focused on the 'calls for silence on the subject'
which were so 'strongly recommended by Ministers and their friends'. It suggested these
calls for silence convinced the seamen there was 'a design of deceiving them', that the
'Ministers had no serious intention of endeavouring to have their demands sanctioned by
Parliament.' It implied this was why they refused to weigh anchor and 'resolved to hold a
Convention of Delegates on board the London lying at Spithead'. As they came alongside
Colpoys' flagship, according to the Morning Post, the admiral:
cautioned them against acting as they had formerly done. He told them they had
asked a great deal, and obtained much, and he would not suffer them to proceed to
93 Lona,n Chronicle, 6-9 May 1797
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demand more. He said they ought to be contented and if they offered to meet in
convention, he would order the Marines to fire on them.
The paper insisted the marines remained steadfast and the admiral's behaviour was re-
strained. When he ordered them to level their pieces, they did so. However, rather than
ordering them to fire, readers were told Colpoys 'again admonished the Delegates, but to
no purpose'. According to this report, a 'slight scuffle' took place; during which one of
the delegates fired at and wounded Lieutenant Sims of the marines. In response, the ad-
miral ordered the marines 'to take good aim' and fire. According to the Morning Post, they
did, killing five seamen, including two delegates. The report continued:
The whole crew of the London now declared open hostility to the Officers and Ma-
rines; they turned the guns in the fore part of the ship towards the stern, and threat-
ened to blow all aft into the water unless they surrendered. The Officers surrendered,
and the Marines laid down their arms. Admiral COLPOYS was put in irons and con-
fined in one cabin; Captain GRIFFITHS, the Captain of the ship was confined in an-
other; and the Officers and all the Marines were made Prisoners. The Seamen were
complete masters of the London, and not only of the London but of the whole Fleet,
which would not put to sea until the demands of the crews were fully agreed to and
ratified by Parliament. It was generally understood in Portsmouth, that Admiral
COLPOYS was to be tried and executed the next morning at four o'clock, and the re-
port was generally circulated yesterday, of that horrid event having actually taken
place.
The Morning Post provided its readers with a vivid picture of the 'melancholy business',
one that, despite the editors' promises, proved to be the least accurate found in any paper
that day. They also described the story's impact: 'never did any news produce a greater
sensation in the town. It was impossible to print Papers with sufficient expedition, to
supply the demand of a trembling and frantic Public.' London's sensation was Ports-
mouth's nightmare. One letter, after declaring the officers of the London had 'hastily put
to death' seven seamen, indicated the 'utmost terror pervades the streets of this town'.
Again, they traced the cause of the 'present alarming discontents, which threaten the pil-
lars of the Empire' to
what passed a few days since in the House of Lords, wherein they considered the
faith pledged to them was not meant to be performed; and this inference they proba-
bly drew from the circumstance, that when a Mutiny lately happened on board the
Culloden at Spithead and though an Amnesty was solemnly promised on returning to
their duty, yet five of the ringleaders were afterwards executed.
The Morning Post concluded its coverage with the comment: 'This is the most shocking
business that ever happened.'
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The Star qualified its coverage with the comment: 'we trust it will appear ... that reports
of today are in general exaggerated.' 96
 While the letters of 8 May focused on a breach of
faith, the editorial of 9 May focused on silence as the cause of the second outbreak:
It seems they had read the late conversation in the House of Lords, in which silence
on the subject of the Seamen's complaints was strongly recommended by Ministers
and their friends; and they suspected there was a design of deceiving them; they sus-
pected that Ministers had no serious intention of endeavouring to have their de-
mands sanctioned by Parliament.
The editors emphasised that the seamen's suspicions were confirmed by an 'unaccount-
able delay of the Ministers in not bringing forward the business'. Their coverage of the
incident duplicated that of the Morning Post, until it described the shooting. They shifted
the blame to Bover, cast Colpoys in a heroic light and confirmed that he had acted on
Admiralty orders:
In consequence of the orders to fire which the First Lieutenant had given, the sea-
men were now proceeding to hang him; Admiral Colpoys interfered, and told them
that the Officer had acted on instructions, which he, Admiral Colpoys had received
from the Admiralty. These instructions the seamen demanded and obtained.
In Admiral Patton's version of the incident,
[Colpoys] peremptorily refused to let the boats with the delegates come alongside.
This being known to the seamen of the London, they consulted together, and resolved
that the delegates should come into the ship. The Officers resisted, appeared armed,
and insisted upon the men who remained upon deck going down below. Some of
them disobeyed this order; and one man, instead of going down, began to unlash one
of the foremost guns, to point it towards the quarter-deck. This man was repeatedly
cautioned against this measure, and was told by a Lieutenant, (Bover), that he would
fire at him if he persevered. The man continued to unlash the gun, and the Lieuten-
ant fired, and killed him on the spot.97
Who saved B over?
Both opposition and government papers protected the admiral's reputation, blamed oth-
ers for precipitating the crisis and crediting him with defusing the situation. The London
Chivnicle presented the 'brave and meritorious' admiral as 'determined to see discipline
preserved'. They implied only prudence in his ordermg the marines 'to be ready', and
gave nothing away in commenting 'on the seamen persevering, the marines fired, and it
Stac9May 1797
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is said, killed 5 men'. The True Briton blundered upon the truth, describing an unruly crew
and a determined admiral who demed the delegates permission to board:
the Crew insisted they should come; in consequence of which he ordered the Ma-
rines out, and told them if they behaved in the least mutinous manner, he would
make them fire upon them, and which from their conduct he was obliged to do; in
consequence of which they seized some firearms, fired upon their Officers, killed
their First Lieutenant, wounded one of the Mates, and several others.98
As it became clear that Colpoys had given the fatal order, justifications replaced denials.
The Oracle and Public Advertiser recreated the 'brave and noble' admiral's address to the
crew as they were about to hang Bover
My Lads,
Though you have flown in the face of lawful authority, and trampled under foot the
duty you owed to me as your Commander, you are sufficiently acquainted with disci-
pline, though you will not practice it, to know that this gentleman whom you are
about to treat so ignominiously and unjustly, has done no more than his duty, that he
was bound under pain of death to obey my orders, and that he has done nothing
from his own head or authority. Can you then, be so unjust, so cruel, to rob him of
his life for an act that was mine? Martial law would have doomed him to death if he
had disobeyed me, and you want to put him to death, because in obedience to the
laws of his Country, he obeyed the orders of is superior officer. He had no will of his
own; he must have obeyed me or forfeited his life for disobedience. Can you, then,
be so barbarous as to single out for your vengeance, a man circumstanced as he is? If
you are bent upon murder, if your fury must have a victim, here I stand ready to die;
the act was mine, let the consequences of it also be mine; involve not in them this in-
nocent and faithful officer, spare him, and I will die contentedY9
This invention went to the crux of the matter. Seamen in the king's service either obeyed
orders or suffered the consequences. While latitude may have been exercised before,
questioning the propriety of orders was no longer an option. With the advent of the
French revolution and the rapid expansion of the Royal Navy, obedience, discipline and
subordination to authority were now considered essentiaL
The press set politics aside to protect Colpoys' reputation. The Oracle declared he had
acted with an 'earnestness and magnanimity that must ever to him the highest honour',
and insisted this was another instance of the 'fickle and unsteady disposition of the Sea-
men'. The London Chronicle, described him as 'noble and manly in every instance', then
supplied a touch of drama. As the men were about to hang Bover, they described the
admiral as rushing forward and declaring
98 True Briton, 9 May 1797
Orac/e, 13 May 1797
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if any blame was imputable, it must rest upon him; at the same time untying his
stock. The magnanimity of this conduct, we conceive, must have operated powerfully
upon the feelings of the men, as they immediately released the Lieutenant, and only
committed the Admiral to his cabin.'°°
Marsden supported this version of the truth in his minutes: 'Colpoys' life had been
threatened. He told them repeatedly they were welcome to take it, if it would satisfy
them; but begged them, for God's sake, to spare their country."° 1 The second secretary
added Colpoys 'conduct has been very manly, and I hope the letters written while he was
under coercion may be published'. 102
In a series of letters written while under confinement, Colpoys offered his version of
what happened. On 7 May, he advised Port Admiral Peter Parker 'm consequence of my
endeavours to suppress a disturbance on board here, four of the people who adhered to
the officers have been badly wounded.' 103 As though it was of less consequence, he
added that four of the men were wounded 'in the between decks' as they were 'endeav-
ouring to force their way on deck'. Colpoys took credit for saving Bover and apologised
for revealing the lieutenant 'acted by my orders and that I acted by orders from the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty'. As though it was his only mistake, he admitted surren-
dering the orders. He struggled to justify his actions and escape culpability for the crisis.
He described the men as 'exasperated at me [and] their officers for doing that which
seems to me to be strictly applicable to their orders'. He implied he responded to, rather
than provoked a disturbance. In the first letters of the series, he did not mention who
fired first; and certainly did not admit giving the order. He argued he had not exceeded
his authority or the Admiralty's instructions. While he regretted the result, he insisted: 'I
have done no more than my duty."°4
On 8 May Colpoys clung to the notion that the men were misguided and anticipated
criticism of his actions by expressing the hope
their Lordships and the Community at Large will do me the justice to believe that
my conduct has not proceeded from hasty or tyrannical motives, but that my only
guide has been the fulfilling my duty as a servant of my King & countries. This I can
now solemnly declare, and mean to do with my last moments, should the poor mis-
guided men - who are to be my judges - allow me to say as much to them.
'°° London Chronick, 11-13 May 1797
'°'W Marsden, A BñfMemoir of the Life and Writings of the Late William Mden (London: Cox, 1838), 88
'°2 Co1pys' letters appear at the end of this chapter. See also E Gnffiths-Colpoys, A Letter to Sir TB Martin
(London: C. Woodfall, 1825)
103 PRO ADMI/5125, Colpoys to Bridport, 7 May 1797
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The admiral asked their lordships' indulgence for his 'irregular preamble', insisting he
only troubled them in the hope of 'relieving my memory from disgraceful refletions,
which a censorious world may [be] much disposed to bestow on an [officer] who has
been the unfortunate, but, I trust, the innocent cause of shedding the blood of his ship-
mates'.
Colpoys claimed, upon learning from Captain Griffiths that 'everything appears as wrong
as ever with the fleet lying at St. Helen's - where the boats are assembling & the yard
ropes reeved as formerly', he addressed the crew and asked if they knew what was 'going
forward at St. Helen's'. The crew assured him they did not. He then asked if they had any
remaining grievances. They responded, 'No, none.' Colpoys cajoled, 'Have you not had
every thing granted - nay, more than you expected - by the Admiralty.' "Yes, Yes" was
the word'; whereupon, he pledged:
.if you will follow my advice, that you shall no get into any disgrace with your
brethren in the Fleet, as I shall become responsible for your conduct; therefore, my
first wish is that you hoist all the boats in, then secure the lower deck guns & ports,
and afterwards, every blue jacket to remain quietly below - that I should get the Ma-
rines & officers under arms. All which was done.105
When the delegates' boats approached the Marlborough, not, as most newspapers re-
ported, when they arrived at the London, Colpoys indicated, 'our people below began to
make a stir & shewed a disposition for coming up, which the officers at the hatchways
prevented.' Suggesting it was more implicit than explicit, Colpoys now admitted giving
the order to fire:
They then began to unlash middle deck guns, point them aft & up the hatchways and
on the officers - calling to me and saying that the men were forcing their way up - &
must they prevent them by firing on them. I said, 'Yes, certainly they must not be al-
lowed to come up till I order them.' Soon after, the confusion increased & some
shots were exchanged from the officers on deck & the men at the hatchways. The
Marines began to throw down their arms and make way for the men to come up.
And numbers, having succeeded, in order to prevent any more shedding of blood
which would have been unavailing against such numbers, I ordered all firing to cease.
Again, he described the crew as intent on revenge, seizing the first lieutenant and carry-
ing him to the forecastle. 'And as soon as a yard rope could be rove, they began to place
it about his neck.' While acknowledging the arrival of the delegates, Colpoys insisted his
appeal to the men and delaying tactics, rather than their intervention, saved Bover's life:
'° PRO ADMI 107, Colpoys to Nepean, 8 May 1797
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What I had to say was that, if anybody was culpable for what happened on that day,
it was myself; for that Mr. Bover only obeyed my orders. And that I only did my
duty. This seemed to irritate not a little, but at length, when I assured 'em that I had
ever felt it my duty to resist such proceeding, but more especially just now, having
received very recent Instructions & Orders from their Lordships for the conduct of
officers toward the men. They one & all caught at the word orders, and desired me to
produce any such, which I said I could do, if they would allow me to go down to the
cabin for them. And which after much hesitation was granted, some men being al-
lowed to attend me. I went down and purposely delayed finding my keys, in hopes
that a little time might bring them to cool reflection -- & God knows—it was a most
doubtful moment, for such a hope as many of them seemed very much intoxicated,
& which had not been the case in any former part of their mutinies.
Colpoys admitted that when he returned on deck, the noose had been removed from
Bover's neck. He closed with another gesture: 'a man can't sacrifice his life in any better
cause than that of fulfilling his duty to his country', insisting 'their Lordships won't, to
save that of an individual like mine, suffer themselves to be driven into any improper
compliances by a set of poor misguided men'. While Colpoys argued he owed his pres-
ervation to his determination to maintain his authority and dignity, Philip Patton implied
it was more a matter of luck:
Admiral Colpoys himself thinks that he owed the preservation of his life, at the first
success of the seamen, to his having always kept his face towards them, as they were
at that moment armed, and thirsting for revenge. Perhaps he does not know that a
man under the quarter-deck had a musket pointed through the gratings at his back,
and was in the act of drawing the trigger, when another man knocked the firelock out
of his hand, and saved the Admiral's life. (Of this fact a woman who was present
gave information.)106
Confined to his cabin and in a confused state, Colpoys described how the delegates met
to determine his fate.
.various were the reports spread about the ship (by our own people - for it was
blowing too hard to have communication with others), how the Admiral & his Cap-
tain (who, being his relation, they thought must be equally culpable) were to be dis-
posed of - but, for the most part, hanging seemed to be the general opinion.107
Instead, on the morning of 9 May, the delegates ordered their release. The admiral re-
corded the terms:
Their final determination, and which I believe at length was settled by the Londons
only, was, that their officers could not do otherwise than obey my orders. Therefore,
they must be liberated, but some particular ones must be landed - that their Admiral
had formerly been their friend, but now, as he was become their foe, he might have
106 P Patton, Account of the Mutinies at Spethead & St Helen's (Portsmouth: Skelton, 1797), 15
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his life - which could be no compensation for the valuable ones that were taken away
by my orders - but that he must also strike his flag.
The debate over Colpoys' fate tested the fleet's resolve. Passions ran so high as to, in the
admiral's words, 'come to blows'. 108
 The issue, however, was not whether or not to hang
him, but whether to assemble a court martial of their own or turn him over to civil
authorities. Colpoys closed: 'just now I am acquainted that when I land I must be con-
ducted before the Mayor of Portsmouth, as well as my Captain, in order to be delivered
up to the Civil Power - to answer for our conduct - and which I trust we shall be able to
do.' 109
 The delegates 'final determination', that Colpoys must strike his flag, signalled the
rejection of 113 unpopular or incompetent officers and ratings by their crews.0
Safe on shore, Colpoys repeated his gesture:
no threats against me are to be a motive for their Lordsbips coming into terms
which may be injurious to one's country. The ships' companies know from me, over
and over again, that if fault lies anywhere, it is at my door only, and let me only be
the sufferer.11'
His sincerity is not in question. The danger he experienced was reaL However, in justify-
ing his actions, Colpoys admitted his mistake and incredibly suggested that, even if he
had known the futility of it, he would have acted the same:
I trust it will appear to their Lordships that my conduct was not over premature. I am
free to say that however wrong it may appear, that even had I been aware that the
marines did not mean to assist us, that I should (after all that has been done for the
seamen) have felt it my duty to make some effort with the few officers I had to assist
me against what I shall ever deem most improper & mutinous proceedings.'2
The day after the incident on board the London, Parliament held its own heated debate.
The members carefully avoided the issues, concentrating instead on misrepresentations,
calls for silence, ministerial procrastinations and delays. In calling for the immediate pas-
sage of the bill, Lord Grenville renewed his determination 'to avoid entering into any dis-
cussion' of its particulars, thus rendering the preparations said to account for the delays
ADMI 107, Colpoys to Nepean, 10 May 1797
109 PRO ADMI/107, Colpoys to Nepean, 9 May 1797
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in presenting the seamen's bill pointless. He also alluded to the press as a disruptive dc-
ment in a delicate situation.
He was peculiarly convinced of the necessity of strictly adhering to that resolution
from the shameful and scandalous misrepresentations that had been made, and in-
dustriously circulated respecting what had happened in a late conversation held in the
House on the same subject. Without, therefore, detaining their Lordship any longer,
he should merely observe, that the Bill ought to pass as speedily as possible, as the
surest and most effectual means of putting an end to the mischief which had been
occasioned by these misrepresentations.113
Lord Russell's brother, the Duke of Bedford bristled in response, saying 'he knew of no
misrepresentations made on the subject, either scandalous or shameful.' Yet, rather than
mentioning either the royal duke or the venerable admiral, Bedford attacked a political
rival, suggesting the 'misconceptions' that had occurred on the matter should be attrib-
uted to 'the injudicious speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty'. Bedford declared that
it came as 'no surprise' to hnn that:
discussion and explanation were equally obnoxious to his Majesty's Ministers; for
secrecy alone could screen their conduct from censure and their character from in-
famy. When any light was thrown upon their actions, it served only to convict them
of odious treachery or the most shameful incapacity.114
He then had the temerity to ask: 'Whether it was the intention of his Majesty's Ministers
to grant the sailors everything that had been promised them by the First Lord of the
Admiralty?' Two days later Spencer privately implored the radical duke to let the matter
rest:
nothing could so much tend to retard such an adjustment, and even endanger its
ultimate success, as renewing in the present moment the discussions upon the subject
in Parliament. Under this strong impression, confirmed & strengthened by every cir-
cumstance which has hitherto occurred, I feel that I should not discharge my publick
duty if I did not in the most serious manner submit it to your Grace's consideration,
and leave it to you to decide whether you will think it right to incur so great a danger,
on a point of such infuite importance to the interests of the Country.'15
Meanwhile, Grenville responded 'with considerable warmth' that it always had been the
Ministers' intention 'to execute the promises of the Admiralty to their full and utmost
extent'. He condemned Bedford for bringing the subject into discussion"6 and the press
for compounding his indiscretions in print
113 The Times, 10 May 1797
114 Staç 10 May 1797
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the mode which had lately been adopted and pursued by individual Lords [of)
putting questions to Ministers, and said, that from answers extorted in that way, the
grossest misrepresentations went abroad through those disorderly and unconstitu-
tional channels, though acquiesced in the public papers. They did not pretend to give,
with any degree of accuracy, what they heard in that House, and had no authority for
reporting what they heard.117
According to the Stafl Grenville saw dark motives behind the misrepresentations:
it was a doctrine which could not be too forcibly stated to the House, that his
Majesty's Ministers and Parliament ought both to be tried by their own acts, and not
by any gross and shameful misrepresentations that were maliciously fabricated to
pervert the public mind, and prejudice it against Government.118
His point was valid, but he need not have looked so far to see who was prejudicing the
public mind. Sheridan shared with his colleagues:
a part of the Letter of the Lords of the Admiralty, and contended that it appeared
clear that they did not expect the Fleet to return to their duty upon their promise
alone; nor was it likely they should rest upon a promise, which might be disavowed.
If it was thought necessary that a greater pledge should be given, and the first step
that ought to have been taken was a communication to that House. He hoped and
trusted that this resolution would have the desired effect; he had too high an opinion
of the character of British Seamen to doubt that; he should think most degradingly of
them if it did not. But if they were of the opinion that this measure would produce
the desired effect, he was sure it would give more satisfaction, if accompanied with a
vote of censure upon the Ministers.9
Sheridan 'c Slander
Sheridan acknowledged the legitimacy of the seamen's grievances, but criticised their
methods:
It is inconsistent with the character ever manifested by British Seamen to act in the
manner they had done; and he could not but attribute their conduct to the effect of
some foul interference on the part of those whose duty it was to have satisfied their
claims.°
The last two implied criticism of the Admiralty and government. However, it only ap-
peared in the Morning Post. Renowned for his rhetoric, Sheridan may have forgotten that
his extra-Parliamentary audience included seamen. He may have believed what he said or
"7 MoruingPost, 10 May 1797
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those reporting his remarks may have added interpretations of their own. Regardless, his
comments, as reported, wounded seamen's pride. Sheridan slandered them:
when men secretly and insidiously endeavoured to sap and destroy the very bul-
wark of the country, who did not dare to stand forward and run the chance of the
consequences, such men must be considered as the basest, the vilest Traitors that
ever a country was curs'd with.
Borrowing from Gardner's skulking lubbers theme, he added cowardice to implications
of treason:
it was impossible, it was not in the nature, not in the character of British Seamen,
that when the fleet of an enemy of their Country was known to be at sea, preparing
for the Invasion of their Country, they should be induced to avoid their duty from
considerations of a personal nature, such considerations had never existed among
that brave and meritorious description of men, the Sailors of Great Britain, and some
foul means unknown to the House must have been used to exasperate them to such
conduct.
Sheridan's suggestion of 'foul interference' was not lost on the seamen. However, his ef-
forts to shame them back to duty or to distance them from the delegates failed. Like
Gardner and Colpoys, he only distanced himself from them. He compounded the insult
by describing Colpoys as a 'great and gallant admiral, whose worth and character he bore
testimony to'. The debate continued until Samuel Whitbread introduced a motion for
censure:
That the Right Honourable William Pitt, in having so long delayed to present the es-
timate of the sum necessary for defraying the expense of an increase of pay, and also
of the proposed issue of a full allowance of provisions to the seamen and marines of
his Majesty's Navy, has been guilty of a gross breach of duty, and deserves the cen-
sure of the House.
The Members defeated the motion by a margin of four to one, then passed the Seamen's
Bill unanimously. The king gave his assent and second pardon later that night. A hundred
copies of both were printed and rushed to Portsmouth. Other than the final negotiations
and reconciliation conducted appropriately by Lord Howe, the mutiny ended the next
day. However, the controversy surrounding it had barely begun.
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I am sorry to acquaintyou that, in consequence of riy endeavour: to suppress a disturbance on board here, four
of the people who adhered to the officers have been bad/y wounded, t Lieut. Syms of the Marines, Mr.
Simpson, one of the Mates, a Marine, and another Also four of the men, in the between dek.c, in endeavouring
to force their way on deck, having directed them all to remain below, till I could learn the particulars of what the
boats of the Fleetfrom St. Helen's were about. lam sorry to add that I was on/y able to prevent their executing
Ljeut. Boner ly satis5ing them that be acted bymy orders and that I acted by order: from the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty. And the men, who came from the other ships, insisted in my giving them those
orders, and which thry now have in their possession. Thry still hold Lieut. Boner a prisoner, and have directed
that Captain Griffith and myelf shall be kept separate. I should hope some measure may be taken in order to
paci the people. And who seem much exasperated at me and] their officer: for doing that which seems to me to
be strict/jr applicable to their orders. Feeling that to have been iiy guide in this unfortunate business, Ifiel very
much res:gned to any consequences which are to follow.
London Spithead
7May 1797
I am very sorry to acquaintyour Lordship that in using my best endeavour: to suppress a Disturbance on board
here this day that of the officers and crew, bane been bad/y woundea Li. Syms of the Marines and Mr.
.Sympsons Mate. One Marine, and a Seaman, with four Sailors who were erideavouring to force their way on
Deck - I have on/y been able to prevent the Men from executing Lieutenant Bevor by shewing them my Orders
from the Admiralçy to use my best endeavour: to prevent any Mutiny. Lieutenant Bevor is kept dose Prisoner
and the Captain and myseff not allowed to communicate. - I am exceedingiy sorrj for this unfortunate Business,
but feel a Consciousness that I have done no more then my Duty, and of course, Feel very bad as to the result.
London, St. Helen's
8May 1797
I request, should this letter be allowed to reachyour hands, thatyou will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty of the folIowing circumstances, which it appears to me should be known to their Lordships and the
Public as ajustfication of my conduct in the unfortunate event which took place on board hereyesterday. And I
trust that their Lordship: and the Community at Large will do me thejustice to believe that my conduct has not
proceededfrom hasty or tyrannical motives, but that my on/y guide has been the fulfilling my duty as a servant of
my King & countries. This I can now solemn/y declare, and mean to do with my last moments, should the poor
misguided men - who are to be myjudges - allow me to say as much to them; and which Jam inclined to think
tb'y wil4 as tby real/y paid unexpected attention to me - even at a moment that one would bane little expected
airy attention from them, but what was producedfrom over-boiling Rage & Fury at seeing several of the wound-
ed & dying shipmates weltering in their blood Even then, I say, thry had, tho' armed with all manner of mis-
sine weapons, they gave me a bearing, and which certain/y saved Lieut. Boner's Life tho' the rope was about his
neck, and, indeed, when taken from his, I expected it would have been placed about mine. This irregular pream-
ble will, I trust, meet with their Lordship: indulgence, which I onE, trouble them with in hopes of relieving my
memory from disgraceful reflections, which a censorious world may [be much disposed to bestow on an officer]
who has been the unfortunate, but, I trust, the innocent cause of sbedckng the blood of his shipmates.
Thai about one p.m. on Sunday the 7th of May Captain Griffith came into my cabin & said, 'Sir, I am very
sorry to acquaintyou that everything appear: as wrong as ever with the Fleet fying at St. Helen's - where the
boats are assembling & theyard ropes reeved asformerfy.' I immediate/y desired he would go on deck, turn all
bands aft, and to let me know when they were there. As soon as they were aft, I went on the quarter deck and
told them that I supposed th!y knew what was goingforward at St. Helen's. Thry one & all assured me they did
not. 'Very well then, let me know f you have any gyievances remaining.' The anjwer was, 'No, none.'
'Haveyou not had every thing granted - nay, more than you expected - by the Admiralty.' 'Yes, Yes' was the
word
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That being the case, I now pledge myself f you wi/follow my advice, thatyou shall not get into any dis race
withyour brethren in the Fleet, as I shall become responsible foryour conduct; therefore, myfirsi wish is thatyou
hoist all the boats in, then secure the lower deck guns Yports, and afterwards, every bluejacket to remain quiet-
i5i be/ow - that I hould get the Mannes & officers under arms. All whith was done.
The officers & Marines (who had all given reason to suppose they meant to stand by us) were dispersed about
drent parts of the quarter deck, poop,forecastle & main deck.
When the boats of the Fleet approached the Mar/borough then /)ing to the westward, our people below began to
make a stir & chewed a disposition for coming up, which the officers at the batchwqys prevented They then
began to unlash middle deck guns, point them aft & up the hatchwqys and on the officers -- calling to me and
sqying that the men were forcing their way up - & must they prevent them by firing on them. I said 'Yes, cer-
tain/y they must not be allowed to come up till I order them.' Soon after, the confusion increased & some shots
were exchangedfmm the officers on deck & the men at the hatchwqys. The Marines began to throw down their
arms and make way for the men to come up. And numbers, having succeeded, in order to prevent any more shed-
ding of blood which would have been unavailing against such numbers, I ordered al/firing to cease & desired the
officers [to] retire qft and the men to come to me. Many of them did sa And the general cry was "Poor/for
Lieut. B over", who was immediate/y seized and carriedforward on the forecastle. And as soon as ayard rope
could be rove, thy began to place it about his neck at which moment, fortunate/y, Mr. Smith our surgeon - of
whom they haveJust/y a very hzgh opinion - got them to allow me to be heard By this time a/co the men of the
other ships (called their Delegates) had got on board &forward on ourforecastle - and I was heard What I
bad to say was that, jf anybody was culpable for what happened on that day, it was myse/for that Mr. Bover
only obeyed my orders. And that I on/y did my duty. This seemed to irritate not a little, but at length, when I
assured 'em that I had everfilt it my duty to resist such proceeding, but more especial/yjust now, having received
very recent Inatnictions & Orders from their Lordships for the conduct of officers toward the men. They one &
all caught at the word orders, and desired me to produce any such, which I said I could do, if they would allow
me to go down to the cabin for them. And which after much hesitation was granted, some men being allowed to
attend me. I went down and purpose/y delayedfinding my keys, in hopes that a little time mzht bring them to
cool reflection - & God knows - it was a most doubiful moment, for such a hope as many of them seemed very
much intoxicatec4 & which bad not been the case in any former part of their mutinies. On returning to the fore-
castle, Ifound they bad taken the rope from Mr. Bover's neck, which gave me some hopes for him, but I must
own,from their countenances, none for myseif However, before I began to read my orders, they, for the most part,
agreed to lay down their arms and put them in safety. Having read them, they said they must have them to con-
sider of & read over; that I must retire - be put under confinement - a/co my captain & Mr. Bover - but all
to be kept separate. I assured them their orders should strict/y be obeyed; and that I pledged myself to them, that
I never meant to be base enough to quit the ship & leave the officers in the lurch who had on/y done their duty in
obeyrng my orders. My answerfrom them was 'We shall chew - as we have power - that we can use it with dir-
cretion.' I on/y requested of them to be quick in their determinations and not to let the Service of the Country
stifferfor any fault of mine. And begged them to remember once [and] for all, that blame on/y belonged to me.
This Sir, I solemn/y declare is the whole that passed And on which I shall make no comments, on/y trust their
Lordthips wi//fee/as I did, that to save the lift of a most valuableyoung officer, Lieut. Bover, I amjustified in
having given up their orders. And I do trust, feeling as I do, that a man can't sacnfice his lift in any better cause
than that of fuflhling his duty to his country, that their Lordships won't, to save that of an individual like
mine, suffer themselves to be driven into any improper compliances by a set of poor misguided men. Acyet, I
have no reason to complain of my treatment today. Capt. Owens' brother (one of our mates) is confined in irons
- many of the people declaring be has .rhewn bimseif too bitter against them.
Capt. Owen, who has been a passenger on board here - and was former/y 1st Lieut. of thu ship, is under con-
finement but allowed to remain with me. The doctor & chaplain are a/co allowed to come to mc - without any
witnesses being bj Andfrom the great confidence the People have sojusib in those two gentlemen, lam willing to
hope for a happy term nation of this disagreeable business, which I mist bar not been broughtforward by any
premature or improper proceeding on my part.
I shall now close tI* probab/y my last address to their Lordships, in full confidence that they, in their wisdom,
will make that use of it which has produced my troubbng them with it, in order to jus4ly my conduct to the mod-
erate & well-disposed




Tho' I have reason to suppose that a letter of three sheets written toyou yesterdqy - at a moment when Iful/y
thought it would be the last I should have occasion to trou leyou with - may still be some where afloat; owing to
a variety of causes, which from my then situation will be sufficientLy obvious to you and their Lordshps. I thank
God thatjust now lam able to addressyou for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admira4#y
with very dflèrentfeelings to those of ysterday. And I requestyou will acquaint their Lordships, that soon after
the ship was anchored hereyesterdqy even ingJ that some of the Delegates, who had been sitting the most part of
the d.!Y on board the Mars, came on board here and directed that Lieut. B over should be liberated - an event,
which for his on.'n sake and his country's, I most hearti'y participated in - I say for his country's, because I have
seldom or ever met with a more promisingyoung officer. And I trust he may meet with that protection which I
am persuaded their Lordships are ever rea4y to shew to distinguished merit. In the course of the even/ingJ and
the ear/y part of this morning, various were the reports ipread about the ship (by our own people —for it was
blowing too hard to have communication with others), how the Admiral & his Captain (who, being his relation,
they thought must be equalfy culpable) were to be disposed of - but, for the most part, hanging seemed to be the
general opinion. It would be trespassing too much on their Lordship's time to mention how opinions were collected
among such a variefy of people on this we:ghy point. However, about 11 a.m., Lord Bridport humanefy con-
trived to get some of his people on board here; and soon after a deputation of our men came to me with a list
containing the names of such officers as must quit the ship the moment the weather will admit of boats going on
shore. Their Lordships may imagine how readify I gave my consent to such jyful news. Indeed, I hadfrequent/y
sent to them to say that all objectionable officers should be landed, but that I was determined to remain here.
Theirfinal determination, and which I believe at length was settled by the Londons onLy, was, that their officers
could not do otherwise than obey my orders. Therefore, they must be liberated, but some particular ones must be
landed - that theirAdmiral hadformerLy been theirfriend, but now, as he was become theirfoe, he might have
his life - which could be no compensation for the valuable ones that were taken away by my orders - but that he
must also strike his flag. So that as soon as the weather permits, myself Captain Griffiths, Captain Owen, a
passenger, Lieuts. McDonnell & Hoare, with Mr. Owen, mate, Mr. King, ditto, and Messrs. Fisher & Payne,
midshipmen, are to be sent away. And I am not sure, but they mean to make some particular request in favour
of Lieut. Boner-- it certain/y shows their good sense to have so hzgh an opinion of him. Thus, Sir, I hope termi-
nates this unpleasant business. Tho'just now Jam acquainted that when I land I must be conducted before the
Mayor of Portsmouth, as well as my Captain, in order to be delivered up to the Civil Power - to answerfor our
conduct - and which I trust we shall be able to dc
London, St. Helen's
10 May 1797
I have, since the melancho/y event Sunday, sent you three different letters for the purpose of giving the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty as circumstantial an account of matters as my situation would admit me to
commit to paper. I have reason to doubt whether conveyances for these letters may haveyet offered And to send
duplicates of them - were now impossible. There's one also for RearAdmiral Young. It would afford me great
consolation to know that any of them bad reached the Board I have on!), to beg that, ( ever tb!y should that
the Board will consider them as the correct statement of apen guided at a moment when it would be impious in
the extreme not to adhere to truth. I must repete [sic one part which may be matenalfor my country's good -
that no threats against me are to be a motive for their Lordships coming into terms which may be injurious to
one's country. The ships' companies knowfrom me, over and over again, that ?f fault lies anywhere, it is at my
door on/y, and let me on/y be the sufferer.
Yesterday, it bad been at one time determined that n'ryse7 with some other culprits, were to be delivered over to
the dt'ilpower, and I was directed to get ready for going on shore. It came to blows. The pobtical scale turned &
I was informed I must remain forfurther orders. In the course of the night, several boats came to the ship from
others /ying here to acquaint this ship's crew that they must n t attempt to land the admiral or officers - without
permission, several of the crews having objected there ta Vanous are the reports in circulation, but since I began
this, I am told that several of the leading crews have determin d that the Londons shall act as they think best by
their officers. And I am also told that the Londons mean to repel Force for Force - ?f any one attempts harm to
their officers. So stands the barometer at this moment - 1p.m.
I am treated with every attention I would e.çtect. The same visitors allowed to come to me. And by them - vi
surgeon, chap/ave. & Capt. Owen - I have sent to the People to desire they will think o4 of the Country -
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that everything depended on the quick sailing of the fleet -- that they m:ght dispose of me -- who on/y was
ble, as thefy pleased; at this moment - or cariy me to sea a Prisoner - My answer is that they mean me no
harm.
Whenever their Lordships may think it rzght for me to strike myflag, I hope they'll not hesitate giving orders for
that purpose - because I feel in d.i4y bound to acquiesce in any measure for the good of my country.
London, St. Hekn'c
9-11 May 1797
I requestyou will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I this morning at 8 am received one
page from the ship's company of His Majesty's Ship London desiring that I would :mmediatey get ready toga
on shore, to be accompanied by my captain, Lieuts. McDonnell & Hoare, with Mr. Owens, master's mate; and
they recommend our going on shore with as little as possible the appearance of officers, to which for my own part
[I made some objections, and which I soon after waved (in their assuring me) that the measure was recommend-
ed; in order to prevent our receiving any insult at our landing, and that there were still some of the ships compa-
ny very rfractorj on the subject - of our being allowed to land - which, however, has taken place without any sort
of dfficulty. I am happy to say that I have found my reception -from all ranks of people - in every respect equal
to my most sanguine wishes. I shall be glad to be assured that sundry letters addressed toyou -for their
L.ordshps' information may have come to bancL If not, it may be necessary for me to make as correct duplicates
as I can, because they related; for the most part, to the particulars of the late unlucky business which took place
on board the London. And by which I ct it will appear to their Lordthips that my conduct was not over pre-
mature. I am free to say that however wrong it may appear, that even had I been aware that the marines did not
mean to assist us, that I should (after al/that has been done for the seamen) felt itmy duty to make some effini
with the few officers I had to assist me against what I shall ever deem most improper & mutinous proceedings.
Admiral Earl Howe is now at St. He/er/s. I saw his Lordshp at my landing &gave him every information in
my power on the subject of the diçtosition which seemed most relevant among the different crews - who I real/y
believe are ready to proceed to sea having declaredfor two days past, that they on/y waited to get rid of objection-
able officers - myself unfortunateLy being now become the most so. That point, however unpleasant to be given
way to, must Ifear be submitted to - in the present situation of affairs. Some officers have been put out of their
shps against their inclinations, others have, Ifear, have asked the men to allow them to land and have done so.
Either way, I hope their Lordsht's will see the necessity of having a number of officers ready to embark with as
little loss of time aspossible;for the state of the Mars, Duke, & Terrible are tru/y alarming. The on/y officer
remaining on board is the master, but the leading sbps certain/y [illegible] of their/illegible] conduct in this
respect. Therefore, I most earnest/y hope that such officers as know they can return to their duty will not lose a
moment in doing so.
I shall wait here their Lordchs pleasure, but believe,for a time it may be as well that I should not be much
seen at a seaport town.
By tomorrow Post, I hope to be able to sendyou for their Lordshs information a correct list of the names of
displaced officers belonging to His Majesty's Ship London.
I have acquainted Earl Howe that I ampeifect/y at his Lordshp's disposal - taking itfor granted that it must
meet with their Lordships approbation.
PS. I amjust now informed that the Coroner's inquest have brought in the death of the seamen Justifiable
Homicide:so that the Mayor sets me at Liberty.
London, St. Helen's
11 May 1797
The different sbps' companies now /ying here have sent to me this morning a list of objectionable officers; and
which must be landed before th!y can proceed to sea, the list being sent to Admiral Lord Bridport. His Lordsbp
will no doubt transmit it toyou for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, who will, I
trust, have no objection to comp5ng with the people's wishes. As soon as I am on shore, I shall apply to their
Lordshpsforpermission to strike my Flag.
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ThIrst/a). 4 Maj 1 '97
It has often been contended by friends
of freedom, that the great object of
the present administration has been the
establishment of arbitrary power by
the subversion of the British
Constitution. Of their direct attacks
upon this (onstitution we has wit-
nested numerous instances. the sus-
pension of the I labeas Corpus .ct, the
repeal of the Bill of Rights in its most
essential clauses, the erection of
Barracks all over the country without
legislative sanction, the disposal of
public money, in which they have
acknowledged no parliamentary cnn-
trd, and the gagging acts, best known
as the Pitt and Gronville Bills, are a few
of the many destructive attacks they
have made against that ancient fabric
The motives of men however may
often be mote accurately discovered by
the collateral parts of the system upon
which they act, this by the more promi-
nent features of their conduct.
Knowledge, in every age and country,
has shewn itself to be the fostering
parent of liberty, and under the clouds
of ignorance we have uniformly found
the rod of the Despot and the yoke of
the Slave. !iThen the mind is enlight-
ened it knows its rank in the scale of
being, and will not submit to insulting
forms of degradation, but in a state of
barbarism its powers lose all their vital
energY, and leave it to fall without a
struggle, the unresisting victim of
oppression.
In order therefore, to reduce a people
once free, to a state of servitude, it is
important in the first place, to make
them ignorant 1w depriving them of
their accustomed means of informa-
tion. And for effecting this subservient
purpose what plan was it possible to
devise which could have been more
successful than that which has been
acted upon by the present Ministers?
Sunday schools were established
throughout the kingdom; but Sunday
schools tended to enlighten the rising
generation b, affording them an
opportunity of early rational instruc-
tion; Sunday schools therefore have
been discouraged and suppressed! and
by whom? by the Clergy, whose duty
and whole office it is to instruct the
people in the principles of religion,
and to propagate morality by the dis-
semination of useful knowledge, but
whose system and whole practice it
unfortunately is, to prostitute the natu-
ral dignity of their order to the lust of
preferment.
The Press also was inimical to their
systet the press therefore has been
the marked victim of their policy - It
Was not enough that the opportunities
of education should be restricted, and
public discussion prohibited by laws:
books, and periodical publications
were still to be had, and there were a
even among the lower classes, who
could read. 1k, have shut up all the
schools and booksellers in the first
instance, would have been a step more
likely to outrage the feeling of the
nation than effect the purpose they had
in view iltey have accomplished their
object in another way. They have laid
such a tax upon paper as to put the
purchase of books out of the power of
the lower and even the middle classes
of society, and by the present addition
to the duty on newspapers, they are
about to pronounce a veto upon the
penodical press. I low long the people
will bear tube duped, oppressed, and
insulted by such an imprincipled and
desperate junto as that at present in
power,itis for theirpatience todccidc.
They have already surrendered the
political tights to its authority, they
have ftlded their moral principle to its
influence, it only remains for them to
Starve the intellectual faculties in coin-
pliance with the regimen which it pee-
scribes.
Ilnuic of l.ordu
ilie Duke of Bedford asked, whether
any of his Majesty's Ministers had it in
charge, from his Majesty, to make any
communication upon the recent
important transactions which had
occurred in the Marine department? If
no such communication was made,
either now or on a future day, he
should find himself called upon to
bring a subject, so connected with the
best interests of the Country, before
their I.ordships, moving for the pro-
duction of certain papers connected
with it.
Earl Spencer replied, that he had it not
in charge from his Majesty to make any
communication to the I louse, nor did
he foresee, that any communication
would be made upon that subject
Earl howe said, that as his name had
been mentioned in the transaction
alluded to, he had anxiously waited for
a suitable opportunity to explain to
their Lordships the part which he had
acted in the business. I lad any censure
been attached to his professional char-
acter, he would have lookedto another
quarter for an enquin. into his conduct.
But as the blame which had fallen
upon him in the present instance relat-
ed to his conduct in a capacitr different
from that on an officer, he looked to
their Lordships for his vindication.
The explanation, therefore, far which
he was called upon, he should take an
opportunity of giving when the Noble
l)uke brought the subject before the
I Ioue. I Ic expressed a wish, however,
that for the sake of the service, the
business had never brought under dis-
cussion, for the laislature would be
brought by it into a most delicate situ-
ation. Either they must approve of
transactions which there was no man
who did not wish had never happened,
or they must withhold that approba-
tion, and thus acknowledge that they
have made concessions under the pres-
sure of the moment which they think
improper to confirm.
Lord Grenville agreed entirely with the
Noble Earl (I lowe) of the inexpedien-
cy and impolicy of bringing the subject
under discussion, and entreated their
l.ordships to allow matters to rest as
they were. I le had, therefore, no hesi-
tation in declaring that he should
steadily oppose any mention which
might be made for the pnxluction of
papers relating to a subject of such a
delicate nature, that it could not be agi-
tated without risking the most serious
danger.
The Duke of Clarence declined giving
am opinion upon the propriety of
introducing any discussion upon the
present subject in a political vies but
as a professional man, he deprecated
such a discussion as pregnant with the
most dangerous consequences to the
service.
The Earl of Carlisle did not presume
to give any opinion upon the propriety
or impropriety of entering into the dis-
cussion of transactions to which no
one was a stranger at the present
moment. But he wished to knov4
whether the penod for discussion was
never to come; whether their
l.ordships, forming one branch of the
Legislature, were to be kept in perpet-
ual ignorance of events which were the
most serious in their nature of any that
had occurred in the country, and,
which had shaken the pillars of the
state to their very foundation? With
respect to the period which might be
most fit for agitating matters certainly
of great delicacy, the was no man
whose opinion he should have so
much deference, as that of the Noble
Earl (I lowe). But as a Member of that
I louse, he could not assent to the doc-
trine of Government holding perpetu-
al silence upon these transactions.
The l)uke of Bedford said, he was
now too well acquainted with the issue
of the motions in that house, which
the King's Ministers intimated their
intentions to oppose. lie certainly
therefore should not make an attempt
to bring the present subject into dis-
cussion, which he well knew would be
fruitless. But if he could conceive any
terms in which he could couch a
motion for the production of the
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papers connected with it, h WOUld
make that motion now; as the transac-
tions, however, to which he referred,
were without parallel in history -- for
hc knew of no instance but the pres-
(lit, Ifl WhiCh the Ministers of thc King
had entered nto correspondence and
negotiations with a body of his
Majesty's subjects -- to conceive the
proper terms for a motion on such a
subject was no easy task. If any mode
occurred to him of obtammg these
papers, he should propose it to the
I louse on a future day without any
preface or recommendation, leaving it
entirely to the decision of their
1
Lord Viscount Sydney deprecated all
discussion upon the subject of so great
a delicacy as the present, as it could do
no good, and might produce much
harm. lie allowed, however, that if it
was to come in any shape before their
lordshipii, that proposed by the Noble
Duke, was the simplest, and therefore
the best. Whether the discussion might
or might not be brought on a future
time, he could not take upon himself
to determine; all he contended was,
that the present was not the proper
time.
Earl I lowe - between the second week
in last lebruary and middle of March,
being then confined by illness at Bath,
I received, by the post, several pen-
turns, purporting to be transmitted
from different ships of the Channd
fleet. 'Ilie were all exact aqies of
each other, limited solely to a request
for an increase of pay that the Seamen
might be able to make better provision
for their families, decently expressed,
but without any signature I could not
reply to applications which were
anonymous, nor acknowledge the
n.ccipe of them to parties unavowed
and unascertained. .bout four or five
of the Petitions first received, though
little different in the hand writing, were
obviously dated by the same person.
and I had therein further reason to
think they were fabricated by some
malicious individual, who meant to
insinuate the prevalence of a general
discontent in the fleet.
Not resting, however, on this cnndu-
sion, I WTote to the Officer at
Portsmouth, to whom I was naturally
to expect such applications would, in
my absence, be addressed, to inquire
whether any such dissatisfaction exist-
ed in the fleet. The answer was "that
no such appearance has been heard of
there, and it was supposed the
Petitions had been framed for the pur-
pose I suspected."
On the morning of the 22nd of
March, the day after I was able to come
to Thwn, one of the Lords of the
.dmiraltv, now absent on service, hap-
pening to call upon me, I related these
particulars to him, showed him the
Petitions, and sent them the same day
to his house in the Office, that they
might be communicated to the Noble
latl who presides at that Board.
Of the subsequent events I have no
other knowledge but such as is to be
obtained in the daily papers. l)emands
for an increase of pay, by Fleet or
Army on service, are not to be diii-




I louse of Peers:
ilie l)uke of Bedford rose to call the
attention of their liwdships to a very
important and serious event, which
had recently taken place. I Ic alluded to
the late Mutiny on board I his Majesty's
l'leet at Portsmouth. It struck him with
surprise that no communication had
been made by Ills Majesty to
Parliament on a subject of such magni-
tude and such great national interest.
He was aware of the delicacy of the
subject, and that the first intimation of
the affair had better come through I his
Majesty's Ministers; yet its importance
was so great, that he deemed it his duty
in case that no communication on the
part of the Ministers was intended, to
move for the production of such
Papers as might tend to through light
upon the subject. lie was not decided
whether he should bring forward a spe-
cific Motion of the afliar however, he
wished to know in the first instance
whether it was the intention of
Ministem to make a communication to
Parliament on the subject.
Earl Spencer said, that he had it not in
Command, from I his Majesty to make
any communication to the I louse on
the subject, nor did it appear to him as
likely that he should be ordered to do
Iail Howe said, that he had attended
the llouse lately several times, and
waited with anxious impatience for an
opportunity of vindicating himself
from an unfounded Charge that had
been alleged against him in the course
of the business mentioned by the
Noble Duke, and also to do	 fl
imputations conveyed in some reports
that had obtained against his conduct
in the same affair, and which affected
his professional credit and Character,
he felt that he could not regularly have
originated the discussion himse1f but
was so far happy, that he was likely to
have a regular opportunity of vindicat-
ing himself; at the same time it struck
him (alluding to the affair of the
Mutiny) as a very improper subject for
discussion, and in the present circum-
stances, rather likely to be productive
of mischief, than of good effects.
Ills Royal Ihighnesii the Duke of
Clarence took the opportunity to
express his opinion, that the Noble
Mmiral's conduct had been perfectly
unexceptional, and that when the
opportunity arrived, he would be able
to vindicate himself in a manner con-
sonant to the illustrious character he
had always maintained; he also coincid-
cd with the Noble Admiral, in depre-
cating the discussion of the subject, as
likely to be productive of no possible
good effect. It was a question that
deeply involved the material point of
naval disciplin.. It appeared to him, in
the arrangement that had taken place,
speaking merely as an Officer (so we
understood the Royal Duke), and with
a view to the fundamental rules of dis-
cipline, to be improper to have corn-
pliedwith the demands of the Seamen,
howcver the concession might have
been polite, or proper in other points
of view
Lord Grenville observed to the same
effect. lie deprecated the discussion of
a subject of such delicacy and impor-
tance, as of the oat injurous tendency,
and, under the present circumstances,
as had better been never mentioned.
Earl I lowe again rose - he observed he
felt the full force of the propriety of
the Royal Duke's remarks on the affair,
with a view to naval discipline; but
what appeared to him to be the ques-
tion, in a Parliamentary discussion of
the business, was, Will ysu agree to the
terms made by the Admiralty with the
Seamen, or not? If the terms were fully
ratified, it would virtually be giving a
sanction to their conduct If refused, it
would show the Seamen that no
reliance was to be placed on the prom-
ises of Government, and the conse-
quences this idea might have, were eas-
ier to be seen than described. As cu-
cumstanccs sttxxl, he had no hesitation
in saving, that the engagements made
by the Admiralty should by fl means
be fulfilled bc Parhamcnt
Earl I lowe ruse as third time, and said,
that by what had transpired, it was not
likely that he should have a fitter
opportunity than the present moment,
for stating to their Iiwdships (to whom
alone he had to kink up for his justifi-
cation) the share he had in the unfor-
tunate transaction, before alluded to,
which to the best of his recollection
was this:
Between the second week of last
Friday, and middle of March (his
Lordship being then confined by ill-
ness at Bath, he received, by the post,
several Petitions, purporting to be
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transmitted from ditten.nt Ships of the
Channel Meet. lucy were all exact
copies of each other, limited solely to a
request for an increase of pay; that the
Seamen might be able to make better
provision for their families; decently
expressed, but without any Signature.
lbs Lordship could not reply to appli-
cations which were anonymous; nor
acknowledge the receipt of them to
parties unavowed and unascertained.
.\bout four or five of the Petitions first
received, though little different in the
hand-writing, were obviously dated by
the same person; and his lordship had
therein farther reason to think they
were fabricated by some malicious
individual, who meant to insinuate the
prevalence of a general discontent in
the Fleet. Not resting, however, on this
conclusion, his liwdship wrote to the
Officer at Portsmouth (to whom he
was naturally to expect such applica-
tions would, in his absence, be
addressct, to inquire whether any
such dissatisfaction existed in the Fleet.
The answer was, that no such appear-
ance had been heard of there; and it
was supposed the Petitions had been
framed for the purpose he suspccteii
On the morning of the 22nd of
March, the day after his Lordship was
able to come to Town, one of the
Lords of the Admiralty, now absent on
service, happening to call upon him, he
(Earl I lowe) related these particulars to
him, showed him the Petitions, and
sent them the same day to his house in
the Office, that they might be commu-
nicated to the Noble Earl who presides
at that Board. Of the subsequent
events, he had no other knowledge
than such as was to be obtained in the
daily Papers; and demands for an
increase of pay, by a Fleet or Army on
service, were not to be discussed, his
Lordship apprehended, in an anony-
mous correspondence.
Ilis Lordship concluded by making
some remarks to the effect of his for-
mer observations, and vindicated the
character of the British Seamen in gen-
eral, whom he dccnbvd as open
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To the Right I lonourablc Earl Spencer,
First Lord of the .%dmiralt; ILtTer XV
-an the Portsmouth Mutiny
My Lord, the statements I have hither-
to made, of the probable conse-
quences of so relaxed a state of our
marine discipline, have been too
prophetic of the calamity which has
now befallen the country. Ilie rerolu-
tionary triumph of the Portsmouth
Mutinecrs has completed the catalogue
of its misfortun iliat a amfedetacy
of such magnitude should have been
planned, and organised into a control-
brig power, without the knowledge of
as to suppose a new case
in the history of human events I have
little doubt but that the spirit of insur-
gency was excited in the first instance,
scattering that incendiary strain of
Irish malcontents through the fleet,
who had been banished as subverters
of good order from their own island,
but as similar efforts might naturally be
expected from these desperadoes,
afloat, it surely called for more than
ordinary circumspection to guard
against their machinations Viliethet
the want of vigilance in preventing, or
the concession which has now sancti-
fied this treason, demands the severest
censure, I shall not at present deter-
mine. If there were solid grounds of
complaints on the part of the Seamen,
which the Board of Admiralty have
admitted, but I am authonsed to deny,
how happened it, my Lord, that these
were not redressed as a boon, before
they became extorted as a right? I
know it to be circulated with much
official industry that Earl I lowe had
received repeated petitions from the
Mariners on this subject, and that he
resigned his command to avoid the
contest he expected This is an impor-
tant point in the question, which can-
not pass unexplained. If the assertion
be true, it must demonstrate one of
two essential facts; viz, either that his
Lordship had transmitted such reman-
strances to the illegibkI Government
without the desired effect, or was satis-
fied in his own mind, that these peti-
tions and remonstrances were not just-
ly founded Be this as it may. when the
time did come that the senses of the
Hoard of Admiralty were open to the
conviction of this national peril, and
disgrace, what were the steps taken on
so memorable an occasion? L)id not
the Naval Presidency of England sue
fur a conference with Joyce and his Co-
I )degateiç which the mutinecrs would
nor condescend to give, until life-ropes
were reeved at the fore yard-arm, as a
most effectual guarantee of their dar-
ing propositionsr
Sir .lan Gardner's reproof of those
men at "skulking lubbers, who made
their mutiny a pretext to avoid the
enemy," though indiscreetly timed, was
the better mode of treating the inaur.
gents, and had it been generally sup-
ported, and with equal firmness, the
Naval Parliament had, no doubt, been
dissolved, and its revolutionary mem-
bers not been going to sea, the proba-
ble rulers of the Western .uadronl
Hut, your Lordship, it seem, has
thought, that a pusillanimous compli-
ance with the mutineer demands, was a
measure of sounder policy; and there-
fore was issued through his Majesty's
Proclamation, an indermnirt which has
sanctified the whole of this systematic
disobedience. I low the offenders mer-
ited all this concession at the hands of
the Government, is best seen in the
manner they received it; for they struck
theirred flag with a churlish reluctance,
still denouncing several gallant officers
in the fleet, and ratifing the treaty
after all, as men "more sinned against,
than sinningi"
And now, my Lord, it may reasonably
be asked, in what state of security is
placed the British Navy, in conse-
quence of this degrading submission
made by its rulers? The delegate muti-
neers still remain on board their
respective ships, and u have neither
ventured to separate, nor remove
them. Should it be necessary, on any
future occasion, to attempt to enforce
punishment on the person of Mr.
Joyce, or remove him, at his co-equal-
izers from their respective ships, will
not the delegate flag of defiance be
rehaisted? will it be safe to trust the
fleet, so commanded off the enemy's
coast? You, my Lord, know well
enough the effect of power gained by
a departure from public principle, to
decide whether men, so intoxicated
with its extorted sweets, are likely to
return with cheerfulness to the sober
duties of dependence, and subjection?
or whether the people of England can
rely on seamen so transmuted, for their
future defence and protection? I must
trespass upon ur Lordship's patience
with some further remarks on this dis-
astrous event.
I have the honour to be, &c. &c
Ruu
(We lament that we had not the power
of giving the above an earlier publica-
tion)
•l'he Mutiny Renewedi
We arc much concerned to announce
to our readers, that the Mutiny on
board the ships of war at Spithcad
broke out again on Sunday last with the
most alarming violence; and, from
what we have been able to collect upon
the subject, we fear there is too much
reason to conclude that aixne blood
has been shed on the painful and lam-
entable occasion. The discontents
which produced this unfortunate event
originated, we understand, in a suppo-
sition that the promises held out to the
Sailors by the Board of .tdmiralty were
not meant to be fulfilled by
Government; which no doubt was
founded not only upon the unaccount-
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able neglect of Ministers, in not bong-
ing the affair immediately before
Parliament, but also upon thc language
made use of in the I louse of l.tirds, a
few evenings since, by one of his
Majesty's Secretaries of Statc. The
ground of this supposition however,
we are happy to find, is at length
entirely done away with, by the rs)te of
last night in the I louse of Commons;
and we entertain the most sanguine
hopes that we shall hencefbtward be
relieved, by the orderly conduct of our
gallant lrs, from the distressing duty
of detailing such dreadful and alarming
proceedings - proceedings which strike
at once at the very foundation of our
national security and individual safety
11w refractory spirit of the Seamen on
the present occasion has been mani-
fested in a manner that reflects very lit-
tle credit on their boasted loyalty and
attachment to thor Country's cause.
Whati the natural defenders of Old
lngland refuse to put to sea, and slug-
gishly rLlnain in port, under a frivolous
pretext, at a time when her coaSts are
menaced by a daring and enterprising
foel Such behaviour is surely unworthy
of the character of Rritish Seamen;
and yet, if we are tightly informed,
such has actually been their unfortu-
nate instance to which we now allude.
Admiral Lord BRIL)PORT, we are
informed by our Portsmouth letters,
received intelligence on Sunday of the
Brest fleet having dropped into the
outer hathour, preparatory to their
putting to sea, and some accounts even
state that they were then actually at sea
in great force. It was under this press-
ing consideration that the Noble
Admiral determined to lose no time in
proceeding in quest of the enemy. lie
accordingl'.; on the morning of that
day, made the signal for the fleet to
weigh from St. I lelen's, which instead
of being obeyed, was universally disre-
garded, and the several crews, after
having given their accustomed muti-
nous cheers, assembled the l)elcgates
of the fleet, and sent their high
Mightinesses to confer with the Sailors
on board the lA)NIX)N, the flagship
of Vice-Admiral (OLP(ff S. and the
MARlBOROUGh, Captain
NICII I (whose dismissal has been
demanded by the crew) at Spithcad.
On their approaching the London,
Admiral COI.POYS gave orders to his
men to prevent them from coming on
board his ship, which the crew obsti-
nately refused to obey. The marines
were then ordered up, and, all remon-
strance proving ineffectual, the
Admiral commanded them to fire
upon the sailors. 1iethcr this order
was or was not obeyed, we are at a loss
to ascertain, our letters varying
extremely upon the subject. Some .'iay
that the marines did tire, not only on
board the lAlndon, but also on board
the Marlborough; that several men
belonging to both ships were killed and
wounded; that the sailors immediately
flew to arms, attacked the officers an
marines, killed a I .ieutenant of the
IA)NIX)N, and another officer,
wounded some privates, subdued the
remainder, and put the Admiral and
Captain in dose confinement, both of
whom they threatened to hang on the
following morning; while others posi-
tively state that the marines refused to
fire, and threw down their arms; by
which means the crews obtained quiet
possession of the ships. The Captain
and First Lieutenant of the MARl.-
B( )Rou(;I I, it is added, were immedi-
ately sent on shore; one or two letters
mention that they were severely
wounded in a dreadful conflict with
their men. Statements so very contra-
dictory we cannot pretend to reconcile,
and we entertain strong hopes that the
whole affair will pnwe to have been
greatly exaggerated, if not grossly mis-
representea
I laying thus Far described the general
purport of the accounts received yes-
terday upon this momentous subject,
without attending to a number of
vague and idle rumours which
obtained circulation in the course (if
the day, we now proceed to state a fact,
the communication of which will, we
are convinced, afford the most heart-
felt satisfaction to every honest
lnghishman.
Advice was yesterday afternoon
received at the Admiralt'., that the
Mutiny on board the Meet had entirely
subsided, in consequence of an assur-
ance from the Commander in Chief
that the recent advance of the
Seamen's pay would that day (Monday)
receive the sanction of Parliament, that
on receiving this communication the
Mutineers struck the Red Hag, which
they had displayed on board the IA)N-
IX)N; that Admiral COLN)VS imme-
diatelv htnd his flag; and, in com-
panv with the M.RLW)R0UGII,
dropped down to St. I Iekn's; and that
when this account was dispatched, the
whole of the Grand Meet were prepar-
ing to proceed to sea in quest of the
enemy; with whom, should they be so
fortunate as to fall in, we doubt not but
the hardy sons of Britain will make due
atonement to their country for their
past conduct
Portsmouth, May 7 - "After post, and
before the mail cnach set out, we have
learned the following particulars: - ilie
Delegates from the different ships at
St. Helen's, came alongside the
London, Admiral Colpovs, about three
o'clock in the afternoon of this din;
and solicited admittance, the Marines
were ordered to fire on them, but
declined, and grounded their arms, ixi
this the Officers dosed the hatchways,
and, on the men forcing their way up,
the Captain fired a pistol, which mor-
tally wounded a lad through the grat-
ings; in the conflict three seamen and
one mantic were also mortally wound-
ed. (hi the other side, lieutenant Sims,
on the Marines, received balls through
both arms, and a Midshipman also was
dangerously wounded. The privates
now took complete possession of the
ship, and would have hoisted
lieutenant Bouvier up to the main
yard, but fnxn his solemn declaration
that he acted by the Admirars order,
on which he was respited for the pres-
ent, but he is, with all other officers on
board, at present in dose confinement,
and God knows what even this night
maybe their fate."
Portsmouth, May 7 - "At twelve
o'clock this morning the seamen on
board the I .ondon struck Admiral
Colpoy's flag, and about three this
afternoon several muskets were fired
on board her with ball, supposed by
the Officers, as they were provided
with them, some say the men now
demand and equal distribution of pnae
money; others, that they are dissatisfied
with the Admiral and his Officers. The
Majestic going down to St. I lelen's this
morning, was stopped, and dreadful
are the consequences that are to be
expected from the fleet being again
prevented from sailing, as it is reported
the lrench are at Sea, with 18 sail of
the line?
Portsmouth, May 7 - I am sorry to say
that the mutiny has broken out again in
the fleet. The Officers attempted to
deter the Delegates from the crews on
the different ships to meet on board
the London, where they intended to
confer respecting their late affair for
raising their pay. This conference of
the 1)elegates was, it is said, occasioned
by a suspicion that Government,
owing to what has lately been said in
the house of Lords, did not mean to
perform their engagements with them.
The Officers cut down some men, one
was hung at the yard arm, and others
thrown into irons or wowideiL The
fleer, however, soon resented this treat-
ment on the part of their superiors,
who ordered the Marines to fire upon
them, but the latter refused compli-
ance, and pounded their arms.
Admiral (:ls is made prisoner, and
his execution is fixed for tomorrow
morning, with the rest of his Officers.
Among the various reports, it is said
the whole fleet has declared that they
will not go out to fight the French
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fki.i. ihe rnhab.tants of Portsmouth
fly tenor, afraid of the bnn
bardment, and every thing threatens
the most melancholy ami'cquences"
Portsmouth, May 7 - "This day a dii-
turbance broke out in one of the shipii,
I believe the London, when some men
were killed by the Officers, in attempt-
ing to enforce order, which has
enraged seamen to such a degree that
the most serious consequences osi
hardly be avoided. 1rror and conster-
nation prevail through our streets, and
it is not improbably but my next letter
may contain an account of the wealthy
inhabitants moving their property to
the interior of the country No boats
arc allowed to go alongside the ships;
but, from the best accounts that have
reached us, the present alarming Ji
contents have originated from a am-
versanon that occurred a few days ago
in the I louse of Lords, from which the
men formed an opinion that the public
faith pledged to them, as happened
lately in the Culloden, was to be broken
or disregarded. The precedent of the
Cullodcn was as foulows a mutiny hap-
pened on the supposition, supported
by the opinion of the carpenters, that
she was unsafe to perform a vcwage. A
gentleman high in rank in a neighbor-
ing kingdom, and of great authority in
the Navy, restored subordiniation on a
solemn promise of indemnity to the
men. A short tme afterwards, howev-
five men, supposed to be ringlead-
ers, were picked out, tried by a Court-
martia and executed."
Staiday kvuiing. Nine o'clock
"This evening the Delegates from the
ships at St. I (dens came to Spithead,
and went alongside of the London, of
98 guns, Admiral Colpovs, who refused
them to come (xi board. The crew
insisted on receiving the Delegates, on
which the Admiral ordered the
Marines aft and told them, in the most
peremptory manner, if they attempted
in the smallest degree to mutm; he
would make the Marines fire upon
them, which, from their behavior, he
was under the necessity of doing.
when one or two of the crew were
wounded. They then got possession of
firearms - fired upon the Officers --
have shot the First Lieutenant dead --
wounded one of the Mates, and sever-
al Officers, who arc now going to the
hospital. The L)elegates are now on
their passage from the London at
.Spithcad to St. I kkn's. It is generally
reported that the &cst Fleet is at Sea,




london Monday May8 - It is very cur-
rendy reported, that the French fleet
ate at sea, and have a fleet of transport
with thciie the account is said to have
been brought from Falmouth, and
received there from SirJobn ii Warren.
The truth we do not vouch for.
Mutiny at Spithea&
th heart-rending pain we announce
to our readers the distressing intelli-
gence, that the mutiny in the fleet at
Spithead and St. I iclens had broken
out again with much alarming violence.
Already some blood has ba.i * spilt
both an the aide of the officers and of
the men. 'is no boats arc allowed to go
on board the ships, our correspon-
dents have not been able to procure
such full information as we could have
wished. The following are the accounts
that have reached us:
Portsmouth May 7 - We are all in a
state of the utmost alarm hete, and it is
impossible to desalbe our sensations
at the present moment. The mutiny on
board the fleet at Spithcad and St.
Helen's is renewed with redoubled
vigour.
This day a disturbance broke out in
oneof theships, I believe the London,
when some men were killed by the
officers, in attempting to enforce
order, which has enraged the seamen
to such a degree that the most serious
consequences hardly be avoided.
lerror and consternation prevail
through our streets, and it is not
improbable but my next letter may
contain an account of the wealthy
inhabitants moving their property into
the interior of the country. No boats
are allowed to go alongside the ships:
but from the best accounts that have
reached, the present alarming discon-
tents have originated from a conversa-
tion that occurred a few days ago in the
house of Lotds, from which the men
considered that the faith pledged to
them had been broken, as no steps had
been taken in Parliament to carry into
execution the solemn promise that had
been made to them in the name of his
Majesty They thought it indispcnsibk
to their security that an Act of
Parliament should be passed before
they proceeded to sea; and they have
ever since talked of the unaccountable
delay of Ministers in not bringing for-
ward the business They also said that
the language of Ministers in the I louse
of Lords was not satisfactor as they
had said that the matter was not to be
discussed or that it was too delicate fin
discussion, or words to that eflèct.
J,e 1oo €hinkI
(j-9.IJ	 9
Mr. Pm ruse, appiiwnth much agstrwd
and embarrassed. - lie began by stat-
ing. that when any proposition was
brought forward for an increase in the
public expenditure, it might naturally
be expected that he should enter upon
a detailed statement as to the cause that
led to that augmentation of pay and
allowance in any of the services - On
the present occasion, however, he
declared, that he did not feel himself at
liberty to enter into a detail of the
transactions: - (A loud call of - heart
I (ease - Observing how much this sub-
ject occupied the attention of the
I louse, he felt himself obliged to say,
that he must trust to their judgement in
concurring to the motion, in prefer-
ence toth entering into a long dis-
cussion. lie was, besides unable to
enter Into a statement of the events
that had more recently happened, and
if he could, he should feel a reluctance
in doing it; for whatever the extent of
those embarrassments might be; they
were wholl or in a great degree, to be
ascribed to misrepresentations The
utmost caution aught to be employed,
to avoid even the possibility of misrep-
resentation. Nothing could, in his
opinion, contribute so effectually to
silence discontent, as the unanimous
decision of Parliament.
Mr. Fox It was not to discussion, he
asserted, but to rilence, that the I louse
was to attribute the mischief that had
happened.... Itwasthedutyof the
house to inquire how far the
Admiralty had acceded to the wishes of
the seamen, and how far the seamen
were satisfied. lot his own part, all his
knowledge of the business was collect-
ed from the public newspapers
Mr. Sheridan: Instead of following up
that instrument by the sanction of
Parliament, the business was suffered
to rest on a mere promise of redress,
and now that the mischief is done, the
Ministers comes with a slow and sullen
pace for the interposition of
Parliament ... . the second discentents
e wholly to be asaibcd to the pro-
crastination of Ministers
It is with the utmost concern we have
to notice a second mutiny on board the
fleet under the command of lord
lridport at St. I lelen's After the vetv
ample concessions which had been
made by the Lords of the .tdmiralt;
and his Majcsws most gracious par-
don, it might have been expected, that
even feeling of discontent would have
subsided, and that the British seamen
would have returned to their duty more
heartily attached than ever to the glory
of their Country; and been inspired
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with a mute than common share of
emulation to med the enemy, and tea-
tifv their gratitude fOr the favours they
had received; but by letters from
Portsmouth received yesterday morn-
ing we learn with regret, that on thc
signal being made by Iord Kridpott on
Sunday morning fOr the fleet to sail,
the seamen again refused to weigh
anchor, alleging as a reason that noth-
ing had yet been settled by Parliament,
confirming their increase of pay &c
On some of the delegates coming
alongside .dmiral (olpoy's ship, the
London, at Spithead, the Admiral in a
very spirited manner declared that
none should come on board. The sea-
men intimating that they should,
Admiral Colpoys told them that if they
persisted, the axisequenccs would be
fatal, as he was determined to see dis-
cipline preserved. On which he called
to the Officer of Marines to be ready,
and on the seamen persevering in their
mutiny, the marines, fired, and, it is
said, killed 5 men. lily seamen soon
got possession of the ship, and fired
aft, by which it is reported the First
lieutenant of the London and several
marines were killed or wounded.
Certain it is, that the mutinous seamen
had complete possession of the
London, and had declared vengeance
against Admiral (.olpoys and his
Officers
It would be improper to detail all the
unpleasant reports we have heard on
this subject; but such was the confu-
sion and anxiety of mind at
Portsmouth, that the precise truth was
not known, as there was little commu-
nication between the ships and the
shote.
The following letters came to hand
yesterday: Portsmouth, Sunday
Evening, half past sax ododi.
when the boats attempted to go on
board Admiral Colpoys ships, he and
his officers resolved to oppose their
costing on board with force, and in the
encounter seven of the boats crew
were killed and nine i ,undoi
Portsmouth - Mar 7
l)vlegatea from the .htp .mt St. lit kn'.
came to Spithead and went alongode
of the London of 98 guns, Admiral
Colpays, who refused to let them on
board; the crew insisted they should
come; in consequence of which he
ordered thc marines aft, and told the
sailors, that if thc behaved in the least
mutinous, he would order them to fare
upon them. Upon this the sailors
seized some arms and fired upon the
Officers. We are extremely concerned
to add, that the hrst lieutenant was
killed, one of the Masters and several
others wounded, who arc now going to
the hospitaL
Portsmouth - Mai 7, On going on
board the London, the Officers resis-
ted with musketry and pistols, and sev-
eral are killed and wounded; the
wounded are just now landed at the
hospital at Ilamilar. it is reported that
.dmiral Colpoys and the Officers of
the London are threatened to be hung
at sun set, we trust it is not true.
Another letter states the following par-
The delegates from the different ships
at St. I lden's came alongside the
London, Admiral Colpoys. About
three o'dock in the afternoon of this
day, and solicited admittance; the
marines were ordered to fire on them,
but declined, and grounded their arms;
on this, the Officers closed the hatch-
ways, and on the men fOrcing their way
up, the Captain fired a pistol, which
mortally wounded a lad through the
gratings; in the conflict three seamen
and one marine were also mortally
wounded. On the other side, licut.
Sims, of the Marines, received balls
through both arms, and a Midshipman
also was dangerously wounded.
The privates now took complete pos-
session of the ship, and would have
hoisted lieut. Bouvier up to the main
yard, but from his solemn declaration
that he acted by the Admiral's ordet
on which he was respited for the pres-
ent, but he is, with all the other officers
on board, at present in dose confine-
ment and (,od knows what even this
night may be their fate.
That terms they have made I am igno-
rant of as there is no immediate cam-
municatiun with the fleet from the
shore; but am told, that on its being
made known to the seamen that the
French fleet were at sea, and that it was
ver unlike the character of British sea-
men to be engaged in quarrelling with
each other when they should be fight-
mg the y agreed to drop
down to St. I lelen's and join the fleet,
saving, that after they had beaten the
lrench. the would then return to port
mod ettic their diffcn,ncvm.
t fltørmi
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The Mutiny on board the Flevt at
Portsmouth has again burst forth with
redoubled violence, threatening in its
consequences the most unfortunate
calamities to our Navy. We might occu-
pythewholeofthisPaperwith thedif-
ferent letters received respecting this
melancholy business; but as the various
accounts would only perplex and con-
fOund our Readers, we shall endeavour
to give an accurate general statement,
founded upon letters of the best
authority, and at the same time, we give
some of those kncrs a place in our
Mr. Pitt For several other reasons I
think it right to state, at the present
moment, that I am not ready to discuss
any more recent events, further than to
say, that as far as we have any opportu-
nity of knowing them, we are not with-
out additional reasons for caution and
circumspection; since the slightest mis-
representations are capable of produc-
ing the most alarming effects.
Mr. Fox: I am of optnion that every
question of a public nature ought to be
fully explained and discussed; but upon
the present question I feel that necessa-
tymuch stronger, from all that I have
seen, and all that lhave heard. it is not
with respect to discussion but to
silence that we are under any difficulty
now
The Right I lanourable Gentleman has
alluded to a supposition, that what has
since happened at POrtsmouth, has
been the effect of misunderstanding.
10 this answer, why was flat the possi-
bility of misunderstanding prevented
by a general discussion and actual vote
upon the subject. Instead of this, how-
ever, a silence was preserved, in (WafCr
as it should seem, to gave probability to
misrepresentation. Sir, I am convinced
that secrecy is seldom so good a mode
of preventing misrepresentation as dis-
cussion.
But to hope that secrecy will be of any
advantage, to think that such an affair
can be smothered, it to act like dill-
dren, who hide their eyes, and think
nobody can see them.
I did say that i knew nothing mare
than what I had collected from
Newspapers, but yet even with that
knowledge; I was ready to vote for the
Motion, though I should have been
much mare ready, had the grounds of
it been filly stated. I repeat, therefore,
that from what I had read in
Newspapers, and shameful it is, that
the I louse should know nothing more,
I was prepared to vote for the addition.
A pretty thing, indeed, it will be to say,
that we did not choose to cnqinre that
we trusted alone to Newspapers; and
that we thought it best to confide in
ruch Ministers. I trust, however, that
this will not be the opinion of the
I louse. I am sure that it is not the opin-
IOfl of the Country; but if it is, all I can
y is, that the Country is doomed to
inevitable destruction
Mr. Sheridan: lie trusted the
Chancellor of the Exchequer would
give some answer, why he had delayed
for a fOrtnight, befOre he had come to
the I louse on the subject. lie referred
to the promise made to the Sailors by
the three Lords of the Admiralt'.; and
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observed, that from the yen terzn of
it, it was evident they were persuaded
thc fleet nuld nOt return to its duty
on their promise merely, but that it
would be previously necessary to give
the Sailors some greater pledge for the
ObsctvaflCc of their promise, and if
such was the case, unquestionably the
yen' first step ought to have been a full
and frank communication to the
Much of what had happened might
have been owing to misrepresentation;
and what he wished to know was, why
the (:handnor of the lachequer had
by delay, given rise to such misrepre-
sentation? Thy. in short, he had not
done what hew now doing sooner?
on Saturday we published, in our
Falmouth kiter, that the French Meet
in Ikest Road, consisting of eighteen
sail of the line, besides a number of
transports with troops, were ready for
sea. This intelligence induced the
.'tchniraltv to order the Meet under
lord Rridport to put to sea immediate-
ly, and instructions to that effect
reached him on Sunday morning. I lit
Lordship made signal for weighing and
putting to sea, but not a crew would
act. it seems they had read the late con-
versation in the I louse of Lords, in
which silence on the subject of the
Seamen's complaints was strongly rec-
ommended by Ministers and their
friends, and they suspected there was a
design of deceiving them; they sus-
pected that Ministers had no serious
intention of endcavouring to have
their demands sanctioned by
Parliament. This was the reason they
refused to weigh anchor on Sunday
morning; and finding themselves, by
the call made on them to put to sea,
forced to a decisive line of conduct,
they resolved tohold a Convention of
Delegates on board the London lying
at Spithead. For this purpose the
Delegates from the different ships at
St. helen's and Spithead, took to their
boats, and proceeded to London;
but when they came alongside,
.dmiral Colpoys whose flag was flying
on board the London, cautioned them
against acting as they had formerly
donc. lie told them they had asked a
great deal, and obtained much, and he
would nor suffer them to proceed to
demand more. lie said they ought to
be contented and if they offered to
meet in convention, he would order
the Marines to fire on than. The
.diniiaI had taicco particular pains to
gain the Marines to his interest, in
which he Id been ably assisted by
lieutenant Sims, of the Marines The
I)elegates, however; persisted: The
.dmiral ordered the Marines to level
their pieces at the Delegates; the
Marines did so, and in their situation,
the dmiral again admonished the
Delegates, but to no purpose. i'it this
time some slight scuffle took place;
one of the 1)ekgatvs, all of whom
were armed with small arms, fired at
lieutenant Sims, and wounded him,
the Manner were then otilered to fire
by the Admiral, who at the same time
desired them to take good aim; they
obeyed, and five Seamen were killed,
two of whom were L)elegates. The
whole crew of the London now
declared open hortility to the Officers
and Marines, they turned the guns in
the fore part of the ship towards the
stern, and threatened to blow all aft
into the water unless they surrendered.
The Officers surrendered, and thc
Marines laid down their arms. Admiral
Colpoys was put in irons and confined
in one cabm; Captain Gtifflthr, the
Captain of the ship was confined in
another; and the Officers and all the
Marines were made Prisoners The
Seamen were complete masters of the
London, and not on1y of the London
but of the whole l'lcet; which would
not put to sea until the demands of the
crews were fully agreed to and ratified
by Parliament. I, was generally under-
stood in Pi,rtsmouth, that .'idmiral
Colpoys was to be tried and executed
the next morning at four o'dock, and
the report was generally circulated yes-
terday, of that horrid event having
actually taken place. Captain (hiffiths
was also in danger, and so we several
of the Officers. The Seamen were
resolved to sacrifice as many Marines,
as they had lost comrades. lieutenant
Sims is said to have died of his
wounds This was the situation of the
fleet on Sunday night.
ibis we believe, is the most accurate
statement of this business that will
appear in any Paper this day. At this
awful crisis we shall forbear from mak-
ing any comments on the conduct of
Ministers.
We yesterday published a Second
Edition with the intelligence, and never
did any news produce a greater sensa-
tion in the town. It was impossible to
print Papers with sufficient expedition,
to supply the demand of a trembling
and frantic Public.
We understand the Delegates ordered a
Convoy to sail while they were in pos-
session of the Fleet.
On going on board the London, the
Officers resisted with misquetry and
pistols, and several are killed and
wounded; the wounded arc just n(Pw
landed at the hospital at liaslar. It is
reported that .'icbniral Colpoys and the
Officers of the London, arc threatened
to be hung at sun set. c. trust it is nor
true.
This day the Mutiny at Spithead and St
I helen's has burst out with redoubled
violence; and what will render the ter-
rible consequences inevitable, seven
seamen were this day hastily put to
death in the London by the Officers
The utmost terror pervades the streets
of this town, and the wealthy seem
disposed to seek an immediate shelter
in the interior. iliough no person
whatever is admitted on board any of
the ships, yet we have reason to kno
that the present alarming discontents,
which threaten the pillars of the
Empire, originated from what passed a
few days since in the Ilouse of Lords,
wherein they considered the faith
pledged to them was not meant to be
performed; and this inference they
probably drew from the circumstance,
that when a Mutiny lately happened on
board the Culloden at Spirhead and
though an Amnesty was solemnly
promised on returning to their duty, yet
five of the ringleaders were afterwards
executed.
This morning a cutter arrived from Sir
John B. %rren. It is stared that the
l'rench I'levt had worked out into the
outer road of Brest, consisting of 17
sail of the line and a number of trans-
ports, which appeared ready for sailing
at a moment's notice.
this particular has transpired, when
the boats attempted to go on board
Admiral Colpoy's ship, he and his
Officers resolved to oppose their com-
ing on board with force, and in the
encounter seven of the boat's crew
were killed and nine wounded.
The Delegates from the different ships
at St. I Iekn's came alongside the
London, .dmiral Colpoys, about three
o'clock in the afternoon of this day,
and solicited admittance, the Marines
were ordered to fire on them; but
declined, and grounded their arms, on
this the Officers dosed the harchuys,
and on the men forcing their way up,
the Captain fired a pistol, which mor-
tally wounded a lad through the grat-
ings, in the Conflict three Seamen and
one Marine were also mortally wound-
ccl. (in the other side, Iieut. Sims, of
the Marines, received balls through
both arms, and a Midshipman was also
dangerously wounded.
The privates now took complete pos-
session of the ship, and would have
hoisted lieutenant Bouvier up to the
main yard, but from his solemn decla-
ration that he acted by the Admiral's
order, (ifl which he was respited for the
present; but he is, with all the other
Officers on board, at present in close
confinement, and God knows what
even rhi night may be their fate.





Fox: All I know is what I have seen in
Newspapers, related as having passed
between the .dmirahy and thy
Delegates of the fleet.
I think he IPitti ought to state even
now what were the circumstances
which have led to the misunderstand-
ing between the Meet and Admiralty
after the first promise was made to the
Sailors. ilus he ought to do no in
order that we may know whether this
vote which is before us is a complete or
a partial compliance with the wishes of
those who are the objects of it? To
endeavour to pass it by in silence is
silly. To expect that secrecy can save
you no and to think that it may be
smothered, is the weakest of all possi-
bk hopes, by which vou will resemble
children, who shut their eyes and think
that nobody can see them. I therefow
hope that this business will not be suf-
fered to be passed by in silence. I will
no more be answerable for any misrep-
resentations that may go abroad upon
our discussion, than the Minister; but I
know that much more misunderstand-
ing is likely to follow silence than dis-
cuasion.
Mr. lox: lie considered the informa-
tion which the newspapers furnished,
and the notoriety of the case, as suffi-
cient to induce him to give his vote for
the resolution.
Mr. Sheridan: Why was it that the vote
was to be proposed when information
was received that new disturbances had
brokcn out? Why did he not take
immediate steps in consequence of the
promises which were made? Wh
instead of the flow and procrastinating
mode that had been followed, and not
the Right lionourable Gentlian
come with a message from the Throne,
recommending, the I louse to take
measures to carry into effect what had
been done? ... From the words of the
Lords of the Admiralty, that they had
come to the resolution of acceding to
the demands of the seamen, "that
might have as early as possible an
opporruntv of returning to their duty;
as it may be necessary that the fleet,
sheuld speedily put to sea to meet the
enemy of the countr" it was plain that
they did not expect that the seamen
were to return to their duty upon that
promise, but that some other proceed-
ing would immediately follow upon it.
The first step then ought to have been
a communication to the house, and
such a vote as this passed with una-
nimity would have perfectly satisfied
them. lie thought too highly of the
character of British Seamen, to imag-
inc that this vote would not satisfy
them, and if it did not, he should think
more degradingly of them than he did
at present. Misrepresentation might
have induced them to do what they
ought not to have dixie; but the Right
hionourable Gentleman ought to have
prevented the possibility of such mis-
representation, lie was convinced,
however, that means of conciliation
would be mow effectual if accompa-
nied with a vote of censure on
Ministers for not coming to Parliament
sooner with some proposition on the
We yesterday gave a variety of letters
and statements from Portsmouth, on
this melancholy subject. We shall now
enter into a detail of all the particulars,
as we have been enabled to collect
them from various authentic sources,
following up this detail with our
Portsmouth, correspondence of mda
by which it will appear that the seamen
have taken an entire possession of the
fleet, and that the life of Admiral
Colpoys appears to be in imminent
danger. There is indeed one consolato-
ry statement from Portsmouth, and we
trust it will appear in the event, that the
reports of today are in general exag-
-
In consequence of information having
been received at the Admiralt that the
Brest fleet, consisting of 18 ships of
the line, with a great nwnber of trans-
ports having troops on board, was
anchored at the outer roads of Brest,
orders were transmitted to Lord
l3ridport, to put to sea immediately,
and his instructions to that effect
reached him on Sunday morning His
Lordship made signal for weighting
and putting to sea, but not a crew
would act. It seems they had read the
late conversation in the house of
Lords, in which silence on the subject
of the Seamen's complaints was so
strongly recommended by Ministers
and their friends, and ther suspected
there was a design of deceiving them;
they thought that the Ministers had no
serious intention of having their
demands sanctioned by Parliament.
'11th was the reason they refused to
weigh anchor on Sunday n'.orning, and
finding themselves, b7' the call made on
them to put to sea, forced to a decisive
line of conduct, they resolved to hold
a Convention of Delegates on board
the London hang at Spithead. Fiw this
purpose, the Delegates from the differ-
ent ships at St. Helen's and Spithead,
molt to their boats, and proceeded to
the London; but when they came
alongside, Admiral Colpoys, whole flag
was flying on board the London, cau-
tioned thou against acting as they had
formerly done. lie told them they
 had
asked a great deal, and obtained much,
and he would not suffer them to pro-
ceed to demand more. lie said they
ought to be contented, and if they
offered to meet in convention, he
would order the Marines to fire on
them. 'Ihe Admiral had taken particu-
lar pains to gain the Marines to his
interest, in which he had been ably
assisted by lieutenant Sims; of that
cusps. The Delegates, however, persist-
etk The Admiral ordered the Marines
to level their pieces at the Delegates,
the Marines did so, and in this situation
the Admiral again admonished the
Delegates, but to no purpose. At this
time some slight scuffle took plac
one of the Delegates, all of whom
were armed with small arms, fired at
Ikutcnant Sims, and wounded him;
the Marines were then ordered to fire
by the First lieutenant of the ship,
who at the same time desired them to
take good aim they obeyed, and five
seamen were killed, two of whom were
I)elegates. The whole crew of the
London now declared open hostility to
the Officers and Marines; they turned
the guns in the fore part of the ship
towards the stern, and threatened to
blow all aft into the water unless they
surrendered. The Officers surren-
dered, and the Marines laid down their
arms.
In consequence of the orders to fire
which the First lieutenant had given,
the seamen were now proceeding to
hang him; Admiral Colpoys interfered,
and told them that the Officer had
acted on instructions, which he,
Admiral Colpoys had received from
the Admiralty These instructions the
seamen demanded and obtained.
Admiral (:dp was now confined in
one cabin; Captain Griffiths, the
Captain of the ship, in another; and the
Officers and all the Marines made pus-
oners. 'I'he Seamen were complete
masters of the London, and not on1y
of the lAxidon. but of the whole Meet;
which would not put to sea until the
demands of the crew were fully agreed
to and ratified, and as Ministers have at
last brought a Bill into Parliament,
which cannot but convince the seamen
that the promises made to them are to
be completely ratified, we hope soon
to be able to inform our readers of the
restoration of proper order and subor-
dination.
On being told three of them were
dead, u•' said that .'t&niral Colpoys
life should pay for it.
By accounts from the ship, we learn,
they all declare the Admiral will be
hung tomorrow Officers from most of
the ships are turning on shore out of
numbers.
The horror and confusion of this town
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arc bvond descnption, rn conse-
quence of the mutiny in the fleet.
All the Officers cxcept the Masters, arc
sent on shore from even man of war,
and they are this afternoon landing
from craft of every description. 1wn
the men of war's boats bring them on
shore, the boat's crews arc armed each
with a brace of loaded pistols and a
cutlass.
The reason assigned by the Seamen for
retaining the Masters on board is, that
if an enemy's fleet should insult our
coast; they will immediately demand
being led into battle, under the com-
mand of this officer only; and they
seem no ways apprehensive of the
results.
Admiral Culpoys is in irons -- Captain
(;nffiths is confined -- and the other
Officers and Marines arc also in cus-
tody, at the will and under the control
of the Dvkgate, who have noç in
fact, the command of the Fleet.
Tarrsda}. 9.Ia) '97
'l'he Chancellor of the lxchcqucr
IPitti rose. lie said, that in conse-
quence of the late transactions which
had made it necessary to raise the
wages of the men of his Majesty's
fleet, and in pursuance of the estimates
furnished for that purpose, he felt it
incumbent on him to propose to the
Committee to grant a awn adequate to
enable his Majesty to provide for the
various exigencies likely to be incurred
as specified in those estimates. lie was
ready to acknowledge, that he felt
peculiar embarrassment, and laboured
under great disadvantage in stating the
suppl because it was always under-
stood, that where any increase was pro-
posed, certain grounds should be given
to proceed on, for the purpose of
ascertaining the propriety of that
increase. This argument applied very
strongly to the measure which he was
about to submit to the judgement of
the Gentlemen, as the increase intend-
ed was of a very substantial nature, and
such as was unavoidable during the
continuance of the r It might there-
fore be expected, that the different
rates of wages, various data, circum-
stances and other matters would be
brought forward to shew the propor-
tionate progression necessary to be
observed. Yet he should say, that with
every view of public utility, with every
confidence relative to prudence and
policy, and with every possible atten-
tion to the delicacy of the case, he did
not feel himself at liberty to proceed
into a regular and formal detail of
what, he had no doubt, had for some
time past engaged the serious atten-
non, and occupied the anxiety of the
I louse. lie should, therefore, on these
grounds, rather rely on, and even claim
the silent indulgence of the I louse,
than enter into any detail of the very
important subject which was then pro-
posed for their acquiescence. t the
same time that he confessed his inabil-
ity to discuss the business in the regu-
lar way, it was necessary for him to
declare, that as to any opportunity of
information which might be expected
from the Government on the subject,
it could not be too strongly impressed
on the minds of Gentlemen, that too
much caution could not be used in an
affair in which the slightest misrepre-
sentation might produce the must dis-
agreeable consequences. lie had suffi-
cient ground to suppose, that nothing
could effectively terminate the difficul-
ties to which he might be understood
to allude, as a knowledge of the Vote
of the I louse on the object which then
engaged their attention, lie therefore
did not hesitate to say, that fnxn the
past circumstances, and the present
general situation of things, he felt it his
duty to ask and solicit the silent judge-
ment of the I louse. In alluding to the
estimates before the Committee, he
trusted, that the particular amount
would not be the chief object of their
attention, and he should, therefore,
without any more prebmm.observa
tions, state at once the different sums
necessary to be voted. In the first
instance, the amount of the various
allowances of wages, increasing in a
proportionate ratio of 5s. 6d. 4s. 6d.
and 3s 6d. per month, or, in other
words,
"The respective increase of the
Monthly Pay for able Seamen,
Ordinary Seamen, and landsmen, with
2d. per 1)ay to the Non Coo nissioned
Officers of Marines, and 2 1 /4d. to
Privates, would produce a Sum total
yearly of £351,(X)0
li, which the yearly Increase of 1/8th
of the whole Victualling of the Navy
was to be added, making at the rate of
19s. per month each Man for 13
Months in the Year, the Sum of
£185,000. And forming together the
Sum Total of £536,000
Mr. Fox began by declaring that he
should certainly give his vote for the
resolution proposed by the Right lion.
Gentleman; but were he tosit over
in silence, in conformity to the desire
pressed upon the House by the Right
lion. Gentleman's entreaties, he
should consider himself guilty of
betxaing the interests of his cowitre
Ivery thing, he would strenuously
maintain, that related to the public
expense, should be publicly discussed;
but in his opinion, the subject which
was then under consideration, was
above all others entitled to publicity
When it was once known that the addi-
tion now proposed was to have been
made, the matter ought to have been,
in the first instance, submitted to the
house; and what so unfortunately
passed in the Iastcr Recess would have
been prevented. Yet if, even after that
omission, the late scandalous delay of
a fortnight had not taken place, there
would have been no new ground for
any event that may have actually hap-
pened at Portsmouth. Sccrt..cy was not
calculated to produce the same benefi-
cial effects as publici.., and the I louse
was now called on to vote, after a delay
in different points of view unpardon-
able, what might have been voted on
the first day, when the matter was agi-
tated. 'l'hc conduct of the
.dministration was highly criminal,
and were the I louse to resign them-
selves blindly to the direction of men
so openly culpable, they would render
themselves responsible for the meas-
ures which they were desired to sanc-
tion. lie asked what confidence could
be placed in men to whom might be
ascribed, with all their other faults, an
event such as had never taken place in
the annals of the country, and which
could not be exactly weighed with
respect to the magnitude of its effects?
When the business was first known,
and he certainly knew it only from the
information conveyed to him through
the methtmi of the public newspapers,
he called on the Right lion.
Gentleman to state the measures which
were intended to be brought forward,
and he repeated the question to him,
but without success. Yet if he felt any
doubts about the propriety of his own
conduct on that occasion, they arose
from the single consideration, that he
had not urged his questions to the
Right lion. Gentleman more frequent-
ly and with more energy. Was the pres-
ent moment a tie for secrecy, or for
placing blind confidence in Ministers,
whose every project had been equally
marked with the character of folly and
ignorance. As Gentlemen were bound
to share the responsibility for the
measure, they were also hound to
enquire into a true and impartial state-
ment of the facts. I Ic would not, for
his pan, answer for any misrepresenta-
tion that might go abroad, and he
desired it to be understood, that he was
for agreeing fully in the resolution pro-
posed to the Committee; but he wished
to have the grounds not which it was
brought forward publicly and fairly dis-
cussed, convinced, as he was, that the
advantages resulting from that conduct
would be general and permanent.
Mr. Sheridan declared that he assented
completely to the exhortation of
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iIence made by the Right I Ion.
(;entknsm to the Committee, and he
should therefore vote the Resolution
Without sa1flg onc word on the sub-
ject. But he begged leave to put one
question to the Right lion. Gentleman:
In alluding to the new Mutiny in the
Meet, he told Gentlemen that nothing
so effectually tend to conciliate
every animosity and to remove all diffi-
culties, as the 'ow of the Committee
for the Resolution which he has pro-
posed. Since the Right lion.
(;endensm has held that language this
night, why did he nut on the same prin-
ciple give the I louse an opportunity of
doing it sooner? Why did he not, after
the promise made by the Aibnirilt
communicate a message to the same
purport from the Crown? Why did the
Right I lunourabic Gentleman stop
there and suffer a fortnight to pass
without taking the least step to concili-
ation? A frank communication was
necessary on this subject, but since it
has not taken place "the vote of the
Committee this night will, said Mr.
Sheridan, I trust give the sailors com-
plete satisfaction, and I shall think very
pootly of them if it does not.
Mt Pitt observed, that the resolution
proposed to the Committee did not
arise out of any fresh intelligence, but
dearly out of the usual progress of
business
In it is with very great affliction we
have to notice a Second Mutiny on
board the fleet under the command of
Lord Bridport at St. I lelen's. We had
hoped, that the very ample concessions
made by the Lords of the .tthnirsJt
and I his Majesty's gracious pardon,
would have not only quieted every feel-
ing of discontent, but would have
attached the British Seamen, if --
ble, more heartily than ever to the giory
of their country, and created a more
common share of emulation can meet
the enemy and, and testify their grati-
tude for the favours they had received.
We learn, however, by letters from
Portsmouth received yesterday morn-
ing. that on the signal being made by
Lord Bridport on Sunday morning for
the fleet to sail, the seamen again
refused to weigh anchor, alleging as a
reason that nothing had yet been set-
tled by Parliament, confirming their
encrease of pay, etc.
We learn however, by letten from
Portsmouth received yesterday morn-
ing. that on the signal being made by
Lord Bridporr on Sunday morning for
the fleet to sail, the seamen again
refused to weigh anchor, alleging as a
reason that nothing had vet been set-
tled by Parliament, confirming their
increase of pay &c. On some of the
Delegates coming along side Admiral
(lpo ship the london, at Spithead,
the Admiral in a very spirited manner
declared that none should come on
boani The seamen intimating that they
should, Admiral (.olpoys told them
that if they persisted, the conse-
quences would be fatal, as he was
determined to see discipline preserved.
Onwhich hecallcdtotheOfficerof
Marines tube ready, and on the seamen
persevering in their mutiny, the
marines fired, and, it is said, killed 5
men. lhe seamen soon got possession
of the ship, and fired aft, by which it is
reported the First lieutenant of the
London, and several marines were
killed or wounded. Certain it is that the
mutinous seamen had complete pus-
session of the London, when the last
accounts left Portsmouth; and they had
declared vengeance against Admiral
(:olpovs and his Officers. We trust,
however, that that brave and meritori-
ous officer is safe.
We do not think fit to detail all the
unpleasant reports we have heard on
this subject; and such was the confu-
sion and anxiety of mind at
Portsmouth, that the precise truth is
not known, as there was little coinmu-
nicatiun between the ships and the
shore.
The second Mutiny at Portsmouth dis-
covered itself on Sunday morning, on
Lord Bridport's making the signal to
weigh anchor at St. I lelen's. It is posi-
tively affirmed, and we believe with
truth, that it was occasioned by the
misrepresentations and scandalous
comments of some of the Opposition
papers of Friday in detailing and
observing what passed in the I louse of
Lords on Thursday last These papers
had cndeavoured to inculcate a notion
abroad, that the Administration of the
country was disposed to evade the
promises made by Earl Spencer to the
There is no reason to believe that the
L3REST purr is vet at sea; though
according to very recent advice's, it was
in a very forward state of preparation
and of considerable force.
Ship News - Portsmouth May 7, A sig-
nal was made this morning on board of
the Royal George, for the fleet to get
under way, when not a singe ship
would obey it.
Delegates from the ships at St. I lckn's
came to Spithead, and went along side
of the London, of 98 guns, Admiral
Colpocs, who refused to let them on
board. The crew insisted they should
come, in consequence of which, the
Admiral ordeted the Marines aft, and
told the Seamen if they behai in any
respect disorderl he would order the
Marines to fire upon them. In conse-
quence of the seamen persisting that
the l)elegates should come on board,
Admiral Culpeys ordered the Marines
to fire, which they did, and killed five
of the seamen; the seamen soon after
got possession of some arms, and in
return fired on the Marines, and killed
the First lieutenant of the Ship, and
five or six marines, besides wounding
some others, who are come on shore,
and are now on their way to the
lIosataL
lxtract of another Lesttr - Intelligence
of the must alarming and most serious
description is this moment received,
respecting the fleet at Portsmouth.
'11th day about 12 o'clock, the Seamen
on board the Iirndnn struck Admiral
Colpoys's flag. and about three this
afternoon several muskets were fired
on board her with ball, supposed by
the Officers, as they were provided
with them; some say, the men now
demand an equal distribution of prize
moner; others, that they are dissatisfied
with the Admiral and his Officers. The
Majestic going down to St. I Iele&s this
morning, was stopped, and dreadful
are the consequences that are to be
expected from the Meet being again
prevented from sailing. as it is reported
the French arc at sea with eighteen sail
of the line.
Another letter states, that several of
the Officers have been wounded by the
men. The effects of this second
mutiny will, it is thought, be more
dreadful than the first. We are all in a
state of alarm and amazement; there
an a thousand reports, they are very
various, but all agree in the horror of
this second mutiny.
Portsmouth 7 May - seven o'clock - A
very serious and alarming Mutiny has
just shown itself at St. helen's and
Spithead. Almost all the Officers of
the Marlborough are sent on shore
with their baggage. The Delegates
from each ship are in procession at
Spithead. Several wounded men are
landed from the London, and we hear
several are killed, their coming on
board being resisted by the Officers of
the London.
01w ifruc fli.'ton
T,srd,r,. 9 .'rIa 1 9 -
Fox lie considered it a shame, that the
only information that the house had
upon the subject should be derived
from the Public Papers: even that
information was enough to induce him
to give his vote for the Resolution; but
still he did not know whether the reso-
lution they were now about two agreed
to, would have the effect that was pro-
posed.
Mt Sheridan said, he was ready to give
his vote for the resolution, without far-
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titer explanatitin at present. -- But there
was one question to which he expected
an immediate answer, because there
could be no impropriety in answering
it. if that was s then he desired to
know why it had not been brought for-
ward before? Because it now might be
said, while we trusted to your promise,
no steps were taken in our favour, but
as sorm as the disturbances broke out
again, then measures were taken for
our rehef Why did not the Minister
bring the subject before Parliament
immediately after the Order in
Council, and I ha Majesty's pardon had
issued? Why was it not communicated
to that house by a Message? If the
Ministers should say that it was
through negligence, or in attention,
that the communication was not made,
then what confidence could the I louse
place in them?
Mr. Sheridan then read a pan of the
letter of the Lords of the .dmiralt
and contended that it appeared clear
that they did not expect the Meet to
return to their duty upon their promise
alone; nor was it likely they should rest
upon a promise, which might be disal-
lowed. If it was thought necessary that
a greater pledge should be given, and
thc first step that ought to have been
taken wa a communication tO that
Ilouse. 1k hoped and trusted that this
resolution would have the desired
effect; he had too high an opinion of
the character of British Seamen to
doubt that; he should think most
degradingly of them if it did not. But
if they were of the opinion that this
measure would produce the desired
effect, he was sure it would give more
satisfaction, if accompanied with a
vote of censure upon the Ministers.
a sensation of the greatest
distress and alarm pervaded the
Metropolis, in consequence of intelli-
gence from Portsmouth, of a very seri-
ous Mutiny having re-appeared on
board the liect tinder lord I3tidport.
e deem it proper to add, that we yes-
tcrdav learnt that the present ferment
in the Iket arose from a gross mis-rep-
resentation of what passed a few days
ago in Parliament, upon the subject of
the late complaints of the Seamen,
conveyed through the medium of a
Jacobin Evening Newspaper which got
on board the Meet.
/t signal was made on board the Rosil
George this morning for them to get
under way, when not a single ship
would obey it. Delegates from the
Ships at St. I ielcn's came to Spithcad
and went alongside of the London, of
98 guns, .dmiral Colpovs, who refused
to let them on board the Crew insisted
they should come; in consequence of
which he ordered the Marines nut, and
told them if they behaved an the least
mutinous manner, he would make
them fire upon them, and which from
their conduct he was obliged to do; in
consequence of which they seized
some firearms, fired ujxrn their
Officers, killed their First lieutenant,
wounded one of the Mates, and sever-
al others, who are now going to the
IlospitaL
Plymouth May 6
/trnved the Anton, of 44 guns (:apt P
(:Durham, from a cruise off h4rest, to
refit, having sprung a leak. She left Sir
John rren, in the Pomone, of 44
guns, with Galatea Frigate, and Sylpli
Sloop of War, cruising off that
I larbour on i.dnedav morning last...
Q be fitonnnj 9o&
if'dses&). 1O.%Ia) !9'
Some ill-founded reports have been
circulating respecting the nature of the
Order of the Lords of the Admirabjc
under which 'ice-/tdmiral Colpoys
acted when over-powered by the crew
of the li,ndon, we insert, for the satis-
faction of the Public, a correct copy of
the Order alluded in, by which it will
appear that the construction given to
the last paragraph, "of its having run-
dered the F.ing's Pardon, granted to
the seamen and marines of no avail,"
could be applied to itby persons only
who have a desire of farther mislead-
ing these deluded people, the Order
itself bearing no retrospect to any pro-
ceeding antecedent to the time it was
given, but being calculated only to pre-
vent disturbances and discontent in
future.
"That the Captains and Commanders
of I lis Majesty's Ships be particularly
attentive to the conduct of the men
under their command, and that they be
ready, on the first appearance of
Mutiny, to use the most vigorous
means to suppress it, and to bring the
ring-leaders to punishment."
Parliamentary Intelligence, I louse of
Lords, Tueada, May 9
The Earl of Suffolk ... Reflecting on
the dreadful and serious calainit
which had given rise to the Bill, it had
for some time past been a matter of
the highest astonishment to him that it
had not much sooner been brought
forward. It appeared to him that there
had been a great degree of criminal
negligence in having so long delayed it,
and he would therefore content him-
self with putting one question to the
Noble Secretary of State. lie requested
to be informed "what were the reasons
for not bringing forward the Bill had so
long been procrastinated?"
The Duke of .thol rose to deprecate
any discussion of the Bill whatever.
The most extraordinary mrepresenta-
irons, he said had gone abroad respect-
ing the short discussion which had
taken place upon the subject a few
nights ago
IlA)rd Grenvilk thanked the Duke for
opposing discussionl
The Duke of Bedford: ... The acts of
the Ministers had long required secre-
cy, and it was natural for them to thank
anyone who, by preventing discussion,
afforded them the only screen they had
to cover their acts from the view of the
Public....
The Lord Chancellon ... Every hour
the Bill was delayed was pregnant
the greatest danger, and might produce
the most calamitous evans.
ilac l)uke of Bedford declared he did
not wish to protract the passing of the
13111, and begged only to ask the Noble
Secretary of State one question:
"Whether Ministers really intended,
and were actually employed in carrying
into effect all the provisions and am-
cessions which had been promised to
the Seamen by the Lords of the
Admiralty?"
h.ord Grville replied with consider-
able warmth. I Ic objected to the mode
which had lately been adopted and pur-
sued by individual Lords putting ques-
to Ministers, and said, that from
answers extorted in that way, the gross-
est misrepresentations went abroad
through those disorderly and unconsti-
tutional channels, though acquiesced in
the public papers. lire, did not pre-
tend to give, with any degree of accu-
racy, what they heard in that I louse,
and had no authority for reporting
what they hearal lie believed that the
inconsiderate discussion which had
been brought forward by a Noble
I)ulce (Bedfbnl) on this subject a few
nights ago, and the shameful misrepre-
sentations which had been made
respecting it, had been the cause of the
calamity which has happened since.
The question which that Noble Duke
had just put to him, certainly went to
raise still further doubts in the minds
of the Seamen.
I l( )LSE OF COMMONS
(:oMPLINTh OF 11IE SEAMEN
IThitbrcad brings motion for censure
of Pitt ... for what appears to have
been a gross neglect in not coming
down to Parliament immediately after
the recess, with an estimate of the
expenses which the increased
allowance to the seamen would occa-
IPitt focuses on 'misrepresentations',
but concedes delays:I ... undoubtedly as
to any misrepresentation or miscon-
ception having arisen from the sense of
Parliament not having been taken
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sooner, udging after the event, no man
can avoid lamenting that the earliest
opportunity possible was not taken....
That I lament deeply if the event has
been produced by delay; that greater
speed was not used is moat true.
(Sheridan obaervesj th regard to the
excuses made on the occasion, that the
usual form to be observed would not
admit of bringing forward the business
sonnet, that the estimates were waited
for, and could not be obtained Good
God! what attention did such excuses
deserve. When the lion. Gentleman
wanted to forward the Imperial Loan,
hc could not be content to wait even
two or three days, and with respect to
the case of the Bank, he was so urgent
that he brought lii, Majesty from town
in order to come to an immediate deci-
sion on the subject, yet in an affair of
high importance to the country as the
one under discussion, he could see
nothing that demanded any cxtraordi-
haste Such excuses, audi conduct
on the pan of a Minister, at such a crit-
ical and eventful crisis, was an insult
upon the house - an insult upon the
(:t.
the claims of the Sailors, however
they
 were founded in justice, had with
regard to the mode of enforcing them,
his entire disapprobation. It is incon-
sistent with the character ever mani-
fested by British Seamen to act in the
manner they had done; and he could
not but attribute their conduct to the
effect of some foul interference on the
part of those whose duty it was to have
satisfied their daims. An interference
of the basest and most treacherous
nature, worse than any open Treason
whatever, for when men stood forward
openly and avowedly, howevet unjusti-
fiabk their conduct might be, still there
was something in that open avowal of
their designs that extenuated their con-
duct, but when men secretly and insid-
iously endeavoured to sap and destroy
the very bulwatic of the country, who
did not dare to stand forward and run
the chance of the consequences, such
men must be considered as the basest,
the vilest 'traitors that ever a country
was curs'd with, (a general cry of I lea,!
I teat!) it was impossible, it was not in
the nature, not in the character of
British Seamen, that when the fleet of
an enemy of their Country was known
to be at sea, preparing for the Invasion
of their Countn; they should be
induced to avoid their duty from con-
siderations of a personal nature, such
considerations had never existed
among that brave and meritorious
description of men, the Sailors of
Great Britain, and some foul means
unknown to the I louse must have been
used to exasperate them to such con-
duct. 'lire evil had now got to that
height that resorting to common meas-
ures would not d There was not a
moment to be lost, if the reports of
the continuance of the disturbance
were true, and he feared they were. The
town had been lulled into a fatal Isensel
that the disturbance had ceased, occa-
sioned by the report of the London
having dropped down to St. I helen's;
but this circumstance could not be
supposed to have taken place, without
presupposing that the command had
been taken from the officers. If it were
true that the lives of the l)elegates had
been lost, and the Sailors had been on
shore to view the dead bodies, then he
would ask what measures had been
adopted, in order to avert the calami-
ties necessarily consequent upon acts,
which must have the effect of cutting
off all hopes of compromise, and of
the future salvation of the (owutry
That measurrs, he npeatcd, had been
taken to avert such calamities? If none
had been taken, then would Ministers
have added a fresh instance of their
negligence and incapacity. They had by
that delay. which they admitted to have
taken place, by their murderous and
inhuman delay (hear, hear from all
parts of the I louse) been the occasion
of all that has happened. There was
not, he was persuaded, a person in the
I louse, who, if a man had fallen in the
fleet, or if that great and gallant
.dmiral, whose worth and character
he bore testimony to, had fallen a sac-
rifice - there was not a man in the
I louse who would not lay every drop
of blood which had been, or should
be, split, to the hearts doors of
Ministers, who might have prevented
It.
'lire stories of the French being at sea
are fortunately without foundation.
Such falsehoods ought not to be circu-
laterL God knows we have already suf-
fered too much from the Jesuitical pol-
icy of false alarms! What might the
consequence to l.ngland, if by these
very
 cunning alarms, we should
prompt the impetuous seamen to
hurry
 the fleet to sea, of their own
accord, without instructions, without
concert, without a rendezvous, and
without auspices. If there was nothing
material to the conduct of a Fleet, but
bravery in the hour of action, we
should have pleasure in seeing the
British Seamen, self-organized,
opposed to the enemy however numer-
ous, but the detail of signals, the co-
operation with the Admiralty at home,
and with all the other stations of the
service, the intelligence with respect to
the enemy. and a thousand other con-
siderations which depend on concert
and establishment, must convince the
sailors themselves that even their own
strength, their importance, their suc-
cess must depend on system, on disci-
pline, on duty, and that they
 can only
hope to retain the Øory they have
acquired by returning to the order that
has made them the pride of the
Universe.
It was inconsistent with the character
ever manifested by British Seamen to
act in the manner they had done; and
he cold not but attribute their con-
duct to the effect of some foul inter-
ference on the part of those, whose
duty it was to have satisfied their
claims. An interference of the basest
and Iriost treacherous nature, )rse
than any open 'Ireason whatever, few
where the men stood forward openly
and avowedly, however unjusrifiabic
their conduct might be, still there was
something in that open avowal of their
designs that extenuated their cnnducr,
but when men secretly and insidiously
cndcavoured to sap and destroy the
very bulwark of the country, who did
not dare to stand forward and run the
chance of the consequences, such men
must be considered as the basest, the
vilest 'Irairors ever a country was curs'd
with, (a general cry of hear! lieu!) it
was impossible, it is not in the nature,
not in the character of British Seamen,
that when the fleet of an enemy of
their Country was known to be at sea,
preparing for an invasion of their
Countr they should be induced to
avoid their duty from considerations of
a personal nature, such considerations
of a personal nature, such considera-
tions had never existed among that
brave and meritorious description of
men, the Sailors of Great Britain, and
some foul means unknown to the
I louse must have been used to exas-
perate them to such conduct.
bt ..Morntq €lyonult
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The Lord Chancellor It was like stop-
ping to enquire how a fire was kindled
before they employed the engines to
extinguish it. The discussion of the
subject was unavoidable; he only asked
a flag of truce for one night, and their
Lordship. assent to the Bill, that it
might be passed, and sent off to
Portsmouth immediately.
The Duke of Bedford asked of the
noble Secretary of State, whether it
was the intention of his Majesty's
Ministers to grant the sailors every-
thing that had been promised them by
the hirst Lord of the Admiralty?
Lord Grenville disapproved extremely
of the question, but answered plainly
and boldly that it always had been the
intention of Government to execute
the promises of the Admiralty to their
full and utmost extent, and if ever a
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doubt could by entertained upon the
subject, the 13111 now before the I louse
was the best proofs of their sinccrit
.fter a warm Conversation between
the 1)uke of Bedford and l.ord
(;rLlWIlle, which was conducted by the
latter with a good deal of personality -
the Bill went through its several stages,
and received the Royal .'issent by
Commission. - .'idjourned.
Sheridan: 11w reason which the
Minister offcrvd as an apology for the
delay that had taken place, was not to
be endured under the circumstance of
the time The minister now pretended
to say that he waited for an estimate of
the expense, which will attend this
measure. Did he really believe that the
public were to be so insulted? lie could
have brought the estimate down to the
I louse the very hour after the King's
proclamation issued. lie was ready
enough to avoid all delay in granting
the imperial I .inn, nay so anxious was
he upon that measure, that he would
not wait for three days, although it was
notorious that intelligence was expect-
ed which would put that Loan out of
the question. lie was ready enough
also to use all due diligence to stop the
payment of the Bank, and to cause the
King to come to town at an unusual
hour and in the must extraordinary
way, in order to issue the Order in
Council fist that purpose. But he saw
nothing in this measure, upon which
the very existence of the nation
depended, that required haste. 'llus
was such shameful neglect, that he
trusted the I louse would feel it, as he
was sure the public felt that, with
abhorrence, the Minister was absolute-
ly without excuse for the delay that had
taken place. lie knew that the Sailors
were dissatisfied. lie now came for-
ward with his unavailing regret that any
disturbance disturbances had hap-
penal lie pretended that they are rose
from misunderstanding Could there
be any wonder at a misunderstanding?
I lad the sailors not a promise from the
Admirah and was not that promise
afterwards treated with apparent indif-
ference by
 the King's ministers? L)id
they have not delay the measure or
which could alone give satisfaction give
its sanction? I lad they therefore no
reason for doubting the sincenty of
the Minister? It was true indeed that in
most cases where money was to be
called from the people, the Minister's
promise was precisely the same thing
as a vote of the I louse of Commons,
at least or was reason for thinking so
from former facts; but it was not won-
derful that the sailors thought other-
wise, for they
 judged more of what
Parliament ought to be than what it
really was by its modem practice; and
therefore unless the Minister had lost
his yen superior intellect, it was
impossible fist him not to perceive the
consequences that followed.
Be the claims of the Sailors what they
ma what was now proposed to be
granted to them was nothing more
than justice. .'tt the same time he said
this, he must not omit ti) state definite-
ly his decided disapprobation of the
mode in which these demands were
insisted upon. It was unfair and incon-
ioitent with the brave, generous and
open character of British Seamen; nor
had hcadoubt but there had been a
foul interference with them, and means
of the basest nature used to induce
them to take the steps which they had
taken. If men were oppressed, they
ought to be relieved by their country
But however just their complaints
were, they ought to complain in a reg-
ular way. if there were among them, as
he believed there were, that advised the
Sailors to put their country into such
peril as it stood in at this moment, for
the purpose of having their objects
carried, such men were the most base
of traitors, lie suspected there were
persons of this description, and the
evil was of the most alarming kind,
when the enemy were actually prepar-
ing in the most formidable manner
against us.
With sincere sorrow we have to state
that the report circulated by Ministers
on Monday afternoon, of the distur-
bances on board the fleet being at an
end, turns on to be totally untrue. It
was founded on the dispatch by the
iclegraph, that the lArndon, the ship
of .dmiraI ()lpnys, was under way,
and that she was going to St. I lelen's to
(in the fleet.
'lucy have by this Resolution the
solemn pledge of the Parliament to
their security and to their demands;
and every man in the kingdom would
join them in resenting the violation of
the terms agreed on, if anything so
wicked and so absurd was to be
attempted. ilic know that there never
was an instance of a solemn indemnin
being broken; nor ought they to be led
away from just confidence in the
sacred word of his Majesty by the
exasperating nonsense that has
appeared in some of the Journals
devoted to Ministers, which we have
good reason to believe the very
patrons of the papers in question
extremely deplore.
The stories of the French being at sea
are fortunately without foundation.
Such falsehoods ought not to be circu-
lated. God knows we have already suf-
fered too much from the Jesuitical pal-
icy of false alarms! What might be the
consequence to England, if by these
very cunning alarms, we should
prompt the impetuous seamen to
hurrv the fleet to sea, of their own
accord, without instructions, without
concert, without a rendezvous, and
without auspices! If there was nothing
material to the conduct of a Fleet, but
bravery in the hour of action, we
should have pleasure in seeing the
British Seamen, self-organised,
opposed to the enemy however numer-
ous, but the detail of signals, the co-
operation of the .dmirahy at home,
and with all the other stations of the
service, the intelligence with respect to
the enem and a thousand other con-
siderations which depend on concert
and establishment, must convince the
sailors themselves that even their own
strength, their importance, and their
success must depend ai system, on
discipline, on duty, and that they can
only hope to retain the glory they have
acquired by returning to the order
which has made theni the pride of the
Universe.
The commotion among the sailors may
very probably have arisen from their
misunderstanding some of the
Minister's speeches. It cannot be
expected that plain, unlettered men
should understand what puzzles the
ablest and most acute of his hearers.
Delicacy - It is rather unfortunate that
the Minister cannot impart some por-
tion of his delicate reserve to the
'l'reasury Writers. In one of their
Papers yesterday we were told that,
when the Marines on board the
London were ordered to fire, the order
was "executed" with a degree of
prompmess and determination charac-
teristic of good and disciplined
Soldiers!" .tnd again -- "we think no
eulogiwn too great for the manly firm,
and officer-like conduct of .'idmiral
or the loyal and soldier-like
behaviour of the Marines." here is a
fine proof of delicacy, and an
admirable display of the split of con-
ciliation. The Sailors do not want
Pacohint P.qxr. u trnT.ire them.
• 
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Lord (isenville thought it necessary to
deny in the most express and positive
terms, that he was, in his official capac-
ity, bound to answer any question that
might be put to him, however unrea-
sonably, by individuals. Ills Lordship
felt that it was a doctrine which could
not be us, forcibly stated to the I louse,
that his Majesty's Ministers and
Parliament ought both to be tried by
their own acts, and not by any gross
and shameful misrepresentations that
were maliciously fabricatedto pervert
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the public mmd, and prvjudicc it
against Government, it would be pecu-
hark hard if Ministers were to be tried
on the grounds of answers extorted
from them by questions insidiously and
irregularly put, and then carefully con-
veyed to the public through disorderly
and W)COflstitUtiOflal channcls, though
they were acquiesced in, he meant the
public Newspapers lie appealed to the
I louse, whether he vu not justified in
stating that all the misrepresentations,
however great they were, with respect
to the present subject, were all owing
to the indiscreet discussion which the
Noble Duke (the Duke of Bedford)
had brought fotward a few nights ago?
ioa: Was this a time to adhere to petty
formalities, to procrastinate fur the
production of an estimate?
Mr. Sheridan: 'Ihe Minister now pre-
tended to say that he waited for an esti-
mate of the expense which will attend
this measure. Did he really believe that
the public were to be so insulted? lie
could have brought this estimate down
to the I louse at the very hour after the
King's proclamation issued. lie was
ready enough to avoid all delay in
granting the imperial Loan, nay, so
anxious was he upon that measure, that
he would not wait for three days,
although it vu notorious that intelli-
gence was expected to arrive which
would put that Loan out of the ques-
tion. lie vu ready enough also to use
all due diligence to stop the payment of
the Bank, and to cause the King to
come to town at an unusual hour, and
in the most extraordinary way, in order
to issue the Order in Council for that
purpose. But he saw nothing in this
measure, upon which the very exis-
tence of the nation depended, that
required haste. This was such shameful
neglect, that he trusted the I louse
would fed it, as he vu sure the Public
felt it, with abhorrence. ilic Minister
was absolutely without eacuse for the
delay that bad taken place. lie knew
that the sailors were dissatisfied. lie
now oane forward with his unavailing
regret that any disturbances had hap-
pened. lie pretended that they arise
from misunderstandinj Could there
be any wonder at that misunderstand-
ing? I lad the sailors not a promise
from the Admiralty, and was not that
promise afterwards treated with appar-
ent indifference by the King's
Ministers? Did they not delay the
measure which could alone give it
sanction?
lie IPitri could not but foresee that
when the order was given for this fleet
to weigh anchor that jealousy would
remain among the sailors, and there-
fore he was to all intents and purposes
answerable for the consequences that
ensued.
Be the claims of the sailors what they
may, what was now proposed to be
granted to them was nothing more
than justice. .t the same time that he
said this, he must not omit to state ohs-
tincily his decided disapprobation of
the mode in which these demands were
insisted upon. it was unfair and incon-
sistent with the brave, generous and
open character of British Seamen; nor
had he a doubt but there had becti a
foul intfc, with them, and means
of the basest nature used to induce
them to take the steps which they had
taken. If men were oppressed, they
ought to be relieved by their countr
But however just their complaints
were, they ought to complain in a reg-
ular way. if there were any among
them, as he believed there were, that
advised the Sailors to put their Country
into such peril as it stood in at this
moment, for the mere purpose of hav-
ing their objects carried, such men
were the most base of traitors lie sup-
posed there were persons of this
description, and the evil was of the
most alarming kind, when the enemy
were actually preparing in the most
formidable manner against us. lie
thought that listening to the sugges-
tions of such foes to this country
would never have been the fault of the
brave British Seamen.
it was currently reported this morning
at 'Change, the Admiral Sir John Jervis
has fallen in with the homcward-bound
Spanish Manilla fleet, and captured
several of the ships. The captured
ships are stated to have from ten to
twelve millions of l)ollars on board.
We do not know on what authority this
intelligence rests, but it had a consider-
able influenceinraising the funds.
Some persons from London have been
distributing hand-bills through the
fleet, inflaming the seamen, and pur-
porting that the Bill had been thrown
ut of th II ' -(	 t I tIs.
bt	 tme.
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The l'arl of Suttolk observed, that
considering the very great importance
of the measure under their lordship's
consideration, he should require the
Noble Secretary (Lord Grenville) to
give an answer to a question which he
conceived to be highly material, lie
wished to know why a measure so very
intimately connected with the dearest
interests of the countrY as that which
was then proposed for the acquies-
cence of the I louse, could have been
allowed tobe postponed to the present
moment? lie hoped the noble sear-
os'v would think fit to give a dear
answer to that simple question, and he
should reserve to himself the opportu-
nity of speaking when that took place.
'11w I)uke of Athol earnestly diprecat.
ed all idea of discussion, and he trust-
ed that their Lordships would not be
induced to enter into particulars of so
delicate a nature, as the present subject
involved. I Ic wished seriously to
impress on the minds of their
Lordshiptc the calamities to which he
might be supposed to allude, had in a
very great measure arisen from the
gross misrepresentations that had gone
abroad respecting the discussion which
had taken place in that house but a few
days ag Feeling therefore as he did
the dangers to which such a proceed-
ing might lead, he should think it his
duty to use every means in his power,
as a Peer of Parliament, to resist the
entering into a debate on the subject;
and he hoped to be seconded, if he
were obliged to move, that the Bill do
pass without further discussion.
lord Grenville thought it necessary to
assure the I louse, that he had come
down determined to avoid catering
into any discussion on the particulars
of the Bill then before their Lordships.
lie was peculiarly convinced of the
necessity of strictly adhering to that
resolution from the shameful and scan-
dalous misrepresentations that had
been made, and industriously circulat-
ed respecting what had happened in a
late conversation held in the I louse on
the same subject. Without, therefore,
detaining their Lordship any longer, he
should merely observe, that the Bill
ought to pass as speedily as possible, as
the surest and moist effectual means of
putting an end to the mischief which
had been occasioned by these misrep-
resentations.
The Duke of Bedford declared, he
knew of no misrepresentations made
on the subject, either scandalous or
shameful. Whatever misconceptions
might have taken place in the minds of
several persons, they should with more
propriety be supposed to have arisen
from the injudicious speech of the
First Lord of the dmirah, when
called upon to inform the I loose with
respect to the progress made in the
business. But he could not imagine,
that these misconceptions were to be
attributed to any other cause.
Lord Moira The question proposed by
the Noble Earl did not go to any point
that could possibly involve, a consider-
ation of the merits or nature of the
Bill, but simply required an explanation
from his Majesty's Ministers with
regard to the delay which it was
acknowledged on all hands had been
suffered to take place in bringing for-
ward a measure of peculiar and press-
ing importance.
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The 1)uke of (irafron: .'ii one of the
greatest calamities the country ever
expeticticed had happened in Conse-
quence of p rastinatiun, it became
the duty of the I louse to enquire how
that protastinanon had taken placc
An explanation on that head was in his
opinion, due to the seamen and to the
public
•llie Duke of Bedford rise, and stated
to the I louse, that he desired to ask
another question of the Ministers, I lit
(; thought it necessary to promise,
that it was one which, if fairly
answered, would completely put an
end to all discussion whatever. 11w
question was - whether his Majesty's
Ministers intended and were really
cndeavouzing to carry into execution
all the promises made by the lord
Conimissioners of the Admiralty to
the Seamen.
Lord Greavillc thought it nccesasry to
deny in the most express and positive
terms, that he was in his official capac-
ity bound to answer any question that
might be put to him, however unrea-
sonably. by individuals. I lis Lordship
felt that it was a doctrine which could
not be too forcibly stated to the I louse,
that his Majesty's Ministers and
Parliament ought both to be tried by
their own acts, and not by any gross
and shameful misrepresentations that
were maliciously fabricated to pervert
the public mind, and prejudice it
against Gernment. It would be pecu-
liarly hard if Ministers were to be tiicd
on the ground of answers, extorted
from them by questions insidiously and
irregularly put, and then carefully con-
veyed to the public through disorikijy
and unconstitutional channels, though
they were acquicted in, he meant the
public Newspapers. lie appealed to the
I louse, whether he was not justified in
stating, that all the misrepresentations,
however great they were, with respect
to the present subject, were all owing
to the indiscreet discussion which the
Noble Duke (the Duke of Bedford)
had brought forward a few nights aga
Mr. Sheridan said, he was sure that no
other impression, except that of con-
tempt, could remain on minds of every
(;enthx in the house, who attend-
ed to the excuse made by the Minister.
What necessity was he under to go
through the forms of making out em-
mates if that was a business likely to
take up much time, why did he not
come down at once with a Message to
the I louse, which would immediately
have voted such swns as would be nec-
essary, and the amount of which what
might afterwards be ascertained, and
might not a vole have been passed to
enable his Majesty to comply with the
demands of the Seamen, and that the
I louse would make goad this same.
Thcre were some occasions in which
the Right 1km. Gcntkan would not
have been so negligent. If an Imperial
loan was to be voted, it could not
admit a moment's delay From such
date delay having taken place, the
sailors of the fleet could not believe
that any propositions made to them
were sincere. Iliey had therefore a
tight to doubt these, which they knew
very well not to have any force unless
agreed to by Parliament-, and it was not
disrespectful in them U) doubt, under
all the circumstances, that the
Parliament would not do what the
Board of 'uliniralty had recommend-
cii. Thereforc unless the Right I Ion.
(lenticinan was totally besotted, unless
he had lost that elegant understanding
of his which had so often shone fort
with such brilliancy in that I louse, how
was a possible that he should not have
apprehended new jealousies among the
Seamen from the backwardness that
was shown in sanctioning the conces-
sions made iw the Board of Admiralty?
With respect to the intended motion
for vote of censure he wished his I Ion.
Friend might not press it on that day;
but he would recommend it to
Gentlemen to press the Minister to
inform them what was the present sit-
uation of the Ileet. With respect to the
concesmons made to the sailors, he cer-
tainly thought they got no more than
what they were entitled U); but the
same time, that he must fully disap-
prove of the mode in which these con-
cessions had been made, and was sure,
from the well-known character of
Ititish seamen, who had ever shown
themselves incapable of anything dis-
loyal or that bordered on rebellion, that
there must have been some foul inter-
ference made use of amongst them.
They must have been instigated to such
conduct by persons who nor having
the confidence to state grievances
openly, had acted the part of the basest
traitors by working in such an insidious
manner upon the brave and loyal sea-
men of the British Navy
If they suffered a brave and gallant
officer, whom every body must
respect, to be sacrificed without adopt-
ing any measures to preserve his life, it
was a murderous delay on their part.
It is with sincere sorrow we cannot
confirm the accounts published with
great confidence in several of the
morning papers of yesterday of the
favourable condusion of the second
Mutiny at Portsmouth. We are sorry to
observe such frequent repetitions of
like assurances because, being altogeth-
er unfounded, they are only cakulated
to sport with the feelings of the public,
whose minds must be tremblinglv alive
to every 'ensaflon. shall pursue the
same line of conduct we did on the late
unhappy occasion of a similar nature,
and publish only such facts as come to
us from the most undoubted authneit
It is however possible, that after using
every cauton, we may commit some
trifling deviation from the fact,
because the letters from Portsmouth,
as well as the reports of persons arriv-
ing from thence, arc so various, that it
is viy difficult to ascertain the precise
truth.
The second Mutiny at Portsmouth dis-
covered itself on Sunday morning, on
Lord Bridport's making the signal to
weigh anchor at St I helen's, it is posi-
tively affirmed, and we believe with
truth, that it was occasioned by the
misrepresentations and scandalous
comments of some of the Opposition
papers of Friday. in detailing and
observing what passed in the I louse of
lords on Thursday last. iliese papers
had cndcavoured to inculcate a notion
abroad, that the Administration of the
country was disposed to evade the
promise made by Earl Spencer to the
seamen. This kind of belief certainly
gained credit on board the fleet, where
there were not wanting persons to
countenance the report, and to rake up
the ashes of former differences.
Accotdinglt, on the signal being given
to weigh anchor, the seamen once
more refused to obey their orders; and
having again rove their yard ropes on
board each ship as a measure of terror
to those who might conscientiously
think that their country deserved a
more grateful return from British sea-
men, on whom such extensive favours
had been recently conferred, they
manned a boat from each ship, which
paraded to Spithcad, where they first
went on board the Marlborough, the
most mutinous ship After conferring
with the crew, the yard ropes were like-
wise suspended on board her. The
I)elegates then came alongside the
London, Admiral Colpoys ship, when
the Admiral called out that they should
not come on board. The seamen said
that should, no which the Admiral told
them that the first act of disobedience
would be fataL The Delegates attempt-
ing to come on board, the Admiral
ordered the Marines to fire into their
boats, by which three Delegates were
killed, and five wounded. The seamen
soon after got possession of the ship.
and fired on the Marines, and killed
five men but instead of the First
Lieutenant of the london, we now
that the Officer shot was lieutenant
Sims, of the Marines, who was not
killed, but only wounded Admiral
Colpoys and his superior Officers were
instantly put under arrest, and his flag,
struck; and on the rest of the
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1)ekgaws coming on board, th
hoisted the Red, or Hkxidv Hag, which
was kept flying the rest of the
(What happened on board the London
is very differently represented, Mane
letter, stating that the Marines fired on
the Seamen of the London, and not on
the l)elcgatcs. As there arc no letters
from on board that ship; it is difficult
to ascertain the truth, though what we
have stated comes to us from very
good authority).
Such was the unpromising and melan-
choly state of affairs at Portsmouth on
Monday cvctung In the course of yes-
terda the public were imposed on (as
might be expected) by seveml pretend-
ed expresses, giving further informa-
tion on this subject; but the reports
brought by them are not worthy of our
observation.
it will be scur from the proceedings of
the two I louses of Parliament yester-
day evening, that the subject of the
Mutiny caine under discussion; and we
are sorry to observe that a considerable
degree of acrimony passed during the
debate.
lire Act was sent off to Portsmouth,
with the hope that it would being the
Seamen back to their dure God grant it
may, for the moment is most awful!
iliere is no reason to believe that the
lrest fleet is yet at sea, though accord-
ing to very recent advice, it was in a
very forward state of preparation, and
of considerable force.
Pnrtsmouth May 8 - The mind of
every one is almost in an indescribable
state, in contemplating the height of
the alarming disorder now prevailing in
the Fleet.
The following persons were sent to the
I lospital wounded last night William
Baker, Richard Collins, John Pickering
and Charles Darrnn.
The three former are dead of their
wounds it was Mr. Sims, First
lieutenant of Marines on board the
I .ondon man of war, who was shot,
and not the First lieutenant of the
ship, as stated by mistake; lieutenant
Sims arm was so shattered, that an
amputation took place this morning
Mr. Simpson, a Midshipman, and four
Seamen were also wounded.
Some of the Delegates, from the flect
called at the hospital this morning to
enquire how the wounded men were,
and on being told three of them were
dead, they said that Admiral Colpoys
life should pay for it; and that they
would go on board, and take the
London man of war down to St.
lichen's, and try him immediatel by a
Court Martial: they then went on
board, and confined the Admiral, and
arc taking the ship down to St. I lekn's
Ohr	 ruc J3riton
If edroda). 10 1a, I 9
Far! Strange (l)uke of .thul, in
Scotland) rose and with some warmth
deprecated all discussion of meas-
ure, as it must be attended with the
worst effects As a Peer of Parliament,
he deemed it his duty to resist every
thing tending to a discussion of the
measure. lie would urge the immediate
reading of the Bill, as wdl as to accel-
erate it through its subsequent stages -
as the best answer which could be
given to those deluded Seamen in the
Fleet, and the best argument to induce
them to return to their dut which
must be given to them by their Countn
- he must deprecate a discussion which.
amongst other evils, might afford the
opportunity of misrepresentation,
which might be attended with serious
consequences
The Earl of Moira observed, that an
explanation on the part of Ministers,
was necessary to satisfy the Country, as
well as Parliament, respecting the caus-
es of their delay in bringing forward
the Bill; and that a satisfactory explana-
tion might prevent the evil from
spreading farther. The Seamen would
then see, that they were not neglected.
The question proposed by the Noble
Earl, he thought, embraced no discus-
sion.
On such an occasion as a Mutiny in the
British Navy - a Mutiny under such
new and peculiar circumstances, it has
uniformly been our wish to preserve
particular delicacy and caution in every
statement which we make to the
Publie, aware how real mischief may be
done to the Country by exaggerated or
misrepresented accounts. The Public
must be sensible likewise how much,
even according to the best authenticat-
ed accounts, the most solicitous for
authentic information may be
deceived, as things in such a state of
agitation and uncertainty as that of a
General Mutiny, must be very much
represented according to the feelings
and information of the Party making
the representation.
Amidst the concussion of accounts, it
is difficult to depend upon what is real-
it'-.
We are equally .,tiI. that on the
present occasion, there has been no
neglect or unnecessary delay on the
part of the Executive Government, to
propose to the Legislature to carry into
execution the liberal and benevolent
concessions of his Majesty and His
Council, in favour of the Seamen, as
we are convinced that the Seamen
have, in the last instance, been impelled
to Mutiny by the insinuations and
machinations of Men whose duty it
was to have pursued a very different
line of conduct. We now speak of Men
in the highest Ranks of 1.1k That mis-
representations even of the speeches
of our most indent Senators have
been made we are sensible, and that
these have done irreparable mischief, is
certain - but if these have the privilege
of disseminating Mutiny and Treason,
is there no law to punish those who
wilfully misrepresent the plainest state-
merits, and such as are calculated and
intended to conciliate and reamcik the




lire death of the brave and wm,rthy
Admiral Colpoys was meditated by
them, because he had, in obedience to
the instructions of Admiralty, and in
conformity to his duty as an Officer,
refused to admit into his ship a set of
men styling themselves Delegates of
the fleet, whose existence in that
capacity was no longer recognised and
because, in support of his authority, he
had ordered the marines to fire upon
his insubordinate crew
The horror and confusion of this town
are beyond description, in conse-
quence on the mutiny in the fleet.
Admiral Colpovs is in ironic Capt.
Griffiths is confined; and the other
Officers and Marines are also in cus-
todv, at the will, and under the control
of the delegates, who have no in fact,
the command of the fleet
The mind of every one is almost in an
indescribable state, in contemplating
the height of the alarming disorder
now prevailing in the fleet.
The Seamen kept the Masters of the
ships of war on board, to fight under
them only; if an enemy's fleet should
insult our coasts; and they seem in no
shape alarmed to meet any foe that
may come against them, even in this
reduced state.
Every thing remains in the greatest
confusion. Five of the delegates are
dead of their wounds, 11 were wound-
ed.
it is with pleasure we hear that .dmiral
(:olpors and Capt. Griffiths are
released from their confinement, and
sent on shore. lire sailors threaten to
go to sea to meet the French without
Officers. Everything wears a most dis-
mal aspect.
It is very strongly affirmed and accred-
ited, that Admiral Colpovs was tried
yesterday by the delegates on board the
Mars for murder, and found guiltc
They still continue, however, unsatis-
fled, and it is said that they now
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capreis a wish tot a change of
Ministers.
When thC crew of the Mars seized
;'idmiral Colpos's, he observed to them,
hat he should die with pleasure, if
he thought the single sacnflcc of his
life would aftetwards induce them to
return tO their duty."
Same ill founded reports having been
circulated respecting the nature of the
Order of the Lords of the .dmirahy,
under which 'ice Admiral C4ws
acted, when overpowered by the crew
of the London, we insert, for the satis-
faction of the Public, a correct copy of
the Order alluded to, by which it will
appear that the construction given to
the last paragraph, "of its having ren-
dered the King's pardon, granted to
the seamen and marines, of no avail,"
could be applied to it by persons only
who have a desire of farther mislead-
ing these deluded pcopk; the Order
itself bearing no retrospect to any pro-
ceeding antecedent to the time it was
given, but being calculated only to pre-
vent disturbances and discontent in
future.
"Whereas, from the disposition lately
shown b' the seamen belonging to sev-
eral of his Majesty's ships, it is become
highly necessary that the strictest atten-
tion should be paid by all Officers in
his Majesty's naval service, not only to
their own conduct, but to the conduct
of those who may be under their
orders: the more effectual to insure a
subordination and discipline, and to
prevent, as far as may be, all discontent
among the seamen, your Lordship is
hereby directed to be particularly care-
ful to enflwce, so far as the same may
depend on you, and to give orders to
the Officers employed under your
command to enforce, all the regula-
tions fbr the preservation of discipline
and good order in his Majesty's navy,
which are at present established for
that pwpose and you are more espe-
cially to gore the following directions,
vi
That the Flag Officers of the squadron
under your command do frequently
muster the crews of the ships belong-
ing to their respective divisions; that
the Captains and Commanders of the
ships and vessels of your squadron
never be absent themselves, nor allow
any Officers under their orders to be
absent from on board their respective
ships for 24 hours at one time, without
our permission, or leave obtained from
yourself for that purpose.
That all lug Officers, (aptains, and
other Officers, do wear their respective
uniforms, nor onK while their are on
board the ships to which they belong.
but also when they are on shore in or
near any seaport town.
Ihat the Captains and (tnnmanders of
his Majestys ships and vessels do cause
the .rticIes of War to be read on
board their respective ships to the
companies thereof, at least once in
every month, agreeabhr to their
instructions, that they also see that the
arms and amZnwiitlaa belonging to the
marines be constantly kvpt in good
order, and fit fur their immediate serv-
ice, as well in harbour as at sea; and
that they are in future to be very care-
ful to rate the ships' asnpanics accord.
ing to the merits of the men, in order
that those who may not be deserving
theircof may not receive the pay of able
or ordinary seamen.
lust particular attention be paid to the
regulations relating to the cutting up of
fresh beef that choice pieces be never
purposely selected fat the officers,
from that which is cut up from the
ship's company; and that choice pieces
of salt meat be never taken for the
Officers Out of the tub or vessels from
which it may be served to the ship's
company.
That Officers do not select casks of
the best wine or spirits for their own
use from those intended for the ships
company, nor exchange any wine or
spirits of their own fot that which has
been sent on board for the use of the
shi
That the Captains and Commanders of
his Majesty's ships do strictly enjoin
the Surgeons belonging to their respec-
tive ships not to take out of the ship
any part of the medicines or neces-
antics intended for the use of the sick,
but strictly to apply them to the pur-
poses for which they were sent on
That the Captains and Commanders of
his Majesty's ships be particularly
attentive to the conduct of the men
under their command, and that they be
ready, on the first appearance or
mutiny, to use the most vigorous
means to suppress it, and to bring the
ring leaders to punishment.
Ginete. 1st May 1797.
Admiral Colpoys has been tried by a
Tribunal instituted by the seamen, the
verdict of which is to the following
effect fliat in every pan of his late
conduct on board the London man of
war, he conducted himself as became a
British Offlcei' he is therefore free to
reassume the command, of his ship, or
decline it, as he thinks proper." Every
thing is amicably settled.
Lord Moira considered an explanation
on the part of the Ministers as
absolutely necessary, not only to satisfy
Parliament and the countr but as the
most effectual means of preventing
the enl from spreading further.
Sheridan: Why should the Ministers
have waited for the estimates on this
occaám? Why not bring down at once
a message from the Throne (in this
subject, calling on the I louse to make
good the increased allowance, whatev-
er it may be? The Ministers were in this
instance in no haste: an other occa-
sions they had shown an uncommon
degree of precipitation. If an Imperial
Loan was to be voted, or the issues in
cash from the Bank to be stopped, the
business was found to be such as
would nor admit of a moment's delay.
If the Ministers had not been besotted,
he would have used more haste (ifi the
present occasion.
In the meantime, he should ask of the
Minister, what was the state of the
navy, at present, and what were the
remedies which had been applied to
cure its disorder? J.buld it nor be nec-
essarv for that I louse to state explicit-
ly, that the claims of the seamen were
founded in justice, though they disap-
proved of the mode in which they had
been enforced? Of this mode he felt it
necessary to say, that it was highly
unbecoming the character of British
Seamen. 'l1cre had been, he strongly
feared, some foul intrfvrce in that
quarter. If men felt themselves
aggrieved, there was a degree of digni-
ty in open resistance; but everyone
must reprobate such foul and mean
treachery, such an insidious sap of the
best bulwatir of the country. It was not
possible to believe that, without such a
base intvrfctvucc; the British Sailors
would have been inactive, when the
enemy's fleet was known to be at seal
Sheridan: Yet now the I louse was
called on to pass this vote in silence, or
rather in sullen dumbness. lucy had
shown their neglect and incapacity, and
they did nor even attempt to make
atonement by any instance of frank-
ness, or by one just admission. What
would be the inference of the seamen?
Would they not say that it was nor
meant to abide by was offered -
that the llouse did not consider their
claims as just, and was nor prepared to
grant them as a matter of right?
Pitt The fair statement is shortly this;
whether the Executive Government
were in possession of grounds suffi-
cient to enable them to infer that the
delay which rook place would be
accompanied with danger to the coun-
try?
Mr. Secretary Dundas: I1hen the
ships dropped down from Spithead to
St. helen's, thee was cy r-ason to
conclude that there was an end of the
mutiny ... The jealousy was revived on
being told by some designing persons,
or more probably informed by some
inflammatorv paper, that the Kings
-
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Proclamatam was a forgery. (oupling
with this the conversation published m
the paperic they conduded that "their
bill," as they called it "was thrown out."
the seamen, on being informed of
the proceedings of Parliament relative
to their demands, dedared themselves
perfectly satisfied with the liberal con-
cessiuns which had been made and
Confirmed to than.
. sense, however, of their having been
missed and imposed on scans to be
general; and there is no doubt that the
arts of ddusion which have been hith-
erto practised on them with us, much
succes', will in future be inefficacious
bt J1orniu €bronulz
Thursek 11 Maj I '97
The .ct of Parliament which was
passed on Tuesday, was no sooner
communicated to the Meet, than it pro-
duced disposituns favourable to order
and peace. A stronger demonstration
of their previous jealousy could not
have been given, than the quick and
generous effect which this measure
had on the hearts of the Seamen. They
received it as an instance of attention
to their remonstranccs the most
unequivocal; and they shewed an intel-
ligent spitit in distinguishing between
the security of law and a mere promise
What a libel is this upon Ministers!
Since it proves that if they had not
delayed the important measure, no sus-
picion would have arisen, nor any
room been given for misconstruction
of their designs
We have through the whole of this dis-
astrous affair, abstained from propa-
gating all the vague reports with which
some of the papers have stunned the
public car, without doing service to the
public cause. The rumours from
Portsmouth were in general false and
mischievous They were the mere gos-
siping stotics of the Platform, or the
anecdotes of the Beach; and vet not an
hour has elapsed without tremendous
narratives of events that never
occurred, or of menacing appearances
that were never seen. We are happy to
say the industry of this spirit of prop-
agation did no material mischief. The
character of our Seamen did not suffer
by the infamies imputed to them. So
deeply muted is the confidence of the
Public in the genuine fidelit of the
Fleet to their Country, that an event
which has filled even confederate
mind with anxiety did not lower the
Funds so much as a wretched article
from a I laniburgh Gazette has fre-
quendv done. We mention this as a cir-
cumstance highly flattering to the char-
acter both of the People and the Navy
It proves that the Country knows how
to estimate the honour of the Seamen,
and we have no doubt but the will
prove worthy of the trust and respect
that has been paid to them.
Tb.vr' , i, 1! .tI	 / 97
Whitbread as it possible that the
I louse could for one moment admit of
that ridiculous excuse in a Gentkmm
who had used such celerity on every
occasion when any abridgement was to
be made in the liberty of the people,
and who had attempted to carry
through the I louse in one night a Bill
for the suspension of the I labcas
(:orpus Act. .i gentleman who stopped
at no formalities; who carried every
thing with utmost expedition and dis-
patch at those times when the country
was threatened, with imaginary pk)ts
and conspiracies; but who, at the
moment of real danger, when there
was a mutiny throughout the fleet, was
obliged to have recourse to the flow of
routine and forms of office; if it was
insisted upon that the late calamitous
events in the fleet were produced by
any misinterpretations of speeches in
Parliament, he desired that it might be
Whitbread's Motion:
i1iat it is the opinion of this I louse
that the Right lion. pet, I,•
having so long delayed to present to
the I louse and estimate of the expens-
es to be provided for in consequence
of the Order of Council for an
increase of pay to the seamen and
marines serving on board I (is Majesty's
fleet, and for the full allowance of pro-
visions to be same, has been guilty of
gross neglect of his duty, and deserves
the censure of this I louse."
for - 63, against - 237
ll(x: debate - Chancellor of the
Ixchcquer:
"It had been argued, that the delay was
the cause of these events, but he
thought it would be fair to observe that
they must have been also in a great
degree produced by the misrepresenta-
tions of discussions that had taken
place in another I louse, which may not
be consistent with the orders of
Parliament for him to name. If those
discussions had not been (providec in
that place by persons who generally
opposed I ha Majesty's Government,
there would have been no misrepresen-
tations of the tendency of those decla-
rations which had been made by per-
sons high in office: there would have
remained no doubt but that at the
moment, at the very hour when those
discussions took place ... the final
Order of Council would have been
referred to a Committee of the I louse
of Commons an estimate made out,
without any relation whatever to the
causes which had produced the late
events
We never recollect to have written
under such extn.lne anxiety as in com-
posing the kading article in our paper
of yestcrda' concerning the mutiny at
Portsmouth, which, according to the
most recent and authentic advice then
received, had assumed the most
gloomy appearance. however, at five
o'clock yesterday momin Mr. Evans,
an Admiralty Messenger, arrived in
town with dispatches from Lord
Bridport, at St. I lelen'ii, which, consid-
ering all circumstances, are satisfactory.
Besides the misrepresentations and
calumnies inserted in the Opposition
Papers of last Friday, insinuating that
Ministers were not disposed to fulfil
the promises made to the Seamen, we
find that hand bills had been also art-
fully circulated on board the fleet,
asserting that the Seamen's Bill had
been thrown out in the Ilouse of
Lords It was this idea which certainly
gave rise to the Mutiny; but we hope
that the authors of it will be traced,
and brought to condign punishment.
l)elegates declared themselves satis-
fied, and expressed the most earnest
wish to go to sea in search of the
enemy; for which purpose they had
retained all the Masters of the different
ships
l'ox: "with regard to the secrecy with
which the business was conducted
throughout, it was his opinion, that
such conduct was only connected with
an absolute Government. And even in
that respect in such a case as the pres-
ent one, publicity was the best and
most effectual made of proceeding
Yorke: "The plain statement of events,
however, materially altered the case, as
it could not be denied, that on Friday
the 28th April, the fleet would have
proceeded to sea under the order of
Lord Bridport, after communications
transmitted to them by the Lords of
the .dmiralrt, had not the wind unfor-
tunately chopped about, and forced
them to remain at St. llekn'a had the
fleet sailed at that time, it would have
been encouraged in blocking up the
harbour of Brest, satisfied as the sea-
men were with the conditions granted
them, instead of being agitated by
fresh discontenrs. Might not the I louse
therefore suppose with no small con-
sistency, that the misrepresentations
which had gone aboard, by whatever
name they were called, gross or acci-
dental, had more probably produced
the events which had recently taken
place, than any other cause?
I)undas. Some persons however, for
whom he could not find a name,
whether Jacobin or any other suffi-
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dewily descnpnvc at their wide.
room sought to mislead them (the sea-
men). The moment the question of the
seamen's pay and provisions was set-
tled, and his Majesty's most gracious
pardon granted to them, thaw persons
endeavoured to persuade them that the
pardon was a fbrgcr When misrLpre-
sentarion of what had passed on this
subject in another place had been cir-
culated abroad, their made of attack
was changed. The seamen were told.
that Parliameiit mLlnt to b,.tra thcm.
rJ,c	 rue J3rtton
Thar4 ii.ti, Fr
',Xe ted considerable sitisfacnun in Liv-
ing before our readers the particulars
which reached town in the course of
yesterday respecting the Mutiny at
Portsmouth, the general appearance of
affairs there being much mare
favourable than report had represented
them to have been on the preceding
day.
That the mcii had not cxsnplcedy
returned to their dut may be attrib-
uted to the fears which they vety natu-
rally entertained of the consequences
of their conduct. A sense, however, of
their having been misled and imposed
on seems to be general; and we have no
doubt that the arts of delusion which
have been hitherto practised on them
with tx much success will in future be
inefficacious.
One of the mast palpable of the mis-
representations employed by the ene-
mies to good order, was an account of
the l)uke of Bedford's Speech given in
the Courier, by which the Seamen,
were taught to believe that the 13111 for
the increase of their pay being ordered
on the table implied, that it was thrown
under the table and consequently
reiectcd. While we recollect many
other such gross and dreadful misrep-
resentations, we are at no loss to
account for the present discontent of
the Fleet.
It appears that several of the Ships at
St. I lelen's and Spithead had returned
to their duty, in consequence of the
receipt of the Proceedings in
Parliament relative to their Pay and
Provisions. Among these we an posi-
tively state that the Seamen an Board
the Royal George and London were
the first to express thur satisfaction. In
the other Ship quietness prevailed, and
sanguine hopes were entertained of
their likewise returning to their obedi-
(lice.
Admiral (olpoys and Captain
(hiffltbs, of the london, came on
shore an Tuesday.
A report has beli prevalent for these
two or three days past, that the French
Meet consisting of seventeen sail of
the line, with a considerable number of
transports, were lying in the outer road
of I3rciit ready for sea, and it was even
stated yesterday, that this Fleet was
actually at sea. If this be the case, our
seamen will be furnished with an
npporiunity of evincing the sincerity
of their return to their dut by giving
such an account of the lnemy as the
have hitherto ever been accustomed to
do; and we trust that they will soon
atone for their present misconduct, by
some great naval achievement.
Lord I lowe yesterday set off for
Portsmouth, not with the intention of
resuming the command of the Meet,
but with the idea of using his influ-
ence, as a great naval conqueror, in
order to bring British Seamen back to
that state of discipline, and to that
sense of duty, which, under his aus-
pices and conduct, had led them to the
most brilliant victories over the ene-
mica of their country
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CHAPTER FIVE: The Seamen's Manfèsto
Whilst ... we preserve our wooden walls, and our men have hearts of oak, as well as our shzps, we
shall have nothin,g tofearfrom Gallic ambition, Dutch pefidji, or Spanish terrjversation.'
In the spring of 1797, it was the Admiralty - not the French, Dutch or Spanish - who had
reason to fear those hearts of oak. A week after the discontents in Portsmouth appeared
amicably settled, the Oracle and Public Advertiser; published what became known as the
Seamen's Manifesto. It arrived in the form of a handbill at the newspaper's office early
19 May. It came from Portsmouth, was assumed authentic and thought newsworthy
enough to put in the next edition. The Oracle was the only London newspaper to publish
it. It began:
TO A LOYAL AND DISCERNING NATION,
The following lines are humbly submitted.
As various reports have been propagated by malicious and unprincipled men,
WE THE SEAMEN OF HIS MAJESTY'S FLEET, under command of Admiral
Lord Bridport, Knight of the Bath, &c, think it a duty incumbent on ourselves, to
publish at large our just and moderate requests - grievances which were promised to
be redressed - snares laid to entrap our loyal brethren, such as were deemed heads of
our proceedings - the particulars of the unfortunate affair which happened on board
the London the 7th instant - unjust aspersions thrown upon our characters as British
Seamen, by an Honourable Member in the House of Commons, with observations
on the same - and our particular reason for not proceeding to sea, that our grateful
countrymen might not be deceived, our ourselves prejudiced by false reports.2
The manifesto neatly articulated the seamen's grievances, refuted parliamentary criticism
of their behaviour and detailed several 'contentious episodes within the mutiny'. It
explicitly condemned the Admiralty, Admiral Colpoys and other tyrannical officers. It
put their actions within a context of loyal protest and took the form of a public letter. It
claimed to offer a fair and accurate statement of the facts and supported that claim with
evidence that had escaped the public's attention.
The manifesto arrived in the aftermath of one mutiny, at the beginning of another and in
response to the parliamentary posturing of Richard Sheridan. He immediately denounced
it as a 'scandalous forgery', 'a gross libel' filled with the 'foulest misrepresentations'. 3 He
condemned it as an 'insidious and industrious promulgation of foul and infamous
falsehoods fabricated by artful and designing men, for the purpose of undermining the
I Genii n'.rMa,gafne,January 1797, 26
2 Oracle, 19 May 1797; RNM 8 1996 19598 6.10.3
3 Monring Chronicle, 24 May 1797
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strongest Pillar of the Empire'. 4
 Sheridan warned it had been 'circulated with much
industry'5 and 'fatal success'6 in His Majesty's ports at Plymouth and Sheerness. He
argued 'it could be proved to be a forgery from internal evidence'; yet offered only his
opinion that 'the language in which it is drawn up is more like the language of a
Circulating Library; than that of a Forecastle.' 7 No one, at the time or since, has
challenged his assessment.
The document provides fertile ground for analysis, revealing much about its authors and
their motives. From its opening, 'To a Loyal and Discerning Nation', to its close, We
remain ... the Loyal and Humane Tars of His Majesty's Fleet at St Helens', the language
of the manifesto, regardless of its source, indicates it was drafted with considerable care
for a specific purpose: to persuade. It is not the humble submission it claimed to be, but
neither should it be dismissed as a forgery.
The salutation 'To a Loyal and Discerning Nation' seems typical of eighteenth century
public pronouncements, but offers more than deference or ritual greeting. The word
'Loyal' complimented its audience, but also identified and linked it with them, while
implicitly denying seditious intent. Knowing their motives were questioned, the authors
reassured readers of their moderation and loyalty. The word 'discerning' flattered their
ability to recognise and understand the truth when they saw it, implying what they had
seen or heard thus far about the mutiny was not true. However, with this public letter,
they sought to influence rather than enlighten. The Seamen's Manifesto was carefully
crafted to capture the public's sympathy and enlist its support. It was propaganda.
'The following lines are humbly submitted' disarmed before it informed. The manifesto
struck a note of calculated irony, insisting it was written in response to 'various reports'
propagated by 'malicious and unprincipled men'. Throughout the mutiny, newspapers
miniinised the problem and assured the public that the seamen had been 'imposed on by
the artful intrigues of designing men, who are traitors to their country'. 8 A week before
Sheridan suggested such men had 'secretly and insidiously endeavoured to sap and
destroy the very bulwark of the country'.9 Beyond the simple ñposte, the manifesto
Ibi€L, 27 May 1797
5 Morning Post, 24 May 1797
6 lEnd, 27 May 1797
7 Sv 24 May 1797
8 The Times, 21 April 1797
9 Mormng Post, 10 May 1797
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offered another perspective on the mutiny, portraymg the seamen as victims and their
critics as misleading the public.
The authors spoke for the fleet reconfirming their ioyaity to the king and re-submitting
to the authority of Lord Bridport. While such language was formulaic, it was a curious
beginning for the document Sheridan claimed would undermine 'the strongest Pillar of
the Empire'. They feigned reluctance to trouble the public with something that might
seem triviaL Short of invasion, to which it appeared to leave the country open, the
mutiny was England's worst nightmare. To contemporaries, it was the latest in a series of
disasters threatening the nation's survival. On hearing of the terms of the settlement,
Burke wrote to Windham:
There is an end of us. The Revolution is accomplished.... It has happened, as I long
feared it would, that danger has commenced in the very foundation of our false
security. We have paid nearly £600,000 a year for the destruction of our Naval
discipline.10
As Burke shared his apocalyptic visions, George Canning, tried to amuse the
disconsolate Windham with a bit of doggerel:
Windham! whene'r thy fervent mind
Some thought, uncommon, just, refined,
In happiest phrase expresses;
Thy vulgar audience stare and gape,
And shout, and chuckle, at the scrape
Of 'Negative Successes.'
Oh tell me! does to-day's Event
Serve to illustrate what you meant?
Or will the Soldiers riot?
Oh! if the Guards have not rebell'd,
And if the naval fray is quell'd
If Portsmouth yet is quiet,
Come, Windham! celebrate with me
This day of joy and jubilee,
This day of no disaster!
Our Government is not o'erturn'd
Huzza! Our Fleet has not been burn'd,
Our Army's not our Master.1'
With the second outbreak the seamen were vilified in the press. Their moderation was
forgotten as their motives and loyalty were questioned. While Colpoys was released by
'°Earl of Rosebery, ed., The fl2indbam Papers (London Jenkins, 1913), 53-54
"BL Addi MS 37844.267, Canning to Windham, 12 May 1797
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the civil authorities and eulogised by the press, they were blamed for the mutiny's only
violence. The manifesto promised to set the record straight. Its authors asked the public
to be impartial, then did all they could to influence their consideration.
Describing their demands as 'just and moderate requests' involved more than deference.
Those requests had assumed the form of mutiny. Despite careful semantics and
observing the 'unwritten rules' of seamen's protests, the delegates understood the risk
they were running. Traditional indulgences and pragmatism were being replaced by strict
interpretations and rigid adherence to discipline. The delegates resisted the change, but
understood: 'There is no justice or injustice on board ship. There are only two things:
duty and mutiny. All that you are ordered to do is duty. All that you refuse to do is
mutiny.'12 By custom before and by order after I May, the Articles of War were read to
the assembled crews at least once a month.
Since the beginning of the war, the fleet witnessed several hangings and floggings for
'mutinous Assemblies', some involving 'traiterous or mutinous Practice or Design'.13
Once their actions were defined as mutiny, the seamen's grievances became irrelevant.
Admiral Patton observed in 1795 'the true spirit of discipline always requires that Mutiny
should never lead to redress, but certainly, and infallibly, terminate in punishment."4
Self-interest dictated restraint, but the delegates seemed to appreciate how their actions
might affect the public and understood that, without public support, those actions would
fail. Thus, they reassured their countrymen that their wage increase would not add
significantly to the public burden.
They described their grievances as being 'promised to be redressed', arguing an
agreement was reached with, then broken by, the Admiralty. They presented the I May
Instructions as a breach of faith. However, they suggested the snares 'laid to entrap our
loyal brethren' would have entrapped the wrong men, that 'one and all' were united in
their cause. Their suspicions were justified. A fortnight before the I May Instructions,
the fleet's officers were instructed 'upon discovering any disposition to Mutiny amongst
' 2 K Weibust, De'p Sea SailorrA Study in Mañtime Ethnolog, (Stockholm: 1969), 372
' U Owenj, Mutiny in the RrrjaINay, 1691-1919 çJ'raining and Staff Duties Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty,
July 1933), BR 1828, i, 19-82
'4 NMIM WYNIO9 7 14, P Patton, April 1795
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the Crews of their said ships, to take immediately the most vigorous & effectual
measures for checking its progress & securing the Ringleaders.'15
The manifesto promised an account of the 'unfortunate affair' on board the London, but
first addressed the 'unjust aspersions thrown upon our characters as British seamen, by
an Honourable Member in the House of Commons'. Sheridan's comments in Commons
on 8 May involved a curious shift in rhetoric. Abandoning his customary criticism of
government, Sheridan appeared to embrace its position by condemning the 'artful and
designing' men who led honest seamen astray. Sheridan may have hoped to restore,
rather than impugn, the character of British seamen. He certainly seemed hurt by their
response: 'They could not have selected any individual on whom to make a charge of
such a nature who so little deserved it.' 16 However, in suggesting they had been led
astray, Sheridan hit a nerve. If left unchallenged, his suggestion could undermine the
fleet's resolve.
Separating the men from their leaders, putting them to work, dividing the fleet and
punishing ringleaders were the standard prescription for mutiny. 17 While fleet officers
saw the futility of attempting it and the danger of discussing it, opposition newspapers
dwelt on the necessity of it. Lord Howe and the Duke of Clarence foolishly announced it
in the House of Lords. And the Lords of the Admiralty virtually demanded it in their
instructions of 15 April and I May. Letters from the fleet provided reassurance and
unnecessary reminders.' 8 With suspicions aroused, it remained vital to maintain
solidarity. In the mutiny's immediate aftermath, the delegates, the men most likely to be
identified as ringleaders, were most vulnerable. Thus, while Sheridan said he did not see
it in the character of British seamen to act as they had, the manifesto insisted his
aspersions were cast upon all seamen. Sheridan had to be discredited.
The manifesto explained their 'particular reason for not proceeding to sea', so that 'our
grateful countrymen might not be deceived, or ourselves prejudiced by false Reports'.
ADM3 136, Nepean to Parker, 15 April 1797
16 p O'Toole,A Traitor's Kiss (London: Granta, 1997), 322
17 Apparently, Spencer was unaware or indifferent to the fact that most previous disturbances were settled
before they became mutinies. While his inexpenence in office, ignorance of maritime traditions and
arrogance in dealing with naval officers did not the cause the mutiny, they certainly did exacerbate a volatile
situation.
PRO ADM1 107, Ramillies to Delegates, 7 May 1797
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Without their intervention, they reasoned, 'the public mind' would be prejudiced against
them.
We requested an Augmentation of our Wages, which was complied with, though
reluctantly, on the part of the Ministers. Our late Wages were, Able Seamen 11. 2s. 6d.
per month and Landsmen 01. 17s. 6d. per month; the present is Able Seamen 1/. 10:.
Od. per month, Ordinary Seamen 11. 2:. Od. per month and Landsmen 11. Is. 0d. per
month there now being three Classes.19
The manifesto focused on the central issue of the dispute: augmentation of wages.
Spencer came to Portsmouth with a fixed agenda. On 17 April he advised the king he
would 'take such measures as may appear the most advisable for putting a stop to, and if
necessary, for redressing the grievance complained of without suffering the
dissatisfaction which seems to have arisen to proceed any further'. 2° His offer was
worked out with Pitt, Dundas and Grenville the night before: 'To add Four Shillings per
month to the wages of petty Officers and Able Seamen; Three Shillings per month to the
wages of Ordinary Seamen; and Two shillings per month to the wages of Landsmen'.2'
The board encouraged the fleet's captains to explain:
The difference of Pay between Ordinary Seamen, and Landmen, is intended to make
a distinction between those who have never been at Sea, and those who having been
sometime at Sea, have learnt a part of the Duty of Seamen, and are therefore entitled
to better pay, than those who are quite ignorant; it is also meant to distinguish still
more than has heretofore been the case the Good Seamen from the Landmen by
having one Rank between them?
They ignored all other grievances.
The delegates refused to compromise. They wished their 'Lordships, and the Nation in
general' be convinced of their moderation, but took exception to the introduction of a
new rating - arguing 'there never has existed but Two Orders of Men in the Navy, Able
and Ordinary.' They insisted on a full shilling a day, full measures of provisions, and
raising out-pensions from Greenwich Hospital to 'ten pounds per annum'. After a
show of intransigence, the board conceded virtually everything they asked for, but
managed to keep landsmen as an official pay rating.
19 Orack, 19 May 1797; RNM 8 1996 19598 6.10.3
20 J Corbett, ccl., Pnvate Papers of Geotge, Second Ear/Spencer (London: NRS, 1914), ii, 110
Morning Post, 24 April 1797
PRO ADM3 136, Supplement to Admiralty's First Answer, 19 April 1797
Ths still fell short of parity with the army and militia. Chelsea Hospital out pensions had been 'increased
to thirteen pounds per annum'.
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While they refrained from immediate comment, on Saturday 22 April, London's evening
newspapers reproduced full texts of the 15 April petitions, 24 Admiralty's offer, the
seamen's first and second replies and the final agreement' making it clear negotiations
were attempted and, from government's perspective, had failed. The manifesto's
observation that their request for augmentation of wages was 'reluctantly complied with'
suggests a familiarity with the negotiations unavailable from newspapers.
The new rating is curious. The term was hardly new. Able seamen, ordinary seamen and
landsmen are the three most common ratings found in muster and pay books of the
petiod. The arrangement, however, was de facto rather than de jurP. As the petitions
specify, the pay regulations in effect dated from the reign of Charles II:
1. That the wages of able seamen fit for the helm and lead top and yard be
augmented from 19s. to 24s. a month, whereof 1. to be paid to the minister and
surgeon as formerly, and the rest to the party.
2. That wages of all not capable of the aforesaid duties be continued at 19s. a month,
and boys and gromets excepted?
3. That gromets be allowed 14s. 3d. a month, and boys 9s. 6d., whereof Is. to be paid
to minister and surgeon as formerly.V
Throughout the dispute, the delegates were sticklers for accuracy, leading observers to
assume someone involved had legal training? Their interpretations certainly leaned
toward the literal. Describing landsman as a classification of seamen was taken as a
contradiction in terms and an insult. By definition and law, landsmen were not seamen.
Their message was clear: this was a seamen's dispute.
As seamen were presumed incapable of organising such a large protest or maintaining
such composure, the Admiralty focused its attention on landsmen. By offering them half
the increase proposed for able seamen, the mutiny's leaders were to be divided from
their followers. After token resistance, the delegates acquiesced and proved the
Admiralty's presumption was wrong. The original petitions were 'humbly submitted' by
seamen and refer only to a shilling per day. They made no mention of pay
24 The earlier anonymous petitions were not published.
See PRO AI)M35 (Pay Books) and PRO ADM36 (Muster Books)
Gromets were apprentice or trainee seamen. N Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea (London: Harper Collins,
1997), 320
27 Calendar of State Papers Domestic 1652-3, xxvi, a, 20 December 1652. The increase itself occurred during
the Interregnum by an order of the Council of State.
Of course, the observers overlooked the secretaries, derks, senior midshipmen and warrant officers who
had the necessary training and practical experience.
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classifications. Later, they added increases for petty officers, ordinary seamen and
marines 'in the usual proportion', but still ignored landsmen.
As it happened, wages were not raised in the usual proportion. Able seamen and petty
officers benefited most and landsmen least. It suited everyone concerned, except
Iandsmen, to emphasise the distinction between those who were and those who were not
seamen.
On 9 May, a fortnight after the settlement and two days after the incident on Lirn don, Pitt
announced the increases would be 'in a proportionate ratio of 5s. 6d., 4s 6d. and 3s. 6d.
per month ... with a Sum total yearly of £351,OOO. 30 A quick comparison suggests a
discrepancy of two shillings per month. However, the navy paid its men by a 28-day
lunar month (13 months to a year). The manifesto expressed the increase in terms the
public would understand, while Pitt understated it by not mentioning how often they
were paid. After this slight misrepresentation, he requested 'the silent indulgence of the
House' in passing the bill, arguing 'too much caution could not be used in an affair in
which the slightest misrepresentation might produce the most disagreeable
consequences.' His warning came too late, more in response to, than in anticipation of,
disagreeable consequences.
A Question ofArrears
Seamen's wages were never less than six months and were sometimes more than
eighteen months in arrears, yet none of the seamen's petitions or the delegates'
documents mentioned this. The problem was not new. Commissioner George Kendall
brought the situation to the attention of the Admiralty in 1653.31 A hundred years later,
Grenville's Act provided naval seamen with some protection by requiring that when in
home waters they be paid 'a year's wages every eighteen months'. 32 The delay
discouraged desertion.33 For the same reason, captains often withheld seamen's wages
If a shilling per day were given to everyone, landsmen would have received over three times the increase
of able-bodied seamen. The higher bounties most of them received already caused resentment.
3°The Times, 9 May 1797
' C Atkinson, ed., Letters and Papers relating to the First Dutch JVar 1652-1654 (London: NRS, 1912), 276-277,
Kendall to Admiralty Commissioners, 13 23Ju1y 1653
32 N Rodger, The Wooden WorW(London: Collins, 1986), 132
33 D Baugh, NavalAdministration 1715-1 750 (London: NRS, 1977), 165
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until their ships were about to sail.M To have money on liberty, to buy 'necessaries' or
provide for their families, seamen sold their tickets at a discount. St Vincent condemned
the practice, arguing 'the discipline and subordination of the Navy was sapped to the
foundation by the Grenville Act ... which transferred the command of the fleet from the
Officers, to whores, landlords, crimps and lastly to United Irishmen.' 35 The arrangement
proved even less satisfactory to those whose wages were withheld. The Morning Post
claimed that in the weeks preceding the mutiny, arrears were a common complaint in
Portsmouth's public houses. The issues of augmentation and arrears appeared
inseparable:
We understand that upwards of a year's wages is due to several of the crews, and that
many months are due to all. The demand for arrears was accompanied by a demand
for an increase of pay. The losses which our seamen have sustained by selling their
arrears to the Sharks in the ships and seaports, have reduced the actual value of a
month's wages, from twenty-two shillings to about fourteen, in consequence of
which they now demand to have their wages raised to thirty shillings per month.
The editorial also touched upon one of the mutiny's underlying causes, a want of money,
and suggested the consequence was not without precedence:
The same cause now threatens to destroy the discipline and affection of our seamen,
which a few months ago prevented our fleet from sailing and capturing the French in
Bantry Bay. The cause is a want of money. The fleet was not then properly victualled;
now it is not properly paid.
Arrears involved more than a tactic to prevent desertion. They were a symptom of
England's financial crisis, a shortage of specie. Since the war began, the national debt
increased from £248 million in 1793 to £389 million in 1797, then jumped another forty
million in 1798 alone. As allied armies preferred to be paid in cash, England had
exported massive quantities of bullion, over seventy-five thousand ounces of gold and
almost seven million ounces of silver since the war began.37
As Emperor Francis tottered on the brink of a separate peace, the new loans to Austria
occupied the public's attention. Bell's W/eek/y Messenger alluded to the illogic of loans to
Rodger, Wooden lVorl4, 133
35 J Tucker, ed., Memoirs of Earl St Vincent (London: Bentley, 1844 , i, 337
Morning Port, 18 April 1797
7 export of bullion was not unusuaL In the three years before the war, 18 million ounces of silver and
181,000 ounces of gold left the country. Presumably, much of it caine back in the form of Imports from
the East and West Indies; thus providing stimulation to the economy, rather than merely a drain to gold
and silver reserves. Journal of the House of Lords, 37 Geo III 253
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repay advances coupled with promises of more loans. 38 The expense of the war exceeded
all expectations. In 1797 alone, of a total expenditure of £57.6 million, £42 million was
spent on 'army, navy, ordnance and war.' 39 In late February, as 'the drain on the Bank for
cash increased in a still more rapid and alarming proportion', the committee formed to
examine the concluded the Bank would, in a matter of days, be unable to make payments
in cash.4°
On 26 February Pitt suspended cash payments 'until the sense of Parliament could be
taken and measures be adopted for maintaining the means of circulation'. 41 The
Committee of Secrecy appointed to study the matter agreed that nothing else could save
the Bank.42 Rather than admitting how much bullion had left England, they insisted the
bank runs were caused by farmers panicking over invasion scares. The measure was
supposed to be temporary, but cash payments were not resumed until 1821. It proved
the country's salvation, providing the 'engine of finance' or 'sinews' that enabled her to
endure another eighteen years of war and twenty-one years of accumulated war debt; but,
to one observer, it seemed a certain path to ruin:
Of Augustus and Rome
The poets still warble,
How he found it of brick
And left it of marble.
So of Pitt and of England
Men may say without vapour,
That he found it of gold
And left it of paper.43
The crisis proved more perceived than real. But with France's financial collapse fresh in
mind, perceptions were enough to cause genuine concern. To opposition, the
opportunity was golden. While Sheridan criticised Pitt for creating his own assznats, the
Marquis of Lansdowne45 warned:
Bell's Week/yMessener, 30 April 1797
A Aspinall & E Smith, eds., Englisb I-hstoricolDoaments 1 783-1832 (London: Eyre & Sportiswoode, 1959),
576-580
4° Third Report of the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Commons, on the affairs of the Bank, 21
April 1797, C9bbett's Par&vnentarj Huto,y, xxxiii, 441 449
41 Stanhope, 20
42 Aspinall & Smith, 587
43 Stanhope, 20
J Ehrman, The Youn,ger Pitt The Consuming Stnggle (London: Constable, 1996), 3
45 Formerly Lord Shelbume.
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Mark my prophecy, my lords ... and do not disdain the counsel while yet in time. If
you attempt to make bank notes a legal tender, their credit will perish. They may go
on for a time, but the consequence is certain. No art, no skill, no power, can prevent
their falling to a discount. We do not speak upon conjecture; the thing is not a matter
of conjecture; the thing is a matter of experience.
Public credit was the soul of England. It was, Lansdowne argued, what distinguished her
from other nations. 'Here, all dependence was on the nation ... every thing, contributed
to, as everything flowed again from, the fountain of public credit.' He emphasised that
the public looked to security and punctuality as its basis. He dismissed attempts to link
the banking crisis with 'the idle stories of unfounded and exaggerated alarms'. Instead, he
insisted 'it proceeded from deep, progressive, accumulated causes', including ministerial
inefficiencies, excessive spending and mismanagement of the war. In particular, he held
that it was 'contemptible to tell us, that, sending money out of the kingdom did not make
us poorer'.47 The marquis' observations were valid, but his prophecy proved wrong. The
'disposition of the people' did not expire. The Orade observed: 'The suspension of
payment in specie by the Bank, has produced no perceptible inconvenience in the
metropolis, its Notes being now as current as at any former period.' Public credit did
not perish. It expanded. Inflation followed the suspension of cash payments, not
collapse. The cost of living increased, but the crisis was averted. Unfortunately, the
solution to one crisis was the cause of another, the mutiny. Forced to live on incomes
fixed in 1653, seamen's families, rather than the seamen themselves, suffered. The mid-
1790s inflation was more than they could endure.
At Pitt's request, the Bank of England advanced loans to Austria before obtaining
Parliament's approval, approval that could be withheld if the Emperor signed a separate.
Approval of these latest loans was an essential part of the budget submitted to
Parliament. From the beginning of the war, England financed allied armies. To facilitate
the advances, Pitt set aside the act restricting the Bank of England from advancing 'any
sums of money, other than on such funds on which a credit is granted by parliament' and
indemnified the directors of the bank for advances made to bills drawn from abroad.
The arrangement did not pass unnoticed:
How long are we to endure a system of prevarication and disregard of all public
engagements it is impossible to say; but that system was never so scandalously
developed as in the printed communications between the CI-LNcELLoR OF THE
Stanhope, 18
47 Annual Reister, 1797, 196
Oracle &PublicAdveriiser, 14 April 1797
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EXCHEQUER and the Bank. We sincerely hope that that correspondence will be
printed in a form that will make it generally known. It will shew the character of Mr.
Pirr in its true light. It would prove that though the Directors never had the courage
to refuse any one of his applications for money, they never ceased to declare to him
that his demands would bring ruin on the House; and though he regularly promised
that each demand should be the last, he accompanied each distinct apology with a
new Petition. We shall give the public a specimen of this curious amour on the first
open day.49
For the navy, the problem was more a matter of punctuality than inflation. In addition to
seamen and officers complaining about arrears, suppliers refused to honour current
contracts or bid on future contracts until those completed were paid. A week before the
mutiny, Portsmouth Commissioner Charles Saxton revealed his frustration in a letter to
the Navy Board:
The yard money £50,000 arrived last night - but no money for ship payments. And it
is absolutely necessary to our going on that we should immediately be supplied with
three or four thousand Pounds at least in Cash and Notes of five, two and one
pound. For while our Balances are kept so low, we are frequently in the middle of a
Payment reduced to the necessity - at last, of parting with all our Cash.5°
Currency shortages also affected local bankers and tradesmen:
On account of the scarcity of silver and the great inconvenience in trade arising there
from, it is agreed by the bankers and many of the principal tradesmen of Portsmouth,
Town of Portsea and Gosport to receive and pay in change French crowns at 5s.
each, French half crowns at 2s. 6d. each, dollars at 4s. 6d. each, and those stamped
and issued by the Bank of England at 4s. 9d. each.5'
These were symptoms of a larger problem. The war was run on credit - a system of loans
and patriotic subscriptions that 'achieved remarkable results',52 but was buckling under
the strain. The money came, but came at the expense of private and public confidence in
government's ability to pay it back. As the war went badly and confidence wavered,
interest rates climbed. Ever anxious to undermine government's credibility, the Morning
Cbmnicle encouraged readers to envision arrears of half-pay, off-reckonings and
undischarged king's warrants, 'lying in masses in the Treasury, War, and Pay-offices',
were the subject of 'loud and heavy' complaint. 53 In the debate over Pitt's proposed
budget, Fox claimed these undeclared debts amounted to over a million and a half
49 Morning Chroniele, 24 April 1797
° PRO ADM1O6 1868, Saxton to Navy Board, 8 April 1797
Hampshire Chronicle, 18 March 1797
52 Ejm, 9
53 Morning Chronicle, 24 April 1797
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pounds and concealed the true expense of the navy. Without mentioning the settlement
with the seamen, Fox selected the one item from the budget certain to call the public's
attention to it. He asked how the expenses for the navy
could be £17,000 less this year than the last, when, instead of voting 110,000
Seamen as we did last year, we had voted 120,000. He blamed this sort of popular
subterfuge and evasion, and predicted, that the consequence would be a final
inefficiency.55
Without considering the demands of total war, Fox offered the crisis as the consequence
of mismanagement and inefficiency.
While arrears figured in the seamen's complaints, they did not appear in their petitions.
The Morning Post was loath to admit its error. When the seamen failed to supply
ammunition for another attack on government, the editors attacked the seamen instead:
the Ministerial Prints assert, that the Seamen affect to have no other cause of
complaint, then the low rate of their wages. It was to be expected the Ministerial
Papers would say this; it was to be expected that they would endeavour to shield
their Employers from a most heavy charge. We know that in Portsmouth every effort
is made to conceal the true cause of the Mutiny ... Still, however, we believe - nay, we
hope that their arrears is the true cause of the seamen's conduct. If that be the cause,
the Ministers are to blame; if a demand for rise of wages be alone the cause, the
sailors are to blame. We can punish the negligence of Ministers; but how can we
punish for misconduct the seamen of a whole fleet? If it be true that the seamen have
demanded an increase of wages, because the subsistence of the soldiers has been
increased, we condemn the demand; for a sailor lives, even now, in a state of
comfort, compared with that of the soldier, or even compared with that of the
Labouring class of society.
On 22 April, the Morning Post published the seamen's petitions. Rather than
acknowledging their error, the editors expanded upon their criticism:
When we view the condition of the soldier, the labourer, and the mechanic, we
cannot say that the condition of the Seaman is less comfortable. The Seaman has to
pay for neither provisions, house-rent, coal, nor candle. He is well provided with
food and lodging, and he has five shillings and sixpence per week to purchase cloths,
(for which no men are at less expense), and to assist his family. This sum, small as it
is, amounts to more than the labourer, or the majority of mechanics can command;
and is even affluence itself, when compared with the subsistence of the soldier. A
sailor's life, except when he is on shore is the least expensive of any we know. He has
not the temptation of public houses, he is not provoked to dress, he is excluded from
The Times,27 April 1797
55 Star 28 April 1797
Morning Pail, 19 April 1797
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all those incidental expenses which too often reduce men with a comfortable pittance
on land, to a state of embarrassment.57
On the surface, their argument appeared valid. Agricultural workers averaged a little
more and unskilled urban workers a little less than a shilling a day. Both provided their
own sustenance and shelter. 58
 However, the argument was built on a false premise.
Seamen were not unskilled. To them, the only relevant comparisons involved what their
counterparts earned in the dockyards, what accommodations were made for other men
in His Majesty's service, and, most importantly, what they could earn in the merchant
service. The seamen asked for a shilling a day and offered the indulgence given to
soldiers as precedent; but they knew naval officers and Admiralty clerks received similar
indulgences, that shipwrights working in royal dockyards earned twice as much 59 and,
most importantly, that they could earn four times as much if they were free to pursue
their profession.
While the Morning Post argued arrears were the problem, the True Briton insisted: 'The
usual regularity has been observed in the payment of the Fleet.'6° Both offered an
element of truth. However, the True Briton neglected to mention the 'usual regularity'
involved withholding six months' wages, or that most seamen were lucky to be paid once
a year; and the Morning Post appeared unaware that, as it was in port more often, the
Channel fleet was paid more often than His Majesty's other fleets. The seamen did not
complain about arrears because they had less reason to complain. They also knew that
discussing the subject was constrained by the fourteenth article of war.
Perhaps it was naïve of the seamen to assume that literal interpretations and careful
circumspection of the Articles of War would provide protection. However, they
repeatedly promised to sail if an enemy fleet appeared (Articles XI, XII and XIII),
insisted frigates from the fleet continue to escort convoys (Article XVII), showed all due
respect to officers (Articles II and XXIII), scrupulously obeyed their orders6' (Article
XXII), and complained about the quantity, but not the quality of their provisions (Article
XXI).
57 IbieL , 22 April 1797
Beveridge, Prices & Wages, ???; E Jones, Seasons & Pnces (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964), 64-65
PRO ADM 42 1316, Portsmouth Extraordinary Pay Book 1797
60 TneeBriton, 15 April 1797
61 Except weighing anchor.
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Grievances about arrears, pm"e money, harsh discipline, trial by jury and the quality of
provisions appeared in the fleet's private, but were absent from its public
correspondence. The seamen of the Channel fleet were practical men. They saw no point
in pressing for more. Such issues were less easily described; redress was less likely; and
asking for too much would alienate public opinion and provide the Admiralty with
another excuse for intransigence. The emotive issue of liberty was raised, but not
pursued. Arbitrary, as opposed to harsh, discipline was treated as a separate issue, to be
pursued by individual ships. Other grievances were not ignored, but held in abeyance
until they could 'be laid Before your Lordships in a regular manner', as the delegates
emphasised 'we know when to cease to Ask as well as to begin.'62
The manifesto continued:
We requested likewise that the Pursers' Eighths should be taken off, which was
complied with; the Weight of different Articles were as follows: Bread 14 Ounces,
Cheese 9 Ounces, Butter 12 Ounces, of spirituous liquors and small beer, the Purser
had an eighth out of each gallon, those eighths are now taken off, and we have the
full weight.63
Neglected by the press and all but ignored by the Admiralty, complaints about provisions
were assumed to be less important than those about wages. However, while the press
was silent, the men were not. Ship-to-ship correspondence between 21 April and 7 May
concentrated on complaints about food. In addition to new weights and measures,
seamen requested fresh vegetables and beef while in port." Pepys' maxim remained
relevant
Englishmen, and more especially seamen, love their bellies above everything else, and
therefore it must always be remembered in the management of the victualling of the
navy, that to make any abatement of them in the quantity or agreeableness of their
victuals, is to discourage and provoke them in their tenderest point, and will sooner
render them disgusted with the king's service than any other hardship that could be
put upon them.65
It was in the interest of the navy to feed its seamen well. improvements in food
preservation and administration of the Victualling Board made it possible to feed
120,000 men and provision 1,000 ships. This enormously complex task was
62 Lon,n Chronicle, 20-22 April 1797
63 Oracle, 19 May 1797; RNM 8 1996 19598 6.10.3
64 PRO ADMI /1022, Parker to Nepean, 22 April 1797; PRO ADMI 107, Seamen's Second Reply, 22
April 1797;Morning Poil, 24 April 1797
65 Uoy 'Victualling of the Fleet in the Eighteenth and Nmeteenth Centuries', in J Watt, E Freeman &
W Bynuni, eds., Sianrng Sailors: The Influence ofNutrition upon Naval and Maritime History (NMM, 1981), 9
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accomplished, not without problems or complaints, but remarkably with less than one per
cent of provisions condemnedf' While the point appears lost on most historians of the
mutiny, food and conditions in the Royal Navy, while far from pleasant, were
significantly better than when Tobias Smollett was writing. More to the point, they were
comparable to what was available in the merchant service.
The Morning Post was not sympathetic to the seamen's plight. The editors argued:
With regard to the increase of the ounces in the pound of provisions, and of the
measure of their drink, we ask, what has been the custom hitherto? Have not the
Navy for a century been provided with the same number of ounces, and the same
measure? If they have, the present Seamen have no more reason to complain than
their predecessors had.67
Again, it was a question of custom versus conventionf While the custom was ancient, the
regulation governing its practice was recent. Twenty years before the mutiny, pursers
successfully petitioned to have it confirmed that they be allowed to deduct one-eight of
all provisions to recover loss 'of Bread by its turning to Dust; of Cheese by its decaying
Mold and being eaten by Mites; of Peas and Oatmeal by their being eaten by
Cockroaches, Weevils and other Vermin'. 69 Part of their compensation, the practice
encouraged pursers to purchase wisely and husband their stores. Despite their reputation
for sharp practice: 'It must be acknowledged that the [seamen's] diet was ample; it
yielded between 4,000-4,500 calories a day.' 7° What it lacked in variety it made up for in
quantity.
In a letter to Nelson written two months after the mutiny, HRFI the Duke of Clarence
offered an insight as to why men, who received more than they could eat, wanted more:
'Every officer must know, that by their old allowance the men on board the king's ships
had more provisions than tiey could consume, and that they always sold a part, therefore
an increase of provisions was not wanted'. 71 Excess provisions were the basis of
S Gradish, The Manning of/he British Nosy during the Semis Years War (London: Royal Historical Society,
1980), 144; N Rodger, The Wooden World, 84-85
67 M0y,W,8POS, 22 April 1797
Roger, Wooden World, 93
69 Lloyd, 'VictuaThng', 11
° RNM 1993 139 (2) 12450 7.3.0, Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea; D
Baugh, British NassalAdministratia,, in the Age of W4'ok (Princeton: University Press, 1965), 376; C Lloyd,
ed., The Health of Seamen (London. NRS, 1965), 164; J Tanner, 'The Administration of the Navy from the
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shipboard economy. Thus, contrary to the royal assumptioit, what was not needed was
most certainly wanted.
Again, the delegates asked only for what they thought they could get. In truth, they had
little reason to complain about the quality of their food, inone to offset the risk of
violating the twenty-first article of war. Instead, they concerrtrated on the more prosaic
issue of weights and measures. And, although practical, they were not sympathetic to the
logistical problems involved.
Bridport reminded Nepean of the volatility of the situation when he wrote on 30 April:
I most earnestly request that their Lordships will be pleased to give immediate
orders, to the Victualling Board, to send without a moments loss of time, proper
Weights and Measures for the several Ships under my Command to prevent possible
fresh disturbances.72
Two days later, he warned: 'several Ships under my Orders might refuse going to Sea
unless proper Weights and Measures were received.'73 Bridporit next asked whether they
should continue substituting two thirds of a pound of Cheshire cheese for one pound of
Suffolk cheese. He queried the practice as in his opinion 'the former in quality is
generally very little superior to the latter. I therefore wish to be informed if this
distinction is to be continued, or whether they are to have the full sixteen ounces to the
pound.'74 Before receiving Nepean's compromise offer of 3/4 pound, Bridport stressed
the urgency of the situation: 'I most anxiously desire that my Letters to you, on the
Subject of Cheese, may be immediately answered for my guidence, and justification.'75
To the seamen, the issue was far from trivial. La Pompie's 'Sink or Swim' letter of 7 May
specifically mentioned cheese and pointedly rejected attempts to satisfy them with
'traditional indulgences'.76 William Bedford, captain of the Royal Sovereign, advised
Bridport that his crew had 'refused to receive' Nepean's compromise, 'stating they had
asked & were promised, the full weight of every article of provisions'7 Also on the day
of the second outbreak, Bridport received a letter from the crew of Ramilliei
72	 ADM1 107, Bndport to Nepean, 30 April 1797
73 1buL, Bndport to Nepean, 2May 1797
' Ironically, forty years before Suffolk cheesemakers lost a monopoly in supplying the navy. As a result of
seamen's complaints, the Victualling Board switched to Cheshire cheese even though it did not keep as well
and cost three tnnes as much. Roger, IVoodèn WothI 85; Gradtsh, 148fn; Beveridge, P'ices & lVages, 576
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We are greatly surprised that notwithstanding near 10 days are past since the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty acceded to our propositions relative to the
additional 8th of provisions & we still find demurs. Sir Richard Bickerton informs us
that we are not to be allowed more than 12 oz. to the lb. of cheese which we have
not thought proper to take; not considering it right to take a less weight of that article
than of the others. We likewise begin to be alarmed at the dilatory proceedings of the
Minister in not bringing our petition forward. It appears evident to us that it is the
intention of the Lords of the Admiralty to amuse us with specious pretences of only
in parts conforming to our requests. With all due submission, we take the liberty of
requesting an answer to the above, hoping your Lordship will favour us with your
sentiments thereon.78
Rather than responding, Bridport forwarded their letter to the Admiralty.
In his 9 May address to Parliament, Pitt described the fiscal impact of removing the
pursers' eighths as involving an annual sum of £185,000, calculated at a 'rate of 1 9s. per
month each Man for 13 Months in the Year'. 79 He also revealed the total cost of the
settlement, £536,000. 80 However, rather than entering into detail or justifying the
expense, Pitt admitted:
he felt peculiar embarrassment, and laboured under great disadvantage in stating
the supply, because it was always understood, that where any increase was proposed,
certain grounds should be given to proceed on, for the purpose of ascertaining the
propriety of that increase. This argument applied very strongly to the measure which
he was about to submit to the judgement of the Gentlemen, as the increase intended
was of a very substantial nature, and such as was unavoidable during the continuance
of the War. It might therefore be expected, that the different rates of wages, various
data, circumstances and other matters would be brought forward to shew the
proportionate progression necessary to be observed. Yet he should say, that with
every view of public utility, with every confidence relative to prudence and policy,
and with every possible attention to the delicacy of the case, he did not feel himself
at liberty to proceed into a regular and formal detail of what, he had no doubt, had
for some time past engaged the serious attention, and occupied the anxiety of the
House. He should, therefore, on these grounds, rather rely on, and even claim the
silent indulgence of the House, than enter into any detail of the very important
subject which was then proposed for their acquiescence.8'
The sum mentioned nearly matched an estimate in The Times a fortnight before: 'The new
budget is to be brought forward in the course of the ensuing week. The augmentation of
the Seamen's pay, in consequence of their late Petition, will amount annually to an
ADM1 5125, Romillies to Bridport, 2 May 1797
The Times, 9May 1797
four months of the year had already elapsed, only £288,615 was due in 1797.
8I The Times,9May 1797
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increase of half a million sterling.' 82 More importantly, The Times explained the delay. The
budget was the largest Parliament had ever considered. Pitt explained:
He had estimated the Ordinary and Extraordinary of the Navy for the year, at
£12,661,000. Of this sum he had provided for opening the Supply before Christmas,
the sum of flO,161,000. And he had proposed to take credit in addition to this of
f3,000,000.
Making the service of the year for the Navy £13,161,000.
By this credit of £3,000,000 he made ample provision for every possible exertion,
and the report of the Committee showed the comcidence of their opinions to be as
close as in accounts of such magnitude could be expected, for their estimate
amounted to £12,935,496. There was, however, still a further sum which was not
included in this estimate, as the value had not yet been ascertained, but which
probably might amount to about £800,000. This was the charge on neutral cargoes.
It was also to be observed, that part of the Navy Bills was carried forward, and which
gave him a sum applicable to this service, by which the vote of credit applicable to it
would be £1,800,000 instead of £3,000,000. In this account of the Navy, he had not
made any provision for the further sum that might be required for the pay and
maintenance of the Seamen, in consequence of the recent event that had happened
at Portsmouth. The reason that he had not included this sum, was, that it would
make the subject of a specific discussion upon an early day, and as the magnitude of
the sum would not be material, he thought it better to leave it altogether to that
discussion.83
His explanation was probably garbled by the Stai's reporter. However, the other
newspapers offered nothing clearer:
The Comnuttee will recollect, that for the Naval service of the current year, there has
been already voted the sum of V,661,000. In addition to which the Committee of
Supply has voted £5,000,000 more. Gentlemen will recollect, that aitho' I estimated
the expenses of the Naval Department at V,661 ,000, I then stated my intention to
propose the provision of a further sum of £2,500,000 in order to remedy an
inconvenience which heretofore had arisen, and thereby have £10,161,000 in cash
towards defraying any excess of Navy Debt.M
There was method in his obfuscation. Those who could follow Pitt's explanations, those
who had helped create or had seen the budget, were not inclined to ask for clarification;
and those who could not would have been reluctant to reveal their ignorance by
accepting his offec
I do not know whether I have expressed myself clearly upon this point, but if not, I
shall be happy to give any Gentleman a further explanation.' Opposition journalists
82 1buL, 22 Apxil 1797
Star, 27 April 1797
The Timer, 27 April 1797
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accused the prime minister of becoming 'noticeably more unintelligible and
obscure.85
In the confusion, he concealed the true cost of the navy and the fact that the budget he
was submitting would fall LI 5.6 million or 37° o short of actual expenditure.
As it would raise awkward questions, Pitt delayed discussion of the Seamen's Bill until
after the budget, including the Austrian loan and the unprecedented naval expenditures,
was approved. The timing was unfortunate. While the budget was prepared before the
mutiny was settled, it had not been presented. The projected costs were available and
relevant, but would have provoked public discussion. Public finances and public
sympathies were considered too fragile to admit the true cost of the war. According to
the king, the situation called for 'noble horsemanship':
there still exists a prevalence of good sense, right principles, Loyalty & Firmness
in the main body of the Kingdom. The last of those Qualities has been shaken by the
Bantry Bay disappointment, & since by the Bank business (and partly also by our
Foreign Negotiations). But I am sure that the Energy of our Countrymen may still be
called forth; and if it can, there are ample means & resources in the National wealth
& prosperity, to facilitate the projects of new Taxes, to maintain the war to a
conclusion neither unsafe nor disgraceful, & in short to do every thing that can be
wished. In a word it is still possible 'to win the world by noble horsemanship'.
With the crisis in Portsmouth seemingly settled, journalists became preoccupied with one
item in Pitt's budget that almost doubled newspaper stamp duties. The Morning Chronicle
declared:
It is a mockery of the national creditor to hold out to him the new Tax on
Newspapers as a security for One Hundred and Thirty-four Thousand Pounds. 87 It is
calculated as a prohibition of the article, not as a source of revenue; it is an ill-
disguised attempt to rid himself of an enemy too powerful for corruption utterly to
subdue. It must be stifled by craft.
Pitt found no comfort in The Timer We are lost in astonishment at who could be the
advisers of such an enormous and impolitic Tax, which must defeat the very purpose for
which it was intended.' It wamedi
We know very well that his enemies will say of him, that this Tax is intended as an
attack on the Liberty of the Press, and to confine the circulation of knowledge; there
85 The Morning Post, 11 April 1797; The Morning Chronick, 15 April 1797. On 10 May, the Morning Chronicle
quipped: Ihe commotion among the sailors may very probably have arisen from their misunderstanding
some of the Minister's speeches. It cannot be expected that plain, unlettered men should understand what
puzzles the ablest and most acute of his hearers'.
PRO PRO3O 8/110/2, George III to Pitt, 26 April 1797
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certainly is ground for suspicion on this head, for the Tax is a complete prohibition
of the sale of Newspapers.89
Immediately before the budget passed by 108 votes, Sheridan promised, 'This tax he was
determined to oppose in every stage, as he was convinced that its ultimate effect would
be the annihilation of the Liberty of the Press.' 90
 Of course, John Henot saw no injustice
in the new tax, did not question government's motives and certainly saw no threat to his
security:
If the proposed additional Tax upon Newspapers should rid the Public of those
despicable vehicles of sedition, which have been most actively employed in
propagating French Principles, even in defiance of Law, the Nation at large will have
reason to rejoice that such a tax was devised.91
Trit'ial misdemeanours & non-compliance
The manifesto understated what Sheridan overstated:
His Majesty's pardon was then requested to exempt our brethren from having any
punishment inflicted on them for trivial misdemeanours, and our non-compliance to
the order given for going to sea; His Majesty was pleased to grant the same; we then
returned to the ordinary discharge of duty, as desired, but from that we never
deviated during our perseverance, except weighing anchor, which we positively
refused, excepting our requests were complied with.
It substituted trivial misdemeanours for mutiny and non-compliance for a refusal to obey
orders, both capital offences. The authors avoided the appearance of presumption by
insisting that his majesty's pardon was requested, rather than demanded. They sought
exemption for their brethem, rather than themselves. Upon receiving the king's pardon,
they acted in good faith and 'as desired', insisting they had never deviated from their
duty. Their words were calculated to leave the right impression.
We then went to St Helen's, distant from Spithead about three miles, on the signal
being made by the Admiral (excepting three ships of the line, which had not their
private grievances redressed, viz. London, Marlborough, and La Nymph). The wind did
not favour our proceeding to Sea, during our Silence, for by this we wish to be
understood we were in a State of Suspense, as there was no sign of an Act being
passed; We could not be deceived in that Point, as the Freedom of the Press is
allowed, and several of us in the Fleet can read.
The Times, 27 Apnl 1797
° True Bnton, 27 April 1797
91 True Briton, 29 April 1797. As prices increased, weaker newspapers disappeared, but overall circulation
continued to increase. Newspaper readers did not consider newspapers to be luxunes.
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The manifesto confirmed what was known, but also revealed the fleet would have sailed
if winds had been favourable, an impression at odds with their determination not to sail
until their bill was passed. Apparently, the delegates assumed that having reached an
agreement with the king's minister and received the king's pardon, Parliament could act
in a matter of days. The fleet had taken on the necessary provisions during the mutiny
and was ready to sail. They had no other reason to drop down to St Helen's. However, if
they naïvely assumed normal parliamentary procedures would allow rapid passage,
government compounded the error by assuming normal procedures could be followed.
George Ill observed: 'It would be idle to lament that the measures for increasing their
pay have been delayed for two weeks coming forward in Parliament, or that the wind has
proved easterly which would have carried them out to sea.'92
The crews of Marlborough and La Njmphe accused their officers of 'tyrannical behaviour'
and remained at Spithead in the anticipation of redress.93 Minotaur, Mars and Ramillies also
remained behind with similar complaints and anticipations, but joined the rest of the
fleet at St Helen's after a week. London remained at Spithead, not because of outstanding
grievances, but because she was considered the least affected and Colpoys was
considered the best man to leave in command.94
The fleet's silence was deceptive. As the pardon applied only to crimes committed prior
to its issue, the seamen had reason to be circumspect. While public communications
involved unnecessary risk, private communications continued. Letters between ships
suggest mounting suspense and frustration. Newspapers provided them with a window
on the world, but one with a distorted view:
on Saturday May the 6th a boat belonging to the Mars came alongside with some
officers when a letter was thrown into the lower deck port by the boats crew which
made the ship's company sensible by what they had seen and read from the
newspapers that they should be entirely neglected in regard of their pay which this
letter was shown to the Captain and by him carrying it to the Admiral he promised
he should inquire into the affair but this would not satisfy the ship's company who
were the more exasperated at their Brothers being neglected and still fearing some
fraud in the part of the Ministers.95
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The manifesto made it clear the delay was only one factor contributing to the second
outbreak. It alluded to inconsistencies in changing weights and measures and the
grievances of individual ships. It confirmed the seamen were aware of the Admiralty's
instructions before the incident on board London:
Our reasons are obviously, not confined alone to the Act not being passed, although
it had laid dormant for fourteen days; private instructions were sent to each
Commandeer in the Fleet, of which we are not Ignorant, as will be found in the
SequeL Full Allowances was granted to some Ship's Companies, supposed to be the
leading ones, and not to others, which caused a Suspicion throughout the whole
Fleet. The ships remaining at Spithead had not had their private grievances redressed,
though many days had elapsed, nor any sign of their being redressed: be it
understood by private grievances - trying by a Court Martial such Officers as had,
repeatedly, behaved in a tyrannical and oppressive manner, unbecoming the
character of Gentlemen and the dignified station they filled.
According to one report, the discovery took place on Duke
A general order from LORD BRIDPORT, on Sunday, was sent on board the different
ships of his squadron. On Monday morning upwards of a hundred men came into
Capt. HoLLowAy's cabin, of his Majesty's ship Duke, of 98 guns, and insisted upon
reading the order. He assured them he had burnt it, which he certainly had done the
night before. They insisted he should send one of his Lieutenants to LORD B1UDPORT
for a copy, and if it was not on board in half an hour, they would hang him! The
captain sent for a copy of the order, which came before the half hour expired. After
perusing the order, they proposed to duck him from the yard-arm, and send him
ashore, the master being the only one they would suffer to remain in the ship.
Captain HOLLOWAY took an opportunity of speaking to him, as he appeared to have
some influence with the crew; he requested he would talk to them, and beg that
rather than he should experience the indignity of being ducked, they would shoot
him! The master told Captain H. he was detained on board by their commands, and
for their purpose, but he would speak to the men, which he did, and persuaded them
to send the Captain on shore without doing him any injury. About an hour
afterwards they turned every Officer out of the ship, except the Master.96
Neither Bridport nor Holloway mentioned it, 97 but confirmation came in the form of a
comgendum appearing in the Star:
We are desired to contradict that part of a paragraph, in which it was said, that Capt.
Holloway was threatened to be hanged or ducked. At the request of the Duke's ship's
company we state, that they were called over the ship's books and each man was
asked, whether he was for the Captain coming on board again or not? After
proceeding until the crew were tired out, (when only one man objected) they said to
Mr. S we are all for the Captain it was then said, up hands you that are for the
Captain, when every man's hand was up which could be observed.98
Star, 10 May 1797
C Gill, The Naval Mutinies of 1797 (Manchestet University Press, 1913), 55fn
98 Star, 12 May 1797
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The manifesto revealed the second outbreak preceded the shooting. Private murmurings
were heard, at length, the breasts of Seamen, fired with indignation, at bemg neglected,
burst forth on the 7th instant.' It hinted of the struggle to maintain the fleet's
composure. With these murmurings, the well-orchestrated protest threatened to slip out
of controL Success depended upon the co-operation and support of the entire fleet. The
oath of fidelity bound one and all to persevere until they obtained redress. The entire
fleet was committed to Proceed in caution, peace and good behaviour. Let no disorder,
nor tumult influence our proceeding.' In the beginning, the support the delegates
sought was easily obtained:
As we are sworn to be just and true to each other until this business is settled you
may rely upon it that it is our intention to stick to our integrity and not listen to any
false pretenses whatever but still are willing to part with the last drop of our harts
blood to maintain the cause we now labour under.1°°
As matters progressed, rather than 'the last drop of our harts blood', they received
suggestions, complaints and reminders of their responsibilities. 10' As a result, several
resigned or were replaced. Factions within the fleet grew impatient. A deposition from a
surgeon's mate of Mars, claimed:
the Ships company has agreed if the Admiralty has not comply.d with everything
they proposed, before they go to sea, they are determined to take the ships into Brest
and you may depend on it that it is not our ship in particular but the Fleet.102
There was no plan, nothing more than bravado; but, as such murmurings threatened the
solidarity of the fleet, the delegates decided to meet in convention, presumably to
prevent what they precipitated.
The manifesto again drew the public's attention to the Admiralty's instructions: 'It was
then, oh! horrid to relate! that we found out the schemes laid out to sacrifice some of the
brightest gems that ever adorned this or any other country.' It set the stage for its version
of the London incident, playing to public sympathies, presuming public gratitude and
cultivating a heroic image for themselves:
Permit us, grateful Countrymen, to ask a few Questions On the Occasion, and as you
are at a Considerable Distance from us at present, and Ignorant of the Particulars,
permit us also to return the Answers, and we will cheerfully submit the whole to your
mature Consideration.
PRO ADMI/5125, Detail, Londons to Queen Ch2.rlottes, 26 February 1797
100 IbitL , Minatours to Delegates, n.d.
101 Ibiti , Dukes to Delegates, n.d.
ADMI 107, Bridport to Nepean, 3 May 1797
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Were we not united in one Cause? Answer. Yes.
Were we not bound by Oath to persevere in our Resolution of not going to Sea until
our just and moderate Requests were attained, and the Sanction of Parliament given
for the Performance of the same? Yes.
Did we not solicit our most Gracious Sovereign's Pardon for any excesses committed
by our Brethren during our late Perseverance? Yes.
Was it not granted? Yes.
No sooner was that pardon granted, but, in direct Contradiction to that His Royal
Proclamation, were Individuals selected for the express Purpose of Sacrificing them
to Malice and private Resentment.
And then poor, but loyal Individuals, Lives to be Sacrificed for the mere Sport of
Tyrants? Not according to the Laws of civilized Nations.
Is such the Recompense for meritorious Service tendered to their amicable Sovereign
and benevolent Nation?
To whom, are we to look or apply for Protection?
We cannot surmise, since all Laws, Humane and Divine, are trampled underfoot,
Miserable, indeed, then is the Situation of the loyal, but unfortunate Tars, whom their
country at Large Adores, but whom tyrannical and malicious Men in Office seek
basely seek, to betray and sacrifice; if a National Bond is not given, Such will be the
Disaster some will Experience.
The delegates assumed the public was 'prejudiced against them' because it was 'ignorant
of the facts'. The seamen followed the news of the mutiny and could see the newspapers
frequently got their facts wrong or, in some respects worse, got their facts right, but their
interpretations wrong. They needed the public's support and did not scruple at offering a
prejudicial interpretation to get it. They offered to 'cheerfully submit the whole to your
mature Consideration', yet did everything they could to influence their consideration,
including asking and answering a series of rhetorical questions.
They submitted that, irrespective of the king's pardon, the Admiralty instructed officers
to select individuals to be sacrificed to 'malice and private resentment' or the 'sport of
tyrants'. As they were the individuals to be sacrificed, they took such threats seriously.
While politicians and newspapermen could feign shock at the suggestion that the
Admiralty's promises might be repudiated, men who witnessed hangings on Culloden
could not. Their final question askedi 'To whom, are we to look or apply for Protection?'
Their argument precluded all but the obvious answer. They assured their countrymen
their pay increase was both reasonable and justified. While a national bond nominally
came from the 'malicious men in office' (whom they did not trust), ultimately it came
from the people (whom they did). Together with their oath of fidelity, it was the key to
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their success. With erstwhile friends abandoning them, they used the press to appeal to
those they could trust.
The manifesto questioned Colpoys' courage:
On Sunday, the 7th Instant, ever to be accorded, a gallant Chief, (not indeed so, but
as such represented by an Honourable Member, Mr. Whitbread; perhaps the
Honourable Member committed a mistake, it was surely his Gallantry with the Fair
Sex he alluded to, for the Country is ignorant of any gallant Action by him
performed with his Officers in consort
The admiral had been conspicuously absent from Bridport's dispatch after the action off
Isle de Groix'°3 and deserved a large share of the blame for allowing the French
expedition to Bantry Bay to escape from Brest.'°4 But, as Sheridan observed, the
manifesto's attack was out of character for British seamen. The paragraph artfully played
off the fawning descriptions of Colpoys appearing in newspapers the preceding week.
The London Chronicle described him as 'brave and worthy'105 and, before any of the facts
were known, declared him to be 'in every instance, noble and manly'. 106 The Oracle
described him as 'bravely and nobly just', 107 then fabricated his speech to save Lt. Bover.
The Morning Chronicle seemed more concerned with the semantics than the substance of
the incident:
Delicacy. It is rather unfortunate that the Minister cannot impart some portion of his
delicate reserve to the Treasury Writers. In one of their Papers yesterday we were
told that, when the Marines on board the London were ordered to fire, the order was
'executed' with a degree of promptness and determination characteristic of good and
disciplined Soldiers!" And again 'we think no eulogium too great for the manly firm,
and officer-like conduct of Admiral Colpoys, or the loyal and soldier-like behaviour
of the Marines.' Here is a fine proof of delicacy, and an admirable display of the spirit
of conciliation. The Sailors do not want Jacobine Papers to irritate them.'°8
Eulogising the man they considered a murderer or, perhaps, calling a marine a soldier
could not be countenanced without a response. Their response, however, betrayed the
presence of a skilled hand and convinced contemporaries the manifesto was a forgery.
Semi-literate seamen were assumed incapable of such writing. However, while many of
ships' letters written during the mutiny were crude, simple and direct; others, from a
1O3 Clowes, The RiyaINay (London: Sampson Low, 1899), iv, 265
BL Addi MSS 35.197.43, Bndport Papers, Bndport to Nepean, 21 Dec 1796
105 London Chronicle, 9-11 May 1797
106 Ibid 11 13 May 1797
107 Oracle, 13 May 1797
'°8 Monwtg Chro,ucle, 10 May 1797
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variety of ships, were articulate, complex and subtle. The navy was a microcosm of
society. In addition to seamen, it sought men with useful skills, including those with legal,
accounting and writing backgrounds. Tom Paine served before the mast, as did
Alexander Selkirk and Tobias Smollett and as would Herman Melville, Henry Dana,
Joseph Conrad and Jack London. The sea held a strong attraction for writers, as they
searched for inspiration, adventure or escape from creditors.
Sheridan recognised a skilled hand and, therefore, assumed the seamen 'had been acted
upon and mislead by treachery of the foulest and blackest nature'. He fancied himself to
be their friend, yet knew little of them. He assumed the presence of an outsider, without
considering the possibility that amongst the 30,000 men of the Channel fleet there could
be thirty-four to represent and articulate the grievances of their shpmates, several who
were well versed in naval regulations, and many who could be described as skilled
writers.
The style of manifesto was irrelevant. Whether its language came from landsmen,
quotalnen or topmen, its arguments could only have come from seamen. By
concentrating on its too fluid, too clever style, Sheridan ignored the manifesto's content.
It offered a detailed description of the L4rndon incident that could only have come from
someone who was there. It offered facts that could be verified and am interpretation that
could not, several days before they appeared elsewhere in print. It claimed Colpoys not
only precipitated, but premeditated violence. Despite earlier references to the
'unfortunate affair', it made accusations of murder. It described the iirlmiral as ordering
his officers to load the quarter deck guns with grape and canister and to be ready to fire
into the delegates' boats, then ordering four of the main deck guns to be similarly loaded
and brought to bear on his crew.
As other accounts suggested the seamen shot first, the manifesto came as a shock, an
effect well calculated, though well disguised, by its understated opening paragraph. While
accurate in much of its detail, the manifesto offered a highly prejudicial account of the
incident. It mixed fact with opinion to lead readers to the desired conclusion. It
condemned Captain Griffith as unwilling to wait until the crew complied with his order
to get below before ordering Bover to fire. 109 It absolved the latter of responsibility by
'°9 A more sympathetic portrait of Griffith and an indication that he learned from lus experience is found
in Abraham Crawford's Rimiacences of a Naval Officer (London: Chathain Pubhshing, 1999), 149-150.
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portraying his actions as dictated at pistol point. It was more than a rebuttal of other
public accounts. It drew a portrait of Colpoys as insensitive, Griffith as impatient, Bover
as reluctant, and the crew as pushed beyond the limits of endurance. Such was their
restraint, according to the manifesto, that despite provocation, they would not hurt the
young midshipmen lowered over the thwarts to cut away the gunport ropes; and such
was their presence of mind that they stationed sentinels at the powder magazines. While
the manifesto confirmed that the crew stormed the deck, it argued they did so to 'confer
with the Officers'. Throughout the 'unfortunate affair', the behaviour of Colpoys and the
officers (other than Bover) was portrayed as irresponsible and cowardly, while that of the
crew was presented as disciplined and restrained. The manifesto confirmed that Bover
was saved, not by Colpoys, but by the delegates; and that, while the admiral's fate was
ultimately decided by the Londons, it was first debated by the fleet. Such detail, available
only to those present, points to the manifesto's authenticity, though not always to its
accuracy. Its authors were insiders, not outsiders.
Sheridan provided the impetus for the manifesto:
The following Aspersions allude to us all, and are taken from an Honourable
Member's Speech in the House of Commons, inserted in the Sun of the 9th instant,
parts of which we have quoted, with necessary remarks on the same, beginning with
the following, his express words: 'There must be a point in which the demands of the
Seamen must cease.' Can that Hon. Member entertain a doubt but we maturely
weighed within our Bosoms the Boon we solicited, nor took Advantage of our
distressed Country at the present momentous Crisis, when so many Millions were
voted away for Chimerical Purposes.
The manifesto supplied the date and source of Sheridan's aspersions - confirming that
newspaper misrepresentations (in this instance appearing in a government paper)
contributed to the problem. In turn, the manifesto misrepresented the Sun's account to
suggest Sheridan's aspersions alluded 'to us all'. Emotive phrasing continued as it
described the seamen as modest and government as extravagant in voting away millions
for chimerical purposes - an obvious reference to the Austrian loans. They quoted
Sheridan as condescending to say:
What has been granted to us, appeared to be no more than what justice required; but
he could not avoid declaring his Disapprobation of the Mode we adopted - it was not
consistent with that high Character which British Seamen always maintained.
He earned a searing retort 'It is beyond our Comprehension what measures he would
adopt as plight Faith was forfeit.' They conjured an image of a venal politician posturing
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at the expense of the long suffering tars and distracting readers from the manifesto's
manipulations.
He farther says, and on bare Reflection of which, he might Blush, if ever a blush
adorned his Cheek. 'I fear they have been worked upon by some Interference of the
foulest, basest and most treacherous Nature,' Treachery! as British Seamen, we detest
the Thought.
The picture of a profligate, a permanent blush adorned Sheridan's cheek. The barb
hinted at the observations promised in its preamble. It damned Sheridan before it
identified him. No doubt he recognised the technique, having used it on stage, in
newspapers and in Parliament. Such language was strange coming from seamen, so
strange that it distracted Sheridan from the manifesto's message - a message that, in the
absence of any other agenda, could only have come from seamen.
The manifesto focused on the word treachery as though it had been applied to seamen in
general, rather than those who misled them. In doing so, it renewed their bond. The
delegates lost their anonymity when they assumed their office. However, they did not so
much lead as represent their shipmates. They served as spokesmen, signed petitions,
negotiated settlements and maintained the fleet's composure; but they were not willing to
be sacrificed as scapegoats. This was their most vulnerable moment, after a settlement
had been reached, before the fleet sailed. In spite of the pardon, there were calls in
Parliament and the press to isolate and punish ringleaders. Their survival depended on
maintaining the fleet's confidence. Sheridan's suggestion that they misled their shipmates
could not go unanswered. On 12 May the Oracle reported: 'The spirit of Mutiny, it is said,
has now so far subsided, that several of the Delegates have been openly reviled, and
some of the most violent of the Mutineers have been confined by the Seamen as
incendiaries who have misled them.' 11° Although false, such reports undermined the
solidarity of the fleet.
The manifesto quoted Sheridan:
'If there were Men who, upon other Occasions, considered themselves as being
oppressed, there was at least something of Dignity and Openness in complaining at
the Moment, but if they wished to obtain Revenge,' says he, 'by Endeavouring to sap
and destroy the Bulwark of the Country, they were the basest and foulest Traitors
that ever disgraced a Country.'
110 Oracle, 12 May 1797
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Again, it quoted him from a notoriously unreliable source, the Sun. If misrepresentations
in newspapers did not cause the problem, they certainly aggravated it. No newspaper
could claim accurate coverage of Parliamentary proceedings. Each was limited by the
transcription abilities of its reporters and coloured by the politics and prejudices of its
editors. Readers in London could compare various newspapers to get a clearer sense of
what was actually said. Thus, while the patrons of coffee houses on Fleet Street might
have realised the Sun had misquoted or misrepresented Sheridan, the seamen, with
limited access to the news, accepted it as accurate. Opposition's Star gave his remarks a
far different meaning: 'If men were oppressed, they ought to be relieved by their
country.' 111 Clearly, Sheridan held Pitt accountable, but Heriot changed his words to
protect the prime minister.
The authors of the manifesto took Sheridan's remarks, as they appeared in the Sun, and
used them against him.
Dignified we are, for the service tendered to our Country on every occasion, when
we had to dispute with the Enemy (superiority of Numbers not excepted) the
Empire of the Main, of which this Country retains Ascendancy. Openness of Heart
and frankness of Mind are the general Characteristic of the British Seaman.
Their reaction did not take into account the context in which Sheridan's comments were
made. On 8 May, other than those who were there, no one knew what had happened on
board London, only that the mutiny had suddenly become violent and an admiral's life
was in jeopardy. Communications between the ships and the shore were cut off when
the rest of the fleet dropped down to St Helen's. Rumours ran rampant. Pitt rushed the
seamen's bill through Parliament, begging for silent indulgence. Opposition supported
the bill, but could not let the opportunity pass in silence. While Sheridan's comments
were made in ignorance of the true situation in Portsmouth, it was Pitt, not the seamen,
who bore the brunt of his attack; and, unless The Times misquoted him, his attack was
personal:
unless the Right Hon. Gentleman was totally besotted; unless he had lost that
elegant understanding of his, which had so often shone forth with such brilliancy in
that House, how was a possible that he should not have apprehended new jealousies
among the Seamen from the backwardness that was shown in sanctioning the
concessions made by the Board of Admiralty?2
Star, 10 May 1797
112 The Times, 10 May 1797; see also London Ch'vmcIe, 9-11 May 1797
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The allusion to Pitt drinking habits was counterproductive. When such words appeared
in print they distracted readers from the real issue. In contrast, the Morning Post offered
nothing to distract its readers from Sheridan's message:
The evil had now got to that height that resorting to common measures would not
do. There was not a moment to be lost, if the reports of the continuance of the
disturbance were true, and he feared they were. The town had been lulled into a fatal
[belief] that the disturbance had ceased, occasioned by the report of the London
having dropped down to St Helen's; but this circumstance could not be supposed to
have taken place, without presupposing that the command had been taken from the
officers. If it were true that the lives of the Delegates had been lost, and the Sailors
had been on shore to view the dead bodies, then he would ask what measures had
been adopted, in order to avert the calamities necessarily consequent upon acts,
which must have the effect of cutting off all hopes of compromise, and of the future
salvation of the Country. What measures, he repeated, had been taken to avert such
calamities? If none had been taken, then would Ministers have added a fresh instance
of their negligence and incapacity. They had by that delay, which they admitted to
have taken place, by their murderous and inhuman delay (hear, hearfrom allpans of the
House) been the occasion of all that has happened. There was not, he was persuaded,
a person in the House, who, if a man had fallen in the fleet, or if that great and
gallant Admiral, whose worth and character he bore testimony to, had fallen a
sacrifice - there was not a man in the House who would not lay every drop of blood
which had been, or should be, split, to the doors of Ministers, who might have
prevented it.113
The seamen who wrote the manifesto did not read the Morning Post. If they had, there
would have been no need to write it. Instead, they continued to misquote him from the
Sun:
'He never could have believed, that while the Fleet of the Enemy was preparing for
Sea, English Sailors would remain in Port disputing with Government, they were the
last body of Men from whom he would expect such Conduct.' Oh! Sheridan, if this
be your mean opinion of British Seamen, thou knowest little, very little, of Seamen's
Sentiment. Our Requests were moderate and just. Why then should the Government
(who know our Deserts) dispute with us? We are not tainted with Republicanism; on
its Agents we would not deign a Look. Impute any Thing on us thy mean Soul can
dictate but Treachery; its Principles we disavow. What revenge does he suppose we
could wish to take of the Country which gave us Birth? If any Revenge was our Aim,
it would have been on those who opposed us, private Individuals, not our grateful
Country.
The manifesto continued to distance the seamen from their former friend. Sheridan
remained estranged and oddly aligned with government during the subsequent mutiny at
the Nore.
" Morning Post, 10 May 1797
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The manifesto made Sheridan appear ignorant, ungrateful and mean-spirited. It
reminded the public their requests were moderate and well deserved. After a final denial
of republican connections and treasonable intentions, they identified the target of their
revenge, not their 'grateful Country', but the 'private Individual' who opposed them.
That Honourable Gentleman, thinking he had defeated the Chancellor, attacked the
poor but loyal Tars. He will not find them easily defeated; opposed to a foreign foe
in particular. That Hon. Member's Struggles are great - a good Salary he wants - then
(like an Honourable Friend of his Bosom) he will be Silent, with Ministers in
particular.
The manifesto ended by offering its observations of Sheridan. It referred to him as an
'Honourable Gentleman' although it suggested he was anything but. His financial
difficulties were common knowledge. In Gillray's cartoon, 'Promis'd Horrors of the
French Invasion', Sheridan was shown making off with two sacks labelled: 'Remains of
the Treasury' and 'Requisitions of the Bank of England'. 114
 The Prince of Wales confided
to John Wilson Croker that Sheridan 'at one time and another' had borrowed as much as
£20,000 from him.' 15 Being a member of Parliament was often all that kept Sheridan out
of debtors' prison.' 16 Still, the manifesto's suggestion was in conflict with Sheridan's
public position on jobbery:
there was a curious strain of simplicity in Sheridan - a soft core inside his wit and
his worldliness. It can be found in his speeches and in his plays, and indeed, in the
whole of his life. It appears in his singular notion that gentlemen who exerted
themselves in Parliament should blush to be found accepting places, pensions, and
titles)17
Sheridan ridiculed George Rose for simultaneously holding the offices of 'clerk of the
parliament, master of the pleas office, surveyor of the green wax' and, as though it were
incidental, 'secretary to the treasury'.' 8 Sheridan managed to reconcile his attitude when
he became Receiver-General of the Duchy of Cornwall in 1804 and Treasurer of the
Navy in 1806.119 However, there is nothing to suggest that in 1797 he accepted a
government emolument in return for his abrupt silence or incongruous support of
government's position on the mutiny, other than his silence and incongruous support.
Even 'the friend of his bosom', Charles Fox, who chose this particular moment to retire
114 BL 8826, 'Proinis'd Horrors of the French Invasion, or Forcible Reasons for negotiating a Regicide
Peace. Vitie. The Authority of Edmund Burke', 20 October 1796
115 L Gibbs, Shei'idan (London: Kennikat, 1947), 145
116 1t was an indignity he would later endure. O'Toole, 451 & 455
117 Ibid., 189
Ibid. 176
Ibid. 378 & 394
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temporarily from public life, was puzzled by Sheridan's sudden reversal and hinted at an
accommodation:
on 2 June, after previously blaming the ministers for the naval mutiny, he rounded
on the mutineers in debate and called for national unity. This he called his speech 'pv
an's et foci?; it conciliated Henry Dundas, but left Pitt unmoved and puzzled Fox,
whose reaction was that Sheridan could not 'add much to the strength' of any
coalition government, owing to 'that incurable itch that he seems to have of
distinguishing his conduct from that of those with whom he wishes to be supposed
united.12°
Whether Sheridan's charge of heart reflected an 'incurable itch' or a genuine concern for
the country's welfare, the seamen lost their erstwhile friend and most eloquent advocate.
A week after the manifesto appeared, Sheridan declared
it was impossible for him to show himself more a friend to them than by warning
them against hearkening to those deceivers who are practising upon them by their
foul and wicked delusions. As well might they think to manage ships without rudders
to maintain the superiority of the Navy without discipline.121
Three weeks later, he abandoned any shreds of sympathy and called for national unified
opposition to the disturbance at the Nore: 'If there is, indeed, a rot in the wooden walls
of Old England, decay and ultimate ruin cannot be far distant' 1 William Cobbett
argued that, in accepting Sheridan's nostrums, the public was like 'a terrified patient who
despairing of his case, gladly accepts of the assistance of one whom he knows to be a
quack'.'
The manifesto closed on the respectful note with which it began:
Dear Countrymen, we presume you will no longer remain Ignorant - therefore beg
leave to conclude our Narrative, and remain
The Loyal and Humane Tars of His Majesty's Fleet, at St Helen's.
,Queen Charlotte, May 13, 1797
On 24 May, the Oracle offered an explanation that came short of an apology:
In the extreme hurry of receiving Expresses from Portsmouth - at three and four
o'clock in the morning - we perhaps did not always very critically weigh the
'R Thorne, Histo,y of Parliament: The House of Commons 1790-1820 (London: Secker & Warburg, 1986),
Members Q Z, 146. The coalition government Fox was referring to may have been the putative
administration to be headed by Lord Moira. Pro an, etfow For field and hearth
121 On 26 May Sheridan announced his intention of introducing a bill an response to the manifesto. The
next day he 'abandoned it on a particular account' - either having reached an accommodation with
government or agreeing the time was not propitious for pubhc discussion of such a sensitIve matter.
J Dugan, The Great Mutiny (New York: Putnam, 1965 ,257
' Cobbett's JVeek?y PobticaJRguter, 13 August 1803
278
communications of our Correspondents. The paper called a Manifesto of the
Seamen, is said to be a forgery; and on reconsidering its contents, we wish, for the
honour of the British Fleet, that it may prove so. But we can prove, that it originated
at Portsmouth - that it was circulated there - transmitted to us from thence - believed
by us to be authentic - and, for that reason, published perhaps hastily and
imprudently, but certainly with purest good faith, and with the mere intention of
gratifying public curiosity by a full narrative of so momentous a transaction. Our idea
was merely to relate events, and certainly neither to stigmatize the character of the
officers, whom we revere, nor to inflame the spirit of dissatisfaction, which we most
sincerely lamented.'24
Their explanation, while plausible, was not entirely credible. If Peter Stuart, editor and
proprietor of the Oracle, was not there to receive the manifesto, he would have approved
galleys before the issue went to press. The Oracle was one of government's more
troublesome supporters:
the Oracle had caused the Government more trouble than almost any one of the
Opposition newspapers. Since its business was primarily extortion, much of its space
was devoted to extortionary material, and it was an invariable participant in every
personal misunderstanding, its support always going to the highest bidder, regardless
of his politics. ... In addition, it was susceptible to subversion by Shetidan.1
Indeed, even before Peter Stuart purchased its copyright in 1795, he managed its 'literary
department with Sheridan standing at his elbow'. 1 The paper proved a willing
accomplice in his political intrigues. 127 Two years later, the paper retained its anomalous
position and unsavoury reputation, but seemed to have fallen out with Sheridan. In
addition to being the only newspaper to publish the manifesto, it criticised his empty
promise to oppose the newspaper stamp tax.
The manifesto provided the seamen with an opportunity to set the record straight.
Before it was published by the Oracle, the manifesto appeared in Portsmouth as a
handbill, 'printed at Portsmouth by the very same persons who had printed the other
papers of the Delegates'. The fleet was its first and most important audience. The
aspersions cast and the questions raised by Sheridan put the lives of the delegates in
jeopardy. The manifesto called for a re-affirmation of the fleet's commitment and the
support of other fleets.
' Oracle, 24 May 1797
'L Werkmeister, A Newspaper His/orj ofEngland 1792-1793 (Lincoln: University Press, 1967), 23
126 IbieL, 176
IbicL, 117-118, 325 & 378
' Oracle, 20 May 1797
129 The Times 27 May 1797
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Although angry, the manifesto's message was clear. It offered moderate requests and
declarations of loyalty, not hidden agendas and certainly not a call to arms. However,
their words counted for nothing as their actions were considered a threat to naval
discipline and social order. Their attempt to set the record straight was dismissed as a
forgery and sank into obscurity.
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Mainly. Potdan nan she. veqnei.d to
Brethren fin, ha....1 say Pnn.mein in
them (ti. ln,ial Mu'-
	 • indeed
ancssoiheOvderginesfa,gnrngit
MujeOy win pleadedto gtn thi ra.ep—we tb
,eiv,ned it the Ordiaatv diuea ad Deep. at
— with. Wi then wn, to St. Helena. dhftant
(is. Spiehsad abcue thee. Mile.. a. the S.pi Meng
sesdu y she Ad..ivel (eeeeeinp hr.. Sb rile
tow, u.hith bad ins shalt pownit Gne.a..c'na..
dvrffed, in. Leaden, Ma.nrougb end La Ny.plL)
The Wind did not (a..., 
sow p......4 to dot.dunn, a.r Since, (a. by this set wilhto I. sadin-
iced -t sea... a State af S.Ipeaee.aa sheen was no
If a. Ad being paflsd ,-us esuld n.e hi
dewived i. thus Paint, at sMe Vettdes ad she PvJa
us allowed, ned literal .1 .a i. she Fleet an tea,5.
On. Xeareuua ave obeucslly, not confined alon, to
the Ad lice being pad. although it laid Donna,.
(a, ba.uieen Day. 
—pnvate inflenimnu we,. thea
so eseli Command,, in she Flee, ad which we ave
netlgna.ane,atwill be(nuandmthnSequei. FuN
Allowow,. was granied a Isnue Ship's Camps...,
In be sh, leading mr,. and nut in e.heva.
wheel, inuleda S.(pucaie uh,c,aghnut tb..hd. lives.
rb. ships emnaueang as Spuheaul had net diii, im.
rite Gnrvancna medselkd. sbmigb aiuuap Days
elapSed. ow 'Y figua If their being teuIvvIeuI: be it
wtdeuflaod by Innate Cuitvancrs—.u;iuug hi' a
Cuens MauiiaI lisris osruce,. ci had. 
'!p"u'11y. be.bared in a Iyra.'u.un.I sal (lpp.ce M...inr,.
unberewisig vi., Chentel,n uI Cee.teun.n and he
dignified Statuen thy blInd. l',veaie Mianu.u,,ngi
sets hen,d,-se length, she Ba.us.ng
 Seani.n, fled
..a ln.dugnatiue. as being eiglelle.l. hunt lor,b en
ike ythm lnIia,s. It was IShn. Oh' lIon,,l in
relate I .bat we Isuanul ant ii.. lit luiniri laud 'ins In
Sacrifice In,. ei 11w brugb.rli Gems iliac eric
ad, rne.J ibis tv any tel.., Ce,.niry. Prrn,it u.
gratrful Cwtau'lryunen, so elk a Few Qnetsouit rut lit
(keafleti. and a. .iu are at a cinfld,,aUn i),IIat.,e
It,., na at rr(tnu . and l;noratut .1 he Parnru,lsn..
p. rune at aI'u so return she Aniwun.. and we w.1
cheerfully luahumit slut nhi.le so you mature CanS.
di ration.
W re we otis .mtrd in ens Calls ala/nm.-
y'..
Wire we tire k,ur.,l by Oath en prr!trs,r I. ur
Re(sil.,ut'o ad n.e &wr so lb a 'anal ea.r jill api
unodir.scLqe.i'u wise a.sa.uir.I, and she Sane'lion
if p.nstcn.ite g ,' . n fir hi I'. rf..rnac,e if abe
fame '—Yu,.
0.4 we dat (dc.,,,.r mod Cruriocu Sat. ri I,,,'.
Panduai (vr any ,arrtf.acsivnuti,d by tasr Brusicry.
duty; '.u.r late P,rfiveracuce'L.Ysp.
Wit it not (Tilted '—Yea.
	
.0 fasmer thin Pa	 sned. bus, in diridi
	
Cerradiitin to iluat	 Preelau.'atuen, waiw
Indiviiia.ali felednd	 eaprili Purpui(c ella.
	
Cnhicieg them to M	 d pruvase Rrftemsn,ent.
Are then poor, bud Iedsviduals. lawn so he
l.ucTihlced lii, she meye,$et if Tjrrant's?—Ncc,
neeot'Jiuigta slur Lawaddatined Matson.1
I. (orb she ptafce [er meriseniow, Service
t'eel.r.d to thor enils5averidgn and hens's-
hent Nation I
Ta n.hnm, are en wj,r apply for Pretefoan'
	





shin it she Sseuaties if loyal, but naferannate




a Men I. OHec (eth.
	
ba(ilyIeE, to betray a 	 lice, di Nunonal
linda not p.... 1 .Ahe she. DilaBu loses
ilill Lepuvienco. W t faming s.
dialy Cataltrophe, cv ,,. 5.1. World .1 eur
Afentua.a:—fla 3as'dqdi mAnn.. evite. be
eunaded, a ialhant Cb. (not suudeed (a. Me as
tint l.nmsdissdr nunplymu, epa. wb.cli Captuia
CV*Aa p.efc'itnd hut Piled a. hum, and Iwo., I..
wunild put hon it De. that Monow if he did
oat inlhanely enieply vh bin Oede,nu-.-in sbus
dilonsnt she I.ituteeant fond, and Wounded sea
Men. The Slop'. Co.ptep bite1 now all below,
and besneg the'. wire fssJ bus. .houugfld,, they
eepnded shUn walk so bout what they wanted, lost
in ,aio, the If ameaucka nd han Ida.,. she lenses
we's thrown on all the Haswnya. u.d the Clint,
poising alt. ifainusintha n tls afldut, (a as it
Rnn... fluid adaid down ths llctchwsyn a. the
wnanned Men below, and Wounded kva.al Ce.
verel', pita .1 which ned fines Dead 1—i. she
see.. s.une the 15th Middiptiw on. b.sflly em-
ployed, with pnoper lmpMeinta. piepared hit the
i',rn.'le, in cut away the Pome Ropes ad site Middle
rise,, well 'enawung sIns the Hoar; eli Sinai,. could
nut Sinus a lion- At lath, ineitatid wish feeing Co
much Ut.,nd (pull, we won 'drtumnsed is (n.e. slut
1'aitaier. m.siwe..aeun, so psetern Small Atm.;
thin drew Ca,s..dgs, baum tune ad die Ls,wsr
tuuni, to (apply lint. wish Powde,. subs.g Care ua
fecure the 3slafaa.ne web pu1uer Ceesinel., Thea
mmcml they weue dtiea.nnd it gain she Maui. Dick,
ste cuslcr w,'h she Odious, en which the Ma.unen
wire l,,mnnuonc,l ,o nibs sit. Oed. dAllegiancn it she
OlSen,., isis ske. p.arcbsd ci 1weioeduaseit Muunder.
not emilane, n.e weidd silty Fur., bus went and
pin..1 show u.n!uappy Sh.pnasei. ris. Uppi, fleck
w it shin flu.imne,I ult pie iiOppafltwn..4heOtcanl
rlkul tue Qu.ann ...I shot Fled. The bleat .1
l'allsun. lv ii,.. rime t,,bIsJsh. and the, mere .le,l
will. n,,s,h sinine liuun.snuiy ba, she miii pan ef
thou .kl,'rie.I. i •iiu. us a. impartial .ilrcouuit .1 Ins
nnh.pyv .hl..iu, .n.l we snal will be a Wanting Is
tllhrcus .aI sit 'hat7 so eat, she Mets wstb 1.1. uvu..n..c
Soap.	 -
fri inn l.nvr.ulp Wvua.lel on_I I.e. Deal j
hIatuses .I4nIy %k..,frd ......(fln,del',.t.a*eAtmidhai a
Is'. e ii.flnrdArpuuaea.....I
Thin n"JrI she Sill hAm.. han swim iii he..ne hi.
nisral C','p..n. a. line a,, pS.a'nt to ca' l.:nu. is,
uti; .ini hi I us .me hen,. r.v.g 5', h.' bin I lu.,',.
tv,rnte .4 'he I). I-en" nil don Moat fun'., i... is
a,n,rr.l at il,' I n.e slur, had.s mhr .,i.r.l .1w
'ii, .bae gullies OlSon, w ut a'l Ii. ha Sum,.
I lusn li,l '.11ui,i. 5,, an e.n.uc. .11 u., ci.,- a
hI$hn.5.yittl, w.eemsed. ru.. we,. u;..., c . 'i-
em. a in a. alps ate Cabin, "a i-' t,.rd c iou.
she, a,rned at ft. lichen'.. Is no.51, gene'.1 Op.-
nion ad thu Sesnw,i. aid .eteh ii, shim, Cciii's best
(peken. en thin Ships an,i.nl a. St. Malta'., In dslare?
ibe 0111cm', steeps Adunjeal Colpop, wheaui tlm.y
w.v. cut,, seat eli. inlhig.sor ad she whale. .p in
site Civil La.. On the iou. st was prapofed. .bat
site Opinaea of each Sh.p'a Cem.pnuty lkosld lii given
an W,ising, folded up. and not to he eçasned iutu.,l
the whale ef mlii Opuniona were ddr.ersd on boaad
she London, and ihs Deinpenc Ira. ench Ship p..-
(site. £Sagnah was then sad. byshe London Ia.
all .1.. Dslegasst so attend (Map is) nod dilune' titan,
sdpeduve Ships Opinion. n.h.. shirt apptn..d.
lob. Psu.,ci 1.1 thit I. Bonud hi lid)
is a. diip Ce'ssa.' M..k if ne
iii:- bicVa..e - -
the Adeelifi d hi. Odics,s ws. th.. diuimeci op
so she Pa.uf.neinh MagiBue..
In the begunning a.n Na.id'e. a. mnenneusi
cbs A(pevflon. shown so our Chn,nlens at
Seams. Tb.Jehlo..iagutnesess she Mans akims-
whole Crew, e,ll.,nded Moo aa.. pisalel it lay
cn.vs(pandsd with French Agentnu Me shey ate as
gre,s.dleCe as they are Mdidsua, Her Csew, we do
not Deny, weit men Hsedfreng she. tb.(.eletMe
Ships. Tne.dt.ry a. Hepiublicaa Pnnapkn ihey,
like 'be Crews .1 the whole (In.,, dufitaw. The fol-
io_usc Mpnllr.nn Alum, se q . all, aids. sakes lv..
an fl'menanalute Menihuit'. Sp,sela in she Ma gIc .1
Couunnun,.In4nted in lb. Sun .1 4e ugtb mis.,
Pants nil which we have qia.aed, wilt nsasy Br-
.ie.b en abc tame, begin.ung with nba (all.wIaId bum
taped Wondin 'Tlse.n null bee psult in which
she Deniandu of the Seamen mod cell.." C,. that
H.. Member eaetfsai. ii dncqbe but we ..ure!y
icighed ..ithu,s .., Ilafouna sh. I,,.. we Celacisei5
a. mash Ad.antage If our didiellod Country at she
p.el'rnt nouneasents CellS,. when In .any Miluien,
wire .u.anl away fee thkierirali Peipofom. Meot...
defeteb to lay. "Wbhe baa be.. geanted it se,
appiaeed so be no mare shin, what jnlla.e requsnsdt
but he inlaid on. wind d.clauthg hue £uu(upgimb.aihu
If she Made we adopesd.—ie was au's esaUeoe with
hua high Chat.diit which liseldi Isea. Unuyi
I' is ond nun CaspanMeflan wbsi
Muilirsy
 be wseuld atop. as plight Fa.ih wa. lutIst..
ad. He faiths, Ia,. and an she bane Radc&.in If
which, he migh Sulk, if eve' a hulk adwned has
Cheek. - I lear slu.y have hen sorbed upall by
l's.. Itiacifetenes at ike bided, baled and mull
iloaellunue. Nuts.." Towche.y has Month Seamen.
we deceit sit. Tbu.nglls. - it done wite Mcii .ehn,
upun other Occateaa. canidened tbemlih,e. as be-
jig oppeelad. shire seat at kilt iasesth.sguID.gni..
57 au's Openneli.n complaining at she Maunmuac;
hut if they waled so obtain Revenge. lays lie, 1y
Ea.desrowing ma lop nod deinny the Bulwark .1
abs Country. they were the bsfehl and fe.le* Pta;-
son. .bat ever dilgrscucd a Coautry. Dignified ni'
are, fur the Scenic. seutdaured so win Counsry itt
every Ucealiim... when we had to .I.rpuase with uhe
h.nciny hlapeni.risy of Mambert out enscepeed) uhi
Empire 'at she Maui, s,f.hueh ski.. Ceuniep retain.
site .hlendency. Upanuteleef Heart and (rsnkn4a
..l Pduad itt she general Cbnrsdoniiic of a Itriluth
Seam's.,. " He never cn,ald base behevnd. this
while the liens If she Enemy win preparing liar
.Sc.. ifaieJula Sailor, would resaio a Pats di(puiuung
with Cu,vcru.mnns,ma; shscy were ibe Lad body nI' Men
mm. whet, lie lhn,dd rurpea inch Cnasded. Oh'
,Sden,ian, if ski, by mean Opins.m of hirisilk ta.
mcii. sham. knowel little, very little. al Seatnamia'
.'ucnsimcat. Om.ar Buq.ctb were moderate and juil.
Why uhria Mould C.nennna.nitt. wI.,, know sean tie.
lent.) .lilpute with ma We are not sainted wit!.
Kepubhucaitufm, en its Agent, we would not deign
a Luank. Impute nay Thing So us shy men. Soul
t.ia dictate but Tseaclsety its l'nmnc.plen we dif.
nine IA has Revenge dues he tiippals we could
uslhi so take of she Co,antu'v which gave ui Birth.
If an tievenge on our Aim. it wai'and hauc her.,
en sIsde nJi.a uppited v.a. prusasc hiud.vud,iaha, a. i
nus 4.at,'fiil C.i'an.is'. 'limit Hnttsu,ablc Gensl.'.
man si.un'uuog lie had defrsscdiite ibasccthae a:.
sucked ii.. piaas bus l..1 Ta.W He will isut Said
shcm e..lIlv deloused; oppaled sos foreign Foe in
pa uicu'ar. This Il'at Meumbr',a llnau4e. ate guess
0a!a-, Ii. wants—thu,n (like aim Hooiau able
b.,rn'h ,.f I,, lilian) be willIe blent, wish Miii.
P_c.. u's palueda.
I). al L . uuu'i ymrn, u-c purItan., ,cma will isa hu.ngn,
nil,.,', lip,.rnaus shruni.0 e big Lease u,u ci,:. I ..'..'
...,, ',.auiai.v;aad .rtain
'h IJIA-I :i ym;i jarn"c 1'J;'
rJD.hia'fe' I'-1.'-' '.
Ian C .iniu,i ' ...
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No reproach can teach common pru-
dence to the Agents of Ministry. I'very
invective that scurrility can furnish is
thrown out on the l)elegates; by a
Pent that is nightly franked to all the
Ports by a man in the Office, and thus
in the very moment that Ministers dep-
recate discussion, and complain of the
indecencies of the press, their own
instruments are the most blameably
indiscreet.
Not merely the relaxation of all disci-
pline for to long a period is a dreadful
calamity; injurious even to the happi-
ness of the seamen themselves, as it
will make their return to duty more irk-
some; but it favours desertion, which
we fear has taken place to a consider-
able degree.
It must be confessed, that if the
Ministers, in the affair of the Seamen,
were guilty of delay, it was their first
fault. Nothing of the kind appears in
their conduct fur the last five years. All
the changes produced on the state of
the country; fatal as they are, bear evi-
dent marks of official precipitation,
and of the rashness which is sworn foe
to delay and consideration.
All the delicacy of the Ministers in the
I louse of Commons is of no avail,
unless they can contrive to infuse a
portion of it into their newspapers.
The irritating language used by the lat-
ter, is such as would disgrace a driveller
even in the last stage of infatuation. If,
however, such people are employed,
they must write in character.
i'here is not an old woman capable of
reading the ministerial papers, who
does not firmly believe that the Duke
of Bedford, Mr. Fox, and Mr.
Sheridan, were on board the fleet all
Sunday and Monday last.
It would be a thousand pities to unde-
ceive them. It would certainly be fool-
ish to make enquiry into the cause of a
fire, rather than to endeavour to
quench it. But it is a subsequent duty to
enquire whether it arose from negli-
gence or accident.
We deprecate a discussion of the late
mutiny as much as Ministers can,
though perhaps for a different reason.
We never remember their entering into
the discussion of any subject which
the did not render more inexplicable
that it was before.
be IIotnnt 'oft
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Admiral Colpoys and Captain
Griffiths, of the London, have just
been put on shore by the Seamen. The
Admiral has escaped with his life, to
the great credit to the British navy; but
you may depend upon this, that he will
not sail with the fleet.
'the Treasury Runners make the most
laboured and infamous attempts to
represent the Opposition as the secret
cause of the Mutiny at Spithead.
Among other false and malicious
reports, it has been generally circulated
these two days, that one of the
l)elegates of the Fleet is a person for-
merly
 a Clerk to Mr. Erskine. 'lliis is a
report most notoriously untrue. Mr.
Erskine's present Clerk, has been his
Clerk ever since Mr. Erskine was at the
Bar, and Mr. Erskine never had any
other Clerk. This fact is well known to
the numerous Gentleman of the pro-
fession, who have intercourse with that
distinguished Advocate.
It is said, that Valentine Joyce, the
1)ekgate at St. I lelen's was furmerly a
'Ibbacconist in Belfast, and that he was
forced on board the fleet, for being an
United Irishman.
I am also assured that the Seamen
throughout the tleet, see there are per-
sons among them who wish to lead
them on for other purposes than those
they aim at, and that they recoil from
those persons, and repent their harsh
conduct to their Officers. 'this, howev-
er, I give merely on report; but I
believe it. As the same rime I must
observe, that since the Fleet has been
so far off as St. I lelen's, it has not been
very easy to obtain particular and
authentic intelligence; but you may
depend that what I write has a good
foundation.





I Old (;TLnville - some candid reflec-
tions on his Lordships speech on
hwsda so far as regards Newspapers
and the liberty of the Press - tomor-
row This is no parry question. We shall
not sit in silence when rational free-
dom is endangered; and if some of our
contemporaries have the meanness to
shrink from the important discussion,
may their memory be branded with the
Infamy which it deserves.
It must be matter of jovto our readers,
that the Seamen at Portsmouth have
had so much self-control as not to pro-
ceed to extremities against Admiral
Colpovs, and the other Officers and
Men who acted under his authoritv
I lad they gone the length of spilling
their blood, we know not how the
Government or the Public could have
kept any terms with them. The conse-
quences to the empire might have been
dreadful.
Thank I leaven the storm which threat-
ened us with such fatal effects appears
to have subsided! and we are freed
from the fears we entertained that the
French Armament, now sitting out at
Brest, would have been able to sail for
its destination without any obstruction
from our fleet. 'I'hat will not be the
case now The French, we hope, will
soon find a fleet at sea, both able and
willing to protect our coast, and chas-
tise the insolence of those who may be
rash enough to dare to invade us.
The British Sailors would at any time
have advanced boldly to the attack; but
we are convinced, that after what has
been just done for them by the Nation,
they will act, if possible, with redou-
bled vigour, and convince the enem
that in their late transactions, with the
Admiralty, they meant nothing more
than they avowed; that their only
object was an increase of pay and pro-
visions and that they were not in the
smallest degree influenced by French
of Jacobin principles.
congratulate our fellow-subjects on
the apparent cheerfulness and prolnp-
titude with which our gallant seamen
return to) their duty The majority seem
now sorry, fur the observations from
propriety; and the stigma which they
have brought upon a service hitherto
the most honourable. We hope this
opinion will be strongly impressed on
their memories; and that the recollec-
tion of their misconduct will make
them redeem the nobleness of charac-
ter, by extorting new honours and
glory from the eneniy
'l'he spirit of Mutiny, iris said, has now
so far subsided, that several of the
l)elegates have been openly reviled,
and some of the most violent of the
Mutineers have been confined by the
Seamen as incendiaries who have mis-
led tlum.
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a body the will cheerfully submit
to) that duty and subordination which
has been the means of leading them to
victory as often as they have faced the
enemies of their country. It will now
be their pride to prove that the integri-
ty of the fleet has not been impaired,
not its discipline rendered inefficient
by their late stand for an increase of
pa They know that without order and
proper subordination, the bulwark of
England, the pride of the Ocean,
would sink into contempt in the face of
I.urope.
Earl I lowe has visited the fleet, and has
been well received by his brother tars
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with whom he has so often rode tri-
umphant. I ha prcsencc could not but
have a good effect, and the more so, as
we understand he was empowered 1w
his Majesty to promise a pardon, and a
generous forgiveness of all past Con-
duct, upon condition of their returning
to that system of duty and discipline
without which the British Navy cannot
exist.
After the numerous misrepresentations
which have been made upon the sub-
ject, we are happy in being enabled to
state, that the crew of the London
behaved with the utmost respect to
Admiral Colpoys during his confine-
mont, and repeatedly told him, that
they had no rntention of hurting him.
arc desired to contradict that part
of a paragraph, in which it was said,
that Capt. I lolloway was threatened to
be hanged or ducked. At the request of
the I)uke's ship's company we state,
that they were called over the ship's
books and each man was asked.
whether he was for the Captain coming
on board again or flot9 After proceed-
ing until the crew were tired out, (when
only one man objecte they said to
Mr. S we are all for the Captain it was
then said, up hands you that are for the
Captain, when every man's hand was
up which could be observed.
11w following address as been pub-
lished by the crew of the Robust
Robust, May 11 1797
The favours and goodness our
Officers confer upon us, are such as
can be equalled by few Officers in the
fleet, and that to our just and grateful
sense, of the Officers of his Majesty's
ship Robust. Is there a man so poor in
spirit that praise such as we have with-
out imitating the actions worthy of
them?
I low pleasant would be the tolls of war
did all employed in it meet with the
same recompense. It is our deeds alone
render us worthy their indulgence, and
preserve, their good opinion. To
inform you with how much ardency we
wish to serve them; if ever accidents
fall in our was; we arc thoroughly
resolved to lead them into the paths of
glory; and they might rest assured that
all of us will rejoice in an opportunity
of testifying our duty, affection, grati-
tude and submission, which we flatter
ourselves they will not here after disap-
prove.
We are, with the utmost respect and




The landsmcn, raised in the different
parishes are among the principal lead-
ers in the mutin
In the course of yesterday, we had
many opportunities of heating from
persons of the best authority the cir-
cumstances of the Mutiny still existing
on board Lord l%ridport's fleet, and the
of it at the departure of the post on
Wednesday evening We had also Iwo
private letters on the subject, from a
gentleman in the most respectable situ-
ation; but we candidly confess, that the
further our enquiries have been direct-
ed, the more difficult it is for us to give
a clear and decisive opinion as to the
real situation of affairs on board the
fleet.
Earl Ilowe went down on Wednesday
afternoon to l'ortsmouth, with
extraordinary powers from the King,
to endeavour to bring the seamen back
to their dutt; and it is hoped that his
prestnce will have a considerable influ-
once on them. The land men, raised in
the different parishes, are among the
principal leaders in the Mutiny. We
believe that Admiral Colpoys and
(:aptain Griffiths have been sent on
shore.
Several ships of the I'leet are known to
be altogether adverse to the late scan-
dalous proceedings, the Royal William
in particular. A boat coming alongside
the lmpeteux, on Wednesda to carry
some men on board her, the crew
refused to admit them, thinking they
were 1)clegates. 'lhe l)uke is now the
most refractory ship. It does not
appear that there is any appearance of
a fresh Mutiny at Plymouth.
We have heard it stated, that in conse-
quence of the disunion which exists
among even the Delegates at
Portsmouth, as to what is fit to be
done, Government has received some
information as to some persons who
have been most active in fomenting
this alarming confusion, and that a
Magistrate has been sent down to
Portsmouth to examine into this busi-
ness. Every person must sincerely wish
that the authors of these broils may
meet with condign punishment, and
there is no way so likely to learn the
secret history of the origin of the
mutiny, as by a disunion among the
I)elqrates.
Great complaints are come up from Sir
Roger Curtis's fleet at Torbay, on
account of their being no oxen or
other fresh provision at that port for
the seamen on their returning into
port. We always thought that the
Contractor had notice when a fleet was
expected in any particular parr, and it
is highly culpable that there should be
r(x)m for the complaint.
'11 IE FREN(;I I Fl.EET
Although the reports made by the
Galetca frigate to Sir J B Warren, and
sent express by him to the Admiralty,
mention their having counted but 17
ships of the line in Brest water, we are
not to conclude that the enemy have
no more ships equipped in the outer
road of Brest and in the harbour than
barely that number; but it is politic in
them to suffer no more to be visible at
one time to our cruisers off the har-
bour's mouth; whilst the rest may con-
tinue concealed within the intervening
headland, which partly separates the
outer road from the Brest water, in like
manner as ships in Catwater or
I lamoaze are most invisible to ships in
Plymouth Sound. That they have dou-
ble the above number the following
statement will evince, and which must
all be ready for sea at this instant, pro-
vided they have their complement of
men. When our Seamen read this list,
we hope they will not temporize a
moment longer, but cheerfully weigh
anchor in search of the enemy.
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Villeneuve's Squadron from Toulon,
which arrived at Brest about Christmas
last; and two frigates
I.e lonnidablc	 80
I.e Ti rannicide	 74
I.e Rosaeau	 74
I.e Morne Blanc	 74
l.eJemappe 74
Returned in January from the Irish


















i roved at Brest from Toulon the latter
end of January, and two frigates
I.e Tunnant	 80
I.e Gillaume fell 	 74
fOTAI. 33 of the line and 18 frigates
l porn immediately from TuitIon 7 of
the line. Equipping at l.'Orient 4 ships
of 76 guns
(;RANI) 'It)tl. 44 ships of the line
It is manifest, therefore, that their aim
is to outnumber greatly our Grand
Channel 11eet; which, if united and in
harmony, would however be more than
a match for all the combined forces of
France and Spain.
Ship News:
Although the Act of Parliament has
been read and distributed amongst the
ships companies here and at St.
I lelen's, it is doubtful whether it will
satis. them; a proof more clear than
anything else that they arc intrigued
and spurred on by traitors who have
nothing in view but the destruction of
their country It is truly surprising with
how much more avidity some read and
listen to Messrs. Fox and Sheridan's
speeches, than to the Act of
Parliament, which before being passed
they pretended was all the wanted. In
passing ime of these misguided men
between decks this day, he was heard to
the Act of Parliament, and said it
should not be attended to Fox's
speeches were what should influence
their conduct and nothing else.
It blows still so hard that all intercourse
with the shipping prevents the possibil-
ity of our decidedly saying ... what
turn things are likely to take. It is
strange to tell, but at the same time
true that not withstanding the excesses
that have been committed, not one
seaman in ten is disaffected. It is the
Parish Quota men that are the princi-




In our Paper of yesterday we expressed
a hope, and indeed a amfidence, that
the disconrents on board the Fleer
were upon the point of finally disap-
pearing. It is with infinite satisfaction
that we find our hopes were upon the
eve of consummation, for yesterday
morning at six o'clock, a Message
reached the Admiralty from
Portsmouth with an account that the
Mutiny was entirely at an end.
Subsequent to this account there were
several communications during the day
means of the Telegraph - lire last
of them, which was received at half
past four o'clock in the afternoon, con-
vcvLd the intelligence that Earl I lowe
was then on his passage to St. I Ielen'Lç
and no doubt what ever was enter-
tained of his Lordship being well
received on board the 11ect.
The Telegraph account added that
Admiral Colpoys and Captain (iriffiths
had just been landed from the london.
'lire Ships' Crews had returned to their
duty, and every appearance of discon-
tent had completely vanished.
The Crews of the Ships who were last
to return to their duty and obedience
to command, were those of the I)uke
and Mars; but the rest of the Fleet hav-
ing declared themselves satisfied, these
were obliged to accede. The 1)ekgates,
many of whom had been changed,
were assembled on board the l)uke,
when they received messages form the
Ships to which they respectively
belonged, to return to immediate sub-
ordination, as the whole Body of the
Seamen declared themselves fully satis-
fied with what Parlament had done.
Many of the Seamen complained of
their having been deceived and delud-
ed by artful men on board the Ileet,
and that many things had been greatly
misrepresented to them.
Earl I lowe is empowered by I us
Majesty to promise a pardon, and a
generous forgiveness fur their past
conduct, upon condition of the
Seamen returning to that system of
duty and discipline, without which the
British Navy cannot exist, and which
has been raised to its present splen-
dour. From the state in which the
Noble Admiral found the Fleet, no
doubt can be entertained of his
Lordship's mission on board it having
the fullest and happiest effect.
After the numerous misrepresentations
which have been made upon the sub-
ject, we are happy in being enabled to
state, that the Crew of the London
behaved with the utmost respect to
Admiral Colpoys during his confine-
ment, and repeatedly told him, that
they had no intention of hurting him;
but they were forced to act as they did
in obedience to the orders of the other
Ships. Admiral Colpoys conducted
himself with the most heroic calmness
and courage during the whole of his
confinement.
The Naval l)elegates, EVANS and
JoYCE, were, it seem; the joint
movers of the late Mutiny; the former
was a pettyfogging attorney, struck off
the rolls for various mal-practices
amongst his Wapping (:lients; the lat-
ter, a Tobacconist of Belfast, in
Ireland, shipped on board a Tender,
with many others, by the order of Lord
(:ARIL•MPToN, for his seditious
harangues.
Mr. Scrjeant .I)AlR set off in great
anxiety for Portsmouth; but before he
had travelled six miles from Town, he
met the Express which brought an
account of the safety of his Son-in-
Law, Captain GRIFFITIIS, and he
returned to J4nldon.
Evans, the Attorney, who was one of
the Naval l)elegates, is a man who has
long attempted to gain money and
popularity among the Seamen, by incit-
ing them to bring Actions against their
(:aptains on their return from sea. The
title with which he chose to distinguish
himself was that of 'Attorney for the
'Irs of Old England'.
The Seamen, there are some hopes,
will give up the Instigators of the late
Mutiny, as they are now generally sen-
sible they have been imposed upon. In
this case, Messrs. Evans and Joyce, we
hope, will soon be removed from on
board the l'lect, where they have done
so much mischief.
We mentioned that a report was yester-
day in circulation, that Admiral Jervis
had fallen in with and taken Five
Spanish Register Ships. lire report, we
are sorry to learn, is wholly unfounded.
A Report was also in circulation, to
which, it is probable, that the other
Report may be traced, that Admiral
Pringle, at the Cape of Good I lope,
had captured two very rich Spanish
Prises from the Island of Manila; but it
does not appear that there is any truth
in this intelligence.
Thelwall has been for some days in the
Isle of Wight, not an indifferent spec-
tator, doubtless, of the late proceed-
ings at Spirhead.
Many of the Seamen complained of
their having been deceived and delud-
ed by artful men on board the Ilcet,
and that many things had been greatly
misrepresented to them.
To the intelligence which we yesterday
laid before our Readers, that the
Mutiny was entirely, at an end at
Portsmouth, we are happy in having
nothing material to add. We stated the
fact from such authority, and in such
positive term; that no doubt we trust,
remain in the minds of the Public; nor
could any confirmation be necessary to
add weight to our information, on a
subject on which, from its importance,
and the public solicitude that it has
excited, we have been anxious to state
nothing of which we were not able to
ascertain the truth.
The diabolical spirit in the Fleet has
been kept up it is confidently said, by
some infernal villains on shore, it being
now discovered that ver few of the
Seamen were really disaffected. On
board some of the three-decked Ships,
not more than ten; in others, not
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exceeding thirty I have just learned
that the Seamen of the Mars have
themselves fixed on one of their Crew
to be tried by a Court Martial, for
inflaming their minds by false asser
tions On board the Sovereign, tiw
King's I'roclamatton was nailed to the
mast; some infernal scoundrel cut utI
God Save the King; the Seamen have
offered Fifty Guineas Reward for the
discovery, and swear they will hang the
man the instant he is detected.
l)o not conceive for a moment that
Portsmouth has been in the state rep-
resented by those l'apers which assume
the garb of friendship, while their real
wish is to sow the seeds of anarchy and
discord.
lire following is a hand Bill distrib-
med Lw the Crew of the Robust:
'The favours and goodness our
Officers confer upon us, are such as
can only be equalled by few Officers in
the Ileet, and that is our just and grate-
ful sense of the Officers of Ills
Majesty's Ship Robust.
1s there a man so poor in spirit, that
praises such as we have, without imi-
tating the actions worthy of them
IIow pleasant would be the toils of
War, did all in it meet with the same
recompense! it is our deeds alone ten-
der us worth their indulgence, and pre-
serve their gxxl opinion. To inform
you with how much ardency we wish
to serve them, if ever accidents fall in
our way, we are thoroughly resolved to
lead them into the paths of glory; and
they mar rest assured, that all of us will
rqoice in an opportunity of testifjiing
our dut't affection, gratitude and sub-
mission, which, we flatter ourselves,
they will not hereafter disapprove.
'We are, with respect,
'Your I lonours eternally devoted
Servants,
'Robust Ship's Company?
'OlE DEl .EGXL'ES 01: TWo Slill'S
(one thc Robust) hAVE .BSCONl)-
ED, 11 IE CREWS ARE SEARCII-
ING FOR 11IEM, and the Sailors on
shore in general want to lay their hands
on the Writers for the Courier and Star
Papers here, who, they say, have misled
them. Lord I lowe went on board the
Flag Ship an hour or two past, but is
not returned.
lire I lind had joined the Ships at St.
I helen's, but was ordered back by the
l)elegates. The Crew refused to bring
her back, some of the Crew of the
Royal George went on board, got her
under sail, and brought her to Spithead
this day; but neither Captain or
Commissioned Officer is on board her.
The I)elegates of the Fleet, we under-
stand, went a few days ago on board
the Mars, and ordered a sumptuous
dinner to be prepared in the Captain's
cabin, to which these (h.ntrv sat down,
attended b the Captain's servants, and
pknn full uppIied with hi WIlIL.
he lrnfbon lntctL
I, lJ.I)
Many of the seamen complained of
thur having been deceived and delud-
ed by artful men on board the fleet,
and that many things had been greatly
misrepresented to them.
Earl I lowe is empowered by his
Majesty to promise a pardon, and a
general forgiveness for their past con-
duct, upon condition of the seamen
returning to that system of duty and
discipline, without which the British
navy cannot exist, and which has raised
it to its present splendour.
ilie l)uke of Bedford said, that as the
public mind was in a state of agitation
upon one particular subject, it might
not be proper for him to introduce
another.
We can state on the most positive
authority that there is no advice of the
Ith fleet being at sea.
Admiral Colpovs conduct has been, in
every instance, noble and mank 11w
seamen of the London, in the first
burst of their revenge for the death of
their comrades, were about to hang the
I:jrst
 lieutenant of the ship, and had
actually prepared a rope for that pur-
pose. The .'idmirsl rushed forward,
and told the men, that the I .ieutenant
had acted by his orders - that he him-
self had acted under the orders from
the Admiralty, and if any blame was
imputable, it must rest upon him; at the
same time untying his stock. 'l'he mag-
nanimity of this conduct, we conceive,
must have operated powerfully upon
the feelings of the men, as they imme-
diately released the Lieutenant, and
only committed the Admiral to his
cabin.
1t Morning Qbroniclt
Satarda). 13 Ma) / 79'
It is certain that the body of the
Seamen highly resent the conduct of
individuals of their own body, but we
believe that the rumour, which states
that they have delivered up any persons
to justice, is totally untrue. -- This is
one of the many indiscreet reports
which are calculated to make the
Seamen distrust the amnesty which
was so solemnly promised them in the
name of his Majesty, and which, of
course, will be implicitly observed.
The county quota-men are said to have
been peculiarly active in the late distur-
bances on board the fleet. We cannot
confirm this report; but we know that
to the unwise measure of these assess-
ments, we are to impute the origin of
the commotion. The able Seamen who
had served through the whole War, and
who had originally received but 51. of
lupunt' saw a set of men, raw, igno-
rant, in some instances old, in others
mere boys, many of them of wretched
character, and many of them in ill
health, come on board with 30, 40, or
even SOL bounty money in their pock-
ets, and these men could neither take
their share of duty in the tops, nor ease
the toil of the veteran. In several
instances, they saw them desert to
return again with a second bounty -
nay, they have seen them return with a
seamd 40 or 501. after being dis-
charged as unfit for the service. This
galled the genuine seamen, and to this
more than to any other cause, perhaps,
may be ascribed the confederacy for
the rise of wages.
bt tttte
.Vati,nIa. 13 Maj I '97
The liberty of the l'ress is now con-
sidered, and justly too, as the BUL-
WARK of our CONSlITUTION;
and we never could sit down quiet and
in silence, whilst under the pretence of
checking its licentiousness, measures
might be in agitation that would
destroy Liberty itself. WI 111SF TI hE
I'RESS IS FREE, TI hE NATION
CAN NEVER BE ENSLVED; for
on the first appearance of a measure
tending to introduce arbitrary powers,
it would sound the trumpet of alarm,
and spreading the dread of it through
every part of the kingdom, rouse the
people to a sense of their danget To
take a FREE I'RESS from the PEO-
PlE would be the same as taking his
eyes from a watchman the compass
from a seaman, the rudder from a ship
Without a FREE I'RESS, a nation
would be nothing; or rather be worse
than nothing - a beast - fit only to carry
burdens - to toil, to labour and to mul-
tiply for the pleasure of l)ESPOTIC
RCLER .% FREE PRESS teaches a
nation its rights, and instructs it in its
duties. It watches to see that ministers
keep within the bounds prescribed by
the Constitution; and that the people
do not encroach upon the executive
authority. It throws out hints for
improvements - detects impostors -
and had a natural tendency to melio-
rate the conditions of mankind ... .
appeal to public opinion upon the sub-
ject.
There is something inconceivably fick-
le and unsteady in the character of our
Seamen: this is a truth that has been
clearly manifested in two instances
-
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since the breaking out of the late
Mutiny.
our Readers will recollect, that in the
first Petition, from the l)elegates, to
the I .ords of the .dmirahv, a very
heavy complaint was made against
i.ord I lowe, who was represented in
some measure as the cause of the
Mutiny, by having neglected to com-
municate to Government the repeated
applications of the Seamen to his
Lordship for his interposition to pro-
cure them a redress of grievances,
applications which they charged him
with having totally disregarded. Who
would have imagined after this, that
they would ever have entertained a
wish to sail under the command of the
Noble Earl? And yet so it is, that they
have expressed such a wish, and that it
is in consequence of it, that his
Lordship has set off for Portsmouth.
What can have been the cause of the
dislike which the Seamen have taken to
some of their Commanders, we know
not; but certain it is, that they have
conceived a dislike to several of them,
and though, without pretending to dic-
tate to the .'tdmiralt; have intimated a
wish that they might be superseded,
and almost with one voice have, in this
blunt and rough way, desired that the
Fleet might be put under the command
of Black l)ick, the usual appellation by
which Lord I lowe is known in the
Navy among the foremast men; his
Lordship's complexion being of a
darkish hue, from long service in all
weathers and climates, and his
Christian name Richard.
The second instance since the late
Mutiny, of the fickle and unsteady dis-
position of the Seamen, occurred in
the case of Admiral Colpovs. When
the Delegates appeared along-side of
the London, on board of which his
flag was flying, he asked them what
they wanted; and was told that they
wanted to confer with the crew on the
subject of their grievances: Upon
which he informed them, that his men
were all perfectly satisfied with what
Government had already done and
promised still to do for the redress of
their grievances; and that relying upon
the faith and honour of Parliament,
they had now no complaint or urge.
This was said within hearing of the
ship's company; and the Admiral, to
convince the l)elegates that he spoke
the sense of his whole crea turned to
his men, and asked them whether he
had advanced any thing contrary to
their sentiments. 'ith one voice they
cried out, that he had said nothing but
the truth. Upon this, he desired that, to
give the l)elegates an unequivocal
prcx)f of their being satisfied and of
their having voluntarily returned to
their duty, they would all go below
Their obedience was as quick as
thought; almost in an instant there was
not a man to be seen on the deck,
except the Officers.
The Admiral then told the l)elegatLs,
that they must return to their ships, for
that he would not suffer one of them
to set foot on board the London. 'lhey
persisted in their desire to go on board,
and to confer with the men; upon
which he told them, in a serious and
solemn manner, that he would suffer
no such thing, but would, on the con-
trary, maintain the discipline of his
ship by force, if they should be so rash
and so lost to a sense of their duty, as
to reduce him to so painful a necessit)
lb convince them that he was in
earnest, he ordered the marines under
arms, and made them prime and load
in the presence of the Delegates. in the
meantime some of the latter were
engaged in conversation through the
port holes with the men between the
decks, and most probably, though most
unaccountably, got encouragement
from them to persist in their resolution
to get (in board.
Admiral Colpoys did every thing in his
power to dissuade and deter them from
so rash and criminal a step, but in vain;
they made light of his entreaties, and
setting his menaces at defiance, pre-
pared to force their way into the ship;
upon which the Admiral called to the
officer of marines to order his men to
fire; the order was given and obeed;
and immediately after, to the astonish-
ment of all on the quarter-deck, the
crew of the l.nndon, that had so very
short a time before declared them-
selves perfectly satisfied, and at the
word of command had so readily gone
below, rushed upon the deck the
moment they heard the firing, and
joining the Delegates, fell upon the
marines. lieutenant Sims, who com-
manded the latter, was wounded in the
arm by a shot, and, as we are told,
though we would hope it was not true,
had his wounded arm broken by a
blow given with the butt end of his
musket by one of his own men.
Certain it is, that the arm was broke;
but what we wish to doubt is the asser-
tion of its having been done by a
marine. Some accounts say the marines
were disarmed by the seamen, others
that they soon joined them, and made
a common cause.
Be that as it may, in the first gust of
their fury, the seamen got ready arope,
with which they were preparing to
hang up lieutenant Sims for having
ordered his men to fire. Upon this
occasion Admiral Colpoys was bravely
and nobly just. I le called out to the
men, and entreated them to give him a
hearing for five minutes; and then, with
an earnestness and magnanimity that
must ever to him the highest honour,
he addressed them in nearly the fol-
lowing terms:
"Mv Lads,
Ihough you have thus flown in the
face of lawful authorit); and trampled
under foot the duty you owed to me as
your Commander, you are sufficiently
acquainted with discipline, though you
will not practise it, to know that this
Gentleman whom you are about to
treat so ignominiously and unjustly; has
done no more than his duty, that he
was bound under pain of death to
obey my orders, and that he has dune
nothing from his own head or authori-
t Can you then, be so unjust, so cruel,
as to rob him of his life for an act that
was mine? Martial law would have
doomed him to death, if he had diii-
obeyed me, and you want to put him to
death, because in obedience to the laws
of his Country he has executed the
orders of his superior Officer. lie had
no will of his own; he must have
obeyed me or forfeited his life for dis-
obedience. Can you, then, be so bar-
barous as to single out for your
vengeance, a man circumstanced as he
is? If you are bent upon murder, if
your fury must have a victim, here I
stand ready to die; the act was mine, let
the consequences of it also be mine,
involve not in them this innocent and




It is with the most heartfelt satisfaction
we can now announce, for the first
time, on the most positive authotit;
that 'the late mutiny at Portsmouth has
nearly subsided and in a manner that
promises to be decisive. Although
some of the Morning Papers have
been informing their readers for some
days past of the happy termination of
this business, it was not until yesterday
that the news reached town.
A very interesting conversation took
place between the Officers of the fleet,
and the principal l)elegatcs, who
seemed perfectly sensible of the
impropriety of their past conduct, and
promised the most perfect obedience
for the future.
We arc happy to confirm the observa-
tion we made yesterda; that there is
great reason to believe that some of
the authors of these broils will be
given up by the Delegates themselves,
and brought to trial.
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Iverv feeling heart and real friend to
the Navy was this morning rejoiced to
see .dmiral Colpoys and Captain
Griffiths landing at Portsmouth, a
proof of the most positive that reason
and subordination is once more
returned and restored to our brave
Tars and the Navy, notwithstanding the
inflammatory hand bills that have for a
time been too successfully distributed
to keep up the flame and deceive them.
The Coroners have delivered in their
verdict on the l)elegates lately shot and
killed, and have reported - JUSTlI1
ABI.E Homicide.
Wi can state on the most positive
authority - that there is no advice of
the French fleet being at sea.
"....nd they might rest assured that all
of will rejoice in an opportunity of tes-
tifying our duty, affection, gratitude
and submission, which we flatter our-
selves they will not hereafter disap-
prove." We are, with the utmost respect
and submission, 'our I lonour's eter-
nally devoted Servant," Robust Ship's
(:cimpany.
bt .Mornwg Q.ljronu!t
Moiukj. 15 Maj 1797
Thus has this unfortunate misunder-
standing terminated, and we trust that
the warning the nation has received of
the evil consequences of tcmporising
and dday, will in future teach our
Ministers that the only safe line of con-
duct is that which is prompt and deci-
sive. That Government makes misrep-
resentatIon impossible whose meas-
ures are open and direct, whilst the
necessary consequence of cunning is
jealousy.
The report of the settlement at
Portsmouth will speedily reconcile, all
the other stations of our fleet, and it is
unnecessary to detail all the rumours
which have been industriously spread
of appearances of mutiny at Sheerness
and other places. The first fair wind,
we mist, cam our fleet to sea; and
if our enemy should have conceived
the false hope from the intelligence of
this disturbance, of insulting the
British or Irish coast with impunity, the
bravery of our seamen will duly cor-
rect their error.
We add but one more remark on this
subject. lo the disingenuous conduct
of our Ministers we owe the origin of
this unhappy dispute; and to the
Seamen's distrust of their character is
to be ascribed its long and disastrous
continuance. I low far men, whom the
voice of so important a body of the
national force has thus condemned,
can truly serve their Country we refer
to their own feelings: If they think that
the verdict of the Parliament, consti-
ttited as it is, is an acquittal in the eyes
of the l'eople, they deceive themselves.
Fhe nation, though torpid, is not blind.
They have succeeded in extinguishing
all the energy which once characterised
the People of England, but that indif-
ference which is the security of
Ministers is the danger of the
C(immonwLll. They cannot be roused
by the present Ministry eve to the
defence of the State.
Admiral Colpovs left Portsmouth for




To A LOYl. AND
l)ISCERNIN(; NATION,
The following lines are humbly submit-
ted.
As various reports have been propagat-
ed by malicious and unprincipled men,
WE TIlE SEAMEN OF HIS
MAjESTY'S llill under command
of .dmiral Lord Bridport, Knight of
the Bath, &c, think it a duty incumbent
on ourselves, to publish at large our
just and moderate requests -- griev-
ances which were promised to be
redressed -- snares laid to entrap our
loyal brethren, such as were deemed
heads of our proceedings -- the partic-
ulars of the unfortunate affair which
happened on board the London the
7th instant -- unjust aspersions thrown
upon the characters of British Seamen,
by an I lonourable Member in the
I louse of Commons, with observa-
tions on the same -- and our particular
reason for not proceeding to sea, that
our grateful countrymen might not be
deceived, our ourselves prejudiced by
false reports.
%X requested an .ugmentation of our
Wages, which was complied with,
though reluctantl; on the part of the
Ministers. Our late ges were, Able
Seamen IL 2s. 6d. per month and
Landsmen OL 17s. 6d. per month; the
present is Able Seamen II. lOs. Od. per
month, Ordinary Seamen IL 2s. Od. per
month and l.andsmen IL Is. Od. per
month there now being three Classes.
requested likewise that the Pursers'
Eighths should be taken off, which was
complied with;-- the Weight of differ-
ent Articles were as follows: -- Bread
14 Ounces, Cheese 9 Ounces, Butter
12 Ounces, of spirituous liquors and
small beer, the Purser had an eighth
out of each gallon, those eighths are
now taken off, and we have the full
weight
I us majesty's pardon was then request-
ed to exempt our brethren from having
any punishment inflicted on them for
trivial misdemeanour, and our non-
compliance to the order given for
going to sea; -- I us Majesty was
pleased to grant the same; -- we then
returned to the ordinary discharge of
duty, as desired, but from that we never
deviated during our perseverance,
except weighing anchor, which we pos-
itively refused, excepting our requests
were complied with. We then went to
St. I lelen's, distant from Spithead
about three miles, on the signal being
made by the Admiral (excepting three
ships of the line, which had not their
private grievances redressed, viz.
London, Marlborough, and La
Nymph.)
Ihe wind did not favour our proceed-
ing to sea, during our silence, for by
this we wish to be understood we were
in a state of suspense, as there was no
sign of an Act being passed; we could
not be deceived in that point, as the
Freedom of the liress is allowed, and
several of us in the Fleet can read. Our
reasons are obviously not confined
alone to the Act not being passed,
although it had lain dormant for four-
teen days; private instructions were
sent to each Commandeer in the Fleet,
of which we are not ignorant, as will be
found in the sequel, Full allowances
were granted to some Ships'
(:ompmies, supposed to be the leading
ones, and not to others, which caused a
suspicion throughout the whole Fleet.
lire ships remaining at Spithead had
not had their private grievances
redressed, though many days had
elapsed, nor any sign of their being
redressed: be it understood by private
grievances -- trying by a Court Martial
such Officers as had, repeatedly,
behaved in a tyrannical and oppressive
manner, unbecoming the character of
(;entkmen and the dignified station
they filled.
Private murmurings were heard, -- at
length, the breasts of Seamen, fired
with indignation, at being negiected,
burst forth on the 7th instant. It was
then, oh! horrid to relate! that we
found out the schemes laid out to sac-
rifice some of the brightest gems that
ever adorned this or any other country
Permit us, grateful Countrymen, to ask
a few questions on the occasion, and as
you are at a considerable distance from
us at present, and ignorant of the par-
ticulars, permit us also to return the
answers, and we will cheerfully submit
the whole to your mature considera-
tion.
Were we not united in one cause? Ans
-- 'tea.
Were we not bound by oath to perse-
vere in our resolution of not going to
sea until our just and moderate
requests were attained, and the sanc-
tion of Parliament given for the same?
291
-- \e%.
l)id we not solicit our most Gracious
Sovereign's pardon for any excesses
committed by our brethren during our
late perseverance? -- Yes.
Was it not granted? -- Yes
No sooner was that pardon granted.
but, in direct contradiction to that I us
Royal Proclamation, were individuals
selected tor the express purpose of
sacrificing them to malice and private
resentment.
.nd then prior, but loyal individuals,
lives to be sacriliced for the mere sport
of tyrants? -- Not according to the
laws of civilized nations.
Is such the recompense for meritori-
ous service tendered to their amiable
Sovereign and benevolent nation?
'lo whom, are we to look or apply for
protection?
'iVe cannot surmise, since all laws,
human and divine, arc trampled under-
foot. Miserable, indeed, then is the sit-
uation of the loyal, but unfortunate
Tars, whom their country at large
adores, but whom tyrannical and mali-
cious men in office seek basely seek, to
betray and sacrifice; if a national bond
is not given, such will be the disaster
some will experience.
Will not the following melancholy
catastrophe, evince the whole world of
our assertions: -- On Sunday, the 7th
instant, ever to be accorded, a gallant
Chief, (not indeed so, but as such rep-
resented bi an I lonourable Member,
Mr. Whitbread; -- perhaps the
I lonourablc Member committed a
mistake, it was surely his gallantry with
the Fair Sex he alluded to for the
Cunrn is ignorant of any gallant
action by him performed with his
Officers in concert, espied the boats of
the 11eet proceeding on board the
Marlborough, which was fortunate
enough on their side; as the London's
Officers, had the quarter-deck guns
loaded with grape and canister shot
ready to fire into them. Admiral
(:olp had all hands sent aft, and
informed them there was something
amiss amongst the ships at St. I lelen's,
an desired them to go below, run in the
lower-deck guns, and lower the ports;
and then part of them return on deck
and hoist in the boats, which was com-
plied with. The same being done, all
hands were ordered below, at the same
time Officers appeared armed, and the
Marines were armed and accoutred,
with bayonets fixed, and pieces loaded.
-- Four of the main deck guns were
ordered to be loaded with grape and
canister shot, run in as far as the
breechings would allow, to be ready to
point forward on the ship's compan
Before the people could well comply
with the orders of going below, the
captain ordered lieutenant Bover to
fire on some of the people that were
forward under the forecastle, which he
did not immediately comply with,
upon which Captain Gtiffiths present-
ed his pistols to him, and swore he
would put him to death that moment,
if he did nor instantly comply with his
orders, in this dilemma the lieutenant
fired, and wounded two men. The
ship's company being now all below,
and hearing there were some boats
alongside, they expressed their wish to
know what they wanted, but in vain,
the hammocks and spars from the
booms were thrown on all the hatch-
ways, and the Officers, putting the
hammocks a little aside, so as to give
room, fired aslant down the hatchways
on the unarmed men below, and
wounded several severely, part of
which are since dead; in the mean time,
the little Midshipmen were busily
employed, with proper implements
prepared for the purpose, to cut away
the port-ropes of the middle deck, well
knowing the heart of a seaman could
not hurt a boy. .t last, irritated with
seeing so much blood spilt, we were
determined to force the gunner's store-
room to procure small-arms; they then
drew cartridges from some of the
lower deck guns, to supply them with
powder, taking care to secure the mag-
azine with proper sentinels. Thus
armed, they were determined to gain
the main deck, to confer with the
Officers, on which the Marines were
summoned to take an oath of alle-
giance to the Officers, but they pro-
voked at premeditated murder, did not
consent, nor would they fire, but went
and joined their unhappy shipmates.
The upper-deck was then stormed in
spite of opposition; the Officers called
for quarter and then, fled. The heat of
passion by this time subsided, and they
were used with much more humanity
than the most part of them deserved.
This is an impartial account of the
unhappy affair, and we trust, will be a
warning to Officers of the Navy to use
men with less tyrannic sway. Seamen
dangerously wounded, and since dead,
three; Marines slightly wounded, one;
Officers wounded, (one in the arm,
and has since suffered amputation)
Thus ended the first action ever that
the brave Admiral Colpovs, as some
are pleased to call him, was in; and had
it not been owing to the kind interfer-
ence of the I)elegate' and the boat
crews, which had arrived at the time
they had got the better of the officers,
that gallant Officer, with all his associ-
ates would have fell victim to an
enraged crew, which their rashness
justly merited. They were confined,
each to his separate cabin, to be tried
when they arrived at St. I lelen's. It was
the general opinion of the Seamen,
and much to their credit be it spoken,
on the ship's arrival at St. I lelen's, to
deliver the officers, except Admiral
Colpoys, whom they were certain was
the instigator of the whole, up to Civil
law On the 10th it was proposed, that
the opinion of each ship's company
should be given in writing, folded up,
and not to be opened until the whole
of the opinions were delivered on
board the l.ondon, and the l)elegates
from each ship present. A signal was
made by the I .ondon for all l)elegates
to attend (May II) and deliver their
respective ship's opinion, when there
appeared: In his favour, at least that he
should be left to his own ship's com-
pany's mode of punishment, twelve;
lor immediate execution, five; Majority
in his favour seven.
The Admiral and his Officers were
then delivered up to the l'ortsmouth
Magistrate.
In the beginning of our Narrative, we
mentioned the aspersions thrown on
our character as British Seamen.
The following concerns the Mars alone
-- whose crew, evil-minded men, were
pleased to say, corresponded with
French Agents; but they as groundless
as they are malicious: -- 11cr crew, we
do not deny, were more headstrong
than those of other ships. Treachery or
republican principles they, like the
crews of the whole I'leet, disavow. 'Ihe
following aspersions allude to us all,
and are take from an I Ion. Member's
speech in the Ilouse of Commons,
inserted in the Sun of the 19th instant
-- parts of which we have quoted, with
necessary remarks on the same, begin-
ning with the following, his express
words: --
"There must be a point in which the
demands of the Seamen must cease."
Can that I Ion. Member entertain a
doubt but we maturely weighed within
our bosoms the boon we solicited, nor
took advantage of our distressed coun-
try at the present momentous crisis,
when so many millions were voted
away for chimerical purposes. lie con-
descends to say, "What has been grant-
ed to us, appeared to be no more than
what justice required; but he could not
avoid declaring his disapprobation of
the mode we adopted -- it was not con-
sistent with that high character which
British Seamen always maintained." It
is beyond our comprehension what
measures he would adopt as our plight-
ed faith was forfeited. I Ic farther says,
and on bare reflection of which, he
might blush, if blush ever adorned his
cheek." I fear they have been worked
upon by some interference of the
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foulest, basest and most treacherous
nature," -- 'l'reachery! as British
Seamen, we detest the thought." if
there were men who, upon other occa-
sions, considered themselves as being
oppressed, there was at least something
of dignity and openness in complain-
ing at the moment, but if the y wished
to obtain Revenge," says he, "by
endeavouring to sap and destroy the
bulwark of the country, they were the
basest and foulest traitors that ever dis-
graced a countr" l)ignified we are, for
the service tendered to our country on
even occasion, when we had to dis-
pute with the enemy (superiority c,f
numbers not exceptc the empire of
the main, of which this country retains
ascendancy. Openness of heart and
frankness of mind are the general char-
acteristic of the British Seaman." lie
never could have believed, that while
the fleet of the enemy was preparing
for sea, English sailors would remain in
port disputing with the Government;
they were the last body of men from
whom he would expect such conduct."
Oh! Sheridan, if this be your mean
opinion of British seamen, thou know-
est little, very little, of Seamen's semi-
ment. Our requests were moderate and
just. Why then should the Government
(who know our deserts) dispute with
us? We are not tainted with
Republicanism; on its agents we would
not deign a look. Impute anything on
us thy mean soul can dictate but
treachery; its principles we disavow.
What revenge does he suppose we
could wish to take of the country
which gave us birth? If any revenge
was our aim, it would have been on
those who opposed us, private individ-
uals, not our grateful country That
I lonourable Gentleman, thinking he
had defeated the Chancellor, attacked
the poor but loyal 'lars. I Ie will not
find them easily defeated, opposed to a
foreign foe in particular. 'Iliat I ion.
Member's struggles are great -- a good
salary he wants -- then (like an
Flonourable Friend of his bosom) he
will be silent, with Ministers in particu-
lar.
Dear Countrymen, we presume you
will no longer remain ignorant -- there-
fore beg leave to conclude our narra-
tive, and remain
TIlE LOYAl. .INI) I IUMANE TARS
of I us Majesty's Fleet, at St. I lelen's.
Queen (:harhrn. May 13. 1'97
Hampshire Chronicle
Sj::o?z;. 20 L, /
.'ibout half past five o'clock on
Monday morning, the boats belonging
to I .ord Bridport's fleet got under
weigh at St. I lelen's in procession, with
a union jack in the first boat and a band
of music.
I laIf past six, the delegates landed at
Salk-port, and marched up to the gov-
ernor's, with a band playing alternately
Rule Britannia, and Clod Save the King
they were instantly invited into the
house, and in a few minutes appeared
publicly on the balcony, where they
were joined by the marine band of
music. In about an hour the delegates
returned to the boats which were
immediately manned to receive Earl
I lowe; and at eight his l.ordship,
accompanied by Sir William l'itt,
General Cuyler, with their aids de
camp Isici, preceded by the ship and
marine bands of music, took water at
Sally-port, where they were received by
all the boats crews with three cheers;
when they got abreast of the platform,
they were saluted by a discharge of
ordnance, and cheered from the shore,
whee the South l)evon band was play-
ing
'l'he following was the order of sailing
1st boat - An unin jack at the fore.
with a band of music
2d boat - The Royal William's barge.
with Earl Ilowe, steered by Mr.
Maxwell, Sir Peter Parker's cockswain.
3d boat - The governor, lieutenant
governor, and their aids de camp.
4th boat - Lady howe, Lady Pitt, and
several other ladies of fushion.
5th boat - 'l'he marine band of music
on each side a line a-head of the ships
boats; the crews cleanly and neatly
dressed.
.s the procession passed Spithead, the
yards of the men of war were manned,
and the Royal William fired a royal
salute.
Forty minutes past twelve, the proces-
non returned to Spithead, where they
were again received with the yards
manned and three cheers. Earl I (owe
and company went on board the
l'rince, Sir Roger Curtis, where they
continued a considerable time.
['orty-three minutes past five, the pro-
cession set out from Spithead in a line
a-breast; about six, were saluted by a
discharge of artillery from the saluting
batten; and a feu de jove by the North
Gloucester, West Kent, and South
I)evon, regiments of militia, who had
been drawn upon the walls upwards of
six hours for that purpose.
Fifteen minutes past six, his Lordship
landed at Sally-port amidst the accla-
mations of the greatest concourse of
people ever assembled here.
i'he following is a statement of cost of
one weekly impression of one thou-
sand, on a supposition that the tax
might take place; the distributor to pay
the printer for each paper sixpence to
retail again for sevenpence, viz.
One thousand papers sold at 6d.
£25 0 0
One thousand stamps and paper
£16 13 4
Carriage down	 £0 7 0
(:cimpositirm and press work £ 0 0
Editor's salary	 £1 5 0
Wages to messengers hired to distrib-
ute the papers	 £2 3 0
Clerk's wages, expence of journies to
get in debts,
London papers, postages, and other
incidents	 £2 5 0
Wear of materials 	 £0 9 0
Interest on increase of capital £ 12 0
£28 14 4
Sale as above	 Q5 0 0
Loss upon the sale	 £3 14 4
A single glance at the above statement
affords proof sufficient to she that
the property of newspapers is already
taxed as much as it will bear.
ratt
.Vaiiird. 2OIa) F79'
It is be deeds - not by words that a
patriot is known. '('he pretender to
patriotism, who only wants to save
appearances, tests his daim to popular-
ity solely on words. When the
Additional 'l'ax upon Newspapers was
proposed by Mr. PlTI, it was opposed
by Mr. ShERIDAN, as in his mind
likely to affect the l.IBER'IY of the
PRESS, and consequently the FREE-
L)OM of the SUBJECt
In the full belief of Mr. SI IERIDAN's
sincerity, our soul went with him in all
he said on that occasion; and we
rejoiced that so powerful a reasoner, so
eloquent an orator, and, as we then
thought, so firmly a patriotic member,
had declared himself the Champion of
A CAUSE DEAR TO ENGliSh-
MEN, and had promised not only to
oppose the NEW TAX as often as it
should come under discussion, but to
divide the I louse in every stage of the
Bill to be brought in for imposing it.
It would seem, however, that on the
first mention of the 'lAX, Mr. SI IERI-
I)AN expended all his patriotic ammu-
nition against it; and that he has not
since been able to furnish himself with
a fresh supply - sufficient even to make
a squib or a cracker!
Thus has Mr. SIIERII).'tN SAI)l.Y
l)lS!tPPOINTEI) OUR I IOl'ES -
which he himself had raised and suf-
fered the Bill to travel through SEV-
ERAl. sTA(;ES - sub silentio as a mat-
ter of course?
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What ground does this conduct lax fur
confidence in other cases? NONE -
for after having told the l'LJBI.lC, that
the measure struck at the ver root of
l.lBERT' he suffers it to proceed
unmolested on its way!
The conclusion which this behaviour
warrants is, either that he has aban-
doned the cause of liberty, or wilfully
raised a clamour against a measure as
highly dangerous, in which, in reality,
he saw no danger at all!
Mr. Pitt has acted the more manly part.
lic ha openly avowed his sentiments,
and adhered rigidly to the letter of his
proposition, lie has scorued Isici sinis-
ter motives for the purposes of a Tem-
porary fame; and on this most impor-
tant of all subjects - the I.1l31R1Y of
the PRESS - he has not advanced dcc-
laratinn . rncrdv to rccedv from them!
br rat(
iF,'d,zcdg. 24 .%I,. I
l)uring the late mutiny at Portsmouth,
we felt it to be our duty, as faithful
Journalists, to collect and publish every
document which might illustrate that
unfortunate but most memorable
transaction. This duty -- which in our
humble province we may call historical
-- we certainly cimsidered subordinate
to that regard, which, as gcxid citizens
and loyal subjects, we owe and feel to
public order and public quiet; and we
should certainly rather wish our narra-
tive to be imperfect, than that this
paper should contain anything hostile
to the general interests of the commu-
nit
In the whole progress of that melan-
choly event, the Oracle breathed
warmest wishes for the return of the
Seamen to their duty. We lamented the
delusion of these gallant men.
applauded the vigilance and provident
wisdom of Government, in redressing
their real and even supposed griev-
ances, with all the speed which the
I .egislative Body would permit. We
equally applauded the manliness with
which a distinguished Member of
Opposition (Mr. Sheridan) put to haz-
ard his portion of popularity among
the Seamen for the sake of his duty to
his Countr
'ictuated as we arc by these sentiments,
it was impossible that we should have,
designedly and deliberately; given cir-
culation to anything injurious to the
discipline of the Navy, or to the char-
acter of brave and deserving Officers.
In the extreme hurry of receiving
Expresses from Portsmouth -- at three
and four o'dock in the morning -- we
perhaps did not always very critically
weigh the communications of our
(.orrespondtiits. The paper called a
Manifesto of the Seamen, is said to be
a furgery; and on reconsidering its con-
tents, we wish, for the honour of the
British i'leet, that it may pnwe so. --
But we can prove, that it originated at
Portsmouth -- that it was circulated
there -. transmitted to us from thence
-- believed us to be authentic -- and,
for that reason, published perhaps
hastily and imprudentl; but certainly
with purest good faith, and with the
mere intention of gratifying public
curiosity by a full narrative of so
momentous a transaction. Our idea
was merely to relate events, and cer-
tainly neither to stigmatize the charac-
ter of the officers, whom we revere,
nor to inflame the spirit of dissatisfac-
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CHAPTER SIX: Desrning Men
Who was behind the mutiny?
The question still intrigues historians. Yet two years before the mutiny, Phillip Patton, an
admiral with ability, but without employment, provided the answer. He predicted it
would happen and profiled the ringleaders. When his prophecy was fulfilled, Patton
provided Spencer with another copy of his 'Observations on Naval Mutiny' (1795).1
They were not on good terms. After helping establish the Transport Board, Patton was
asked to remain as a commissioner and forego promotion to rear admiral.2 He refused,
received his promotion, but remained on half-pay until Spencer left office. 3 Patton took
up residence near Portsmouth to write about naval affairs. In January 1798 he privately
printed those observations, together with an 'Account of the Mutinies at Spithead & St
Helen's written in the end of June of the same year' and 'Observation on the State of
Discipline in the Navy at the end of the year of 1797'. These and two related papers on
naval affairs were printed as a book in 1807. Patton noted in the preface, 'Publication
was never intended; a few copies were struck off for preservation, or to be
communicated to those persons who could apply the information to national advantage.'
A copy inscribed to Sir John Barrow is preserved in the Admiralty Library, Portsmouth.4
Patton's opinions on mutiny were well founded. He suppressed a mutiny when in
temporary command of Prince Geoe in January 1779. The experience left a profound
effect on Patton. His observations were founded on years of experience at sea. And he
concluded that without such experience, the civil lords of the Admiralty were
unequipped to deal with the possibility of a general mutiny.
Patton justified his position and shared his frustration in the preface to his account of the
mutmy:
Having been for a considerable lime deeply impressed with an idea that general
Mutiny would take place in the Navy, I drew up the following observations as early as
the year 1790. Upon the breaking out of the war, a copy of this paper was sent to Mr.
NMM WYNIO9/7/14, P Patton, April 1795
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Bastard MP for Devonshire as he had in a particular manner interested himself in
Naval Affairs.
Upon my arrival in London in the year 1794,1 became more and more convinced of
the danger of general Mutiny, and in consequence revised the observations, adding to
them my ideas of the means by which such dangerous combinations among seamen
in King's Ships, might at that time have been prevented. This paper so amended I
begged a most respectable Naval friend, then in Office would present to the first
Lord of the Admiralty; and I urged in conversation upon all occasions, the necessity
of immediate attention to the symptoms which were daily occurring of approaching
disorders. The paper was accordingly put into Earl Spencer's hands in April 1795,
very soon after he came to the Admiralty. I also used means to convey this paper to
Mr. Pitt, and to Mr. Dundas, and although I cannot say positively that they perused
it, I had good reason to believe it was presented to them. A copy of this paper was
also delivered to Mr. Wilberforce MP for Yorkshire, about the same time and
remained in his possession about a twelvemonth.
His premonitions were confirmed in April 1797. He continued:
All these means to attract attention, to this important subject proving fruitless, I had
the misfortune to see the Mutinies which it had been my most earnest endeavour to
avert, break out in April last.
When the board of Admiralty came to Portsmouth on the sixteenth of April being
then in the neighbourhood, I took the earliest opportunity to wait on Earl Spencer
on the morning of the seventeenth, not to assume anything from what I had
predicted, but to remind his Lordship of the hints which the Paper I had presented
two years before contained, some of which might be found useful upon the present
occasion. Earl Spencer read the Copy which I had in my Pocket, remembered the
Paper perfectly, and begged a Copy if he should not be able to find the one he had
received from me in London. After assuring his Lordship of my readiness to supply
the Copy, and also that of a paper at more length on Naval Affairs which I had also
presented in 1795, I took my leave.5
He explained his motivation and methods in writing; and categorically denied the
possibility of outside interference:
The trouble I have uniformly taken to prevent the bad effects which might arise from
the discontented state of the seamen's minds, has naturally led me to consider the
Mutinies with attention. In consequence, I have not neglected any opportunity which
presented itself to obtain such information as might place the views of the seamen in
their true light, and I have endeavoured to give just representations, which will show,
that opinions propagated respecting traitorous designs in the fleet are totally void of
foundation, undoubted proof having been produced that these mutinies had no
connection with any seditious practices on shore.'
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Instead of outside influences, Patton insisted that 'the plan for obtaining redress of the
grievances which the seamen conceived they had long and patiently suffered, was
concerted among the best sailors of the line-of-battle ships of the Channel fleet, so early
as the month of December 1796'. He described the source of the seamen's discontent:
To those who are well acquainted with the dispositions of seamen bred in the
merchant service, it will be sufficient to say, that the whole plan was concerted and
only known to such real thorough-bred impressed seamen in each ship, as always are,
and always will be, the leading men in measures which comprehend the whole
companies: and that almost the whole warrant-officers, and all the seamen petty-
officers, were equally interested in the success of the plans which were to be pursued.
All the prime seamen who are petty-officers, but do not walk the quarter-deck, as
well as those who fill no office, feel the oppressive weight of compulsive service, and
are uneasy under the consequent confinement. It is these circumstances which have
operated, and these circumstances will continue to operate to make the cause of one
the cause of all, until an effectual remedy be applied.7
According to Patton, the cause of the mutiny 'lay in permitting gradually increasing
hardships to produce general discontent.' He saw their ability to unite on the single issue
of a pay increase as the secret to the seamen's success: Without very general concurrence
in opinion on the subject of pay, it is impossible the unanimity which appeared could
have been produced.'8
 He certainly did not see it as their only grievance and warned 'they
now know how to combine, so as to take the command of the fleet at any time, provided
only that they can have intercourse, and can find a reasonable subject for complaint upon
which they are able to produce unanimity'.9
Patton agreed that newspapers had a role in triggering, but not in causing, the outbreak at
St Helen's:
The newspapers that contained the conversation in the House of Peers were no
sooner circulated in the fleet at St Helen's, than a considerable fermentation was
produced in the minds of the seamen. They concluded that there was at least some
hesitation in fulfilling the promises which had been made by the Board of Admiralty.
They looked to the House of Commons as the only branch of the Legislature which
could dispose of the public money, and conceived that nothing was certain until the
law sanctioning the promise which had been made to them had passed in Parliament.
Far more culpable in his opinion were the Admiralty's instructions of I May:
Collecting all the circumstances in one view, they exhibit an extraordinary defect of
knowledge of what passes within ships of war, as well as a want of foresight of the
ibuL, 2
8 Ibid, 5
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effect which such directions would probably have at the time they were issued. After
these paragraphs, others follow, which give such orders with respect to the
provisions, wine, and spirits, as tend directly to insinuate, that at least part of the
cliscontents among the seamen arose from the improper conduct of the Officers in
the management of these articles. I have not had occasion to know very lately the
conduct of the sea-officers on those points; but I have understood, that their hands
were never cleaner than at present, and that there is no foundation for such an
insinuation as the order contains. Nor has it appeared that the seamen lay any thing
of this kind to the charge of their Officers in any complaints they have made. The
more intimately any person is acquainted with the Navy, the more extraordinary
those passages in this general order will appear.
To Patton, the offence of issuing such instructions was compounded by their
publication:
what renders them more distressing to sea-officers is, that the succeeding events
produced a publication of this instruction in all the newspapers in Britain. In what
light will the great body of the people, unacquainted as they are with Naval affairs,
regard sea-officers, after so gross an insinuation against their probity from the very
highest authority, which is always supposed to be as enlightened as it is powerful?
In contrast to prevailing opinion, Patton praised the behaviour of the fleet's officers. He
argued that, as redress of the seamen's grievances was outside their purview, there was
little they could have done to suppress the mutiny. He added that, but for the restraint
they showed, the consequences would have been much worse:
Notwithstanding this order delivered to all the Admirals and Captains of the Channel
fleet before the second mutiny took place, not one of them, Admiral Colpoys
excepted, attempted to use the means suggested by this new instruction to suppress
the disorder. Upon the breaking out of this new combination, in which the whole
command was again taken from the Officers by the seamen, the absolute necessity of
submission was universally felt; nor was this an unfortunate perception, because a
general resistance must have produced a fatal slaughter of a body of men not entirely
useless to the State. Had such a carnage taken place, the seamen would have had no
alternative; the ships must have been carried to France, and the country laid open to
the land-attacks of an incensed enemy.
Patton argued that 'In so dreadful a crisis, the public must also be satisfied. Blame must
be imputable somewhere.' He concluded: 'the highest authority had no proper
conception, either of the temper of the seamen, or of the power they might be able to
exercise.' He suggested that, after their indifference created the crisis, the board's efforts
to escape responsibility insulted the fleet's officers and exacerbated the situation:
The order issued by the Admiralty, dated the i' May 1797, develops the intentions of
that Board. It insinuates the injustice of the Officers towards the seamen. No
complaints were made of any Officer, the Surgeon only excepted, in their petitions;
therefore all insinuations were at that time highly injurious to the general character of
sea-officers. These were the means, however, which were taken to point out to the
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public causes for dissatisfaction among the seamen, without reflecting upon the
conduct of the Admiralty, in not attending to their real situation, to what had been
done for the Army, or to their petitions, which had been made known at least to
some members of that Board.
He considered:
It is natural for men to remove blame from themselves. It is proper, when this can be
done with truth and justice; but when it is attempted at the expence of both, shame
only can attend such an injury done to the characters of any body of men. If the
Board of Admiralty had seen things in their true light during the mutinies, these
disturbances could not have lasted twenty-four hours. The members of that Board
who were at Portsmouth saw the whole through a false medium, which it will take
tune to dissipate. They were unequal to the task they had to perform. They were
ignorant of the real dispositions of the leading seamen in the fleet. These facts will at
last come out in open day, notwithstanding the folly which bewildered even the
Representatives of the Nation, and suggested the idea, that the mutinies originated
from the seditious practices of the democratic faction on shore. Thus, according to
the plan of accounting for these disturbances without imputing any blame to
Government, two causes for so alarming a disaster were laid before the public, which
were equally void of foundation.
Patton placed the mutiny within a tradition of seamen's protests. He recognised 'the
seamen of the fleet did not at any time view their own conduct in the light of a mutiny;
they all along regarded their refusal to weigh the anchors as a combination to obtain what
they deemed the just reward of their labour.' He concluded that, once the protest became
general, government had no alternative to compliance:
In whatever light this combination was regarded by those who possessed the power
of the State, two very material points were clear. The first is, that as the discontent
was quite general, no power whatever could dispossess the seamen of the command
of the ships. The second follows of course, that no means remained to secure to the
country the use of the fleet, but the most speedy, the most full, and the most direct
compliance with all their demands, even supposing them to have been more
unreasonable than they really were. However plain these points may now be, they
certainly were not perceived by the Admiralty when their Lordships were at
Portsmouth; nor had they a just conception of the danger when they issued the
general order dated the l' of May, which certainly produced the bloodshed on board
the London.
Patton insisted that 'the state in which I knew the seamen's minds to be long before the
disturbances took place, induced me to believe, that the mutinies in the fleet would have





It has been frequently asserted, that the mutinies were originally formed and fostered
by the discontents produced by the French Revolution, and sedition thus
disseminated among the seamen. This assertion, however, has been clearly and
satisfactorily proved to be unfounded, from the most unquestionable authority, that
of the delegates themselves, who declared most solemnly that no person on shore
had the least hand in what the seamen had done; and this fact is farther ascertained,
by the uniform and universal opinion entertained in every ship, with respect to the
12grievances of which the complained.
He held that, more than any other contributing cause, the delays in bringing the subject
before the House of Commons caused the second outbreak. He quoted a delegate as
saying: 'those in power took them for fools, or vagabond rascals; but that they would
convince them that they were neither, and that they would not be so treated.' Patton
argued that it became violent only after Colpoys' intemperate display, apparently
sanctioned by 'the highest naval authority, ... convinced them that their lives were at stake
on the measures they had taken; and that they must continue to command, and secure
their power at all events.' Patton saw no mystery in the mutiny:
It is only necessary to know the feelings of good seamen, to comprehend perfectly
how they will act in cases like those under consideration; and it is by not
understanding the full influence and power of thorough-bred sailors in King's ships,
that any errors can have been committed in managing this most disastrous calamity."
However, he admitted their feelings were unlikely to be given such consideration: 'Nor
will these facts have any influence on men who hold seamen to be a thoughtless,
worthless set of beings, who are the worse for every additional farthing which is
bestowed upon them.' 14
 He assumed that 'these ideas of any great body of men are too
stupid, too contemptible, to require refutation'. Unfortunately, such prejudice has been
the principal barrier to accepting his interpretation of the mutiny.
Patton's observations and conclusions are vital to understanding the mutiny. He did not
conceal his bias; but it was professional, rather than political He may be considered
disgruntled or predisposed to finding fault in Spencer, but his arguments are clearly
stated and his insights are penetrating. Given that he was writing without access to
Admiralty records, his account is balanced and remarkably accurate.' 5 Nevertheless,
Patton was ignored by his contemporaries and neglected by historians. He commented:
12 Ibid, 17-18
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It is true, that after the little regard that has been paid to the papers on Naval affairs
which I have sedulously endeavoured to convey to the men in power, little hope of
my information being of use remains, or that this weak endeavour should avert
future calamity. But when the independence of the State is at stake, and the sudden
defection of the Navy may subject this country to France by a false or confused view
of the internal condition of King's ships, it becomes the duty of every man
acquainted with the subject to report whatever may conduce to correct so fatal an
16
error.
Ironically, John Owen, author of another invaluable, but neglected history of the mutiny,
was one of the few to recognise Patton's importance. He acknowledged his debt 'Much
of the foregoing is drawn from the writings of Admiral Philip Patton, which abound in
criticism that is still of use in the study of discipline.' 17 Owen established Patton's
credibility as a sea officer with considerable experience:
Patton joined the Service at the age of fifteen or sixteen in 1755, became a captain in
March 1779 and a rear admiral in June 1795, served as a lord of the Admiralty from
1804 to 1806, and died an admiral in December 1815, having in his own words 'been
present at the taking or destroying forty of the enemy's line of battle ships, besides
many of smaller force'. LordJellicoe is his great-grandson.
He enters our story as acting captain of the Pnnce George, a few months before he was
made post, crushing incipient mutiny by promptness and decision. In 1797 he learnt
before anyone else that the great mutiny in the Channel fleet was about to begin,
though he was serving on shore at Portsmouth and had not been at sea for several
years. 18 Knowledge of the seamen and their conditions had warned him of the danger
long ago and led him to write his 'Observations on Naval Mutiny', a paper he pressed
upon Lord Spencer (the First Lord) and on Pitt, Dundas, and Wilberforce in 1795.
Several other papers came from his pen, among them 'An Account of the Mutinies'
(at Portsmouth in 1797), and perhaps most important of all 'Strictures on Naval
Discipline'. This was not his only subject, he also wrote at length on such things as
trade protection, signals, gunnery, the handling of ships.19
Further praise for Patton came amid criticism of Gill:
He gives a wealth of detail, and his book is most interesting and valuable in many
respects, especially on the political side. But he entirely disregards Patton's
arguments, which seem to go to the root of the matter; and he considers the many
extensions to be 'only echoes' of the first disturbance, whereas it is important to
emphasize the sympathy of almost the whole Navy with what happened that Easter
at Spithead. Moreover, Mr. Gill has a queer way of taking the unsupported
' 6 Pafton, 'Observations on disciphne', 10
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statements of mutinous seamen at their face value, while dismissing as prejudiced the
considered judgement of officers conducting inquiries.20
While admitting Patton's importance, Owen discreetly ignored his criticism of the
Admiralty. Instead, he embraced the conventional wisdom that 'cunning men' entering
the navy under the Quota Acts caused the trouble.
It gave an irresistible chance for lord lieutenants and chief magistrates to rid
themselves of undesirables by shifting the burden of their charge to sea officers, as if
(to borrow words from Kipling's boarding officers) we had not cares enough already
in fighting all creation. There is no doubt that men of this sort were responsible for
most of the unrest in the two or three years following the general mutiny for the
redress of real grievances in 1797. It was easy for cunning men, English
revolutionaries or Irish rebels, fraudulent clerks, and the like, to work upon the
feelings unsettled by the upheaval in the spring of that year, to gain support for their
seditious plans by exaggerating small grievances and inventing new ones. It seems
curious now that the country should pin its faith in such characters instead of
fostering the undoubted loyalty of true seamen by reasonable provision for their
21
welfare.
A casual reader might miss Owen's qualification. He commented on the effect, rather
than the cause of the mutiny at Spithead. His reluctance to share Patton's criticism of the
Admiralty was understandable. Assigned to the Training and Staff Duties Division of the
Admiralty, Owen wrote Mutinj in the Rojial Nay in the aftermath of the mutiny at
Invergordon.
The end of naval discz))line
While several outbreaks followed Spithead, to most contemporaries there was one
mutiny. Those that followed were derivative. When, where or even why they happened
paled in comparison to what was happening. To contemporaries, especially officers in
the Royal Navy, the restoration of discipline became all that mattered. The grievances,
money, politics and personalities became irrelevant. A witness to the mutiny, Captain
Graham Moore, Melampus, noted in his journal on 27 April 1797:
It is very evident to my judgement that the spirit of the seamen was roused by finding
that although they were so miserably paid, there was no intention of raising their
wages and that they never could obtain by fair means what they are so well entitled
to. I think there is no wicked or licentious spirit among the sailors, they were
moderate in almost all they demanded, and many things did they refrain to touch




to what it is long before it was asked, when it was asked it ought to have still more to
have been raised, but they have neglected the matter until it broke forth like
lightning. They have taught the seamen how to carry their point; it may have very
serious consequences and is a sad blow to the Naval Discipline.
In one of his last letters, Edmund Burke wrote to William Windham:
But among all the parts of this fatal measure of the Mission of my Lord Howe has
been by far the most mischievous. Had a great naval commander been sent down -
Gravempietate etMentus vitum quem - to awe the seditious into obedience, it would have
been the best thing that could have been thought of; but to send the first name in the
navy, and who had been but lately a Cabinet Minister and First Lord of the
Admiralty, at upwards of seventy years of age, to hunt among mutineers for
grievances, to take the law from Joice [sic, a seditious Clubist of Belfast, and to
remove by his orders some of the principal Officers of the Navy, puts an end to all
hopes forever. Such mischief need not to have been attended with such
degradation.25
Exaggerated fears and condemnation also came from Lord Sheffield: 'Lord Howe
deserves to be keel-hauled for yielding to the proposition of dismissing such officers as
the sailors required. There must be an end of all subordination. Nothing now can do but
a peace, which will dismiss the greater part of them.'24
 While relieved that it was finally
over, Captain Moore saw no reason to celebrate:
At this critical and delicate moment down came Lord Howe with extraordinary
powers and indeed, I believe, a kind of carte blanche to deal with the mutineers, the
whole business came to be revised again, and everything was given up to the caprice
and licentious disposition of the seamen; all the officers whom they had forced on
shore were superceded from their ships.
This miserable and melancholy negotiation lasted several days, during which time Sir
Roger Curtis' squadron came round from Torbay being compelled by their crews.
When the seamen of Lord Bridport's fleet had declared themselves satisfied and
ready to proceed to sea, they insisted on Lord Howe rowing through the fleet in
procession with the delegates of the fleet.
All the troops stationed at Portsmouth were drawn up on the lines to fire a flu dejoie
on the return of Lord Howe with the delegates and the reconciliation of the seamen
was celebrated with all the pomp imaginable.
Many people in London and some few even here thought all the firing and cheering
was in honour of Lord Howe, but this was in reality the triumph of mutiny over the
discipline of the navy, which has received a blow which I much doubt of it ever
25
recovering.
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In late June 1797, Aaron Graham offered his 'Hints on the fleet and Navy' to the Duke
of Portland. He saw 'the reorganisation of our marine and the return of the sailors to a
legitimate obedience' as essential to England's 'existence as a maritime - nay even as an
independent nation'. Graham focused his attention on naval officers: 'A professional Eye
equally familiar with the ancient discipline and the present insubordination naturally fixes
itself on The Officers of the Fleet'; and dwelt upon the need to re-establish their
authority:
That subordination is necessary to discipline - discipline to conquest and conquest to
the preservation of the Empire. That their Country will reap as much profit from
their union (in fact it is connected with its preservation) and that none but the
Enemy can receive any advantage from excess that in the end would render the
character of a British sailor contemptible.
Graham suggested:
There is one thing which they have never much insisted upon but which if granted as
a boon (in the end it will - and perhaps be claimed as a right) would tend much to the
purposes of a prompt reconciliation - it is more a reasonable Distribution of Prize
Money. This was by many of the ships brought forward and will no doubt on the
return of the Channel fleet be made a question of.
James Burney, who had sailed with Cook and wrote extensively on naval affairs, shared
the determination to re-establish discipline. He recommended a conciliatory approach.
Burney felt 'great defects in the Naval Laws and Regulations to have been the princpaI,
if not the sole, cause of the late mutiny. Certain it is, they have caused a disinclination in
the best seamen to their being employed in His Majesty's Naval Service.' 27 He argued:
The best discipline consists in regularity and method. . . .To the superiority of our
commerce and not to the severity of our discipline, is to be attributed the superiority
of British Seamen, of which striking instances occur in our privateers and merchant
vessels.
He encouraged Spencer to address grievances involving prize money, punishment and
shore leave before they led to further disturbances. Apparently knowing the mood of the
Admiralty, he hesitated before suggesting mercy:
For that which I am going to add, I am anxious to bespeak your Lordship's particular
indulgence, sensible that I am taking a liberty beyond that of stating general ideas on
the service. i, in punishing the present mutiny, many examples shall be made, it will
throw much discredit upon the general character of the British seamen; whereas, if it
shall be judged proper, when the mutineers are wholly in the power of government,
BL Add MS 37877 folios 72-73v Windham Papers XXXVI, Hints on the fleet & navy, June 1797. Full
text included at the end of this chapter.
27 H Sproule, 'James Burney's Opinions on the Naval Mutinies of 1797', Mariner's Mirror, xlvi (1960), 61-62
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to make any amendment in the naval laws in favour of the seamen, then lenity can
produce no other effect than that of creating good will and attachment.
However, like Patton, Pakenham and Graham, Bumey was ignored. After Spithead,
Spencer adopted a brutal approach to the restoration of discipline, an approach that
precluded further negotiation or accommodation. As a result, the gulf between the
quarterdeck and the lowerdeck increased and little was learned.
Deszgnin Men
Never could we have believed that the honest character of a gallant British sailor
could have suffered itself to be imposed on by the artful intrigues of designing men,
who are traitors to their country.
In 1842 the first published history of the mutiny noted that 'men of fair talent managed
the perilous enterprise.'30 Forty-five years before, The Times agreed: 'The answer to the
Ghost of Kempenfeldt ... is so far important, as it shows the spirit of the sailors at
Portsmouth, and is evidently written by some able pen, which has probably served them
on other occasions.'3' Such speculations assumed the seamen were illiterate, argued they
could not have written such documents, and concluded they must have had help. More
to the point, they assumed the simple seamen, incapable of such sophistication or
cunning, were misled. The True Briton assured its readers that 'the diabolical spirit in the
Fleet has been kept up, it is confidently said, by some infernal villains on shore.'32 The
intrigues of infernal villains or designing men were somehow more comforting than
considering the flaw in their logic, that amongst the 30,000 highly skilled and immensely
proud men of the Channel fleet the necessary skills were found. The rumours also served
to divert public attention from government's poor performance in the crisis. The Times
invited a comparison:
When the circumstances of this passive insurrection, and the secret and prompt
manner in which it has been organized and executed, are compared with the various
measures obstinately pursued by a dangerous faction throughout the country to
poison the public mind against the Government, it is impossible not to perceive the
intimate connection which exists between the means employed in exciting this
discontent, and the systematic plan uniformly adopted by a few men in the
Ibid., 62
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Opposition to weaken the constitutional energy of the Executive Power, and to
impede the exertions of national strength.33
Two days later, the editors extended the connection from opposition politicians to
opposition prints:
From the system observed throughout the present discontents, there cannot now be
a doubt but that some secret enemies not only to our own, but to any form of
Government where the laws are respected, have found means to enlist themselves
into our fleet, for the purpose of disorganising it; and we are sorry to say, that they
find very able advocates in some of our newspapers, whole licentious comments
throughout this business prove that they are ready to concur in any measures which
may tend to harass his Majesty's Ministers, and finally to overthrow the Government.
Let any man compare language of some of Opposition prints with the disorderly
proceedings now going on at Portsmouth, and say whether there is not a very close
affinity between the two parties.TM
It was a question of style over content, form over substance. It was not what the seamen
wrote, but how they wrote it, that aroused suspicions. Sheridan declared their words
lacked a 'rough, honest, manly conformation' and constituted a 'direct contradiction to
the general character and conduct of a British Sailor'. 35 The Morning Chronicle responded
indignantly:
We have avoided all discussion of the subject of the grievances of the Seamen. The
matter was too important to be lightly or loosely canvassed. Representative
Government actually established on board the British fleet, and a Commission of
Admiralty gone to treat with a Convention of Delegates, is an era in the annals of our
Navy which no man who madly gave his suffrage for the present War of
Disorganisation ever expected to see. Good God, what a spectacle for England! But,
though the independent Prints have, with becoming prudence, abstained from all
unseasonable commentaries the devoted agents of a presumptuous Ministry have not
shown equal discretion. They have dared to libel the wise and virtuous men who have
zealously endeavoured to avert from England the horrors which have fatally come
upon us, by asserting that emissaries of the Opposition have been the authors of the
confederacy, and that the whole is the fatal fruits of their machinations. It is enough
to say that this unprincipled aspersion is contradicted by the tenor of the proceedings
of the seamen themselves; and Englishmen will know how to treat a calumny so base
and diabolicaLTM
The Morning Chronicle blurred distinctions between opposition and its emissaries in print,
claiming for the latter a degree of autonomy they did not have. Such politically pregnant
phrases as 'representative government', 'convention of delegates', 'authors of the
The Timis, 19 April 1797
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confederacy' and 'war of disorganisation' undermined James Perry's argument. While
readers tolerated such coloration, the government newspapers affected outrage:
No public event has taken place, either at home or abroad, since the commencement
of the war, however unfavourable it may have been to the national prosperity, which
has not been falsely commented on and industriously exaggerated by the prints
devoted to the Opposition, to gratify the hatred and jealousy of the Party against the
Administration. Steady to this principle of gross misrepresentation, a Morning Paper
of yesterday has seized with avidity the recent discontent manifested by the seamen
on board the Grand Fleet, and has, with its accustomed malignity and falsehood,
made it the ground-work of a most violent invective against his Majesty's Ministers.37
A week later, the Morning Chronicle admitted the unreliability of reports and recognised the
danger in publishing them: 'To retail all the mischievous reports of the Platforms at
Portsmouth, and collect all the stories which were magnified on every repetition, would
only serve to sow the seeds of future jealousy and discord in the fleet.' 38 With other
opposition papers in mind, editor and proprietor John Bell warned that irresponsible
coverage could exacerbate a volatile situation:
We deprecate also the lamentations of those who pretend to see in this great event, a
revolution in the system of British discipline. This whining cant may make the change
which they affect to deplore; since it is an acknowledgement of weakness that would
engender and animate disobedience. But let us view it without prejudices, and we
shall view it without alarm. The grievances must have been severely felt and long
suffered that could give rise to a confederacy so general, so systematic, so well
combined, and so temperately conducted. Its management is a proof that it was not
the effect of sudden passion - nor was the feeling locaL In what new light then, does
this event serve to make us consider the British Seamen. Are we to iearn from this,
that they are patient and forbearing, but when roused, firm, constant and
unconquerable. Thank God, it was always their character, and it will continue to be
their character. This event has created no change; except, as we have said before, that
it will serve as a useful admonition to Government not to fight the grievances of the
seamen when presented in the prudent and humble guise of a petition without
signatures. It is painful for pride to grant to remonstrance what was refused to
prayer.
The London Chronicle and The Times curtailed their coverage and hinted at journalism's
emerging sense of ethics:
We do not think fit to detail all the unpleasant reports we have heard on this subject;
and such was the confusion and anxiety of mind at Portsmouth, that the precise truth
is not known, as there was little communication between the ships and the shore.39
" The Time,, 19 April 1797
Morning Cbnrnide, 25 April 1797
39 London Chronicle, 6-9 May 1797; The Times, 9 May 1797; Morning Post, 9 May 1797
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While most newspaper editors struggled to determine which news was or was not fit to
print, John Heriot apparently assumed that any news which might prove embarrassing
for government should be ignored, re-written or denied. 4° The Morning Post offered no
apologies. It defended the public's right to be informed and the press's responsibility to
keep it informed. By providing a forum for public discussion, Daniel Stuart argued they
could help resolve the crisis:
We speak thus freely on this subject, because we think it is one that should be met
and discussed without reserve. We disapprove one half of the complaints in the
Seamen's Petition, we totally disapprove the spirit of them, and above we disapprove
of the steps they have taken to obtain redress. The Treasury Journals have adopted a
cringing treacherous language that may produce the greatest mischief; as it is
calculated rather to encourage than repress the spirit of revolt. Let the Seamen's
complaints, be met fairly; let them be told what redress may reasonably be expected,
and what redress should not be demanded: let this be done, and the Journalists may
produce a very salutary effect upon them. It is on such occasions that Journals may
be of service to the State. But fawning on Seamen, or fawning on Ministers, is alike
pregnant with mischief.4'
Heriot condemned Stuart's attitude, but also criticised his old rival:
It is pretty well understood that the late discontents of the Seamen were fomented
and encouraged by some Emissaries of Faction, who went to Portsmouth upon the
occasion. We cannot for a moment allow the belief; however, that these persons were
Opposition Ambassadors. ... Almost all the Morning Papers, who have indulged in
disgraceful and dangerous fictions respecting the late Proceedings, are now obliged to
contradict the falsehoods with which they have endeavoured to impose upon the
42Public.
Two weeks later, oblivious to his inconsistency, Heriot implied the 'emissaries of faction'
were 'ambassadors of the opposition' after all:
we are convinced that the Seamen have, in the last instance, been impelled to
Mutiny by the insinuations and machinations of Men whose duty it was to have
pursued a very different line of conduct. We now speak of Men in the HIGHEST
RANKS OF Ui'E.4°
Rather than risk libelling the Duke of Bedford, Lord Howe or the Duke of Clarence,
Henot blamed his fellow journalists:
That misrepresentations even of the speeches of our most violent Senators have been
made we are sensible, and that these have done irreparable mischief, is certain - but if
4°True Briton, 21 April 1797
41 Morning Post, 22 April 1797
42 True Brito#, 26 April 1797
43 IbidL, 10 May 1797. Presumably, the Duke of Bedford.
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these have the privilege of disseminating Mutiny and TREASON, is there no law to
punish those who wilfully misrepresent the plainest statements.
After presenting his readers with the least accurate coverage of the mutiny, Heriot
admitted: 'amidst the concussion of accounts, it is difficult to depend upon what is
reality.' He insisted 'it has uniformly been our wish to preserve particular delicacy and
caution in every statement which we make to the Public, aware how real mischief may be
done to the Country by exaggerated or misrepresented accounts.' Heriot's priorities were
plain, easing the public mind was far more important than informing it. Newspapers had
no need to misrepresent or exaggerate to cause mischief. Accurate reports of Lord
Howe's and the Duke of Clarence's remarks before the House of Lords were enough to
arouse seamen's suspicions. On 9 May the Tnie Btiton reported:
the present ferment in the fleet arose from a gross misrepresentation of what
passed a few days ago in Parliament, upon the subject of the late complaints of the
seamen conveyed through the medium of a Jacobin Evening Newspaper, which got
on board the fleet.
Without considering the source, Conrad Gill saw this 'indirect evidence' as proof
'beyond doubt that such writings were issued, and were distributed in the fleet with the
deliberate object of exciting a fresh mutiny'. 45 He identified the 'Jacobin Evening
Newspaper' as the Courier, and argued its absence from the archives was suspicious.
Ignoring the logistical problems involved in destroying newspapers akeady in circulation,
Gill failed to explain why government would want to do it.
Irrespective of misrepresentations, the suggestion that government could or should
renege on Spencer's promises or the King's pardon was implicit in their lordships' ill-
advised comments. Those comments merely confirmed suspicions aroused by the
intercepted instructions, uneven distribution of provisions, perfunctory investigations of
ship's complaints and delays in passing the bill. It was politically expedient to suggest the
second outbreak occurred because of misrepresentations in the press. In addition to
removing the responsibility from government, blaming newspapers for the second
outbreak undermined opposition to the new tax increase and provided grounds for
further repression.
Heriot admitted the effect of prejudice and limited perception on the news:
'IbieL,9May 1797
' C Gill, Naval Mutinies of 1797 (Manchester University Press, 1913), 49
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The Public must be sensible likewise how much, even according to the best
authenticated accounts, the most solicitous for authentic information may be
deceived, as things in such a state of agitation and uncertainty as that of a General
Mutiny, must be very much represented according to the feelings and information of
the Party making the representation.
The True Briton suggested that few of the seamen were disaffected and those few
admitted to being misled. 47 The Times took the suggestion a step further: We are happy to
confirm the observation we made yesterday, that there is great reason to believe that
some of the authors of these broils will be given up by the Delegates themselves, and
brought to thaL' While Lord Russell and the Morning Herald all but demanded it, 9 the
Morning Chronicle saw the danger in such indiscretion:
It is certain that the body of the Seamen highly resent the conduct of individuals of
their own body, but we believe that the rumour, which states that they have delivered
up any persons to justice, is totally untrue. This is one of the many indiscreet reports
which are calculated to make the Seamen distrust the amnesty which was so solemnly
promised them in the name of his Majesty, and which, of course, will be implicitly
50
observed.
A Pettyfogjing Attorney & a Seditious Tobacconist
Notwithstanding his criticism of his colleagues, in fact, immediately following those of 26
April, Heriot indulged in a few disgraceful and dangerous fictions of his own, regarding
the identity of the designing men. We learn from good information, that a person, who
was some time ago, in the capacity of Clerk to a very eminent Opposition Barrister, was
one of the most active Leaders in the late Mutiny on board the Fleet.' 51 Just avoiding
libel, Heriot referred to Sir Thomas Erskine. He earned an angry retort52
The Treasury Runners make the most laboured and infamous attempts to represent
the Opposition as the secret cause of the Mutiny at Spithead. Among other false and
malicious reports, it has been generally circulated these two days, that one of the
Delegates of the Fleet is a person formerly a Clerk to Mr. Erskine. This is a report
most notoriously untrue. Mr. Erskine's present Clerk, has been his Clerk ever since
Mr. Erskine was at the Bar, and Mr. Erskine never had any other Clerk. This fact is
True Bñn, 10 May 1797
Ibid., 11 May 1797
The Times, 13 May 1797
49 MorninHerah 8May 1797
50 Mornin Chronicle, 13 May 1797
' True Briton, 26 April 1797
52 De1 Stuaxt, proprietor of the MorninS Post, was a close friend of Erskine.
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well known to the numerous Gentleman of the profession, who have intercourse
with that distinguished Advocate.53
Unrepentant, Heriot continued to search for scapegoats, distracting readers and
misleading historians in the process. The True Briton declared: 'The Naval Dele,gates, EVANS
and JOYCE, were, it seems, the joint movers of the late Mutiny.' The True Brition
described Evans as:
• a petyfo,ggin attornçy, struck off the rolls for various maipractices amongst his
W/apping Clients ... a man who has long attempted to gain money and popularity
among the Seamen, by inciting them to bring Actions against their Captains on their
return from sea. The title with which he chose to distinguish himself was that of
'Attorneyfor the Tars of Old England.TM
This was the first public mention of the mysterious Mr. Evans, whose name surfaced
four days earlier when Nepean received a letter stating that 'Mr. Evans, a lawyer of
Abilities, but of the most villainous sensibility, was acting under an assumed name as a
Delegate among the Mutineers in the Fleet at Portsmouth.' 55 A week later, their
Lordships were cautioned 'not to place confidence in any information given by Mr.
Evans, the Attorney, as there does not exist a doubt of his being at the bottom of the
proceedings of the Mutineers at St. Helens'. On 8 June former Lord Chancellor
Thurlow received a letter from someone claiming to know the villain:
Evans was an attorney in the Minories; 20 years ago he was in a respectable line. I
had some business with him twice. At the commencement of the American war
before a declaration with France, French prizes that were taken, he defended, and
,	 57
called himself the Frenchmen s Lawyer.
Thurlow's correspondent, VV, supplied a wealth of detail, but his credibility suffered
when he identified Richard Parker, President of the delegates at the Nore', as 'a
Fishmonger in Westminster'. He also offered grist the conspiracy miTh
The violent speeches in Parliament extolling our enemies and depreciating our
Government and Constitution, had deeper root than mere declamation; the
Corresponding Societies did not confine their intercourses with each other, but
extended their Communications not only with Ireland but France. Two days before
the Fleet sailed from Spithead, a Tallow Chandler, told a person that I know, 'he was
sorry the plan had not been completed', he was asked, what plan, he sayed, 'the plan
of destroying the Docks, setting fire to Portsmouth, and carrying the Fleet to the
French; but he hoped before they sailed it would be done.' This led me to make some
53 MorninPost, 12 May 1797
' TyueB,iton, 12 May 1797
ADM12/75, Admiralty Digest, Promiscuous K/50a, 8May 1797
TM lbid., East India Company, 15 May 1797
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enquiries; and, by accident, I met with a Tradesman who belonged to the
Corresponding Society; but finding they had gone to such lengths, as to send a man
to Paris and corresponding with him there, he quitted them; he says that they sent
from Paris to this Society, a civic crown, a cap of Liberty of velvet, laced, a book of
their constitution, elegantly bound; besides these, a curious emblematical curiosity of
4 ears of corn, representing the 4 quarters of the world.
While such detail made good gossip, without confirmation, they offered nothing more.
Apparently considering himself immune, VV cautioned: 'The itch of news, my Lord, is
the general disease of the Town.'
Strangely, the Morning Post joined the True Briton in adding currency to the rumours. The
former commented, 'It is said, that Valentine Joyce, the Delegate at St. Helen's was
formerly a Tobacconist in Belfast, and that he was forced on board the fleet, for being an
United Irishman';59 while the latter added he was 'a Tobacconist of Belfast, in Ireland,
shipped on board a Tender, with many others, by the order of Lord CARHAMPTON, for
his seditious harangues'. t° Oliver Goldsmith explained how it might happen:
You must not, however, imagine that they who compile these papers have any actual
knowledge of politics or the government of a state; they only collect their materials
from the oracle of some coffee-house, which oracle himself gathered them the night
before from a beau at a gaming-table, who pillaged his knowledge from a great man's
porter, who had had his information from the great man's gentleman, who has
invented the whole story for his own amusement the night preceding.61
In contrast, William Johnson Neale described a respectful Joyce approaching Lord Howe
to confirm arrangements for the celebrations on 12 May:
He requested to know at what hour the next morning he would be pleased to
embark? His lordship replied, their time should be his; and seven o'clock was fixed,
as the tide would serve that hour. Joyce, next turning to Lady Howe, begged to know
whether she would honour them with her company, assuring her ladyship of perfect
safety and freedom from apprehension. She replied, nothing would give her greater
pleasure than to accede to their request, which she did with the utmost confidence
and satisfaction. Lord Howe invited Joyce into the Governor's house, to drink a glass
of wine, which invitation was readily accepted, 'with a manly freedom,
unaccompanied by the least particle of familiarity or mdeness'.
Aaron Graham interviewed the wife of a tallow chandler assumed to be the brother of Valentine Joyce,
but was told he was no relation. PRO ADM 1/3974, note from A Graham, 12 May 1797
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Unfortunately, Neale combined these observations, which can be confirmed, 63 with
gossip, rumours and speculation gleaned from contemporary newspapers which cannot
This seaman, whose politeness made a most favourable impression upon the writers
of the day, had been a tobacconist at Belfast, where he was shipped on board a
tender of Lord Carhampton, under an accusation, true or false we cannot say, of
treasonable conduct and seditious harangues. A brother delegate was a man named
Evans, formerly an attorney, who had been struck off the rolls, on account, it would
appear, of various maipractices among his Wapping clients."
Denied access to official records, contemporary observers and early historians of the
mutiny might be excused for accepting coffee-house gossip or newspaper speculations.
Conrad Gill, who had access to the archives and unconcealed contempt for Neale,
accepted the canard without question. As it suited his purpose, he described Joyce as a
'quotaman imprisoned for seditious practices'. 65 Similarly, he described Evans as 'a man
of great ability, but he had been disqualified for maipractices, and had entered the navy,
under an assumed name, as a common seaman'. While Gill cited the précis of Thomas
King's letter to Nepean in Admiralty Digest, he failed to note that, like the pejorative
'pettyfogging', the mention of 'malpractices' appeared only in the True Bnton.
Manwaring and Dobrée, who did examine the relevant records, indicated Joyce was 'a
sound, experienced, authoritative sailor, or he would not have been Quarter Master's
Mate'.67 Yet, despite providing such proof, they circumvent the controversy by
suggesting 'it is likely that he has been confused with someone else.' Michael Lewis
compromised by offering Joyce as 'a Quartermaster's Mate of apparently good character,
certainly a strong man, and, in his way, a wise one; probably, also, affairé and too well
educated to have been a professional seaman'. 69 He explained a 'real British seaman was
usually a simple soul, obstinately conservative, ill-educated and ... unvocal'. Lewis did
not explain how Joyce could have become a quartermaster's mate without being a real
seaman. James Dugan tried to have it all ways, declaring Joyce was both a quartermaster's
Hampshire Chronicle, 20 May 1797
64 N/Roberts, 124
65 Ibid, 317th
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mate and a seditious tobacconist from Belfast who 'had recently came aboard in the
quota'.7° Marianne Elliott followed this curious leap of iogic with a curious leap of her
own, describing Joyce as a United Irishman who 'administered the United Irish oath to
many of his colleagues'. 71 Roger Wells built upon supposition, rather than evidence, to
announce that Joyce was a 'local democrat ... "well" known to the Home Office for his
political work'. He insisted the delegates' political aspirations were sufficiendy obvious as
to require no proof, insisting it would be 'idiotic' to think otherwise.72
While the truth about Evans, if there is any truth about Evans, remains a mystery, the
truth about Valentine Joyce is available to anyone willing to do the research. Joyce was
neither a tobacconist, a clubist, a quota-man, an Ulsterman, a United Irishman, nor even
an Irishman. He was born in Jersey in 1 769. His father, also Valentine, served in the
garrison invalid corps in Portsmouth. 74 His mother and sister also lived in Portsmouth.
The Joyce family was Unitarian. 75 Valentine Joyce was a professional seaman. He went to
sea when he was eleven, was rated able seaman in December 1788 and served on HMS
Perseverance until October 1793 when he joined Royal George, rated quartermaster's mate.76
Lord Howe commented 'as he has been spoken of to his disadvantage, prejudiced me by
his conduct, equally in his favour'. Beyond the muster books, pay books and Howe's
high opinion, Joyce himself offered clarification. He wrote a letter to the editor of the
Portsmouth Gazette
As I make no doubt of your willingness to correct any error which may find its way
into the public papers, more particularly one wherein the feelings of an individual are
concerned. I beg leave to say, that in the Sun of the 14th instant, the Editor is pleased
to mention my name jointly with a suppositious one of Evans, and to describe me as
a Tobacconist of Belfast in Ireland, who, for seditious harangues, had been shipped
on board a tender by Lord Carhampton.
70 J Dugan, Great Mutinjv (New York: Putnam, 1965), 63; C Emsley, A Hill & M Ashcroft, eds., North Riding
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The above statement is totally erroneous. I am now twenty-eight years old, and have
been seventeen years in his Majesty's Navy. I am a Seaman, who from his soul, wishes
well to his King and Country, and whose conduct, I flatter myse1f, has and will free
his character from the effects of malice or misrepresentation. I hope candour will





th	 78St. Helens, May the 15 , 1797
Instead, 'candour' delayed publication of Joyce's letter until 10 July 1797. The editor
unconvincing explained. 'The above would have appeared before, but by accident was
mislaid.' Had it appeared two months earlier, it would have been news and almost
certainly would have been reprinted by the London newspapers. As it was, Joyce's
clarification slipped into obscurity and the rumours persisted. On 3() May, the Oracle
reported. 'Joyce, one of the Delegates from Portsmouth, on Thursday arrived at
Sheerness: he travelled in post-chaise and four!' 79 The Oracle's credibility suffered in that a
fortnight before, the Channel fleet sailed with Joyce on board Royal Geory,e.
Patton warned, 'Great errors are made in taking a confused view of the men embarked in
the King's ships, and in underestimating the knowledge and judgement of the leading
seamen.'8° Joyce's letter proved seamen could also be articulate. 81 Rather than singling
him out for punishment, the navy later recognised his worth. He was promoted to
quartermaster and two years later to midshipman. On 3 February 1800, the Portsmouth
Gazette reported: 'Valentine Joyce, who bore so conspicuous a part in the mutiny at
Spithead in the year 1797, was drowned when the Brazen sioop was lost a few days since
on the coast of Sussex.'
None of this, including his tragic end, would matter if the facts rather than the fictions
about Joyce and Evans prevailed. Instead, it demonstrates the power of propaganda and
the danger of relying too heavily on newspapers as evidence. They provide a wealth of
78 Pon',rmouth Gaytte, 10 July 1797
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contextual detail without perspective. They reflect the passions and prejudices of the
time. They can be invaluable, but only if put into context. Despite their self-righteous
posturing, newspapers failed to fulfil their most basic promise. As early as 1720, the
public was asked to make informed judgements:
Look we then with a narrow searching eye into the con flrm'd and known authentic
passages of the present times in the different nations, and from thence let us after
making judicious comparisons, judge whether their several interests will probably run
so far on in amicable links as to constitute one whole and solid chain, of agreement.83
But the public was inadequately informed or deliberately misinformed by those who saw
the pursuit of the truth as secondary to the pursuit of politics or profits.TM
Quota-men
The role of the quota-men in the mutiny has been misunderstood and magnified.
Manwaring and Dobrée's sympathies with the lower deck apparently did not extend to
believing seamen were capable of organising a successful mutiny. Instead of designing
men, jacobins or radicals, they argued quota-men managed the mischief.
These recruits were, mostly, better educated than the normal run of seamen. They
were not the sweeping of the dock-sides or prisons, or ignorant men who had known
nothing but the sea; they were sometimes even men who had failed in some
profession - schoolmastering, the law, or business - and had probably run into debt;
they were tempted by the bounties offered by the mayors and sheriffs - which might
be as much as £70 - and it was these men who, when the authorities had emptied the
prisons, got rid of seditious elements, and all tindesirables generally, came to swell the
ranks of the service. Realising the beastliness of the conditions of life at sea, they
kicked, and began to light a gleam of hope in those who had never thought of
kicking. Busily, circumspectly, on upper deck and lower, from the forecastle hands to
the cockpit servants, at greasing the guns or manning the fore-tops, they blew gently
but steadily on the tiny, timid flames, urging the men to ask for at least the common
decencies of treatment, without which a man is more wretched than a brute.85
Manwaring and Dobrée were not the first to exaggerate the role of quota-men. Twice in
one paragraph in The Times declared: 'The landsmen, raised in the different parishes are
among the principal leaders in the mutiny'. The inference was that nothing was wrong
with the fleet 'It is strange to tell, but at the same time true that not withstanding the
F Clifton, IVeek y Medlg: or, the Gentleman's Recreation, c 1720; J Bhck, Enlisb Press in the Ezgbteenth Century
(Aldershot Greg Revivals, 1987), 29
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85 Manwanng & Dobrée, 16
The Times, 12 May 1797
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excesses that have been committed, not one seaman in ten is disaffected. It is the Parish
Quota men that are the principals, and have misled these honest fellows.'87 Such
repetition implied a deeper purpose, to supplant the truth. The letters from Portsmouth,
including those published in The Times, contradicted the editorial and confirmed that the
entire fleet was committed to the cause. However, this would not bear public
consideration in a government paper. Opposition's Mornin& Chnrnicle came closer to the
truth, recognising that seamen were resentful than receptive to the quota-men:
The county quota-men are said to have been peculiarly active in the late disturbances
on board the fleet. We cannot confirm this report; but we know that to the unwise
measure of these assessments, we are to impute the origin of the commotion. The
able Seamen who had served through the whole War, and who had originally
received but £5 of bounty, saw a set of men, raw, ignorant, in some instances old, in
others mere boys, many of them of wretched character, and many of them in ill
health, come on board with 30, 40, or even £50 bounty money in their pockets, and
these men could neither take their share of duty in the tops, nor ease the toil of the
veteran. In several instances, they saw them desert to return again with a second
bounty - nay, they have seen them return with a second 40 or £50 after being
discharged as unfit for the service. This galled the genuine seamen, and to this more
than to any other cause, perhaps, may be ascribed the confederacy for the rise of
89
wages.
Without offering any evidence, William Johnson Neale assigned the quota-men a major
role in the mutiny, but appeared to suggest that they had a moderating influence:
everyone must be struck with the moderation of the sentiment, the respectful
language, and the forcible expression in [their] compositions; from which the direct
inference would be, that persons of education, rank, and abilities, superior to the
general class of seamen, had framed the addresses. ... Their written manifestos were
in harmony with the system and plans adopted by the mutineers to promote their
intentions; both betokened intelligence, capability, and moral courage.
He noted the contemporary belief that seamen were incapable of writing a manifesto or
displaying 'intelligence, capability and moral courage' needed to organise a mutiny of
such magnitude:
this circumstance gave support to the belief that operations were directed by other
heads than those of the seamen; a rumour, therefore, that paid traitors and political
incendiaries had been introduced into the service, purposely to excite the passions,
and poison the minds of the seamen, obtained extensive circulation and ready credit
in the kingdom.
IbiL; True B,iton, 12 May 1797
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After dismissing the possibility of designing men, Neale subscribed to the equally
unlikely notion that all was orchestrated by quota-men, who were now a corrupting
rather than a moderating influence:
men of good education and ruined fortunes, dissipated characters, and spirits
intolerant of repose in those stirring times, ... sought refuge in the navy from
importunate creditors and embarrassed circumstances. The large bounties offered to
persons who might be induced to enter the service, attracted many, born in a
moderate station of life. Attorneys, disqualified by unprofessional practices,
excisemen cashiered for dereliction of duty, clerks under suspicion of embezzlement,
men of desperate reputation, and criminals escaping justice, found their way on
board his Majesty's fleet, and infused a secret leaven of discontent into the ranks of
the seamen, at variance with their rough, honest, and genuine dispositions.9°
Largely a whig invention to embarrass government, the myth gained credibility with
repetition. Neale argued:
such men were likely to feel more acutely hardships and grievances, to which they
were not habituated'; and assumed their 'superiority of intellect would place them at
the head of any movement, and ensure for the conduct of affairs, firmness of
purpose, acuteness, and the use of means proportioned to the end.
In July 1933, twenty-two months after the mutiny at Invergordon, the Admiralty
published and required all officers to read Mutinj in the Roja1Nay: 1691-1919. Written as
a training manual, Commander Owen's analysis of the records was thorough, thoughtful
and remarkably accurate. However, it remained expedient to suggest the influence of
outsiders:
It was easy for cunning men, English revolutionaries or Irish rebels, fraudulent
clerks, and the like, to work upon feelings unsettled by the upheaval in the spring of
that year, and to gain support for their seditious plans by exaggerating small
grievances and inventing new ones.91
The confusion stems from misinterpretations of the Quota Acts of 1795 and 1796. In
1785, Charles Middleton, then Comptroller of the Navy, proposed 'adopting some
system of inter-mixing a certain proportion of landsmen to be raised parochially or
otherwise' as the most practical and least expensive way to increase the pool of seamen
available in the event of war?2 He urged Pitt 'To arrange by statute the parochial
'° Neale/Roberts, 29
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supplies of landsmen and the proportion of seamen from the seaports, is a measure that
should be set about with deliberation but speedily.' 93 Instead, Middleton's
recommendations were shelved until he became a Lord of the Admiralty ten years later.
By then, England was at war, without enough seamen to satisfy the demands of her
merchant and naval services and without enough time to turn landsmen into seamen. As
the navy grew from its peacetime establishment of 16,000 in 1793 to 120,000 in 1797,
impressing seamen in port and at sea, not only failed to satisfy its needs, but created
problems for the merchants?
The Quota Acts were meant to relieve these problems. The Port Act promised to be a
practical alternative to impressment, while the County Act provided a politically
acceptable alternative to conscription. Under the Port Act the bulk of those recruited
would be seamen supplied directly by shipowners and merchants. In theory, this relieved
'outward-bound merchantmen of the inconvenience of having seamen impressed from
their crews'. 95 It also allowed them to protect their best and rid themselves of their worst
men.
The Quota Acts 'made naval recruitment a matter of local responsibility'?6 In 1795, the
Port Act promised to bring ten thousand seamen or twenty thousand landsmen into the
navy.97 The County Act was to add another ten thousand volunteers from inland counties
and parishes?6 The Port Act included Scotland, whereas a separate act called for 1,714
county volunteers from Scotland? The acts did not apply to Ireland.
In the short debate preceding their passage, Sir Francis Baring and Charles Grey
mentioned the 40,000 British seamen in French gaols, implying only peace could bring a
solution to the navy's manning problems. Roland Burden argued 'the merchants were
being unduly taxed'. He advocated a pay increase and a greater share of prize money to
931bia,206
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make the King's service more attractive to seamen. 'He was called to order."°° The
County Act passed on 5 March 1795. The Port Act passed eleven days later.
Advertisements appeared in provmcial newspapers to recruit volunteers:
A plain fact. Every seaman's pay in His Majesty's Navy is 22/6d. per month, one
pound of the best beef or pork, good broth, one pound of bread, and one gallon of
best beer; and in short, he travels always with his house over his head, sleeps dry, and
at this time can have a bounty of nearly two year's pay in advance, besides the
advantage of prize money.101
The ports and parishes offered bounties varying according to what local authorities
thought would attract the right sort of volunteers: young, fit and single men. 102 The navy
could reject those considered too old or unfit. It was feared that the families of married
men would become burdens to the counties or parishes. 103 Under the Port Act, merchant
vessels were held in port until quotas set in proportion to their tonnage were met.104
Under the County Act, counties or parishes were penalised LiO (in addition to the
bounty) for each man short of their quotas. The navy appointed regulating officers for
each port and county to inspect the volunteers, although their decisions could be
overturned by local justices. 105 The recruits were inspected again when they reported on
board the receiving ships. Article twenty-three of the County Act ensured that unsuitable
recruits could be rejected.'°6 The Quota Acts of 1796 were similar but, whether the result
of a better harvests, improving economic conditions or manpower shortages, succeeded
in raising only 6,142 volunteers for the navy.107
Unlike most of the seamen, the quota-men volunteered. Presumably, the bounties settled
their financial problems. While life at sea may have proved a disappointment, their
complaints did not figure in the proceedings. The quota-men did not cause disaffection,
they caused resentment. They were landsmen drafted into situations where seamen were
needed. Missing the point of Middleton's proposal, government introduced the acts
when there was no time to convert Iandsmen into seamen. Even though they were paid
100 Oprey, 135
11 York Qm,iucle, 3OApril 1795
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locally, the bounties given to quota-men undermined suggestions that government could
not afford to give seamen what from their perspective was an insignificant increase.
The acts were never popular. Seamen resented the exorbitant bounties. Officers
struggled to integrate landsmen into their crews. Counties and parishes objected to the
expense. Merchant companies and shipowners resented both the expense and the
inconvenience of embargoes.'°8 Regulating officers found the duty unpleasant. The
arbitrary nature of the quotas caused problems for all concerned, as did the practice of
buying substitutes to complete quotas. Government newspapers, without holding
government responsible for their presence, nnphed quota-men were behind the mutiny.
Opposition newspapers described the acts as proof of government's incompetence.
Neale's mutilation of Robert's manuscript ensured that a whiggish interpretation of the
mutiny prevailed:
Not content with the treatment we have described, the government commenced
emptying the jails of all abandoned reprobates and irreclaimable characters that could
be found in the country, and by sending them on board the fleet, at once rid
themselves of all further trouble, provided food for the shot of the enemy, and by
numerical presence of a set of lawless villains, foolishly imagined they were adding to
the courage of veterans already approved in numberless engagements. ... By this
scandalous proceeding, the seamen who had passed his life in the service of his
country was reduced to a level with the wretch whose crimes had expelled him from
its shores, the calling to which service was thus publicly and officially acknowledged
as the worst punishment in the state, and while the men became disgusted with their
governors, they were infected by their companions. Accustomed to a life of vagrancy
and enjoyment, the criminals so drafted from the prisons, passed their time in
harassing good officers by their outrage of all duty, and the making an excuse for
tyrannical commanders to indulge in brutal and disgusting exhibitions of corporal
punishment. Filled with regret in their own minds for all they had lost on shore, and
accustomed, even as rogues in England, to find some show of justice due though to
the guilty, they now atoned to themselves for the impossibility of revenge, by
pointing out to the seamen the unnatural tyranny exercised over them, and the surety
of redress on the facts being made known to their countrymen. Thus tutored on the
one side by iniquity, and goaded on the other by injustice, our surprise here naturally
arises, not that the British seamen should have been driven to revolt, but that they
109
should not have revolted long before.
Michael Lewis argued that unqualified local authorities inevitably simply selected the
wrong people:
The scheme soon degenerated into a sort of minor gaol-delivery. The counties
tended to select their 'bad boys', their vagrants, tramps and idlers. It suited the
'°8 Emsley, Hill & Ashcroft, 9
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Justices of the Peace to conclude that the local poacher would be as destructive to
French sailors as he was to English birds - and possibly they were right, though there
is no shred of evidence to prove it. The town and city authorities sent worse types
still - their undesirables; beggars; minor thieves and pickpockets, or people who
looked as though they might pick pockets. They even, sometimes, gave the
delinquents who appeared before them the alternatives of Quota or Quod.°
While colourful, his description draws more from contemporary prejudices than analysis
of the acts." 1 The counties did what they could to comply with the acts and minimise the
expense. One of Lewis' prejudiced sources was Edward Brenton:
The quota-bounty given in 1795, 1796 and 1797 we conceive to have been the most
ill-advised and fatal measure ever adopted by the Government for manning the fleet.
The seamen who voluntarily enlisted in 1793, and fought some of the most glorious
of our battles, received the comparatively small bounty of L5. These brave fellows
saw men, totally ignorant of the profession, the very refuse and outcasts of Society,
fleeing from justice and the vengeance of the Law, come on board with bounty to the
amount of L70. One of these objects, on coming on board a ship of war with QO
bounty, was seized by a boatswain's mate who, holding him up with one hand by the
waistband of his trousers, humorously exclaimed, 'here's a fellow that cost a guinea a
,1 12pound!
Brenton was not alone. The acts were an easy target for condemnation. 'The Quota Acts
have served subsequent historians as the perfect vehicle for every theory, each proposing
their own favourite candidates as the Quota men who must have inspired the mutiny.'113
Some were described coming on boar&
covered with filth, crawling with parasites, 'so truly wretched, and unlike men',
that the lieutenant must have been disgusted to receive them. Criminals sentenced at
the sessions were offered the alternative of going to sea. The direct consequences
were that our ships of war were frequently manned by criminals and petty thieves,
who stole from each other, and skulked their work, and deserted when they could.
The lower gun decks became the scene of nearly every vice and crime in the calendar.
Perhaps no place has contained more vice, wickedness, and misery, within such a
narrow compass, than a ship of the line at the end of the eighteenth century.114
Such absurdities require no comment, other than to note their passage from prejudiced
observers to biased newspapermen to nineteenth-century popular historians to twentieth-
110MLewis,118
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century polemicists - each accepting the interpretation without question or further
115
enquiry.
As the bounties were set and paid locally with one-third advanced to the volunteer, the
local authorities took care to select the right men as they were likely to lose advances to
those rejected by the navy. While rumours of men deserting and re-enlisting to get a
116	 ,
second bounty persisted, the practice was a capital offence. As for Brenton s refuse
and outcasts of society', both acts specified that 'persons accused of Offences punishable
by Law, shall be delivered over to the Civil Magistrate' and 'the regulating officers had
strict orders not to enrol as quota-men any felon, undischarged soldier, or vagrant.'117
Another of Pitt's schemes to raise men caused the confusion. Amending a 1744 act
regarding the disposition of 'rogues, vagabonds, and other idle and disorderly persons',118
the Vagrant Act of 1795 authorised local magistrates 'to apprehend all idle and disorderly
persons who might be able to serve in the forces and who could give no account of their
means of procuring a livelihood'. 119 The navy had long served as an alternative to gaol;
but in wartime there were not enough of the right sort of undesirables to satisfy the
navy's needs. Thomas Turner, shopkeeper and churchwarden, highlights the
shortcomings of the system in a small Sussex village:
Sunday, April 2. In the even, Master Hooke and myself went and searched John
Jones's and Prawles', in order to see if there was any disorderly fellows, that we might
have them to the setting to-morrow, in order to send them off to sea. We found
none that we thought proper to send.uo
Dr. Johnson's dictum may have discouraged society's more literate refuse: 'No man will
be a sailor who has contrivance enough to get himself into a gaol; for being in a ship is
being in a gaol; with the chance of being drowned. A man in a gaol has more room,
better food and commonly better company.' The Vagrant Act could not be 'considered a
success for it raised few men and then of a particularly vicious type'. 121 While no quotas
115 Rodger observes that Masefield's Sea Life in Nelson's Time 'still has its admirers, but none among those
who know anything at all of the subject'. Rodger, 'Mutiny or Subversion?', 15
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or bounties were involved, those recruited were frequenfly confused with quota-men.
122Sadly, the confusion persists.
Gill found additional proof of intrigue in the Annual Register of 1797:
it was surmised that a spirit of dissatisfaction had been infused into the ships
companies by those who had lately entered among them: several of whom were
known to be of qualifications superior to the situation to which they were driven by
unprosperous circumstances, and, in some degree, allured by the greatness of the
bounties given. Of these, several were discovered afterwards to have been
disqualified attorneys, and cashiered excisemen, clerks dismissed from employment,
and other individuals in similar cases. It was also suggested, that, besides these, many
persons had entered on board the ships, qualified to breed disturbances, by acting in
that station, and selected for that purpose, by enemies of governmentY3
By truncating the qualifiers 'it was surmised' and 'it was also suggested' from the above
and ignoring the Annual Registet's biased sources (newspapers), Gill advanced the
argument without augmenting it. He concluded that 'many of the leading mutineers were
either quota-men who had adopted revolutionary opinions, or volunteers who had
purposely enlisted to encourage and direct the discontent that was known to exist in the
navy."24 Like Neale/Roberts, he suggested the quota-men were 'most keenly conscious
of the physical hardship' of life at sea, insisting they 'were also the most likely to be
infected with sedition'.' He described them as 'the authors of the mutinies, and as the
instruments by which the secret societies were able to spread their influence in the fleet'.
Gill offered no evidence to support his allegations that the quota-men were seditious,
revolutionary or had any influence over the delegates. As the relevant records provide no
examples to support his theory, the only conclusion supported by the evidence is that
quota-men volunteered for the money.'
The best estimate is that the 1795 acts recruited about 31,000 men, the 1796 acts
much fewer. Possibly no more than one-sixth were seamen, but the remainder were
overwhelmingly young working men from a cross-section of the usual trades, mostly
from the counties they were recruited for or nearby. Though there were some from
more distant parts, only 300 were Irish. There is no evidence at all of the disqualified
attorneys, cashiered excisemen, fraudsters, debtors, bankrupts, vagrants, beggars,
poachers, pickpockets, Sunday-school pupils, schoolmasters and other undesirables
I22( Doorne, Mutirj and Sedition in the Home Commands of the Rqya/Nay 1783-1803 (London PhD, 1998), 78
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supposed to have been recruited by these acts. All the evidence is that these were not
educated trouble makers, but responsible working men in need of employment.127
Instead of suggesting they enlisted to excite mutiny, Manwaring and Dobrée emphasised
the poor conditions which they assumed led the quota-men to revolt:
But probably the most powerful influence in causing disaffection was the presence of
a large number of quota-men, who, better educated, resented being treated worse
than animals, being styed and fed like swine, and often treated like swine by
superiors, who, sometimes irresponsible, acted under the protection of a ferocious
code known as the Articles of War. They also, discontented for themselves, would
help to foment discontent among the seamen.
When designing men could not be found, quota-men served the same purpose, enabling
government newspapers to re-assure the public there was no rot in England's wooden
walls. They also allowed the opposition press to argue the introduction of seditious
elements into the navy as proof of government's incompetence. Two hundred years later,
quota-men are still scapegoats to those who see seamen as illiterate, inarticulate and
incapable of organising a successful mutiny.
Wells argued that the introduction of the quota-men effected 'something of a revolution
in the social composition of the lower decks'. 1 He contended:
The combination of unionist mentality fuelled by democratic ideology underlay the
massive mutinies of 1797. Pay and conditions were the initial issues. The mutinies
occurred soon after the bulk of the quota men joined. The literacy of the mutineers'
communications proved the participation of well-educated men. The mutineers'
organisations, their elections, delegations, ships committees, and central committees
reflect perfectly those of the popular democratic societies. For as naval historians are
inordinately fond and implicitly proud of stressing the 'real British of seaman was
usually a simple soul obstinately conservative, ill educated', too unsophisticated to
even conceive the organisation which was to be responsible for their initial triumphs
over the Admiralty.
Wells ignored the seamen recruited under the Port Acts and neglected to mention that, in
addition to fifteen thousand men recruited under the County Acts, between 1792 and
1797 over eighty thousand merchant seamen were pressed (over one hundred thousand
if discharges, desertions, disabilities and deaths are taken into account). While the food
and conditions merchant seamen endured were generally not any better, the pay was;
and, more importantly, they had a voice in the management of their ships, some even
127 Rodger, 'Mutiny or Subversion', 11. Actually, Emsley did discover a cashiered exciseman and two
former schoolmasters amongst the North Ridmg recruits. Emsley, Hill & Ashcroft, 92,96 & 107
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Wells, 83-84
332
had shares in a voyage's profits. Merchant seamen also had long traditions of collective
bargaining in which refusing to weigh anchor was an accepted tactic.'°
Even if the established complaints procedure broke down, as occasionally it did, and
the men resorted to mutiny, they invariably followed a set of time-honoured,
unwritten rules which limited their mutiny to a formal demonstration of token
disobedience, quite without violence. Authority, for its part, had but one reaction to a
mutiny conducted according [to] the rules: swift, complete surrender.131
The Channel fleet did not need to import 'unionist mentalities' or 'democratic
ideologies'. They were already present. Rather than reflecting the easily penetrated and
largely unsuccessful systems of the corresponding or Irish societies, the seamen used
their own proven procedures.
Wells was wrong to assume the quota-men managed the mutiny because seamen were
'too unsophisticated even to conceive the organisation which was to be responsible for
their initial triumphs over the Admiralty'.' 32 He held that the 'literacy of the mutineers'
communications proves the participation of well-educated men', without considering that
the former is not necessarily dependent upon the latter. He also insisted their language
'suggests the strength of democratic ideology in their ranks'. His argument was
reminiscent of Sheridan's 'circulating libraries'; and, like Sheridan, he failed to support it
with any evidence or examples prior to the mutiny.
Polemical misuse of the evidence plagues the history of the mutiny. Wells has made the
'painful crawl through the archives', but has selected and arranged evidence to prove his
point. Inevitably, interpretations differ according to the passions, prejudices and
perceptions of those who recorded their impressions, the newspapers who collected,
edited and published them and the historians who interpret them. Limited information
constrains perception. As more becomes available, interpretations should change and
understanding should increase.
While Gifi approached the subject with a predilection to prove that 'the spirit of
revolution invaded the navy', he presented his evidence in a sufficiently 'balanced and
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scholarly' manner to leave room for discussion. Similarly, Wells argued the mutiny was
part of a democratic movement, managed by outsiders and aimed at peace or
constitutional reform, but supported his argument with contrivance rather than evidence.
He mined the archives to find evidence supporting his hypothesis and ignored everything
contradicting it. He adjusted chronology to imply precedence where the documents offer
only consequence. He edited and removed statements from their context to suit his
purposes, then cited respected authorities to give the illusion of support.
According to Wells, 'Although the War Office prohibited army officers from recruiting
in prisons, the courts had no such scruples, and many suspects escaped trial by "opting"
for the army.' 133 He argued the practice was even more prevalent in the navy and cited
Clive Emsley in support. Emsley, however, did not oblige:
I have made a detailed study of the records of eight borough and thirty-six county
sessions during the period of the war against Revolutionary France. Seven of these
sessions (Bedford, Bedfordshire, Cambridge, Cumberland, Herefordshire, Norwich
and York) have no record of any man being enlisted from the court-room. The other
thirty-seven sessions sent a total of 384 offenders.'
Emsley mentioned three individuals, accused of 'administering illegal oaths' and given the
choice of enlistment in the army or transportation:
these cases aside I have found no evidence in the Home Office Papers, Assize
Papers, or in Quarter Sessions Papers of anyone being sent into, given the choice of
enlisting in the services after being convicted in England of 'sedition', 'seditious
words', 'seditious libel' or any other clearly 'political' offence.S
Wells cited F W Brooks in support of his statement that 'hundreds of insolvent artisans,
tradesmen small masters, and failed members of the boueoisie, shopkeepers, clerks and
even attorneys' seized the 'opportunity' to become quota-men. Instead, Brooks declared
'the bulk of the men were agricultural labourers ... village lads with decent
reputations."
Wells offered two statements, one obsequious, the other salacious, as proof of the fleet's
disaffection:
The crew's ship's committee on the Rqyal Sovem<gn told Captain Bedford that his, and
other expulsions of officers 'entirely proceeded from the suggestions of disaffected
'331bie480
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men', characters perhaps like Cohn Brown who tried to destroy faith in the king's
pardon, and push forward: 'the buggar [si] of a King was asleep or flicking the
Queen at the time he made it ... having a good ship under them if the Crew were of
his Determination they would have no government but their own."37
Wells failed to mention when, where or why the statements were made. The first
appeared in a letter given to Captain Bedford as he and Admiral Gardner boarded the
Rqyal Soverezga amidst the celebrations of 11 May.' It reassured Bedford of his crew's
loyalty and willingness to resubmit to discipline and begged him to
do the Ships Company the favor of interesting yourself with Sir Alan Gardner to
pardon the unprecedented conduct of that part of them who from the impulse of the
moment and being misled by the misrepresentations of Others, desired him, Yourself
and Officers to quit the Ship; a Circumstance they have ever since sincerely
,1 39
regretted.
Two months later, Cohn Brown, a seaman from another ship, was accused of 'publickly
mak[ingJ use of treasonable and mutinous language'. The incident occurred at Plymouth
on 14 June following the reading to the ship's company of the 'Proclamation for the
Suppression of the Mutinous and Treasonable Proceedings of the Crews of Our Ships at
the Nore' and the 'Resolutions of Merchants, Ship-owners, Insurers and other
Inhabitants of London concerning commerce and navigation'.' 40 Wells constructed his
illusion from the testimony of two witnesses at Brown's court-martial. The master
testified:
I heard him say shortly after that it was a pretty speech (alluding to the Proclamation
that had been read in the forenoon) that the Bugger of a King was asleep or fucking
the Queen at the time he made it - such discourse passed for some time - he said that
the King might be buggered and all his officers under him - he said that there was
tollerable good usage in the ship but they may thank themselves for it but for the
future that if any officer in the ship, let him be whom he would, should offer to strike
him that he would knock him down with a hand pike. He said he had a very good
ship under foot why did they not pay them or why were they not paid or words to
that effect and that if the Men were of his Mind they would pay themselves and take
her and have a roving Commission.'4'
A seaman testified that the 'words to that effect' were: 'That having a good ship under
them if the crew were of his determination they would have no Government but their
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own with the sea being wide enough and any country better than their own.' Brown, of
course, denied the charges, claiming to have been 'greatly in liquor' and engaged in
'Romancing discourse' at the time. While his disaffection was plain, his statement had
nothing to do with the King's pardon. He responded, in sympathy or drunken confusion,
to the threats to deny pay, pensions and future employment in the merchant service to
the 'mutinous seamen at the Nore'. Brown found no support for his scheme. Instead, he
was arrested, confined until tried, convicted and hanged at Spithead. After exaggerating
the significance of a minor incident involving more drink than disaffection, occurring at
another time, another place, and relating to another mutiny, Wells ignored the 6 June
'Address from the Seamen at Hamoze to the Seamen at the Nore':
We on board the different Ships in Hamoze, have consulted together concerning
your present Proceedings, and understand that you are still keeping forward your
cause, We therefore wish to know your Grievances that makes you still dissatisfied,
as we have had every Grievance settled here with us, and that we can farther assure
you, that the Grand Fleet is at Sea, and in greater Spirits than they ever were, and we,
as your Brothers, expect that you will be satisfied with the same Terms we are, which
are such as all true hearted Loyal British Seamen should be satisfied with; we trust
that you will immediately return to your regular Duty as we have done, and that you
will be satisfied as we are - your present Proceedings are a scandal to the Name of
British Seamen - Immediately Answer this to us, whose Names are hereunto
subscribed, being the former Delegates of the Fleet in Hamoze, in the Name of all
the Ships Companies.142
Wells argued the mutineers' organisations reflect those of the popular democratic
societies. Aaron Graham was predisposed to make the same connection:
the systematic appearance with which the delegates and the sub-committees on
board different ships conducted the business of the mutiny may be supposed a good
ground of suspecting that better informed men than sailors must have been
employed in regulating it for them.143
Graham, however, concluded that they were unnecessary:
at first [we] were inclined to believe [this] too; but in the course of their
examinations of people belonging to the fleet they were perfectly convinced that
without such a combination and with the assistance of the newspapers only
(independent of the many cheap publications to be had upon the subjects relating to
clubs and societies of all descriptions) and the advantage of so many good writers as
must have been found among the quota-men, they were capable of conducting it
themselves.
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While Graham allowed the evidence to refute his hypothesis, Wells did not. Instead, he
dismissed Graham's investigative efforts by suggesting he 'would not have been very
ready to admit to political disaffection within the fleet even had it existed'. Wells did not
say why. Aaron Graham was an experienced and respected police magistrate; and the
Duke of Portland was eager to uncover disaffection, provided it could be attributed to
outsiders. It would divert the public's attention and keep newspapers supplied with
stories about subversion, sedition and treason.
None of the delegates were quota-men. None of their public documents or private letters
addressed quota-men's concerns. Nor did they hint at a political agenda. Instead, they
repeatedly reassured the country of their loyalty and emphatically denied Jacobin
influences. The settlement benefited seamen to the detriment of landsmen. It did nothing
to improve the conditions or discipline that made naval life so harsh for landsmen.
Allusions to the contrary are so scattered as to suggest individual rather than general
disaffection. Indeed, insubordination or disrespect were punished. The True Briton
reporteth
On board the Sovereign, the King's Proclamation was nailed to the mast; some infernal
scoundrel cut off God Save the King; the Seamen have offered Fifty Guineas Reward
for the discovery, and swear they will hang the man the instant he is detected.145
In the heated debate over Colpoys' fate, the consensus called for moderation. Cries of
'blood for blood' were not allowed to jeopardise the proceedings.
While proving that none of the delegates at Spithead were quota-men, Manwaring and
Dobrée still insisted they had a key role in the mutiny. 1 Ignoring clear evidence that the
fleet was united because it had a common grievance, the time and the ability to reach a
consensus, they concluded:
Whoever it was that organised the seamen must have been a man of ability
amounting to genius. But no ringleader ever appeared; it was as though the Fleet
spoke with one voice, spontaneously. ... Not only did the leader get this strange
medley to act in concert, but he managed them so as to allow him to frame their
demands with consummate skill. In the early petitions one point was put forward,
and only point one, a perfectly reasonable one, which everybody would be able to
appreciate, one which involved no idea of personal wrongs or of other people's
shortcomings, but was on the face of it perfectly fair.'47
1 "Wells, 92; Thomis & Holt, Th,?ats of Revolution in Bntain 1789-1848 (London; Macmillan, 1977), 25-26
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J G Bullocke followed in the same vein:
In this Fleet an organisation of the men was rapidly coining into being. Exactly how
this was brought about we shall never know, but someone connected with it almost
deserves the overworked title of 'genius'. For when the time came, the Fleet acted
like one man, sensible and reasonable demands were put forward, and a studied
moderation was preserved in all things.
Similarly, Michael Lewis preferred conspiracies to explanations that were supported by
the evidence:
The men behind the famous Spithead affair of 1797 have never really been identified.
This alone argues considerable cleverness in them, for ringleadership in mutiny was
highly dangerous. They were, however, almost certainly not of the old seamen stock.
They showed themselves too subtle and sophisticated for that.149
However, Rodger conclude&
It is only possible to believe that the mutiny was really led by Quota men if one
believes that the delegates were straw men concealing the real leaders - or the real
leader, that shadowy Macavity of the Channel Fleet, the mysterious genius who
'must' have organised the mutiny but who covered his tracks so perfectly that no
evidence of his existence survives. Here we are in the presence of the conspiracy
theory in its purest form, in which the entire absence of evidence only serves to
prove the fiendish cunning of the conspirators.'°
He observed: 'A number of those who have written about the 1797 mutinies have been
more or less explicitly applying their history to support modern political or social
causes.'151 Rodger suggest that in this sort of 'engaged' history,
all pretensions of objectivity are suspect, the only honest history being that which
candidly expresses the moral, political, and personal beliefs of the historian. ... this
kind of 'engaged' history shares with sociological history a contempt for the
experiences and beliefs of contemporaries and an overweening regard for the
superior wisdom and judgement of the historian.'52
Polemics did not wait for historians. To contemporaries, the mutiny was inherently
political Revolt against authority could not be regarded in any other light. For those in
power, it posed a threat. For those out of power, it posed an opportunity. Government
used the mutiny to justify further curtailment of civil liberties. Opposition used it to
undermine confidence in government. Radicals and revolutionaries reacted too late to
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149 Jwjs 124-125
' 50 Rodger, 'Mutiny or Subversion?', 9
151 Ibid., 1
152 G Himmelfarb, 'Social History and Moral Imagination', R Neale, Histoy & CIass Essential Rnadñgs in
Theorj and Interpretation (London: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 269
338
have any effect at Spithead. However, as the outbreak at the Nore proved, the mutiny did
politicise the seamen. As Patton predicted, Spithead made seamen aware of their
collective strength and government's weakness. While the fleet seemed satisfied with
what they had accomplished, it took time to restore discipline and settle back into normal
routines. On 26 May Captain Moore described the problems he encountered:
On the 22nd the Melampus came out to Spithead; the ships at Spithead are all more or
less in a state of mutiny, the streets are filled with drunken sailors, in short, I see no
end to the dismal business.
It is now eleven o'clock at night and I do not believe there are 20 sober men on
board; they have been boxing at a great rate among the Irishmen, of which
description we have a very large proportion, but I do not believe they are at all
disposed to mutiny; they have just left off dancing and those who are not totally
insensible are singing in chorus the Boyne Water.'53
There were certainly elements and individuals in the fleet who felt the delegates had not
gone far enough. A residual of disaffection and its consequence were confirmed on 3
July when Captain Bedford of the Ryal Soverezn requested a court-martial for William
Lee and Thomas Preston. They were accused of 'being very forward, several times in the
course of the preceding Month, in endeavouring to excite Mutiny'.' The charges
specified that 'Lee had been concerned, and particularly forward in fonning a Party
amongst the Ships Company to take the Ship from the Officers, and carry her to
Spithead.' There they hoped to force government to sue for peace. Their court-martial
was held at Torbay on 28-29 August 1797. Lee and Preston were found guilty and
sentenced to be hanged. Bridport issued detailed instructions for the executions:
at 10 o'clock to morrow morning, you are to cause the Preparative Signal, a
Yellow Flag at the Main topgallant Mast head, to be hoisted, and fire One Gun, on
board the said ship, when the Boats Manned, and Armed, with a lieutenant in each
will be sent, from His Majesty's Ships under my Command in this Bay, to see the
sentence of Death on William Lee, and Thomas Preston, carried into Execution,
which you are to put in force, precisely at 11 o'clock, to morrow the 4th Instant, by
causing them to be severally hanged by the neck, at the Yard Arms of the said Ship,
until they are Dead, and you are to order such parts of the Boats Crews of the Fleet
to come on board the Rqyal Sovergn, and assist in the manning of the Yard Ropes.
And as soon as the Execution is put into force, you are to read the Articles of War,
to your Ships Company, impressing upon their Minds, upon this Solemn Occasion,
the fatal consequences that may arise from a Mutinous and Disorderly Behaviour,
that they may be restrained by the Ignominy of their Fate, and warned by their
Examples.
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In their final statement, Lee and Preston were obliged to make Bridport's point:
Shipmates and Brethren
We who this morning are doomed to bid adieu to this World, think it our duty before
we are launched into the Guiph of Eternity, fully to acknowledge to you, that we
have received a fair Trial for the Crimes which we have committed, and have merited
the Punishment which we about to suffer. But as dying Men, and Christians, we now
earnestly entreat you, to beware of that Rock on which we have foundered. We are
now fully convinced of the necessity of obeying those, who are set in Authority over
us, and of living content in the situation in Life, in which it has pleased God to place
us.
Having received assurances, as our last request, that those who have been so
unfortunate as to have been connected with us in our late Crimes, will not for the
same be brought to Punishment; we now look forward with Pleasure to the moment
of our Fate, in a full and joyful Expectation of partaking in those Joys, which in
Heaven are prepared for Penitent Sinners.'55
John Owen put the matter into a broader context when he observed:
From 1779 until the end of the war with Napoleon in 1815 hardly a year passed,
except in time of peace, without at least one mutiny. This marked change was due to
the growth of education and social consciousness, influenced perhaps by the example
set in America, partly to the fact that service in the Navy was becoming more
arduous. Ships spent more time at sea and the number of men required, both for
ships of war and for carrying trade, increased out of proportion to the population, so
that the faults in administration bore more hardly and there were fewer opportunities
for relaxation. The men were less ready to take hardships for granted: not only could
they see more clearly than their ancestors how much was due to inefficiency and how
much was unavoidable, but they were quick to resent what seemed unnecessary.1
However, he ignored the obvious. While social consciousness and literacy had increased,
inefficiencies did surface and the service was more arduous, these factors did not figure
in the seamen's complaints. They sought better pay, provisions and pensions.
The administration of the navy and shipboard management made vast improvements in
the eighteenth century. Despite its all its faults, the Navy Board did all that it was asked
to do. The sheer scale of activity caused the problem: the number of ships and men in
service, the length of time they were at sea, and the volume of victuals, supplies and
money required to keep them afloat. The mutiny came at a time when the Admiralty, the
Navy Board and the officers were stretched to their limits. To cope, they redefined
methods, discipline and relationships with the lower-deck. The mutiny resisted those
changes, particularly when they involved abandoning traditional rights and indulgences.
155	 chaplain or an officer often helped the condemned prepare their final address.
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In a context of war and revolution, it made no difference. Regardless of their motives,
their actions constituted a threat to authority that could not be tolerated.
However, whether it was seen as an act or a strike for better pay and conditions, both
were illegal. The King's Bench ruled in 1721:
'It is not for refusing to work, but for conspiracy that they are indicted, and a
conspiracy of any kind is illegal'. ... For men to meet privately to do injury to another
(i.e. to harm the business of their employer) had 'at all times been considered by the
law of this country, as a very heinous crime'; even had the combination been
intended as a 'good and useful act', a strike was clearly a conspiracy.'57
Under the common-law, 'the fairness or justness of the workers' claims was not at issue,
only the fact of conspiracy. In practice, 'the threat of legal action' was preferred 'to the
making of martyrs'. 158 Under Admiralty law, such conspiracies were considered mutiny,
but the practice was much the same. When the threats and intimidation proved
inadequate, examples were required. Three years before, Philip Patton as suggested as
much in his Observations on Naval Mutiny.
the true spirit of discipline always requires that Mutiny should never lead to
redress, but certainly, and infallibly, terminate in punishment. It may perhaps be said
that there are seasons when clemency is necessary to safety, but when the requisite
punishments cannot be inflicted upon those Men who are convicted of Mutiny, lest
they should produce some greater evil, an irrefragable proof is produced that
discipline is in the last stages of decline, and the force of the Nation is then become
more dangerous to the state, than to the Enemy.'59
An eyewitness to the proceedings, Lieutenant Phillip Beaver, put the problem into
perspective. He admired the seamen's courage and restraint, but condemned their
conduct
They have all, however, excepting one ship only, behaved with great prudence,
decency, and moderation (if I may use those terms when speaking of an act of
mutiny) in this business; and obey their officers as before in the regular routine of
ship's duty - saying that they are not dissatisfied with their officers or the service, but
are determined to have an increase of pay. ... As an officer, I must condemn their
conduct, as a well-wisher of my country, I must regret its being so exceedingly ill-
timed; but as a man, I can find many excuses for them. I could say many things to
extenuate their conduct, and I cannot but admire their moderation in so daring an
exercise of illegal power, and their patriotism in having so studiously prevented our
'57J Rule, Labowin,g Classes in Early Indust,ialEngland 1750-1850 (London: Longman, 1986), 259
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enemies from conceiving they can derive any advantage from it, by declaring that if
their fleets appear at sea they are ready to follow them.16°
Beaver's sympathies were not shared. Most officers saw the seamen's triumph as a stain
upon their records. For one, it ended in suicide in an Admiralty waiting room. 161 The
subject was discreetly avoided. The Naval Chronicle prefaced one of its rare comments on
the mutiny with an apology: 'To dwell on transactions like these is highly offensive to our
feelings.'162 Naval biographers generally excised that portion of their subject's careers.
Such reticence was understandable, but not without consequence. Dismissing the mutiny
as the work of designing men or quota-men diverted public discussion, allowed
government to escape responsibility and ultimately perpetuated the problems. Warnings,
precedents and opportunities to learn from mistakes were lost:
The true significance of the mutinies in 1783 was the lesson they gave the seamen in
the power of concerted resistance to authority on a large scale as a means of having
grievances put right. Fourteen years later, in far more serious circumstances, the men
showed they had learnt the lesson; but it passed unheeded by the Government and
the Admiralty, who were quite unprepared for what happened in 1797.163
The new precedent suddenly became important. The lesson learned by the seamen at
Spithead had to be unlearned. The I May Instructions were explicit, though ill-timed.'
They were neither an exercise in the obvious nor 'a masterpiece in folly'. 165 They signalled
a change in policy and the end of a tradition:
Where modern officers expect to command, mid 18th century officers hoped to
persuade. The fact that this did not alarm them was partly because it was a feature of
service life to which they were completely accustomed and no different from the
weakness of civil authority on shore. Much more, however, it reflected an
unconscious belief in the stability of society ashore or afloat. English society in the
middle years of the century was, or at least seemed to be, fundamentally secure and
almost static. Those in positions of power or authority and those without either, felt
themselves far more bound by mutual ties of dependence and obligation than
separated by divisions of class.
Prior to 1797 and particularly in the merchant service, as long as it 'conformed to certain
unwritten rules', mutiny was an accepted negotiating tactic. Such mutinies were 'regarded
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it with a weary tolerance, as one of the many disagreeable but unavoidable vexations of
naval life. It called, not for punishment, but for immediate action to remedy the
,167grievances complained of. With the 1 May Instructions, the Admiralty gave notice
such practices would no longer be tolerated.
A lesson in moral economy
On 24 April 1797, a retired naval officer offered some advice to his 'younger brethren':
The Seamen are intrusted to your care as children to a parent. View them with a
parental eye, and remember that the only difference between you and them is
education. They neither want for Good Sense, or Affection for their King and
Country.
By order of George III, Lord Howe went to Portsmouth to listen to and resolve the
complaints of individual ships, to reassure and celebrate with the fleet. He was old,
exhausted and in pain. He had been publicly humiliated and presumed to have neglected
his men. They publicly forgave him. The press proclaimed his role in resolving the crisis
without admitting his role in creating it.
The conduct of Lord Howe, during the mutiny of 1797, was as commendable as it
was arduous. The difficulties he had to encounter, would almost baffle the exertions
of the human mind. The kingdom contemplated, with a degree of unusual anxiety,
this venerable character, whose head was silvered o'er with age and long service,
struggling at the close of life, to withstand the insidious artifice of the enemy, which
threatened to lay the proudest honours of Great Britain in the dust. He felt humanely
for those who were infected by the noxious poison, and strove with parental
tenderness in their behalf. He stood like the guardian genius of his Country, between
the dead and the living, and stayed the phtgue.169
The paternal allusions provide a clue as to what went wrong. The mutiny was always
more than just complaints about 'biscuits and arrears'.
It is possible to detect in almost every eighteenth-century crowd action some
legitiinising notion. By the notion of legitimisation I mean that the men and women
in the crowd were informed by the belief that they were defending traditional rights
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The mutiny succeeded because it followed a well-established pattern. The thirty thousand
men of the Channel fleet united in the belief that they were defending traditional rights.
In spite of their apparent strength, the delegates, indeed the fleet as a collective body
bent on the exercise of the politically possible, recognised the need to form a consensus
and secure public sympathies. 17' Contemporary observers made the connection between
the mutiny and traditional forms of public protest:
The guilt of Ministers in neglecting to satisfy the just demands of our Seamen is the
less to be forgiven, as the impending misfortune was many weeks ago foreseen. The
complaints of the Sailors, on account of their arrears, were as loud, and as generally
heard in Portsmouth, as the complaints of the poor were lately heard on account the
dearness of bread.'72
The mutiny at Spithead 'was a highly complex form of direct popular action, disciplined
and with clear objectives'. 173 The seamen's grievances 'operated within a popular
consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegitimate practices'. The delegates
asked only for what could be justified to the fleet and the public. Rebellious spirits were
controlled, violence was avoided, licentious behaviour was punished and discipline was
maintained. They denied outside influences and reassured the king and the country of
their loyalty. They sought no more than the recovery of 'lawful rights'; and, as a result,
enjoyed unqualified support.
We the Marines of the ,Queen Charlotte Impressed with the strongest sense of
Gratitude for the good Wishes of the Seamen towards us we do Return them our
most unfeigned Thanks with every Assurence of Steadyness to their Cause. We offer
our Services and do Assure them that We will assist them in Recovering their Lawfull
Rights at this time or any Other Whatsoever.174
Theirs position was well grounded in
a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper
economic functions of several parties within the community, which, taken together,
can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor. An outrage to these moral
assumptions, quite as much as actual deprivation, was the usual occasion for direct
175
action.
Significantly, the seamen complained more of injustice than deprivation. Conditions were
difficult, but they were accustomed to a hard life. They asked for a shilling a day,
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although the amount was far short of what they could earn in the merchant service. They
wanted sixteen ounces to the pound, fresh vegetables and beef instead of flour in port,
although they already had more than enough food. It was a matter of principle. 'The
moral economy demanded pure food, honestly measured, at a fair price." 76
 The seamen
sought justice, respect and the restoration of traditional rights and allowances. Their
loyalty and obedience did not have a price, but it did have a reciprocal obligation. Their
welfare and lives were entrusted to their officers. The seamen of the Channel fleet
expected Howe to champion their cause. According to centuries of naval tradition, an
admiral's duties included:
l'admiral est gouverneur des mariners & les doit gouverner & sustenir en toutes leurs loj's &
coustumes & eulx defendre a toutes Injures encontre tows & se besoing est poursur pour leurs
guages & en eulxfaire estrepye aura &prendra le dit admiral de chule tipqyee des guages aux
mariners ms &po.' les quel ms.'
Howe's position was untenable. He was refused permission to retire. He repeatedly
complained of the impracticality of commanding the fleet while convalescing at Bath.
Yet, while recognising the problem, he did nothing to compensate for it. Instead, he
refused to communicate with his replacement, leaving Bridport unaware of the fleet's
discontent. Though respected and revered, Howe failed in a basic responsibility.
However indisposed or sympathetic in character, as the commander-in-chief Howe was
responsible for the welfare of his men. While he convalesced at Bath, the responsibility
devolved without the attendant authority upon a man who wanted the authority without
the responsibility.
After Howe's apparent indifference and Gardner's harangues, the seamen expressed their
disappointment in a letter to Bridport: 'This second instance of the failure of an Officer
all most believed to be the Seamen's Friend has convinced us that we have nothing to
depend upon but our own vigorous exertions to obtain redress of grievances intolerable
and insupportable." 78 They hoped to cajole Bridport into assuming more responsibility:
we must however hope that your Lordship will consider the whole fleet as
universally and zealously attached to your Lordship and amidst the disaffection of
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our supposed friends turn their eyes to your Lordship their father their friend and in
short as a nobleman willing to assist and further our endeavours.
Unfortunately, Bridport also failed in a basic responsibility. As acting commander-in-
chief, he was expected to know the mood of the fleet and to handle whatever problems
might arise. However, Bridport appeared intent on avoiding, rather than assuming such
responsibility. On 23 April he began a letter to Spencer with the complaint 'I have
undergone so much fatigue this day, that I have hardly strength to write a line to your
Lordship.'179
 On hearing of the fleet's second refusal of his order to sail, he wrote:
I find with some distress and pain that I cannot command the Channel Fleet with
credit to myself or advantage to the public. I suggest to your Lordship whether it
might be better for the King's service that I should be permitted to strike my flag and
go ashore. I [send] these thoughts privately to your Lordship, for candid
consideration, as indeed my health has been so much impaired, by the late and
present painful trials, as to render one unfit for public service.180
To Nepean, he added: 'My mind is too deeply wounded by all these proceedings, as I am
so unwell that I can scarcely hold my pen to write these sentiments of distress.'181
The need to re-establish discipline and subordination to authority overshadowed any
lingering paternalism. The navy of the late 1790s was not what it was forty years
before. With the massive influx of men, unprecedented demands and expectations, the
navy neglected its traditions and abandoned implicit understandings.
Ironically, after providing the perfect paradigm for interpreting the mutiny, Thompson
failed to see it at work:
It is foolish to argue that, because the majority of the sailors had few clear political
notions, this was a parochial affair of ship's biscuits and arrears of pay, and not a
revolutionary movement. This is to mistake the nature of popular revolutionary
crisis, which arise from exactly this kind of conjunction between the grievances of
the majority and the aspirations articulated by the politically conscious minority.'
In his brief excursion into naval history, Thompson denied his own thesis and failed to
note that only seamen's aspirations were articulated. Elsewhere he commented:
[T]he larger outlines of power, station in life, political authority, appear to be as
inevitable and irreversible as the earth and sky. Cultural hegemony of this kind
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induces exactly such a state of mind in which the established structures of authority
and modes of exploitation appear to be in the very course of nature. This does not
preclude resentment or even surreptitious acts of protest or revenge; it does preclude
affirmative rebellion.'TM
Without understanding maritime traditions and customs, Thompson assumed the mutiny
was a rebellion. Forced to look outside the fleet for explanations, he chased phantoms.
Rodger describes Thompson's contribution to our understanding of the mutiny as 'the
romantic socialist view':
The true meaning of the mutinies was noting so trivial as naval affairs, which
Thompson had no idea of investigating; they were to be understood as a significant
movement in that most significant of all historical movements, the rise of the English
185
working class.
He expanded upon the theme:
It has also been argued that Thompson was insufficiently rigorous in his Marxism,
that romantic notions of working-class solidarity are no substitute for pure dialectic,
and that the only way to understand the life of the Navy is in terms of the struggling
proletarians striving to escape the shackles of the capitalist mode of production. This
tends to the unusual, almost unique, conclusion that the seamen were not an isolated
profession needing outsiders to teach them their revolutionary responsibilities, but
members of a radicalised working class quite capable of mounting their own
insurrection without the instruction of Quota men.'
Strip away the sarcasm. What remains is self-evident the seamen were quite capable of
mounting their own insurrection without the instruction of Quota-men or any other
outsiders:
There is no reason to argue that seamen were political innocents incapable of
collective organisation without outside help. ... Professional seamen like the
delegates of the fleet at Spithead were heirs of an ancient tradition which owed
nothing to outside tutelage. Arguably the harsher attitude toward collective protest
adopted by the Admiralty since the 1780s had forced the men to tighten up their
organisation, but they did not have to invent or borrow a tradition of collective
action. The whole experience of shipboard life was an education in teamwork and
initiative. ... As petty officers and leading hands they had been trained to carry
responsibility. They knew far more about collective action than shopkeepers or
schoohnasters.187
To Thompson the sophistication shown at Spithead was anomalous. While the mutiny
embraced some of the traditions of the moral economy and reflected some of the
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customs of food nots, it was an altogether more focused and structured protest. This
inconsistency led Thompson to look elsewhere for inspiration. Outside influences were
assumed to be at work. However, instead of looking outside the fleet for inspiration or
leadership, those who would understand the mutiny should look deeper inside naval and
merchant seamen's traditions. As Patton predicted, the mutiny was led by the best, not
the worst, men from each ship. On 15 April after unsuccessfully haranguing his crew,
Admiral Gardner:
selected all the good & leading Men in the Ship, and pointed out the necessity of
their good offices being employed in bringing the less informed Men to a sense of
their duty, and that I looked upon them to do so; their reply was, that they were fully
determined not to go to Sea, till such time as their Petitions were attended to &
complied with; that the Seamen & Marines of the Fleet had been neglected & they
conceived themselves equally entitled to the notice of their Country, with the Army
& Militia.188
The seamen were not deluded. They knew what they wanted. There were no outsiders,
no mysteries to unraveL The delegates, selected by the crews of the seventeen ships-of-
the-line then at Spithead, led the mutiny. They exercised caution and restraint because, in
signing the 15 April petitions, they knew they would be the first to hang if things went
badly.
An Abominable Itch
We have heard it stated, that in consequence of the disunion which exists among
even the Delegates at Portsmouth, as to what is fit to be done, Government has
received some information as to some persons who have been most active in
fomenting this alarming confusion, and that a Magistrate has been sent down to
Portsmouth to examine into this business. Every person must sincerely wish that the
authors of these broils may meet with condign punishment; and there is no way so
likely to learn the secret history of the origin of the mutiny, as by a disunion among
189the Delegates.
Despite due diligence, Aaron Graham found no secret history, no disunion among the
delegates, nor any indication that their actions were directed or influenced by unknown
parties on shore. His reports to the Home Office were thorough to the point of
describing his meals and counting his crossings of Portsmouth Harbour. The Duke of
Portland was sufficiently pleased to give Graham an assistant and ask him to investigate
the outbreak at the Nore.
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Those determined to make connections between the mutiny and popular democratic
movements are frustrated by the absence of evidence. Thompson admits: 'The attitude
adopted by the LCS towards the mutinies remains problematical.' 19° Preoccupied with
their own problems, the mutiny took them by surprise. Nonetheless, rumours abounded
of meetings in Chatham and Portsmouth, of the travels of various radicai leaders, of
contacts between delegates and unknown agitators. On 12 May the True Briton reported:
'Theiwell has been for some days in the Isle of Wight, not an indifferent spectator,
doubtless, of the late proceedings at Spithead.' 191 Graham described the problem:
Before I received your last letter I was pretty well convinced that Theiwell had not
been in this part of the World since the disturbances began at Spithead; for in the
first place I could not believe he would venture to come here at a time when he must
expect to be known by a great many people from London, who guessing his errand
would think it their duty (under existing circumstances) to have him taken hold of.
Independent of that I have minutely traced every story respecting him to its original
Reporter and most completely satisfied myself that there is not an Individual who
knows his Person either in Portsmouth or Gosport can say he has seen him. But to
show you how difficult it is to come at the truth of things here, on Saturday last, I
met the Honbie Capt. Berkeley of the Fomiidable who told me Thelwell, at short time
since, was on board his Ship at Spithead. Did he know him? No. How then could he
be certain it was Thelwell? Why he had been told by some of his People. Did ih
know him personally? No, but they believed it to be him, and he (Capt. B) had
believed and said so too, but now that I wanted a better proof of fact than his mere
belief, he began to doubt it. So great is this abominable itch 192 (among all description
of persons) for inventing something new, and so common is the practice of
circulating as a matter of fact what is now considered only as a story of the day that
Treason itself might easily be planned, executed, and publicly talked of long before it
would be seriously noticed by the magistrates who seem to think it beneath them to
k for information and even when it is brought to them, I am afraid it is little
attended to unless the informer can in the first instance produce proof sufficient to
193
convict upon.
Graham had little help in Portsmouth. He suspected the local population, corporation
and mayor sympathised with the seamen's efforts more than his. 194 Yet, he categorically
denied their efforts were directed or influenced from ashore:
°Thornpson, Making of the IVorkin,g Chars, 184
191 True Briton, 12 May 1797. Henot forwarded a letter from an observer at one of Theiwell's 'political
lectures' (HO 42/39, Pro Patria to the Editor of the True Briton, 12 April 1797). The themes and messages
he attributed to Theiwell did not surface during the mutiny.
192 An 'abominable itch' was a euphemism for pubic lice.
193	 ADM1 4172, Graham to Portland, 22 May 1797
194 Seamen reciprocated community support a few years lster when the crews of G/oy and Teineraire joined
in 'a conspiracy to compel Farmers and Butchers to sell their Commodities at a reduced price'. PRO
ADMI /3974, Hatton (Undersecretary of the Home Office) to Nepean, undated; also see Wells, 'Revolt of
the south-west', 732
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I would not have it understood because I have taken so much pains to get at this
little fact that therefore I am of opinion the Seamen have been mfluenced in their
conduct by any body from the Shore - on the contrary, aitho' I have no doubt that
pains have been taken from time to time to supply them with inflammatory writings
(which could be easily and I am sure was done by means of the Slopsellers) yet I am
persuaded from the conversation I have had with so many of the Sailors that if any
man upon earth had dared openly to avow his intention of using them as instruments
to distress the Country his life would have paid the forfeit.195
Graham warned the mutiny would attract 'many people ... from different parts of the
Kingdom to try if the moment of disorder is not favourable for producing disaffection
amongst the Seamen'. The danger, he feared, lay ahead:
Nothing like want of loyalty to the King or attachment to the Government can be
traced in the business, but as that admirable system of discipline which used to keep
the Navy in such good order is now (I am afraid completely destroyed) at least for
the present it should be strongly suspected that on the return of the Fleet into Port
there will be many people sent hither from different parts of the Kingdom to try if
the moment of disorder is not favorable for producing disaffection amongst the
Seamen.
Newspapers & Mutiny
Instead of designing men or quota-men, William Windham blamed newspapermen for
the mutiny.' Several captains of the fleet shared his opinion. Captain Hood, Mars,
advised his uncle Lord Bridport 'of the disturbed and unsettled state of the Ships
Company on account as they said of the Speeches they had seen in the News Papers'.'97
Captain Holloway, Duke, confirmed his crew was 'apprehensive from the Debates in the
Lords on Thursday last that their Increase of Pay will not be granted'.' As news spread
throughout the fleet, those who heard it second-hand were not quite sure what had been
said and apparently assumed the worse. Captain Thornbrough, Robust, confirmed that
misrepresentations and rumours damaged the fleet's confidence, but not its solidarity:
my Ships Company this morning at 9 o'Clock hearing Three Cheers given from
the Queen Charlotte, Rqyal Geote, Pompee, Impeteux and several other Ships, They
answered it from the Forecastle, I immediately went forward and asked what was the
Reason of the Cheering they informed me they did not know, only had heard it
mentioned the Parliament would not grant the money to pay them the additional
' PRO ADM1/4172, Graham to Portland, 22 May 1797
' The Times, 1 January 1799
197 PRO ADM1/107, Hood to Bridport, 7 May 1797
'Thid., Holloway to Bndport, 7 May 1797
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wages, and that the Duke of Clarence had spoke against them in the House of
Lords.1
Gardner agreed that newspapers played a part in the outbreak on 7 May, but said nothing
about misrepresentations: 'The present mutinous disposition, I believe, is occasioned by
the Speeches, which the Papers say were delivered on Wednesday last, by the Duke of
Bedford & other great Personages in the House of Lords.'20°
Newspapers played an important role in the mutiny. They informed the seamen of what
was happening in London. They provided them with news of the war, other government
pay increases, the Emperor's loan and the proceedings of Parliament. They reflected
public opinion, including both supportive and alarmist views of their proceedings. And
in this unique circumstance, they gave the seamen with both the opportunity and the
means to secure public sympathies. They also taught them the art of propaganda and the
language of circulating libraries. Second Secretary of the Admiralty William Marsden
observed:
The minds of men of all classes and descriptions had been more or less affected by
the principles and success of the French revolution, where the paramount efficiency
of physical force was exemplified, and encouragement given, at the same time, to the
adventurous exercise of talent.... [T]here is no good reason to presume that there
was any direct attempt on the part of the French Government to excite mutiny in our
fleets, yet the leaven of insubordination set to work in that country had insensibly
spread, the ideas of what are termed natural rights were disseminated in numerous
cheap or gratuitous publications, the discussion of bold opinions became fashionable
in public-houses, and our honest and open-hearted seamen were seized with the
contagion.20'
While newspapers informed the fleet of what was happening in Parliament, they also
informed the public of what was happening in Portsmouth. However, in addition to
informing readers, newspapers influenced them. Editorials, letters, false fleet sightings,
rumours of Jacobin agents and designing men, misrepresentations of Parlimentary
proceedings and apocryphal speeches by Gardner, Colpoys and Howe all served, with
varying degrees of success, the same purpose, to influence public opinion. Beyond
question, the seamen read newspapers; and, as Heriot, Howe and Sheridan discovered,
when their anger was aroused, they responded to what they read. Those responses show
how easily the medium could be manipulated and how difficult it was to controL
' Ibid., Thornbrough to Bndport, 7 May 1797
Ibid., Gardner to Bndport, 7 May 1797. The seamen themselves confirmed his opinion. ADMI /5 125,
Detail of the Proceedings
Marsden, 88-90
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Misrepresentations. Misinteepretations & the Polemical Misuse of Evidence
The mutiny was misrepresented the moment it was reported. It was misinterpreted the
moment those reports were read. And those interpretations have been misused to deliver
polemics ever since. Participants, whether serving on the lowerdeck, the quarterdeck or
the Board of Admiralty, could not view the emotionally and politically charged issue with
objectivity. They took more trouble justifying their actions than recording them
accurately. Witnesses saw only so much The delegates limited access to the ships
throughout the mutiny and denied it altogether when the fleet dropped to St Helens on 8
May.
Despite an over-abundance of evidence, few first-hand accounts of the mutiny survive.
With those that do, identifying their bias must precede understanding what they have to
say. Unfortunately, in the historiography of the mutiny, it rarely has. Amid so much
evidence and conflicting opinion, it is difficult to choose. When newspaper accounts
come into play, it becomes a simple matter to construct a picture of what 'might' or
'ought' to have happened. But, as David Bonner-Smith warned, it does not have the
merit of being true.202
Newspapers played a significant, but not vital, role in the mutiny. They made the mutiny
public, forcing government to deal with a problem they were hoping to ignore or quietly
suppress. Newspapers gave seamen an opportunity to put their case to the public. As
Michael Lewis commented, the 'Delegates were uncannily wise in their dealings with the
nation as a whole, for from the first, they meant to get, and to keep, the sympathy and
good opinion of the country.'203 In contrast, government and its hirelings fared badly in
their efforts to contain and cope with the crisis. Their propaganda rebounded upon
themselves and provided the seamen with opportunities to capture public sympathies
they would not have otherwise had. Contrary to Windham's suggestion, newspapers did
not cause the mutiny. They did misrepresent what was said in the House of Lords on 4
May, but those misrepresentations made no difference. There was no need to
misrepresent what was said to upset the seamen. The truth was upsetting enough.
In addition to providing a useful chronology, concise summaries of major events and the
text of several key documents, newspapers offered contemporary readers rumours,
2 er-Sth, Manner's Mirror, October 1935, 430
M Lewis, SpdheabAn informal Histoty (London: George Allen & Unwin Co 1972) 136-7
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gossip, speculation, squibs, political and personal invective and a wealth of irrelevant and
contradictory detail. For historians without access to official records, they became the
primary source. As a result, histories of the mutiny often reflect, without understanding,
the passions and politics of contemporary public discussion. Historians with access to
the archives tend to correct the details without challenging interpretations.
Spithead was a story that could not be contained. Previously, most news of naval affairs
came through channels. Opinions, expressed in letters and editorials, were usually
formed on that information alone. The mutiny was an exception; if not an accident, it
certainly was
a human event of the most extraordinary nature, and should be held up to
posterity as a beacon or seamark to them to avoid such danger in similar cases, as it is
more profitable to improve by other men's miscarriages than by their own, there
being two ways to gain knowledge, first by our own experience, and secondly by that
204
of other men.
The mutiny flooded newspapers with news, confused, contradictory and charged with
passion and prejudice. In principle, opposition papers attacked while government papers
defended government. However, newspapers succeeded or failed according to how well
they established their editorial identities and fulfilled their commercial priorities. While
John Heriot consistently served government, James Perry was 'first and foremost, a
newspaperman'.205 He built the Morning Chronicle's circulation to unprecedented levels by
serving his readers' needs with better writing and more timely, complete and accurate
reporting. Daniel Stuart emphasised advertising and built the Morning Posts circulation
by catering to readers' tastes.207 While John Walter may have considered his newspaper as
'a mere appendage of his printing business', his sons argued that The Times prospered
because it was 'a better interpreter of public opinion than all its rivals'. 208 As circulation
and profits grew, all three newspapers became more independent, representing 'what
they considered to be public opinion'. They foundi 'It paid them to do so.'209 Not
20 W Nichelson, A Treatise on Practical Namgation and Seamansbp (London: Gilbert and Co., 1796), appendix,
2-3
205 Christie, Myth & Reality in Late-Eighteenth-Century British Pobtics and Other Papers (London: Macmillan,
1970), 355
Christie, Myth & Reaky, 344; Cranfield, 80
Cranfield, 84
The I-hulorj of The Times: The Thunderer' in the Making 1785-1841 (London: The Times, 1935), ix-x I
Christie, Myth & Reality, 321
Aspmafl, Politics & the Press, 380
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surprisingly, government servants like Treasury Secretary George Rose complained that
newspaper editors were becoming 'notoriously unmanageable'.21°
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L INES,
(CurnpuIed on lio.ird Iii, M.ip.flys Ship LONDO>;
Iv
The WIDOW of a SEAMAN,
Who 'oft his I_iIc in the Defence oi his Counirç on Board the INTRZPID,
in che prefenc War.
- E Genius of Britain went hovering round,
For the fear'd that fair Freedom was fled,
But, the found to her oy that (be was not quite gone,
But remain'd with the Fleet at Spitliead.
.Rejnic'd at the News to the charlotte (he flew,
'Where fair Freedom (he heard fat cnthron'd;
They all mann'd the Yards as the Goddefs came in,
For Britain and Freedom they own'd
The Fleet hail'd the Goddels with three hearty Cheers,
As Ihe flood on the charlotte's Gangway;
She dropp'd a Ld Tear as (he look'd on her Sons,
Who fo long neglecled had lay.
She was led to the Cabin, fair Freedom was there,
True Loyalty f.tt by her Side,
BRITANNIA i.it down in a Traniport of Joy,
All hail to my Heroes, Ihe cry'd.
Every Ship of the Line fent two Seainn fo brave,
'Whom the Goddef receiv'd with a Smile;
'flicy affur'd her that if they were treated like Men,
They would [liii guard her favourite Ifle.
Go on my brave Sons in the Steps you now tread,
ie Virtue your Gu1d and your Guard;
And GoD, who rules over the Land and Sea,
Will your honeft Endeavours reward.
The Genius of Ipeland came in with her Harp,
She faluted fair Freedom with Tears:
They all mann'd the Yards to welcome her o'er
And ev'sy Ship gave her three Cheers.
Succefs to the Seycnten united brig!it Stars,
Let their praife echo round cv'ry Shore,
And the i5th of April will nc'cr be forgot,
Till Britain and Frecdorzi 're no more.
PRCRO 120,1/5/5
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ROBUST, May i uh,
T
HE Favours and Gocdnefs our ()cer cunfer
upon us, are (uch as can b evivalled by few Ofcers in
the Fleet, aid	 is out jull and grateful Senfe ui the Otlicer.
of Hia Maeily's Ship Rubuft. Is the,e a Man (v poor in
Spirit that piai(ea Inch as we have without animating the
AaiOnl wotihy of them?
How p)e.tfsnt W,)UId he the Toils of War did all employed
j t meet with the fame R .compence. It is our Deeds alnne
,e,tder us worth y their Indulgence, and prcfrrve their good
Opiion. in infi'tni you withi how much Ardvney' we wifh
to ferve them, if ever Accidents fall jn our Way, we are
thorough?y re(ftvet in lsd them into the Paths of Glory and
the9 might irI alTuied that all of iii will rejoice in an Oppor-
tunity of teltifying Our Duty, AIetlinn, Gratitude, and Sib-
miffion, which we flatter ourfcle. they will not hereafter
dfapprove.
We are, with the utmolt Refpe	 and Submifflon, your
Honors etetnlly d.votcd Servant,,&o8rsr ShIP's COMPAI%Y.
To t4e PantTZ o/lhePoaTAIouTu GAllTTE.
SIR,
A7E, the Ship's Company of His Majefty's Ship
V V MASS, having teen i the Star and other 1.ondon Papers,
£xtriEts from heir CorreIpondents with the Fleet, d?ced the
12th inflain, affrting the Mars to be the only diflatisfied Ship
in the Vleet, which information we poticively eontradit. Our
intention was to sa as the Fleet did, nor have we any nther
intention, being fully convinced of our grievances being redref-
fed, and pafred into an At (or immediate relief.
As to ou' Captain and Ocers, we efteem and relpe1 for
their humine behaviour, and confider ourfelves is hippy with
them as any other men in the ferivce. Y'e alto beg leave to
remark, that no let of men in his Majefty's fervice ate mote at.
tached to their S'wereign and Country, and to defend theit
Caufe with the loft drop of their vital blood, than are
TiLE SEAMEN OF THE MARS.
5.M?L1Il'.,.%fdy$3,I797.
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You have, I presume, read the address of the ship's companj; of which I am a member, tojou, recommending me
as their representative in j1vture; thej have given me the mostJlattenngproofi of their opinion of in,' abilities to
act as a man and a Cbnstian oigbt to da Under these irtumstances, I flatter mjself yu will hear me with
patience, as I ampan'/y conz'inced your own sentiments, when compared with mine, willjoin me in savin,g a
desewzn,g characterfrom ruin and destruction. I shall not dwell on the partiadars of jesterdaj thcj Jam vnfl-
dent, are still warm injour memones, but only recalljour attention to the behaviour of jour brother I"alentine
Jyce. 1-us intrepidity in rescuin,g the unfortunate ntleman from the bands of an enraged multitude will, I am
sure, make a deep impression onyrnr minds, and will, I hope, influencejou to act in a manner wortbj' of
Christians and British seamen; thus much, mj brethren, for preJace
Permit me now to speak for that ship's compaiy whose confidence I enj In the first place, had they followed the
momentay impulse of passion, and wreaked their vengeance on that unfortunate gentleman, afew minutes would
have brougbt to their recollection the amiable character he alwaja bore amon5st them, and I am confident, would
have embittered the latest moments of their lives. Now, mj bretbren,j'oureneral is 'Blood for blood' Do
mean that as a compliment to us to assist us infollowing error after error? If so, it is a poor compliment
indeed; or dojrou, let me ask jou, think itjustice? I hope not; 'fjvu do, pra) from whence doy.iu derive the
authorif'y to sit as a court over the bfe of even the meanest subjecL The only answerj'ou can ,give me is, thatjvu
are authon'sed bj'jour respective ship's companies. But is that authorify sufficient to quietjour vnsdence for tak-
ins the sift even of a nminal, much more that of a deserving and worthj' gentleman, who is an ornament to his
profession in evey respect? I can almost safe/y sayjou will sqy 'Ntz' But fjou are to be influenced kjyour
ships' companies, contray tojour own opinion, I am but a sinie individual amongyu, and before this hand of
mine shall subsnbe the name of FIemin to anjIbin that may in the least tend to that ,gent/eman's prejudice,
much more his /jfr, I will undeigojour utmost violence, and meet death with him hand in hand I am, neven'be-
less, as unanimous as anj member in the fleetfor a redress of yur5nerances, and maintain that point withjvu
all, so /on asjoie are contented with yur orzinaI demands, but the moment I hear of jour devia:infrom these
principles, that instant I becomejour most inveterate enemj.
You see, brethren, I ad openly, and am determined to support it. as I will neverform a pan' to do injustice to mj
county; andfor the future. I shall expect that whatever comes before us shall be only conductive to the much
wanted and desirable end of restorin,g this fleet to the confidence of our injured vunt. Let these bejour aims,
andjou my depend upon eveçy supportfrom me and this ship's companj And be assured, that the lift and
character of Mr. Borer shall alwqys remain inviolate in our hands; and we think an) step to the contray b:gbly
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Qtb tb 3'ortfrnoatb actte
SCM,
A 5 1 n,ke no doubt o rnir wflLin'eti
LI cr,rd aIy eiior wbch nia	 ii&
hut) the puMie patrs, in'ir	 pricirIy QI
whcjeii the kcLiiis ul ri iuiviJt	 ;t
ci',.
I beg 1ave 'o fiy, that in the 5u	 f thc
i,irit, iluc I!.diiur ispltaft'd to ncniicu r
	 nainp.
jouhtiv wih * finpofik.us one cii Evvs, and kf
Jelcuibc me is i Tubaccuniti of eI'a'I lu laCtirt
w)o, mr kditius ha,ng"cs, bad bcii Lhippcd q
btj.ird a lender	 Lcr't	 ipor,.
'I h abc'Vc (tdICHhCUt IV 101311,
am r;O	 uwIJ1y.igbt scis o, and h.e hzf
fcvc'inccn years in hio MjrLiy'.i Nsy"...--.--atr j
Seaman, who, frDirI his I'u, jflj; a 'cfl so hg'
King nd Country, aud w}iitc coniu1, 1 flutiet
rnvidf, has ar3d. wU fLec hit cIuricr Irotn sl
c1fAs of inahce or rniliepie 1cit.iuon.-
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Sin,
iivyi	 Sc rV,1 titVALLTE JOYCE.
ROYAL CI:ORGE,
St. Ilc.en'i, M4zy 1e i5:h, i;y.
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